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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Between November 1837 and August 1839, the Colored American reprinted entries of 
“Dr. Smith’s Journal,” an account of James McCune Smith’s journey from New York to 
Glasgow in 1832 to attend medical school at the University of Glasgow.  The journal charts not 
only Smith’s impressions of his shipmates and encounters in Scotland, but also his understanding 
of U.S. politics and culture.  In an August 1832 entry, he watches as his ship, the Caledonia, 
catches and then passes the Druid, a British ship from Bristol.  The exhibition of superior 
shipbuilding inspires Smith to reflect on the nation’s prospects more broadly: 
an American ship is an epitome of the great and rising country, whose Star Spangled 
Banner proudly floats o’er her deck.  “E Pluribus Unum” “From many nations” were the 
men gathered who felled the trees and chipped the timbers and moulded them into “one” 
harmonius and beautiful craft.1   
 
The competition between these craftsmen in an open market, unencumbered by artificial 
strictures of patronage or “ancient methods,” creates a higher-quality product.  Yet the ship, 
inasmuch as it represented the genius of U.S. institutions, also invoked its “malignant 
prejudice… a canker and a curse to the soil, whence she sprung.”2  U.S. ships were the fastest on 
the sea, in part, because they needed to outrun British ships patrolling the Atlantic for illicit slave 
trade activities.  And though Smith was recently emancipated in 1827 under New York’s gradual 
emancipation law, he was attending the University of Glasgow, because neither Columbia 
College nor Geneva College (now Hobart and William Smith Colleges) was willing to admit a 
black student.3  In Smith’s account, this combination of emancipatory ideals and oppressive 
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practices makes the ship “beautiful but baneful object,” a symbol the nation’s potential, but also 
a potential instrument of its horrors.   
 Smith’s reverie pivots from the ship’s conflicted symbolism to a scene of resistance that 
offered one path to reclaiming the U.S.’s democratic promise: 
John, a boy of nineteen, whom the Englishman had brought from the coast of Africa, took 
possession of one of the catheads in order to get a good view. An Irishman coveting the 
place, desired the boy to leave it, and after vainly using other arguments, pulled him 
down, saying he had no right there because he was black!4  
 
Evocatively and perhaps like Smith, John seizes the freedom and opportunity represented in the 
ship and nearly falls victim to a moment of race making.  When the Irishman cannot reason John 
from his perch, he resorts to force, offering John’s blackness as reason enough for supplanting 
John’s position.  John, however, deviates from the expected script and meets the racialized 
violence with “a blow on the nose which drew blood.”5 Passengers and crew side, not with the 
Irishman, but with John—a fact all the more significant because Smith notes that nine-tenths of 
the passengers were Irish.  By claiming a visionary position and refusing to play his part in the 
now-predictable drama of white supremacy, John, the scrappy young African, “is dubbed the belt 
of the ship.”  Like the iron plates protecting the waterline of armored vessels from attacks and 
obstructions, the passengers hail John as the ship’s protector.6 
Smith’s Caledonia journal is not explicitly about citizenship as such.  But he and other 
black writers nevertheless tell us much about citizenship in the early U.S., both in theory and in 
practice.  The ship serves as a stage on which Smith reenacts the drama of aspiration, 
racialization, resistance, and community formation involved in early U.S. citizenship.  John’s 
actions call his fellow passengers to reorganize the ship’s communal landscape as they assume 
responsibility for defending his right to the cathead, the ship’s most forward position.7  They 
ignore their countryman’s call to ethno-racial and national solidarity, voting instead for a more 
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just community that eschews Smith’s original vision of cankerous prejudice.  While the 
Caledonia may have inspired Smith to theorize the kind of citizenship U.S. institutions could and 
should produce, it is John who models the kind of subjectivity and practices that could bring 
such institutions into being.  John’s actions catalyze a ship-wide recognition and defense of his 
rights, resulting in a reconfiguration of the ship’s institutional structure.  Shipmates hold the 
young African and the strength of his convictions, not as an intruder, but rather as the ship’s 
protector (“belt”), the symbol and preserver of its integrity.  
Black Theories of Citizenship in the Early United States, 1793-1860, tells a story about 
how black writers like Smith theorized and practiced citizenship in the early U.S, beginning in 
1793 with events recorded in Absalom Jones and Richard Allen’s A Narrative of the Proceedings 
of the Black People during the Late and Awful Calamity in Philadelphia in the Year 1793 (1794) 
and ending in 1860 with the last issues of the Anglo-African Magazine.  It places understudied 
writers and texts like Smith, William J. Wilson, the Anglo-African Magazine, and black state 
convention proceedings in conversation with Frederick Douglass and Henry David Thoreau and 
periodicals like Douglass’s Paper, and positions these black citizens—unsung and celebrated—
as some of the most important theorists of citizenship.8  Indeed, we cannot fully understanding 
citizenship in the early nation without engaging the ideas of the writers who were often at the 
center of national and local debates and who built communities out of the literal enslavement that 
provided one the revolution’s most powerful metaphors.  As contemporaries debated the nature 
of the bonds between citizens in a republic and the kinds of institutions best suited for managing 
tensions between self-interest and the common good, black writers and activists were theorizing 
citizenship practices based on their own readings in political history and experiences in self-
governance that included framing constitutions for civic institutions, organizing state and 
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national conventions, and attempting to create political coalitions within and between diverse 
communities.  They were participant observers whose work indexed and contributed to what 
citizenship was becoming even as it imagined alternative possibilities out of their own “peculiar” 
understandings of difference, republicanism, economics, and self-government.9 
While drawing on understandings of black civic texts as a part of broader traditions of 
protest, I emphasize how black critiques, engagements, and theories generated new paradigms 
for citizenship as an active and expansive practice, rather than a static identity.  They offer a 
collective social theory of citizenship as an ongoing process of community building based on 
four principles:  neighborly contact across social-economic boundaries, the free circulation of 
civic power, economic equality, and critique as a civic duty.  Like the young Smith, black writers 
and activists saw great potential in U.S. institutions and framing ideals—its civic republicanism, 
the comingling of peoples and ideas, participatory politics, and shared sovereignty—, and they 
also recognized that, like the Caledonia itself, these same ideals, could and did accommodate 
systems of oppression as readily as they did egalitarian polity.  Like John, their critical practice 
produced a different vision—a different sensibility of what citizenship could be—often forcing 
the state and other institutions to react to their assumption of rights and demands for recognition.  
Black citizens did this work not simply as a response to white oppression, but more importantly 
as a matter of course in the shaping of their own communities and in the process of meeting their 
own political, social, and cultural needs.  Towards this end, each chapter analyzes key literary 
and historical flashpoints—from the 1793 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia to the market 
revolution to Dred Scott vs. Sanford and the Lincoln-Douglas debates—to consider how these 
episodes and the responses of black civic actors and intellectuals contribute to our understanding 
of these principles in terms of cultural and political practice and the kinds of citizen-subjects 
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such practices might cultivate.10  Not only do these texts offer theoretical readings of 
citizenship—that is, the content of black theories—but their articulation of civic practices and 
their very structure model the theories they sought to outline, both how republican institutions 
should look and the critical sensibilities of the citizens who would constitute and, in turn, be 
constituted through them.11 
 
1.  Citizenship and Early African American Print Archives   
The prevailing narrative of early African American literature has been the movement 
from slavery to freedom, and rightly so.12  Approximately ninety percent of the black population 
in the U.S. was enslaved and most free persons of color were either descended from slaves, self-
emancipated or emancipated through state law, and the anti-slavery movement created one of the 
most robust cultural markets in the antebellum U.S. The slave narrative genre in particular, and 
anti-slavery culture more broadly, provided fertile ground and a durable framework for the 
literary imagination, simultaneously following and cultivating public taste for particular kinds of 
representative blackness.  Describing the 1850s as “the First Afro-American Literary 
Renaissance,” William Andrews argued in 1981, “the fugitive-slave narrative…[was] the only 
one [literary genre] in which black writers had achieved any fame,” but this success “presented a 
no-win choice for most aspiring Afro-American literary people.”  “A writer who had not been 
born a slave” or was not telling a story about enslavement “had no story to tell.”13  
Yet, even before the 1850s, burgeoning print cultures told precisely the kinds of stories 
Andrews’s description of the literary market of the 1850s would seem to belie.  Scholars like 
Dorothy Porter have called our attention to “early Negro writings” from a variety of collectives 
including mutual aid societies, religious and fraternal organizations, sermons, confessionals, and 
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constitutions.  These texts bring to light a different set of intellectual, social, and cultural 
problems and insights into what Porter describes as “the beginnings of the Afro-American’s 
artistic consciousness…the first articulations of the appeal of beauty and the moral sense.”14 
More recently, Elizabeth McHenry’s work on literary societies, John Ernest’s analyses of 
“liberation historiography” and the chaotic contingency of racial formations, and Frances 
Smith’s call for narratives based in a robust Afro-Protestant print culture invite us to tell 
“interesting narratives” about early African America.  These stories take shape in what Eric 
Gardner describes as “unexpected places,” those print and geographical sites including 
periodicals, texts from the western states and territories, black writing in languages other than 
English, and massive collections of poetry that have yet to be fully explored or theorized.15  
These projects are not just about the recovery of texts or troubling the cannon, nor do 
they seek to diminish the importance of the slave narrative or experiences of enslavement; rather, 
they are invested in creating a deeper understanding of the expressive print cultures.  These print 
cultures were generated not only out of protest, but also, as Foster suggests, out of communities’ 
needs “to speak to and for themselves about matters they considered worthy of written words.”  
These communities worked, Foster continues, “to communicate physical and metaphysical 
realities and to develop their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and artistic selves. They wrote about 
civil rights, economic enhancement, love, and marriage.”16  In those spaces we still find early 
African Americans wrestling with issues of enslavement, but also very much invested in local, 
everyday issues, slavery being one, sometimes tertiary, issue among many.   
One of the stories we can tell from this print-culture oriented approach to early African 
American literary history, the story Black Theories excavates, is how black Americans thought 
about and practiced citizenship and through them, how citizenship changed as a concept and 
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practice in the early U.S.  When we read the early African American archive, citizenship quickly 
emerges as a key term and vexed concept.  “Citizen,” as the 1854 National Emigration 
Convention put it, was “a term desired and ever cherished” throughout early African American 
print.17  A perusal of Porter’s Early Negro Writings reveals a collection of addresses on the 
abolition of the slave trade from 1808 to 1815 that begin, “Fathers, Brethren, and Fellow 
Citizens,” or simply, “Citizens.”18  Martin R. Delany dedicates Condition, Elevation, Emigration, 
and Destiny of the Colored People in the United States (1852) “to the American People, North 
and South.  By Their Most Devout, and Patriotic Fellow Citizen, the Author;” Douglass 
addresses his July 5th “Oration” to “fellow citizens,” even as he positions himself outside the 
“nation;” and many of the collective addresses black citizens issued to the public were addressed 
to “fellow citizens,” often as a common denominator set against the particularistic discourses of 
ethnicity, class, or nation.19  And while the Emigration Convention argued explicitly for 
emigration, it nonetheless makes useful claims about the meaning of citizenship, perhaps more 
so because it highlights its abrogation for black Americans.20 From this perspective, even texts 
that do not argue for citizenship in the U.S. provide productive analyses about citizenship more 
broadly—what it was in the moment and what it could become. 
The proliferation of the phrase “fellow citizen,” then, was more than a rhetorical device 
or ironic signifying. As Smith asserted in 1859, citizenship describes “the relation between a 
person to an elective form of government,” but it also operated as a guiding ethic, describing a 
relation between people in variously configure communities and, in the context of black public 
address, as a performative invocation of a relationship between writer and audience that asserted 
access to the very civic imaginary and moral equality from which black citizens were being 
barred.21  Absalom Jones’s 1799 petition to the “President, Senate, and House of 
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Representatives,” for instance, claimed citizenship for his fellow petitioners and for enslaved 
people, “believing them to be objects of your representation in your public councils, in common 
with ourselves and every other class of citizens within the jurisdiction of the United States.”  
They were included in the Constitution’s “We, the people of the United States,” and, as such 
were not outsiders asking for inclusion in the body politic or for a special dispensation.  Rather, 
they were “guardians of our rights, and patriots of equal and national liberties.”22 Thirty years 
later, when David Walker addressed his Appeal to “colored citizens of the world, but in 
particular, and very expressly, to those of the United States of America,” Walker was similarly 
calling on “coloured citizens” to assume the rights and subjectivity citizenship, just as John 
assumed his position on the Caledonia.  “America is more our country, than it is the whites 
[sic],” Walker argues as he calls on his black readers to be responsive to their fellow citizens in 
slavery.  At the same time, Walker takes white “Americans” to task for not heeding previous 
generations’ calls to take responsibility for the crime of enslavement by “mak[ing] a national 
acknowledgement to us for the wrongs they have inflicted on us” as an affront to natural law and 
Christianity.23  
The texts and institutions free people of color produced—the constitutions and meeting 
minutes, newspapers, pamphlets, confessionals, and a host of other ephemeral media—reveal 
that the titular freedom of emancipation was part of a larger, highly creative democratic project.  
Walker and others recognized that, in addition to emancipation, the state and white citizens had a 
responsibility to ameliorate the material and psychic effects of enslavement and white supremacy 
as a part of a larger democratic-republican project.  (As Hosea Easton aptly put it in 1837, 
“Merely to cease beating the colored people, and leave them in their gore, and call it 
emancipation, is nonsense.”24) While for Walker, this project is inextricable from an expansive 
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understanding of Christian ethics, as my discussion of neighborliness in Chapter Two suggests, 
this ethical understanding and critique of enslavement also offers the framework for a secular 
critique of liberal self-interest and the management of participatory politics more broadly. “True 
patriotism,” as Delany asserts in an 1848 North Star article, “consists not in a mere professed 
love or country, the place of one’s birth,” but rather in “an impartial love and desire for the 
promotion and elevation of every member of the body politic, their eligibility to all the rights and 
privileges of society.”25  In each reiterative instance, “citizen” invoked a civic ethos and 
protocols of recognition and justice that called on audiences to think about their relation to 
citizens and others as one of mutual responsibility, responsiveness, and active engagement, a 
relation in which membership and individual rights come with moral obligations to a collective, 
not to be reducible to individual interest or managed by racial, economic, or other forms of 
hierarchy.26 
Black Theories offers a diachronic narrative of black theories and practices of citizenship.  
It argues for the specificity of each moment in terms of historical context, geographic scale, and 
the exigencies of needing to persuade a wide range of audiences, from hostile white auditors to 
ambivalent black citizens to fellow black activists with opposing views. If, as Rogers Smith has 
argued, U.S. “civic ideals” were constructed out of multiple traditions that combined “varying 
civic conceptions blending liberal, republican, and ascriptive elements in different 
combinations,” so too do black theories and practices of citizenship combine elements of civic 
republican, liberal, religious, nationalist, and other traditions and discourses in ways that reflect 
the breadth and depth of black intellectual history.27  Even critics writing in the same region, 
about the same population, had vastly different conceptions about the role of and relation 
between “color,” “condition,” labor, morality, wealth, education, etc. in defining and countering 
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oppression.28  As I argue in Chapter 4 through Wilson and Smith’s economic debates in 
Douglass’s Paper, these differences arise not only from conflicting personalities and local 
differences, but also point to conflicting “conceptions of truth” and epistemological 
commitments.29   
The public debate over the causes of racism and prejudice and the constantly changing 
attitudes towards violence, emigration, the Constitution and myriad other issues suggests a 
dynamic discursive community, not easily reducible to one or two representative figures.30  The 
periodical press and composite documents like convention proceedings are particularly useful for 
analyzing black theories precisely because their heteroglossic structure, a structure that calls for 
multi-vocal, dialogic narratives.  Indeed, as Caleb argues in “A Note on Leaders,” an 1861 article 
in the Weekly Anglo-African, formal piety and education “at a time when knowing the alphabet 
seemed extraordinary” may have once vaulted any man to community leadership, but that time 
had long passed; black people could and were thinking and writing for themselves.31 Top-down 
notions of black leadership would no longer work, if they ever had.  The black print archive, 
then, offers not only theoretical frameworks for thinking about citizenship, but also useful 
models of democratic exchange and the kinds of spaces and institutions (print, galleries, 
conventions, markets, etc.) that support it.  
 
2.  Early U.S. Citizenship: Narratives Decline and Erasure 
By the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, legal and popular consensus saw black 
Americans as not fully citizens, neither in the rights-bearing sense nor in the eyes of most of the 
white citizenry.  This was not always the case, nor was it an inevitable outcome of the revolution. 
The Articles of Confederation had been explicit about who was a citizen at its adoption: “The 
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free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states.”32  The 
1789 federal constitution, however, was silent on the subject, in part because slavery and the 
status of black people was a minefield for the constitutional convention, but also because 
distribution of power between federal and state governments was not settled.  The Naturalization 
Act of 1790 restricted naturalization to “free white persons,” but it did nothing to clarify the 
status of those already in the country, at least not in law.  Instead, as historian Douglass Bradburn 
explains, it along with the 1792 Militia Act both clearly demonstrated “an awareness” on the part 
of the federal government “of the type of citizens the act expected to create” and placed people 
of color in the double bind of not being accepted as native-born citizens and not having a clear 
institutional way to secure full citizenship.33  Citizens in the early republic were identified more 
by what they could and could not do within states (e.g. vote, own land, marry) and between 
states (e.g. those rights protected in the Privileges and Immunities Clause) than by federal statute 
or race.  And, because the state, not the federal government, legislated almost all of these rights, 
early U.S. citizenship itself was state-based, not national.34 
Some of the earliest attempts to define U.S. citizenship, however, quickly began the 
process of linking those rights and social markers that identified the citizen to white men, in 
principle if not yet in law.35  David Ramsay’s 1789 A Dissertation on the Manners of Acquiring 
the Character and Privileges of a Citizen, for instance, used the example of “Negroes” as the key 
point of differentiation between sovereign citizens and mere inhabitants:   
Any person living within a country or state, is an inhabitant of it, or resident in it.  
Negroes are inhabitants, but not citizens.  Citizenship confers a right of voting at 
elections, and many other privileges not enjoyed by those who are no more than 
inhabitants.  The precise difference may be thus stated:  The citizen of a free state is so 
united to it as to possess an individual’s proportion of the common sovereignty; but he 
who is no more than an inhabitant, or resident, has no farther connection with the state in 
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which he resides, than such as gives him security for his person and property, agreeably 
to fixed laws, without any participation in its government.36 
 
Citizens were sovereign; voting was a sign of sovereignty; therefore, anyone who voted was 
implicitly a U.S. citizen.  Ramsay builds on an generally understood connection between 
citizenship and the specific set of rights and social practices associated with sovereignty and 
collective governance, but he does so in a way that fixes the range of people who could 
conceivably perform these practices, suggesting that Negroes were and could only be inhabitants 
without a share in collective sovereignty.  The fact that at the time Ramsay was writing, free 
black people could legally vote in every state except Georgia and his own South Carolina, and so 
were in fact citizens by Ramsay’s own definition, was less important in practice than the 
conventional wisdom that black people were not “original citizens.”  They were not, from 
Ramsay’s perspective, part of the original constitutive people, so citizenship was something they 
would have to be given with the consent of white sovereigns.37   
Ramsay’s Dissertation maps a trajectory that first linked citizenship to political rights 
generally assumed to be restricted to white men but that increasingly linked citizenship to white 
manhood itself.38  Whites repeated his argument throughout the nineteenth century along with 
erroneous assertion that “Negroes” did not and had never “possess[ed] an individual’s proportion 
of the common sovereignty.”39  The prosecution in Crandall v. State of Connecticut (1834), for 
instance, based its definition of citizen—those whose rights were protected under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause—in part on voting:  “as it [voting] has been denied to the coloured race 
generally, it is evidence, that that race were not embraced by the framers of the constitution, in 
the term citizen.”40  Georgia similarly justified its detention of black sailors based both on 
disenfranchisement across many states and laws explicitly preventing marriage between black 
and white people in states like Massachusetts.  They did not have a claim to all the privileges and 
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immunities of federal citizenship, because they did not enjoy all the privileges of citizenship in 
their home states.   
As states revised their constitutions to restrict political rights to white men and as new 
states adopted constitutions with black codes, Ramsay’s assumption became more the reality and 
took on the timeless character of what had always already been.  Where Ramsay argued in 1789 
that since Negroes could not vote, they must not be citizens, Chief Justice Roger Taney and 
Stephen Douglas, backed by revisionist history, racial science, and popular opinion, would argue 
in 1857 that black people could not be and were never intended to become citizens; they could 
never be more than inhabitants, because they were not white.  Black Theories, then, tracks how 
black citizens creatively responded to and grappled with what Bradburn describes as 
“denization,” a process that “extended only some rights and privileges of citizens” to black 
people without considering them “part of the body politic.”  Black Americans were not “aliens,” 
as such, but the state did not treat them as full citizens, either; their status “remained conditional, 
and privileges once extended could be revoked.”41  The difference here, however, is that states 
removed (rather than extended) rights from them.   
As Ramsay’s Dissertation, myriad federal and state judicial decisions, and the 1789 
Federal Constitution demonstrate, the denization of free black citizens was a long political and 
economic process of selective inclusion and exclusion requiring constant institutional and 
cultural maintenance.  When black people actually appeared to claim rights not explicitly 
reserved for white men, they increasingly met violent resistance and negative judicial decisions, 
and, as I discuss in Chapter 3, many states revised their constitutions to make the restrictions 
more explicit.  Reading early national citizenship from this perspective—through processes of 
denization and systematic racial domination—offers a narrative of closures and narrowing 
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instead of expanding rights and liberties.  Potentially more fluid ways of thinking about 
citizenship and the constitution of “We the people” became increasingly more restrictive as ideas 
about racial difference became clarified and institutionalized. The politics of racial exclusivity 
and rhetorics of white male equality consolidated a normative white manhood that authorized 
anti-democratic practices across the board.  
Against processes of denization and a U.S. civic imaginary that was becoming 
increasingly racially ascriptive, black writers invoked histories of black civic activity and cited 
black civic practices as performances of citizenship, using such performances not only to justify 
their claims but also to do the very work of citizenship from which law and custom was 
excluding them.  The Robert Purvis and those who signed the 1837 “Appeal of Forty Thousand 
Citizens, Threatened with Disfranchisement, to the People of Pennsylvania,” for instance outline 
the legal and historical basis for black citizenship in Pennsylvania with a blistering critique of 
justifications for black disenfranchisement.42  They cite black military service and taxpaying, 
moments during the framing of the Articles of Confederation when delegates struck down 
attempts to affix “white” as a modifier of freeman or free inhabitant, and passages from the 
Journal of Congress, “citizens of the United States, as are free person’s of color,” that confirm 
black citizenship from the nation’s founding.43   
Like many of the texts in Black Theories, the “Appeal’s” materiality—its circulation and 
literal presence on the table at the convention—was a key element in the work it did in 
constituting a black civic presence assumed absent or in the process of being forcibly removed. 44  
The “Appeal” was read during Pennsylvania’s Reform Convention in 1837, sparking a prolonged 
debate amongst delegates (almost twenty pages), first over printing and distributing the petition 
to the convention, and then over a wide range of questions including the petitioners’ status as 
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citizens, what some delegates saw as the “Appeal’s” “injurious” language, and the implications 
of accepting the petition for Pennsylvania’s relation to slaveholding states.  The convention 
eventually decided to at least print and distribute the petition (56 for, 45 against), though it kept 
the language restricting voting rights to white men.  This moment of claims making, like so 
many instances on both small and large scales, was a civic act that called those in power to 
recognize and admit how central black citizens and their claims were to national politics and the 
very nature of democracy in the Union.45  As one delegate to Pennsylvania’s constitutional 
convention put it, the “Appeal” “involved questions of the utmost importance not only to the 
character of our deliberations, but to that of the State, and to the Union itself, of which it forms 
an important part.”46  While the “Appeal’s” content revealed the sham of Pennsylvania’s 
disenfranchisement of black citizens, debates over its formal status as a petition, appeal, or 
memorial, and the debate over how the convention should accept it, if at all, had ramifications 
for the nature of representation and the relation between government and the governed more 
broadly.  As I argue in Chapter 3, black civic texts pushed at the limits of early U.S. 
republicanism and revealed the ease with which the state could disempower one segment of the 
citizenry ostensibly in the name of empowering another.  Most states, like Pennsylvania, erred on 
the side of preserving the Union for “every white freeman,” but the debate within the 1837 
convention also points to the antagonism among white citizens themselves around black 
citizenship.47 
 
3.  Black Theories:  Practice, Style, Critical Method  
While state policies and public discourse around citizenship were becoming more racially 
restrictive, black activists articulated an expansive theory of citizenship, not as a common 
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identity as such, but rather as a set of practices—political participation, mutual aid, critical 
debate, and the myriad daily interactions between people living in the same spaces, both physical 
and virtual—and as a civic ethos reciprocally activating and activated by these practices though a 
permeable civil society.  Hosea Easton’s A Treatise on the Intellectual Character, and Civil and 
Political Condition of the Colored People of the U. States (1837), for instance, theorizes 
citizenship as a complex of social interactions, a commons essential to the functioning of any 
society and the livelihood of individuals within that society.  “A withholding of the enjoyment of 
any American principle from an American man,” Easton asserts, “either governmental, 
ecclesiastical, civil, social or alimental is in effect taking away his means of subsistence; and 
consequently, taking away his life.”48  Easton and others figure citizenship practices as a conduit 
for channeling a human need for political activity and recognition, a vital force connecting and 
animating individuals and communities, and a promoter of civic virtue and productivity, not a 
reward for them.  These practices create citizens by enabling them, as Michel de Certeau would 
later put this point, “to take up a position in the network of social relations” made up not only of 
citizens but of people who, by virtue of their engagement with and contribution to the whole, 
could become citizens.49  Refusing access to this network constitutes, for Easton, an act of 
violence that makes the perpetrator a “murderer of the worst kind,” because such restrictions 
would in effect create the very material inequalities that were paradoxically used justify them, 
stripping individuals or groups of their means of existence.50 
By analyzing citizenship as a practice, Black Theories combines formal paradigms of de 
jure membership within a political body (a state or governmental group) with the de facto social 
recognition and relationships (ecclesiastical, social, and alimental or economic) that enable 
individuals and groups to claim and these rights.51  It reveals the degree to which citizenship 
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involves equal access to state and civic institutions and an understanding of mutual dependence 
within and between communities that, as historical sociologist Margaret Somers posits, only “an 
alliance of public power, political membership, and social practices of equal moral recognition” 
can maintain.52 Indeed, black writers argued that the state and civic institutions should work to 
strengthen the “social intercourse” that enables people to practice citizenship rather than 
allowing private racial and economic interests to create artificial barriers.  And, like Smith’s 
meditation on the Caledonia, they argued that this free contact and circulation was vital not only 
to individuals but also to the nation as a whole, as individuals worked collectively to create the 
institutions that could sustain them.  Like the human body, the body politic could only grow 
stronger when power circulated evenly amongst its members, and, like the human body, it would 
suffer if this circulation were blocked. 
Nineteenth-century black writers look forward to twentieth- and twenty-first century 
human rights discourse and engage debates still central to theorists of democracy, both of which 
frame citizenship as a basic building block of social life.  Justice Earl Warren echoes Easton in 
his 1958 dissent in Perez v. Brownell:  “Citizenship is man’s basic right, for it is nothing less 
than the right to have rights.  Remove this priceless possession and there remains a stateless 
person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen” potentially without the ability to 
assert or defend any rights at all.53  And, just over one hundred years after Easton, Hannah 
Arendt derives the “right to have rights”—the right “to live in a framework where one is judged 
by one’s actions and opinions…and a right to belong to some kind of organized community”—
from experiences of alienation and deprivation, most fundamentally executed in institutionalized 
enslavement.54  More recently, social geographer Anna Secor has identified “the everyday life-
spaces of the city—its neighborhoods, parks, streets, and buildings” as “both the medium 
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through which citizenship struggles take place and, frequently, that which is at stake in the 
struggle.”55  That is, citizenship and struggles for citizenship happen in those very spaces Easton 
and others cite as life sustaining as much as they do in official state institutions, and it is through 
these sites that oppression can be contested and in which alternate models can be enacted.  And 
while Secor’s work focuses on urban spatial practices, Black Theories demonstrates that the 
principle holds for spaces of all kinds, both physical and imaginary, and for texts like Absalom 
Jones and Richard Allen’s 1794 Narrative or William J. Wilson’s 1859 “Afric-American Picture 
Gallery” in which “citizen” is not the operative term in play.  As my discussion of neighborliness 
and economic citizenship reveals, black writers often found useful models for civic practices in 
places like the early American backcountry, among laboring sorts, or in constructs like the 
republic of letters. 
Reading citizenship as a practice also means attending to how political acts are encoded 
and received or “styled” in ways that we can analyze in terms of form and genre. Certeau 
usefully clarifies, practices as 
more or less the coherent and fluid assemblage of elements that are concrete and 
everyday (a gourmet menu) or ideological (religious, political), at once coming from a 
tradition (that of a family or social group) and reactualized from day to day across 
behaviors translating fragments of this cultural device into social visibility, in the same 
way that the utterance translates fragments of discourse into speech.56  
 
Practices are both formal and performative—governed by rules and conventions that are 
nonetheless both subject to reception and misfire and open to “narrative” acts of revision and 
improvisation.57  Considering citizenship practices in terms of style offers several advantages:  1) 
it calls us to focus on how, as Robert Hariman posits, “relations of control and autonomy are 
negotiated through the artful composition of speech, gesture, ornament, décor, and many other 
means for modulating perception and shaping response.”58  That is, style also offers language for 
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thinking about how people come to desire particular modes of citizenship—a desire that I 
analyze in Chapter 4 in terms of representivity and in Chapter 5 in terms of taste—and how this 
desire is managed through aesthetic sensibilities.  2) It provides an analytic for attending to 
audience, to the interplay between convention and improvisation, and to the synergy between 
speech, embodied public performance (manner of dress, labor, public demonstrations, etc.), and 
print.59 3) It offers a paradigm for talking about civic ideals like republicanism and liberalism in 
terms of how writers were using them as tropes and as frameworks for organizing social and 
political interactions rather than as a coherent ideology.60  As Kirsten Silva Gruesz suggests in a 
Latin American context, black theories of citizenship “illuminate the cultural values distinct to 
the immediate world of each, as well as the ones they shared.”61  By analyzing political discourse 
in terms of style Black Theories attends to how black citizens were attempting to mold emergent 
republican ideals into a more inclusive practice of citizenship while remembering Joanna 
Brooks’s caution that we not read early black writers as grafting wholesale dominant discourses, 
but rather to take into account their active engagement with and tactical use of language and an 
array of intellectual traditions.62   
Black activists were often well aware of and very explicit about how language, form, and 
performance produced a sense of rationality, particularly as notions of deliberation and rational 
debate were leveraged against them and others (women, lower class folk of all kinds, and so on). 
Their reflexivity around racialization and their own performance of politics reveals the measure 
of stagecraft inherent to civic acts, whether in the context of official governing bodies following 
parliamentary procedure or in the context of dress and the everyday publicness of streets and 
markets.  Racial performance and political performance were mutually constituted and shaped by 
power relations between embodied subjects.  Under such conditions, the character of a given 
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utterance and its reception become predicated on presenting recognizable forms and, more 
importantly, on the power to set the conditions of recognition.  Even as early U.S. print culture 
“rejected the notion of ‘power embodied in special persons,’” following Jay Fliegelman, black 
writers expose the mechanisms through which this print culture designated a new set of special 
persons whose capacity for republican politics was underwritten not by property or civic virtue 
as such, but by whiteness.63  
Nineteenth-century black activists highlighted tensions between the rhetorical protocols 
of civic practice and the racial protocols of whiteness in a way that, like John’s act of resistance, 
impressed upon white audiences the arbitrariness of racial distinctions and how this arbitrariness 
ultimately undermined basic principles of collective governance.  Such was the case as 
Pennsylvania’s 1837 Reform Convention debated Purvis’s “Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens.”  
Some delegates took issue with the document’s tone, calling it “a mere argumentative paper” 
with “nothing in its character which entitled it to receive any special attention,” a document that 
contained language “not very courteous…indeed, for petitioners.”64  These comments prompted 
Thaddeus Stevens (Adams County) to counter:  “When a petition was couched in language 
respectful to the body to which it was presented, they were bound to receive it.  Was this 
memorial, then, to be rejected?  He would never give his vote for that.  Such a memorial, coming 
from white men, would not be considered offensive.”65  For Stevens, it seemed clear that to some 
of his fellow delegates the “respectful” nature of the petition hinged on the racial identity of the 
petitioners, which itself was under question and admittedly artificial, as “[p]robably many of 
those who signed the memorial are as white as many of us, although they do not rank according 
to the technical terms of ‘white’ and ‘black.’”66  The debate highlights the degree to which 
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notions about racial hierarchy colored the reception of political acts and even whether or not an 
act would be received as political at all. 
Stevens’s commentary, enabled by the “Appeal,” also reveals the critical sensibility that 
black theories have to contribute to citizenship, a method that white allies from Stevens to 
William Lloyd Garrison to Benjamin Rush would learn from and appropriate.  The blackness of 
black theories is not attached to racial identity as such, but rather from this critical approach to 
civic practice, what Samuel Ringgold Ward, writing in 1840, would call seeing through a 
“different medium.”67  I join critics from Richard Wright to Ifeoma Nwankwo and John Ernest 
who link, in differing contexts, blackness to a critical perspective or, as Wright posits, an “angle 
of vision,” “the frame in which the picture is hung.”68 In the same decades that the constitutional 
convention shaped the federal compact and factions contended over models of political and 
economic representation, community leaders like Absalom Jones and Richard Allen were 
framing constitutions for the Free African Society and new religious and fraternal organizations.  
As the 1791 “Address of the Representatives of the African Church” posits:  “men are more 
influenced by their moral equals than by their superiors…and…are more easily governed by 
persons chosen by themselves for that purpose, than by persons who are placed over them by 
accidental circumstances.”69  In the process of making claims to the right of religious assembly 
and independence, the Representatives of the African Church also theorize representation more 
generally in a way that critically highlighted the philosophical challenge black theories of 
citizenship presented to contemporary civic practice. While the church’s appeal resonated with 
late-eighteenth-century republicanisms, especially as contemporaneously articulated by Thomas 
Paine, it was perhaps “peculiar” in the eyes of Benjamin Rush because it emanated from the a 
different “angle of vision”:  experiences of former slaves and carried with it an explicit critique 
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of the racial and civic republican politics underlying in the federal and state constitutions that 
Rush helped frame. 
 
4.  Chapter Outline 
Using the interpretive insights of James McCune Smith, Hosea Easton, Free African 
Society, and others as a guide, Black Theories is organized around four basic, interrelated 
citizenship practices and the stylistic and subjective schemas each practice cultivates:  neighborly 
contact across social-economic boundaries, the free circulation of civic power, economic 
representation, and critique.  
The shift from British subject to U.S. citizen had no road map:  What was to be the 
relation between citizens and between citizens and the state?  Did all citizens share equally in 
sovereignty and governing?  How were citizens to define the common good and, more, how were 
they to navigate between the dictates of this common good and their own commercial interests? 
These were precisely the questions at the heart of James Madison, Thomas Hamilton, and John 
Jay’s articles in support of the 1789 federal constitution, not categorically defining the citizen as 
such, but rather articulating rubrics for civic virtue and outlining the ways of engaging in a 
political community that would create a sense of citizenship as shared sovereignty.  Chapter 2, 
“Neighborly Citizenship,” takes up these questions terms of civic republican ethics and 
enlightened self-interest through Absalom Jones and Richard Allen’s A Narrative of the 
Proceedings of the Black People (1794) and Matthew Carey’s A Short Account of the Malignant 
Fever, Lately Prevalent in Philadelphia (1793, 1794).  I first read Carey’s Account as indicative 
of a two-tiered civic republicanism in which citizens able to maintain a more classical standard 
of virtue and duty manage and protect those citizens following a civic ethos more amenable to 
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commerce and self-interest.  Jones and Allen’s examples of black relief workers during the 1793 
yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia models an ethics of neighborliness.  An alternative to 
Carey’s mix of sociability and enlightened self-interest, neighborly citizenship is a cooperative, 
active civic practice based on a sense of mutual dependence and activated by a “real sensibility” 
that identifies with the stranger as a neighbor, as a fellow mortal of equal moral worth in a 
neighborhood based on horizontal networks.   
Narrative’s neighborly citizenship provides further grounding for Jones and Allen’s plan 
for emancipation, an “experiment” in institutional neighborliness that would educate the children 
of slaves as full citizens.  And yet, the tension between economic and civic registers in Narrative 
also suggests that actual civic practices tend to produce possibilities that exceed the boundaries 
of the stories that frame them.  This chapter, then, models how careful readers can extrapolate 
theoretical paradigms from how black activists wrote about civic practices, sometimes in a way 
that extends beyond the explicit intentions of the original argument.  As subsequent chapters 
demonstrate, these paradigms arise as much from the structure and circulation of the texts as they 
do from their content. 
Chapter 3, “Circulating Citizenship,” positions the black state conventions of the 1840s 
as central to our understanding of citizenship and the operation of participatory politics as a 
citizenship practice more generally.  Through readings of convention proceedings from New 
York (1840) and Pennsylvania (1841, 1848), I trace a shift in U.S. political culture from 
potentially more direct and public forms of political participation, like extra-governmental 
conventions, to more managed and proprietary forms of representation.  To counter arguments 
that black people were either too irredeemably degenerate or too dependent on waged and 
manual labor to warrant full citizenship, convention addresses built on natural rights theory and 
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contemporary physics to suggest a circulatory model of civic power.  Fellow citizens, they 
suggest, are not linked by common ancestry or political agreement, as such, but rather by their 
faith and participation in a republican style of politics.  Just as blocking access to major 
waterways could destroy a city, blocking the free circulation of civic power could result in either 
civic and social deterioration or explosive revolt among those disenfranchised.  Scholars rightly 
point to the expansion of voting rights in the 1830s and 1840s as a moment when representation 
became increasingly abstracted and sustained populism as such was effectively precluded, but 
the work of black activists suggests a moment of tension in which this foreclosure was resisted 
by the disenfranchised and by voices of dissent seeking alternative routes to counter anti-
republican practices.70   
My discussions of neighborly citizenship and the circulation of civic power reveal that 
citizenship practices and economic practices were inextricably linked.  Chapter 4 “Economic 
Citizenship,” turns to periodical literature in Douglass’s Paper during the early 1850s—James 
McCune Smith’s “Heads of the Colored People” series and William J. Wilson’s “Letters from 
our Brooklyn Correspondent”—to excavate changing understandings of citizenship in the wake 
of the market revolution.  Both Wilson and Smith read the U.S. as tending towards economic 
citizenship, a structure in which the market displaces civil society as the privileged space of 
citizenship practices and civic identity.  Yet, where Wilson argues pragmatically for the 
cultivation of a “black aristocracy,” economic representatives for what he saw as a solidifying 
U.S. oligarchy, Smith valorizes the “best average colored” person as the embodiment of a new 
urban republicanism, the foundation for a strong democratic polity of laboring folk.  Wilson and 
Smith use their pseudonymous narrators, “Ethiop” and “Communipaw,” and the generic 
flexibility of the sketch to lay out the kinds of fluid subjectivities best suited to navigate the new 
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civic-economic terrain, the former offering a street savvy businessman viewing the economic 
landscape from the “heights,” the latter a “whitewasher,” a skilled laborer who transgresses 
boundaries and insists on a horizontal configuration of politics.  Their collection of fictionalized 
case studies, ethnographic observations, and flâneur-like urban narratives highlights the degree 
to which black conceptions of citizenship unfold not just in speeches, conventions, and 
pamphlets, but also through a highly creative community of letters. 
Throughout the Black Theories, I foreground how the codification of white male 
citizenship in the nineteenth century operates as a form of civic management that freezes, not 
critique as such, but critique of how citizenship is structured. Chapter 5, “Critical Citizenship,” 
examines the meaning of critique and the means for cultivating a critical sense among a diverse 
citizenry.  Through the Anglo-African Magazine (1859-1860), I outline a collective and 
participatory project of building different idioms of citizenship and peoplehood as a counter to 
the “limits placed on humanity” and “truth,” following editor Robert Hamilton and Frederick 
Douglass, that national fantasies of a white republic authorized.  The work in the Anglo-
African—serialized fiction, scientific and historical treatises, and polemics—cultivates readers’ 
tastes for understandings of collective memory, the constitutional “we the people,” and politics 
more broadly as messy, sometimes contradictory, and always in-process.  In particular, William 
J. Wilson’s “Afric-American Picture Gallery” series posits that the proper attitude of citizen to 
national symbolic is the attitude of the critic to the work of art.  While the three preceding 
chapters take up citizenship’s incorporative aspects, this chapter posits the essential function of 
politics as disruption and intrusion.  The role of the citizen becomes inciting disruption, a process 
modeled in figures like Wilson’s “Thomas Onward” who embodies what Jacques Rancière 
describes as a delinquent story, one that “call[s] into question the distribution of roles, territories, 
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and languages.”71  For Wilson, Watkins, and others, the “thrillingly sublime courage” of slave 
resistance catalyzes this disruptive process and serves as a warning that critique, without a 
concomitant impulse to action, risks reproducing the very closures it is meant to defy.  
Though each chapter focuses on a specific citizenship practice, these practices are 
mutually constituting and always simultaneously in play.  One requires the other to create a 
viable polity:  neighborliness depends on circulation and critique to give it boundaries; economic 
citizens should behave ethically, not as agents in an ostensibly liberal market, but rather as 
participants in collective neighborhood.  Yet, writers’ emphasize one approach over another in 
response to political and historical moments of crisis and change.  There were more possibilities 
for citizenship when Absalom Jones and Richard Allen formed the Free African Society than 
when Robert Hamilton founded the Anglo-African Magazine, and these tactical shifts reflect that 
declension.  The state conventions’ emphasis on voting rights in the 1840s, for instance, seems 
out of place in the 1850s after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act and in the wake of Dred Scott v. Sandford.  Jones and Allen’s foregrounding of 
neighborliness in the 1790s speaks to their sense of hope that the young nation would hold to the 
promises of equality and commonwealth articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution.  The rapidity with which the two former slaves rose to prominence in Philadelphia 
gave them cause to believe in a generally progressive trend, despite many setbacks.  Yet, by 
1860 calls for neighborly citizenship—that is the ability of fellow citizens to engage each other 
on terms of mutual responsibility and good faith—seem misplaced in light of an ascendant 
capitalist citizenship and the sense that deep institutional and cultural changes were needed 
before any kind of democratic society could be constructed.  
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Events, then, did not unfold as resolutely or as positively in the early republic as they did 
on the Smith’s Caledonia.  The journal suggests a younger man’s conviction—in the 1830s, just 
a decade after emancipation in New York—that white supremacy could and would be overcome 
as black citizens asserted their rights and white citizens recognized and joined in their efforts.  It 
is a story that perhaps could not account for historical contingency, the power of capital and self-
interest, and the tenacity of racism and white supremacy.  To the extent that this dissertation tells 
a story, then, it is a story about the tension between black citizens’ creative struggle for civic and 
social justice based on the promises they saw in representative governance set against the 
developing national predilection to foreclose such possibilities through increasingly restrictive 
legal and social practices.  The continued pressure of such a volatile landscape forced black 
theorists to rethink and re-articulate their relation to the state continually, resulting in a body of 
political literature that offers some of the most incisive analyses of citizenship available today.  
Moreover, their attention to and experimentation with form, style, and the relation between 
politics and aesthetics challenges us to rethink our narratives of early African American literary 
history.  Their work, from Jones and Allen’s 1794 Narrative to Frances Ellen Watkins’s 1859-
1860 “Fancy Sketches” in the Anglo-African Magazine, suggests this history has routes that do 
not lead inexorably from slave narrative to novel, but rather, like early national citizenship 
practices, proliferates in multiple directions.  If in 1832, James McCune Smith viewed U.S. 
citizenship as a “beautiful but baneful object,” Watkins and others writing in 1860 frame 
citizenship as beautiful but baneful process, the central figure of which is less a ship—the 
product of democratic practice—and more the critical citizens themselves. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
NEIGHBORLY CITIZENSHIP IN ABSALOM JONES AND RICHARD ALLEN’S A 
NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK PEOPLE DURING THE  
LATE AND AWFUL CALAMITY IN PHILADELPHIA IN THE YEAR 1793 
 
 
With regard to the emigration to Africa you mention, we have at present but little to 
communicate on that head, apprehending every pious man is a good citizen of the whole world. 
Reply of the Free African Society (Philadelphia, PA) to the Union Society of Africans (Newport, 
RI) October 1789.1 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Free African Society’s (FAS) 1789 response to the African Union Society of Rhode 
Island’s proposal for a settlement in Africa reflects the officers’ optimism at the close of the 
eighteenth century.  Rather than cite the new federal Constitution or the spread of 
“republicanism,” the FAS sees a cosmopolitan citizenship manifesting in the “expressive 
language of conduct” of those “persons who are sacrificing their own time, ease and property for 
us, the stranger and the fatherless, in this wilderness.”2  Piety works as an active principle of 
citizenship, the pious citizen reaching out to those in need according to an ethic of neighborliness 
suggested in the golden-rule logic: “do unto all men as we would they should do unto us.”3  
More than an article of faith, the FAS provides a statement about citizenship practices by way of 
what the good citizen does and, as important, how the good citizen views and engages others, 
stranger and friend alike.  The pious man may be a good citizen of the world, but he 
demonstrates this citizenship through concrete local, everyday interactions.  Even as federalists 
and anti-federalists debated the nature of the bonds between citizens in a republic, the role of 
human interests in maintaining and/or disrupting those bonds, and the kinds of institutions best 
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suited to managing those (particularly economic) interests, societies like the FAS were forming 
citizenship practices based on their own experiences and understandings of political and religious 
texts.  Though early African Americans’ formal citizenship was in flux, the accounts of civic 
activity they left behind provide key critiques and modifications of developing civic republican 
logics, suggesting that even as civic republicanism took shape in the late-eighteenth-century 
U.S., other civic schematics were not only possible, but concurrently being developed and 
enacted.   
This chapter takes up one such account, Absalom Jones and Richard Allen’s A Narrative 
of the Proceedings of the Black People, to develop a social theory of citizenship as a practice of 
neighborliness.4  The 1793 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia and the print exchange 
between Matthew Carey and Jones and Allen, founders of the FAS, offer a flashpoint through 
which to read neighborly citizenship against late-eighteenth-century civic republicanism.5  
Building on the image of the pious citizen of the world and the notion of an “expressive language 
of conduct,” Narrative clarifies neighborly citizenship as a set of actions:  the proactive 
engagement with the suffering stranger out of what Narrative calls “real sensibility.”6  This 
active principle offers a pointed critique of how the bifurcation of civic responsibility suggested 
in the civic republican model of Carey’s Account encourages a more passive approach to fellow 
citizenship through protocols of politeness and enlightened self-interest.   
Moreover, the form and point of view each narrative takes models the kinds of bonds and 
citizenship practice each schematic offers.  In contrast to Carey’s emphasis on the virtues of a 
managerial elite, Narrative reproduces some of Account’s key scenes from the perspective of the 
citizens on the ground, very ordinary “poor black” men and women, whose actions are otherwise 
unnoted or vilified.7  Narrative’s vignettes describe specific encounters amongst strangers in the 
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style of the parable of the Good Samaritan, fleshing out neighborliness as a citizenship practice 
robust enough to promote mutual responsibility yet open enough to promote more democratic 
engagement.  This shift in perspective suggests that fellow citizenship did not fail during the 
crisis, but rather, yellow fever narratives sought it in the wrong places, ignoring the citizenship 
practices and potential fellow citizens right in front of them.  
Responding to Carey allowed Jones and Allen to use the style of public “Refutation” to 
make claims against Carey and the nation more broadly.  The appended “Address to Those Who 
Keep Slaves, and Approve of the Practice,” in turn, uses the proceedings of the black people as a 
case study that justifies and provides a framework for further “experiments”:  emancipation, 
abolition, and the full incorporation of black citizens after slavery.  In the moments characterized 
by Myra Jehlen as “history before the fact” or, in this case, citizenship before the fact, the terms 
of fellow citizenship were unsettled, not just in Philadelphia in the immediate aftermath of the 
epidemic, but also across a new republic still unsure of its federal compact.8  Even as Jones and 
Allen recounted events in recognizably republican terms, their narrative structure represents an 
attempt to reshape the discourse of citizenship in the messy moments when the city and the 
nation were trying to make sense of what seemed to be wholesale civic failure during the crisis.  
 
2.  Fever:  A Crisis in Fellow Citizenship 
The yellow fever hit Philadelphia in August of 1793, killing between 4,000 and 5,000 
people (10-15 percent of Philadelphia’s population), approximately 400 of them free Africans, in 
a little less than three months.  An additional 20,000 fled the city for safety.10  The federal 
government was in recess during the epidemic, leaving the recovery efforts to a Relief 
Committee of voluntary citizens led by Mayor Matthew Clarkson.  As the fever dissipated in 
November, Matthew Carey, an Irish immigrant, printer, and entrepreneur was charged with 
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composing the city’s official account, including theories about the fever’s causes and 
progression, the activities of the Relief Committee, and the general state of the city during those 
three horrible months. 
More than a chronicle of the immediate crisis, Carey’s A Short Account of the Malignant 
Fever, Lately Prevalent in Philadelphia: With a Statement of the Proceedings that Took Place on 
the Subject in Different Parts of the United States presents Philadelphia as a metonym for the 
nation’s civic and economic climate. 11  His and other yellow-fever narratives present two 
problems:  1) the “dissolution” of “natural” bonds, including familial, neighborly, and formal; 
and 2) a concomitant crisis of commercial regulation, relating to the role of the state in guiding 
markets and the market’s ability to regulate itself.12  As he navigates these political and 
economic problems, Carey employs standard tropes of an early national civic republican style:  
luxury vs. temperance, sober vs. sanguine behavior, virtue vs. corruption, regulation, etc.  This 
style mixed classical republicanism’s emphasis on sacrifice, the common good, and a fear of 
luxury and corruption with a more favorable attitude towards commerce as an expression of 
liberty and a path towards and sign of stability and competence, all moderated by a sense of 
divine consequences for intemperance.13  In this flexible constellation of concepts, Carey links 
progress to regulation:  “virtue, liberty, and happiness of a nation,” he posits, depend on its 
“temperance and sober manners.”14  Virtuous citizens are not necessarily the yeomen attributed 
to Jeffersonian mythology, but rather the “plain and wholesome” city dwellers whose daily 
commercial interactions knit them into a community that prized respectability, politeness, 
temperance, and industry.15  Life in the city and commerce may provide opportunities for 
corruption, but the sober citizen could resist these temptations with proper self-regulation and 
institutional oversight, if not on their own merits, then because maintaining a public image of 
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self-regulation and politeness could be profitable.  Moreover, when otherwise self-regulating 
individuals fell victim to the temptations of success, strong civic and financial institutions could 
help rein them in, providing a safety net for the innocent and a bulwark against the market’s (or 
individual) unpredictability for society as a whole.  In such a climate, virtuous citizenship did not 
require the sacrifice of individual interest for the common good so much as the prudent 
regulation of an enlightened self-interest—do no harm, rather than do good.16   
Based on the premises of his civic republican style, Carey’s prefatory remarks about pre-
fever Philadelphia strike a tenuous balance between the pursuit of commerce and the regulation 
of extravagance, individual liberty and culpability, and institutional oversight.  For Carey, the 
stability of the Federal Constitution brought the new nation from the brink of “anarchy”:  
commerce flourished, and “property of every kind, rose to, and in some instances beyond its real 
value.”17  The economic boom of the mid-1780s and 1790s, however, undermined the sober ethic 
and political economic stability:  “prospects formed in sanguine hours” replaced the prudent 
deliberation of less prosperous times, and “luxury, the usual, and perhaps the inevitable 
concomitant of prosperity, was gaining ground in a manner very alarming.”18  Carey’s 
ambivalence about the relation between economic prosperity and corruption (is luxury “usual,” 
but avoidable, or is it an “inevitable” natural consequence) mirrors fluctuations within early 
national debates about such correlative or causal relations, but most agreed luxury had 
consequences:  the extravagance and economic intemperance of citizens primed the city for 
“something…to humble” their “pride.”19  Even so, the revival of the Bank of Pennsylvania in 
1792-1793 and the “liberal conduct of the bank of the united states,” a combination of private 
and public management, looked to have stabilized the market, regulating currency and “saving 
many a deserving and industrious man from ruin.”20  The consequences of the previous years’ 
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glut and speculation had apparently taught these “deserving” men a valuable lesson, while the 
banks softened the economic blow.  With the federal government managing politics, the banks 
watching over commerce, and the common citizen sufficiently chastened, the middling and 
economic elite was looking forward to a prosperous fall quarter in 1793. 
The yellow fever tipped the balance of this system, removing the stability and confidence 
that made common prosperity and individual interest compatible if not complimentary.  Account 
registers the schism between the two as competing principles of human nature, two orders of 
natural law at odds.  Carey describes a mass of “people at the lowest ebb of despair” whose 
actions were dictated by “the great law of self preservation.”21  In one of Account’s most often 
quoted passages, Carey observes: 
we cannot be astonished at the frightful scenes that were acted, which seemed to indicate 
a total dissolution of the bonds of society in the nearest and dearest connections….  A 
wife unfeelingly abandoning her husband on his death bed—parents forsaking their only 
children—children ungratefully flying from their parents, and resigning them to 
chance…masters hurrying off their faithful servants to Bushhill… [and] servants 
abandoning tender and humane masters.22 
 
The danger the fever presented (real or imagined) overrode the natural familial bonds that had 
served as a model for good citizenship.23  Family units disintegrated and every other form of 
relation followed suit.  Readers should “not be astonished,” however, because the consequent 
flight was equally natural and perhaps stronger than inducements to stay.  “Self-preservation,” 
observes Carey, is a “law,” stronger than kinship, governing not just human behavior, but the 
“whole animated world.”24  This law led those with means to flee, while those who could not flee 
either hid, avoiding their neighbors, or took advantage of the crisis to make a profit.  In the latter 
case, while these people may have risked their lives in the process, the profit motive undermined 
their claims to good will; profit was a seemingly unnatural substitute for other failing bonds.   
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This general un-neighborliness revealed holes in the civic republican matrix outlined in 
Carey’s prefatory remarks and mirrors both Federalist and anti-Federalist concerns during the 
constitutional debates in the previous decade.25  These debates asked the same fundamental 
questions about social and civic relations that Carey’s Account investigates:  what is the role of 
self-interest in shaping civil and economic society, what are the duties that citizens have to each 
other and to the community at large, and what is the role of government in directing and/or 
cultivating these interests and duties.  The disintegration of fellow citizenship in Philadelphia 
becomes reproduced on the national scene as surrounding counties, states, and other “strangers” 
abandoned those seeking refuge.  “The universal consternation,” Carey reports, “extinguished in 
people’s breasts the most honourable feelings of human nature…suspicion operated as 
injuriously as the reality.”26  Philadelphians’ inhumanity towards each other revealed the 
weakness of societal bonds between friends and neighbors while the inhumanity of the 
surrounding communities uncovered a deeper lack of feeling (or substance in that feeling) 
between citizens within the new republic.  If societal bonds could not survive a climate that 
demanded more of its citizens than politeness and sociability, could the new federal compact?  
The yellow-fever epidemic made “strangers” out of neighbors and fellow citizens alike.27 
Despite the dire image of a more general un-neighborliness, Carey presents the singular 
achievements of individuals like Stephen Girard and members of the Relief Committee, led by 
Mayor Matthew Clarkson, as models of the kind of virtuous citizenship that sustains a republic.  
When “government of every kind was almost wholly vacated,” including the caretakers for the 
poor and orphaned, these men stand in as the stabilizing force, mirroring the influence of the 
Federal Constitution and Bank of Pennsylvania in the years before the crisis. Girard, a French 
immigrant and one of the wealthiest merchants in the city, and Peter Helm are representative 
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republican citizens in this instance.  “[A]ctuated by…benevolent motives,” the wealthy Girard 
eschews the safety of retreat to serve the common good.28   Their sacrifice is twofold:  they 
sacrifices their business interests to oversee matters at Bush Hill without regard for 
compensation (and they can do so because they are wealthy, a prerequisite for the virtuous 
republican), and they risk “little less than certain” death.29  Girard and Helm, Carey continues:   
without any possible inducement but the purest motives of humanity…came forward, and 
offered themselves as the forlorn hope of the committee….  [F]rom the time of 
undertaking this office to the present, they have attended uninterruptedly, for six, seven, 
or eight hours a day, renouncing almost every care of private affairs.30 
 
Carey’s style here reflects more the rigidity of early eighteenth century’s classical republicanism 
than the more fluid late-eighteenth-century model of sobriety and polite sensibility outlined in 
his description of the pre-fever commercial and political climate.31  Girard, Helm, and other 
“benevolent citizens” comprise a core managerial elite whose affluence and position give them 
the ability to flee but whose sense of duty compels them to stay.  Carey’s emphasis on the 
voluntary nature of their work—sacrificing private interests without the possibility of 
repayment—enhances Girard’s republican credentials as the prototype of benevolent disinterest.  
In short, Girard exemplifies the temperance, sobriety, and service that sustain republican virtue 
as a rationale for elite enterprise.  
These few bright spots are just enough to bring the city through the crisis and offer hope 
for its recovery.  Carey’s Account exudes confidence about the city’s speedy return to its pre-
fever form and optimism:  “streets, too long the abode of gloom and despair, have assumed the 
bustle suitable to the season,” and, as people return (including the President Washington), 
commerce is picking back up.32  Even the flight out of the city retroactively symbolizes the 
success of “the nature of our government,” because it “did not allow the arbitrary measures” that 
a “despotic” government would have initiated in attempting to curtail the epidemic.33 Overall, 
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then, Carey’s Account simultaneously excoriates the general inhumanity, naturalizes it as 
concomitant with crisis itself, and suggests that the nation should not read the episode as 
indicative of behaviors under normal conditions.  This tripartite description was calculated to 
explain events during the fever in a way that would protect Philadelphia’s economic interests in 
trade and the city’s political (and economic) interests in remaining the nation’s capital. 
Carey ultimately presents a two-tiered protective civic republicanism, a citizenship 
practice in which citizens able to maintain the classical republican standard of virtue and duty 
watch over—either in government or in philanthropy—those citizens for whom the classical 
model is much too demanding or rigid.34  These citizens, guided by a civic republicanism more 
amenable to commerce, become a sign of republican freedom in the sense that the state allows, if 
not encourages, them to be as self-interested as their morality, material circumstances, and the 
market permit.35  As a citizenship practice, the two-tiered civic republican model allows citizens 
to act on their own interests in the comfort that government institutions and benevolent citizens 
like Girard and Helm would help direct those interests through prudent regulation and could 
protect citizens from each other.  This vertical management made the marketplace less the 
breeding ground of distrust and corruption of classical republicanism and more a safe place to 
display and exercise fellow citizenship, which, in turn, opened citizenship practice to a wider 
range of citizens, identified by their ability to observe protocols of politeness and sociability.36  
Yet, could the city, let alone the nation, depend on such a division of civic responsibility?  
How could these citizens reconcile the apparent weakness of fellow citizenship in the face of 
crisis with its ostensible success in more stable times?  In the absence of a robust civic structure, 
the relief effort—at least in Carey’s Account—turned into a market, and the benignly self-
interested turned into inhumane deserters or extortionists, their activities too unethical for civic 
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republican discourse to absorb and their work too dependent on wages, their bodily sacrifice too 
tainted by profit-motive, for his classical virtue to applaud.  The problem, then, turns not simply 
around inclusion or exclusion, but rather around notions of the common good and, ultimately, the 
role of interests in constructing or obstructing the pursuit of this good, and how persons—
strangers and friends alike—ought to relate to one another when the “law” of “self-preservation” 
and the needs of the community collide.  
Carey’s Account does offer possible solutions outside of this tiered structure, even if his 
narrative perspective tends to obscure them.  Carey mentions neighboring cities like Springfield, 
NJ, and Elkton, MD, that offered refuge to their fellow citizens, suggesting that such towns offer 
models for the “humanity and tenderness” other states ought to show their neighbors if such a 
crisis should return.37  While elaborating on scenes of horror, Carey also reveals that people were 
on the streets of Philadelphia assisting the suffering, but these others were not included in the 
“nearest and dearest relations” nor were they “respectable citizens” or members of the relief 
committee.  While his narrative calls the audience’s attention to the “cries” of a pregnant woman 
surrounded by her dead family and without a midwife, he also mentions “one of the carters 
employed by the committee for the relief of the sick,” who helped her deliver her child.38  
Elsewhere, “respectable women” depend on “servant women for assistance.”39  Each instance 
provides an opportunity for Carey to meditate on the potential virtues of these lesser sorts who 
also risked their lives during the crisis to help neighbors in the same way that neighboring cities 
offered assistance to fleeing Philadelphians, yet both of these scenes foreground the 
abandonment, rather than the service, ending with reiterations of the “dreadful spectacle.”40  
Moreover, in calling attention to Girard’s wealth, Carey’s narrative implies that only citizens of 
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means and “respectability” could muster the requisite resolution to act and that their force of will 
carried the common folk with them. 
Among the workers overlooked in Carey’s Account were Philadelphia’s black citizens.  
Even when they make positive contributions, Carey uses the necessity for the presence of these 
people as a sign of the community’s breakdown:  without the people representing the “nearest 
and dearest” connections in society, the “wives, children, friends, clerks, and servants,” Carey 
explains, “many men of affluent fortunes…have been abandoned to the care of a negro.”41 
Carey’s distinction between waged service and benevolence becomes even more apparent as he 
excepts the Negroes from the “nearest and dearest” of the community, and their aid does not fit 
within the expected system of civic recovery.  The civic republicanism that depended on notions 
of “natural” relationships, like familial bonds, or disinterested benevolence to define social 
relations had no interpretive frame for valuing their work as legitimate practices of citizenship. 
These scenes instead signal the overall breakdown of white community during the epidemic: 
white readers see images of an abandoned city, left to pilfering, poor black people without 
having to acknowledge white absence or cowardice.42   
More than symbols of white absence, however, black Philadelphians come to represent 
corruptive elements at work during the crisis.  Just after praising Absalom Jones and Richard 
Allen for organizing free African relief workers, Carey accuses (some) workers of extortion:   
The great demand for nurses, afforded an opportunity for imposition, which was eagerly 
seized by some of the vilest of the blacks.  They extorted two, three, four, and even five 
dollars a night for services that would have been well paid by a single dollar.  Some of 
them were even detected in plundering the houses of the sick.43   
 
He further undermines their contribution by quoting from John Lining’s 1753 observation of 
black immunity in South Carolina, implying that the risks involved for them were minimal.44  
Tainted with commercial interest yet incompatible with civic republicanism’s regulatory schema, 
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black citizens presented both a visible threat to and a handy release valve for Philadelphia’s post-
fever anxieties.45  They provided filler for the gaps in Carey’s two-tiered civic republicanism, 
filler that could then be easily excised from the state’s civic imaginary. Carey’s Account reduces 
Jones, Allen, and Gray’s efforts at best to the exceptions that proved the rule of the general 
dissipation of social bonds, at worst to shady market exchanges and outright theft.46  It is not just 
that Carey’s Account gives the impression of widespread black theft; rather, by emphasizing the 
distress of helpless citizens and the general abandonment while, as Jones and Allen suggest, 
upholding a select few, he often deemphasizes those who do offer assistance, missing an 
opportunity to explore citizenship practices that might actually work beyond the managerial elite.  
Even his account of black citizens enhances the notion that only a managerial elite of a 
community can access civic virtue.  Jones, Allen, and Gray, like Girard and Helm, preside over 
an otherwise unsung and unruly laboring mass.   
Where Carey sought to reassure people that the system works, that state and financial 
institutions could properly manage potentially destructive interests in normal conditions, Jones 
and Allen’s Narrative suggests that perhaps this management is a crutch, a shell game in which 
citizens take advantage of the potential individual benefits of civic republicanism’s adaptability 
to commerce while refusing to assume moral and political responsibility for how this commercial 
ethic could turn fellow citizens into antagonistic strangers.47  The rest of this chapter focuses on 
Narrative’s account of individual citizens, contrasting it to Carey’s managerial narrative to 
suggest a neighborly ethics of citizenship that could provide a stronger basis for active 
citizenship than the “natural” bonds or elite benevolence cited in Carey’s Account.  Whether or 
not Jones and Allen are explicitly taking on civic republican models of citizenship—they use 
terms like “sensibility” and “duty,” sometimes ironically and at other times in ways that 
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implicate them within civic republican logic—we might usefully frame what Narrative offers as 
a third way, navigating between the layers of Carey’s tiered civic republicanism.48  
 
3.  Response and Diagnosis:  The Problem with Citizenship as Commerce  
Published in January 1794 after the third edition of Carey’s Account, A Narrative of the 
Proceedings of the Black People during the Late and Awful Calamity in Philadelphia in the Year 
1793 and A Refutation of Some Censures, Thrown upon Them in Some Late provides a 
chronology of black work during the epidemic, beginning with Jones, Allen, and William Gray’s 
voluntary efforts and the FAS and Free African Church’s (FAC) response to Mayor Matthew 
Clarkson’s call for assistance and ending with an accounting of the group’s expenditures and 
disposal of beds.49  Jones and Allen also contest “kind assurances” of black immunity and set out 
counter “partial, censorious” accounts of the black workers as a response to not only Carey, but 
also, in Jones and Allen’s words, “the many unprovoked enemies who begrudge us the liberty we 
enjoy, and are glad to hear of any complaint against our colour, be it just or unjust.”50  
Read through Narrative’s analysis of the labor market during the epidemic and Jones and 
Allen’s experience as former slaves and free Africans, the civic breakdown during the epidemic 
was not unexpected.  Rather, the stress it put on the civic body brought into sharp relief the 
structural instabilities of a civic republicanism predicated, as Gordon Wood explains, on “more a 
willingness to get along with others for the sake of peace and prosperity” than on the sense of 
shared responsibility for the common good, or fellow citizenship.51  While contemporaries like 
Carey claimed that Federalist regulatory structures could prevent fellow citizenship from 
collapsing under normal circumstances, Narrative’s account of the inability of institutions to 
regulate the market for relief workers emphasizes the limits of market structures in creating 
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relations between citizens when the underlying ethic governing citizenship practice depends on 
and encourages atomization and exploitation.  Moreover, even as Narrative offers a productive 
critique of civic republicanism’s economic valences, its inversion of Carey’s style underscores 
how readily the economic rhetoric of interests can be manipulated to justify anything from 
benevolent service to the slave trade.   
The commercial ethic that remained submerged or managed before the fever comes to a 
head during the crisis and seems to overpower official regulation.  Mayor Clarkson, Jones, and 
Allen all attempted to regulate the cost of the relief efforts by employing workers through the 
city and other civic institutions.52  The presence of these regulations highlights the economic 
similarities between the moment of crisis and the city under normal conditions. Jones and Allen 
recount their meeting with Matthew Clarkson about the rising fees:   
[Clarkson] sent for us, and requested that we would use our influence, to lessen the wages 
of the nurses, but informing him of the cause, i.e. that of the people over-bidding one 
another, it was concluded unnecessary to attempt any thing on that head; therefore it was 
left to the people concerned.53   
 
As Clarkson’s response suggests, inflation not only overcame the city’s ability to influence its 
workers, but also changed the nature of economic exchange itself.  Clarkson, Jones, and Allen 
could “influence” the workers to lower their fees, because the workers were their employees and 
they provided a flat wage intended to make these services available to all, but the bidding war 
took the workers out of the their direct employ.  People offering these payments were operating 
squarely within a market in which their individual means and interests were their own concern.  
Since the workers were not setting the prices, but rather were responding to the effects of supply 
and demand with individual consumers dictating the price ceiling, neither the Mayor nor, 
perhaps, Jones and Allen saw a need to intervene, and even if they did, they could not.  
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Jones and Allen’s emphasis on the forces of supply, demand, and self-interest reveals that 
the black workers’ response to the market during the epidemic worked by the same logics that 
governed white activities before, during, and after the epidemic.54  The “difficulty” of finding 
“persons…to supply the wants of the sick” and the increasing “applications” for services that 
Narrative describes during the fever parallels Carey’s earlier description of the “number of 
applicants for houses” before the fever.55  The “extravagant prices…paid” (the “two, three, four, 
and even five dollars a night” in Carey’s Account) mirror the pre-fever increase of property 
values to “double, and in some treble what it would have been a year or two before.”56  In both 
Carey’s Account and Jones and Allen’s Narrative, the syntactic focus on environmental forces 
rather than individual choices—the presence or absence of an agent—absolves the actors of 
moral responsibility.  Rents “had risen” in Carey’s Account, without mention of the property-
owners’ agency as a factor in driving up prices.  The nursing fees, however, increased because 
“the vilest of the blacks…eagerly seized” the “opportunity for imposition.”57  Here, Carey also 
mentions the increase in demand, but where the demand for housing drove rents (passively) up, 
the demand for nurses provided an opportunity for corruption that black workers actively 
pursued.  Jones and Allen use much the same strategy, but inverted, contrasting the bidding war 
and those who were (passively) paid exorbitant prices to a “white woman” who “demanded” “six 
pounds” for her services.58  Their inversion disarms Carey’s racialization of economic 
corruption, demonstrating black virtue in the face of white inhumanity. 
The facility with which Jones, Allen, and Carey manipulate commercial language 
demonstrates the slipperiness of the economic discourse more generally when applied as an 
ethical tool.  The mirroring between Narrative and Account destabilizes the economic discourse 
they both use, however tenuous, ironic, or adversarial that use may be.59  This indeterminacy 
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disrupts both Carey’s and Jones and Allen’s attempts to situate virtue or corruption in any one 
group.60  Good citizenship from this perspective depends less on adhering to a set of ethical 
precepts than on maintaining the authority to set those precepts and to justify one’s actions 
accordingly.   
The parallels between commerce before and during the fever and Narrative’s vindication 
of black laborers, then, offer a larger critique of how civic republican logic “protected and 
facilitated” the economic interests of a white elite, making self-interest, as Joyce Appleby posits, 
“a functional equivalent to civic virtue” that masks the maintenance of inequality.61  Narrative’s 
juxtaposition of pilfering and privateering illustrates how official discourse produces this 
functional equivalency and its uneven results:  “We know as many whites who were guilty of it 
[theft and extortion],” Jones and Allen write, “but this is looked over, while the blacks are held 
up to censure. —Is it a greater crime for a black to pilfer, than for a white to privateer?”62  The 
comparison indicts both black and white citizens for taking advantage of the breakdown during 
the fever to make a profit.  Compared to “pilfer,” however, “privateer” invokes a more 
pernicious attitude towards commerce that may be legal, strictly speaking, but also involves an 
antagonistic ethic that perhaps causes the waning virtue Carey notes in Account’s opening 
lines.63  Coming directly after a sentence focused not on white theft, but rather on people offering 
accounts that “[look] over” white theft while highlighting black criminality, “privateer” 
confronts the duplicity of official narratives and structures that essentially legalize white theft.64  
Just as a state’s letter of marque authorizes the private citizen to approach “foreign” ships in a 
way that would amount to piracy under other conditions, the collective attitude towards 
commerce authorizes, if not encourages, citizens to approach each other in ways that would 
otherwise amount to theft, as if they were not just strangers, but also enemies.65  During the 
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fever, white “victims” attempting to out-bid each other, though operating within accepted 
parameters of the market, were behaving in ways that turned neighbors into strangers, fellow 
citizens into foreigners.   
The “functional” equivalency of self-interest and civic virtue breaks down when citizens 
are forced to choose between what the rules of commercial exchange allow them to do and what 
civic duty or fellow citizenship suggests they ought to do.  Economic inequalities in place before 
the fever exacerbate this war-like relation, stripping the polite trappings of the market structure 
Kloppenberg aptly describes as the “natural harmony of benignly striving individuals,” revealing 
it to be instead a free-for-all.66  Jones and Allen explain: 
when we procured [workers] at six dollars per week, and called upon them to go where 
they were wanted, we found they were gone elsewhere….  [U]pon enquiring the cause, 
we found, they had been allured away by others who offered greater wages, until they got 
from two to four dollars per day.  We had no restraint upon the people.  It was natural for 
people in low circumstances to accept a voluntary, bounteous reward.67 
 
People followed their “natural” inclinations, and individual means would control just how far 
these inclinations could go.  If it was natural for people in Carey’s Account to abandon the 
“nearest and dearest,” was it not more natural for citizens to lay aside questions of fairness to 
strangers in the name of self-preservation and economic self-interest?  This principle holds 
doubly true for “people in low circumstances,” who, unlike Girard and Helm, were not 
financially secure even before the fever.  
Even as the fever brings this atomizing and antagonistic tendency to the surface, Jones 
and Allen had a ready analogue in an everyday reality sanctioned in civic republican society:  the 
slave trade.68  Just as Philadelphians attempted to outbid each other for services at the expense of 
their neighbors’ lives, slave owners battled each other for the lives of other human beings.  And 
just as the “purchasers” of slaves, as Anthony Benezet put it, “[encourage] the Trade, [become] 
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partaker in the Guilt of it,” so, too, do these bidding citizens bear responsibility for the chaos 
their bidding engendered.69  Notwithstanding Carey’s view of the Federal Constitution as a 
stabilizing force, black Americans were still subject to enslavement and the caprice of white 
interests, with the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law being only the most recent in a string of setbacks.70  
As Jones explains in a 1799 petition to the “President, Senate, and House of Representatives,” 
the law codified on the federal level the treatment of human beings “like droves of cattle.”71  
While Narrative’s bidding war and a slave market are not the same, they do operate by similar 
premises.  Neither Jones and Allen nor Mayor Clarkson has (or takes) authority to regulate these 
exchanges between yellow fever victims, citing the independence of economic exchanges 
between individuals in a way that parallels the federal government’s refusal to “interfere” with 
individual property rights and the rights of the several states for the sake of preserving the union.  
The problem does not hinge completely on the absence or presence of regulation; rather, 
Jones and Allen’s emphasis on the bidding between buyers as the source of inflation coupled 
with the linguistic slipperiness of economic moralizing in both Narrative and Account reveal that 
no matter how enlightened self-interest might be, it is still an atomizing and antagonist ethic, one 
contrary to the notions of fellow citizenship Carey attempts to extrapolate from it.  Narrative 
does not suggest that commerce in itself is corrupt, nor does it suggest that state and civic 
institutions should not have a hand in regulating commerce or providing a framework and 
direction for civic activity.  Jones and Allen cite several black workers who charged for services, 
but always with the caveat that the worker “charged with exemplary moderation” or “enough for 
what she had done.”72  Recall also that Jones, Allen, and Gray worked with the city’s 
government to coordinate their efforts during the crisis, that the FAS and FAC were both 
institutions created to coordinate civic activities, and that Allen himself was an especially adept 
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businessman.73  Rather, depending on a managerial elite (either the federal system, heroes like 
Girard and Helm, or civic leaders like Clarkson, Jones, and Allen) to insure that citizens work 
towards their own general welfare, or to simply protect citizens from each other, removes the 
need for citizens to be responsible to and concerned for each other, requiring only that they 
appear to be so.  Even if, as Carey’s Account claims, citizens’ freedom to flee the city during the 
fever showcases the strength of republican governance, the implication that preventing wholesale 
abandonment of Philadelphians by fellow Philadelphians and those in neighboring states might 
have required a mandate points to weaknesses in the relation between the citizens themselves.  
 
4.  Solution:  Neighborly Citizenship  
Where Jones and Allen’s vindication of black economic practices during the fever 
reproduces the tensions between interest and virtue in Carey’s Account, how they narrate the 
activities of black citizens working outside this economy sets the social world on a different 
axis.74  Even as Narrative inserts black citizens into the civic republican polity of feeling and 
virtue described in Carey’s Account, its shift in narrative structure and emphasis disrupts not 
only the discourse’s racial-economic valences—that is whether or not “negroes” and “servants” 
can be respectable citizens—but also undermines respectability as a measure of good citizenship 
and the individualistic ethos that measure promotes. Using Jones and Allen’s distinction of a 
“real sensibility” and the FAS’s reference to an “expressive language of conduct” as guides, we 
can frame what Narrative offers in its account of black citizens during the fever as an alternative 
practice of citizenship based on an ethics of neighborliness.75  Neighborliness corresponds with 
the duty to the common good suggested in classical republicanism and embodied in Girard and 
Helm in Carey’s Account, but with a potentially more democratic ethos of equality and inclusion, 
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demanding instead that neighbor-citizens serve the common good by serving each other, by 
being neighborly towards the individuals encountered in everyday life.  This openness results in 
a permeable civic space, resembling more a dynamic web of associations based in mutual aid 
than a single sphere, a neighborhood rather than a market.  
I use the term neighborliness to describe Narrative’s civic ethics here rather than piety, 
“Golden Rule,” mutual aid, charity, or the like for three reasons:  1) Neighborliness emphasizes 
that this ethic operates between individuals in a way that creates a collective and that these 
interactions occur on terms of moral equality.  This emphasis on horizontality, moreover, 
distinguishes neighborliness from cultures of benevolence, classical virtue, or sensibility.  2) The 
term connects Jones and Allen’s investment in Christian ethics via the narrative formula of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan with their equal investment in developing a strong political 
structure for not only emancipation, but also full citizenship.76  Narrative responds to a parallel 
question raised in the late-eighteenth-century U.S.:  “Who is the good citizen?”  3) Consolidating 
this question under the term “neighbor” or “neighbor-citizen” also allows me to map how the 
Samaritan parable’s emphasis on neighborliness as a matter of civic law informs Jones and 
Allen’s larger project of emancipation and structural adjustment. 
Rather than emphasize economic exchanges, Narrative registers neighborliness as a 
cultural practice in black citizens’ “real sensibility”:  their quest to “be useful” and their 
“rendering services where extreme necessity called for it.”77 One case, mirroring familiar scenes 
of abandonment in Carey’s Account, features the actions of a poor black man set against two 
others.  The comparison between the three upends accepted civic roles and creates space for a 
more substantive critique and revision of not only how commentators like Carey applied civic 
republican logic, but also of the civic republican logic itself:   
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A poor afflicted dying man, stood at his chamber window, praying and beseeching every 
one that passed by, to help him to a drink of water; a number of white people passed, and 
instead of being moved by the poor man’s distress, they hurried as fast as they could out 
of the sound of his cries until at length a gentleman, who seemed a foreigner came up, he 
could not pass by, but had not resolution enough to go into the house, he held eight 
dollars in his hand, and offered it to several as a reward for giving the poor man a drink 
of water, but was refused by every one… .78 
 
The first half of this story follows the trajectory of Carey’s account: Carey also mentions the 
plight of “poor” persons “without a human being to hand them a drink of water,” “men of 
affluent fortune…abandoned to the care of a negro,” and those whose money could not “procure 
proper attendance.”79  In these instances, Carey’s two-tiered model falls apart.  With expected 
neighbors failing and no one willing to risk infection for even a considerable fee of “five 
dollars,” the suffering either die alone, die in the presence of a negro (which amounts to the same 
thing in Carey’s Account), or, as in the case of a servant girl, die in a cart as the guardians of the 
poor attempt to find a home willing to take them in. 80  Where Carey’s illustrations typically end, 
however, Narrative offers “a poor black man” who “came up” and not only “supplied the poor 
object with water,” but also “rendered him every service he could.”81  Punctuating the 
insufficiency of money as a motivating factor, when the gentleman offers to pay the black man to 
help the dying man, the black man responds: “Master…I will supply the gentleman with water, 
but surely I will not take your money for it.”82 
While the poor black man’s story undoubtedly offers a direct rebuttal to Carey’s assertion 
of black inhumanity, particularly in his refusal of the gentleman’s money, the black man also 
provides a more general view of citizenship practices missing in Carey’s Account:  an immanent 
sense of civic responsibility uncoupled from social status or economic motivation.  The man’s 
action demonstrates a “real sensibility” that compels him and other black citizens to move 
forward even as white neighbors hide or stand by because “the dread…was so general” as to 
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make friends “afraid of each other.”83  Both groups show a kind of sensibility when confronted 
with a nearly overwhelming emotional tide—fear, horror, despair, pity, etc.—but black citizens’ 
sensibility becomes “real” through the “expressive language of conduct,” that is, when at sight of 
“others being so backward” they take responsibility for the abandoned.84  Narrative’s sensibility 
becomes “real” or concrete only as it produces measures to alleviate the scene of suffering or 
need that initiated the sensible response.  (Hence Jones and Allen’s position that their “services 
were the product of real sensibility.”85)   
The gentleman in Narrative’s vignette offers a useful point of contrast between a 
productive “real sensibility” and familiar eighteenth-century cultures of sensibility and 
benevolence.  Despite the appearance of virtue in his attitude, the gentleman’s sensibility is no 
more effective than other citizens’ abandonment.  His concern for the dying man results in 
inertia:  “he could not pass by, but had not resolution enough to go into the house.”86  He fulfills 
the expectation that a cosmopolitan gentleman be able to “relate to strangers, to share in the 
feelings of others, including social inferiors and even animals.” 87  The anonymous writer of 
“Observations on Sensibility, or Felling, as Opposed to Principle,” a 1791 article in Carey’s 
American Museum, explains, “This [concern] is the work of an unprincipled man of feeling, 
whose nerves with peculiar irritability, can tremble every hour at the touch of joy or woe; whose 
finely-fibred heart would thrill perhaps with horror at the sufferings of—a fly.”88 The public 
display of sensibility, “Observations” continues, “supplies the want of religion…[,] appears more 
lovely than all the virtues,” and provides a benevolent analogue to the functional equivalency of 
self-interest.89  The gentleman feels for the stranger very publically (he was standing on the 
streets) without a concomitant identification of the stranger as one who, more than an “inferior,” 
requires the gentleman to overcome his irresolution.  
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In contrast to the poor black man who moves to help the dying man, the gentleman tries 
to move capital instead, “[holding] eight dollars in his hand,” implicitly valuing the poor dying 
man’s needs or the value of his own good citizenship at eight dollars in the process.90  His 
willingness to use capital as a proxy, to stand by until the market produced an agent, alienates 
him from a potential neighbor, resulting in the kind of complacence that created the economic 
crisis before the fever, and a climate of exploitation during the fever.  His attempt, like Carey’s 
Account, shifts attention away from his inability to help, calling attention instead to those for 
whom his fee is not a sufficient motivator.  Perhaps the gentleman even sees himself as a 
helpless victim of both the dread the man’s wails cause and the manifest inhumanity of 
passersby. 91  Juxtaposed against the poor black man, the gentleman’s inertia becomes less about 
the gentleman’s helplessness in an unwilling market than about the insufficiency of simple 
sensibility in general as a guide for civic action.   
Narrative’s analysis of those like the “gentleman,” people of status and means looking to 
pay others for services, suggests that looking upward for models of good citizenship reveals a 
civic inadequacy that may be all the more dangerous because it is cloaked in performances of 
sensibility and class expectations rather than in an active “real sensibility.”  Where the seemingly 
“natural” bonds between citizens (family, friends, servants, and neighbors) fail and the 
gentleman’s sensibility and finances prove ineffective (or, as in the previous discussion, 
counterproductive), the poor black man offers a third way, a neighborly ethics predicated neither 
on the claims of sociability or kinship nor on performances of sensibility and benevolence.  Like 
the rank-and-file citizens, the man has no claim to respectability—Narrative describes him 
simply as “good natured”—; like the gentleman, he cannot simply walk by.  Absent any obvious 
tie to the dying man or social expectation of virtue, the poor black man nevertheless steps 
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forward, his “real sensibility,” or piety in the FAS’s terms, providing the cosmopolitan link with 
the stranger even as the gentleman’s sensibility fails. 
Through the comparison between sensibility and real sensibility, Jones and Allen, like 
many late-eighteenth-century writers, were attempting to distinguish between sensibility as a 
physiological and performative response to outside stimuli and an ethical imperative to act 
regardless of the presence or absence of a sensible reaction or empathy.92  These pedagogical and 
literary discussions turned to schemes for regulating sensibility through the cultivation of reason, 
contrasting sensibility to teachable principles like charity.  “Observations,” for instance, claims 
the person who “possessed but a small degree of feeling” could still exercise charity, because 
charity “consiteth in the subjection of the mind to known duties.”93  “A steady, uniform 
principle, unconnected with passion, and founded on reason and on truth,” charity was thus 
available to all citizens willing to submit to its teachings.94  Indeed, charity more obviously 
aligns with the notion of piety that the FAS forwards, contrasting to sensibility as it prompts one 
to “heal the wounds of the afflicted, to soften their sorrows, and to succour the wretch that 
struggles with adversity,” whether one emotionally identifies with this suffering or not.95  And 
while Narrative does not use separate terms to differentiate between “sensibility” as a 
physiological response and “real sensibility” as a principle, the contrast between the gentleman’s 
inertia and the poor black man’s activity, his “language of conduct,” suggests that the difference 
between the two—sensibility and real sensibility—corresponds to “Observation’s” opposition of 
sensibility to charity and the FAS’s invocation of piety.   
The parable of the Good Samaritan provides a useful parallel text, connecting events in 
Narrative to the FAS’s notion of the pious person as good citizen of the world, and offering a 
vocabulary for articulating the kind of relation between citizens that “real sensibility” or charity 
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should produce.96  Reading the Proceedings of the Black People through the parable’s narrative 
formula, a formula that would have been familiar to Jones and Allen’s readers, we see how the 
strategy of inversion moves beyond setting black virtue against white inhumanity.97  The 
conversation between Jesus and a lawyer about law and civic responsibility frames a moment in 
which Jesus pivots on received understandings of the law to offer a more expansive notion of 
who is the neighbor, or to whom the good citizen should be responsible and responsive.  When a 
lawyer questions Jesus about eternal life, Jesus responds with a question of his own:  “What is 
written in the law?”  The lawyer replies, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 
soul…strength, and…mind; and thy neighbor as thyself.”98  Jesus tells the lawyer that he has 
answered correctly, but, not to be outdone, the lawyer asks a logical follow-up question:  “And 
who is my neighbor?”  Rather than answer the lawyer’s question—”who is my neighbor?”—by 
describing the set of people whom the lawyer should love, and thus offering a restricted notion of 
neighborliness, Jesus offers a parable, a case study, outlining the characteristics of the neighbor 
as the subject, sensible to another’s suffering, in action99: 
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which 
stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.  And 
by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he passed by 
on the other side.  And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on 
him, and passed by on the other side.100  
 
As in Jones and Allen’s vignette, the parable features an injured man in need of assistance.  
Respected community leaders and fellow Jews—symbols of the civic and moral good—
recognize the man’s suffering, but go out of their way to avoid helping him.  Instead, a Samaritan 
not only aids the man, but also insures his safety until his recovery.  The Samaritan, seeing past 
the mutual enmity between Jews and Samaritans, “discover[s] the neighbor” in the injured man 
and becomes the good neighbor, the keeper of the law who will “inherit eternal life,” because he 
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acts as the neighbor rather than looking for the neighbor.101  
This response has deep implications for the construction of community and citizenship as 
a point of civil law going beyond a simple moral query.  In the context of the Mosaic Law, legal 
scholar Jeremy Waldron explains, love thy neighbor “is emphatically not a moralistic add-on to a 
legal code,” but rather, the maxim “sums up the spirit of the legal code.”102  Using a Samaritan—
a people viewed by Jesus’ audience as a lower caste or culturally and religiously abject—as the 
model of neighborliness, Jesus shifts the audience’s focus from finding the neighbor amongst 
themselves to finding the neighbor-citizen within themselves, and, in so doing, expands the 
boundaries of “my neighbor” beyond respectability  (“respectable citizens”), genealogy 
(whiteness), or political status.  The onus falls on the sensible citizen’s ability to see the 
neighbor-citizen in the other person rather than on the other to demonstrate respectability to an 
already-constituted community.103  The mark of the good neighbor-citizen, and the good 
community by extension, becomes not simply the ability to extend boundaries over an 
increasingly diverse set of neighbors, but rather the ability to make this extension on terms of 
equality. 
Each case, the parable of the Good Samaritan and Jones and Allen’s Narrative, inverts 
audience expectations to reveal an ethics of neighborhood that foregrounds the citizen’s choice 
to be the good neighbor.  Just as the parable uses narrative inversion to critically re-evaluate the 
terms of the lawyer’s question, “And who is my neighbor?” Narrative interrogates late-
eighteenth-century questions about the ethical relation between citizens by thinking about the 
kinds of relations the good citizen should actively produce rather than the inverse, how to 
produce the good citizen (an idea to which I will return shortly).  Narrative answers Account’s 
implicit query—who is my fellow citizen, who is the good neighbor—by reproducing some of 
 61 
Account’s key scenes from the perspective people of a caste—”servant,” “negro,” “foreigner”—
neglected in Carey’s Account.  Through this narrative formula, Narrative suggests that the good 
citizen has a duty “to do all the good” he or she can towards “suffering fellow mortals,”104 that is, 
to approach others as equals, not simply out of a desire not to offend, but rather out of a position 
of proactive goodwill.  Such contact, “conducted in a mode of good will” across social 
boundaries (between Samaritans and Jews, free African and white citizens, strangers, etc.), as 
Samuel R. Delany would later explain, “is the locus of democracy as visible social drama,” 
providing “the lymphatic system of a democratic metropolis.”105  In other words, Jones and Allen 
realized that the vision of and action towards others as neighbors (Narrative’s real sensibility) 
could create spaces that fostered horizontal relationships more conducive to democratic 
citizenship than could contemporary notions of tiered civic republicanism.    
In the context of the fever, the implication of mutual responsibility in “suffering fellow 
mortals” should not be overlooked.  Jones and Allen’s multiple references to those in need as 
“suffering fellow mortals,” rather than distinguishing between themselves and the people they 
helped as in Carey’s repeated “respectable” or “benevolent” citizens suggests a sense of moral 
equality in the contingency of mortality and the “frailty of human nature,” an acknowledgement 
that circumstance is the only difference between those in present need and those currently able to 
meet that need.106  Everyone was susceptible to the fever—Gray dies of the fever and Allen and 
Alexander Hamilton (who lived just a few houses down from Allen) contract the fever but 
recover—making death, or the threat of death, the great equalizer and making the shared 
vulnerability, the notion of fellow mortality, much more visceral.107  If the fever itself offers an 
immediate social equalizer, the notion that everyone is vulnerable and that no one can “survive 
on self-interested negotiation alone,” as Daniel Vickers posits of the early national backcountry 
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context, suggests a more fundamental codependence and equality.108  This recognition of fellow 
mortality, of a shared condition, between individuals presupposes and affirms each person as 
having equal moral worth regardless of prior social, political, or economic status. That is, the 
neighborly citizen understands that benevolence means more than appearing virtuous; it means 
mutual aid:  collective action against needs that threaten individual competence, in the 
recognition that a threat to the individual is, ultimately, a threat to all.  
In this framework, neighborly citizenship happens in the day-to-day interactions between 
individuals, not as commercial agents, but rather as members of a community, collectively 
engaged in being “useful” to each other and sharing responsibility for their mutual wellbeing. 
Narrative illustrates this everydayness in figures like an “elderly black woman” who asks simply 
for “a dinner master on a cold winter’s day” as she “went from place to place rendering every 
service in her power without an eye to reward.”109  The kind of exchange represented in the poor 
black woman’s movements across the city creates neighborhood rather than a market: a link 
between neighbors based on a “mutual relation,” as Jonathan Edwards explains, “equally 
predicable of both those between whom there is such a relation.”110  If we take seriously 
Narrative’s distinction between the woman’s request for dinner and her not having “an eye to 
reward,” the exchange—meeting a present need in return for security against a future need—fits 
within the framework of societies like the FAS in which members contributed to a general fund 
against the needs of its collective membership or others.  In this case, the poor black woman 
makes an informal contribution to the collective and acknowledges her codependence with those 
to whom she makes her contribution in the same move.  And while the woman’s example comes 
from a moment of extreme duress, like the Samaritan’s narrative, her actions in the crisis yield 
lessons for the post-fever world.   
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Such a practice could serve as a bulwark against the ballooning system of credit and 
atomizing market exchanges dominating the opening pages of Carey’s Account and the echoes of 
the slave market that haunt Jones and Allen’s Narrative.  The elderly woman understands that 
while the “reward” may not be immediate or public, so long as the overall community follows 
the ethic of neighborliness, everyone benefits.  This neighborliness corresponds with Thomas 
Paine’s figure of society as a “great chain of connection” created by “the mutual dependence and 
reciprocal interest which man has upon man, and all the parts of civilised community upon each 
other.”111  Such a dynamic form of association suggests a turn from the capitalist citizenship 
proffered by Carey to a classical republican notion of civic duty—recognition that being a good 
neighbor-citizen means sharing responsiblity for the community’s well being.  Yet, it also builds 
on a late-eighteenth-century sense of democratic voluntarism and equality that shrinks the scope 
of neighborliness from a broad notion of the “common good” and abstract humanity to more of 
an everyday sense of individual relations.112  It retains the openness of late-eighteenth-century 
politeness and sociability, but focused less on their middle-class or performative valences and 
more on the material usefulness of such gestures.   
By reading Narrative through the parable’s familiar formula, then, we see real sensibility 
as a mode of neighborly citizenship, the good neighbor-citizen producing neighborhood through 
an immanent impulse not only to identify with the stranger, but to approach the stranger as 
neighbor, as a fellow mortal of equal moral worth in a mutually dependent community.113   This 
account of black citizens during the fever, then, not only shows the weakness of social status as 
an indicator of civic virtue, but also offers neighborliness as a citizenship practice that creates 
horizontal relationships between citizens where civic republicanism would suggest hierarchy and 
allow abandonment.  In this framework, the poor black man’s labor deserves as much “credit” as 
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Girard’s; or, rather, their efforts during the fever represent a common, neighborly citizenship that 
white neighbors in Narrative’s vignette do not practice.  
 
5. Experiments in Structural Neighborliness 
In the preceding sections, I have contrasted the civic and narrative schematics of Carey’s 
Account and Jones and Allen’s Narrative to outline an ethics of neighborliness, a civic ethos 
animated by a sensibility made material or “real” through concrete actions.  The neighborly 
focus on being useful to others, on being a good neighbor rather than finding the good neighbor, 
creates bonds between citizens independent of other forms of association—familial, racial, 
economic, national, etc. While, as I have suggested, neighborliness ultimately manifests in 
concrete actions between individuals, its logics have implications for how civic institutions take 
shape and the criteria by which people are integrated as citizens.  Neighborly practices ultimately 
produce neighborly institutions; the ethos and actions that characterize the neighborly citizen 
also characterize the neighborly institution. 
Granville Sharpe and other anti-slavery activists, for example, take up the political 
resonances of neighborliness via the Samaritan’s narrative to articulate a global notion of 
belonging.114  In The Just Limitation of Slavery in the Laws of God (1776) Sharpe explains, “No 
nation therefore whatever, can now be lawfully excluded as strangers, according to that 
uncharitable sense of the word stranger in which the Jews were apt to distinguish all other 
nations from themselves… all men are now to be esteemed ‘brethren and neighbours.’”115  
Benjamin Banneker uses a similar approach in his 1791 letter to Thomas Jefferson, reprinted as a 
pamphlet with Jefferson’s response in Philadelphia in 1792 and in Banneker’s Almanac for 1793: 
it is the indispensible duty of those, who maintain for themselves the rights of human 
nature, and who possess the obligations of Christianity, to extend their power and 
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influence to the relief of every part of the human race, from whatever burden or 
oppression they may unjustly labor under.116 
 
Sharpe and Banneker use logics of neighborliness to combine an appeal to moral equality with a 
call for social justice.  First, they establish the equality of all people—enslaved and free, 
European and African—as a moral and, in Sharpe’s argument, a legal principle extending 
beyond the confines of a single nation or state, an equality stated in religious precepts yet 
applicable to a secular state.  For Sharpe, the Samaritan parable’s articulation of neighborliness 
suggests that nations can no longer use national differences, however defined, to justify the 
oppression or exclusion of others: all nations and peoples are to be respected.  Second, they 
argue that acknowledging this moral equality, what Banneker translates into secular terms as 
“those inestimable laws, which preserved to you the rights of human nature,” requires the state 
and/or the individual to actively work so that not only slaves, but also “every individual, of 
whatever rank or distinction” can “equally enjoy the blessings thereof.”117  For Sharpe, this 
principle underwrites part of the legal case against British slavery.  For Banneker, it sets up 
emancipation and social justice as litmus tests for the “sincerity” of early U.S. republicanism. 
Read through Sharpe, Banneker, and the FAS, the ethics of neighborliness modeled in 
Narrative is not a supplement to republican citizenship.  Rather, neighborliness gets to the heart 
of the kind of society republican governance is meant to produce:  one in which citizens feel a 
duty to apply, in Banneker’s words, “the most active effusion of [their] exertions” to ensure that 
all people have equal access to the benefits thereof.118  Or, to put it in terms familiar to 
Narrative, they have a “duty to do all the good” they can for their “suffering fellow mortals,” 
because it is the best way to secure the good of all.119  Just as the good neighbor makes neighbors 
out of strangers, the good citizen or the good state makes citizens out of strangers.   
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Narrative’s other components, including addresses to “Those Who Own Slaves, and 
Approve of the Practice,” “To the People of Color,” and to the “Friends of Him Who Hath No 
Helper,” take up these principles and shift focus from immediate events to “a refutation of some 
censures.”120 Jones and Allen’s “Refutation”—a term commanding the same typeset in the 
pamphlet’s title as “Narrative,” suggesting that the two modes of address were coextensive—
encompasses answers to developing theories of racial difference and political solutions to 
Thomas Jefferson’s query:  “What further is to be done with them?”121  The Narrative proper 
was of paramount importance, but not necessarily the document’s central focus, providing a case 
study for the kind of citizenship that could take shape after emancipation, a test not only of black 
civic freedom, but also of the kind of civic space that could result from contact between 
ostensible strangers.  The addresses, in turn, make explicit the paradigms implicit in the 
Narrative’s account of neighborliness, applying its example to a broader agenda centered not just 
on emancipation, but also the full incorporation of free Africans as U.S. citizens.  
During the fever, the FAS and FAC became increasingly integrated with Philadelphia’s 
civic structure:  they paid workers, bleed victims, vet volunteers, and Clarkson went to Jones and 
Allen for help regulating rising fees.  They provided a bridge between the work of the official 
committee and city government and those citizens outside this official organization.  Prisoners 
wanting to volunteer, for instance, applied to the elders of the FAC “who met to consider what 
they could do for the help of the sick,” and it was under their supervision that the prisoners “were 
liberated, on condition of their doing the duty of nurses at the hospital at Bush Hill.”122  The 
transaction showed the FAC supplementing and, in some cases, replacing the gutted government 
infrastructure with their own chain of command.  Instead of calling on the mayor or the official 
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relief committee, prisoners, many of them black, “apply” to the elders of the African Church.  In 
the absence of a court, the black religious organization filled in the judicial gap. 
Where, as several critics have suggested, yellow fever accounts typically linked 
blackness with the chaos and “dissolution” the crisis caused, Narrative links it with good 
management and restoration.123 As the crisis increased, so did the FAS and other black citizens’ 
role in the city’s infrastructure.124  Tellingly, it is in the context of this work that Rush calls Jones 
and Allen “two African citizens” in his own Account.125 Similarly, while describing the state of 
disorder at Bush-hill, Narrative reports, “only two black women were at this time in the hospital, 
and they were retained and the others discharged, when it was reduced to order and good 
government.”126  These women of “good character” symbolize the ordinary black folk whose 
significance has only now reached the light of day.127  And through them, black presence 
becomes a central ingredient in the city’s return to “good government.”128 Rather than a threat to 
citizenship and government, as in Carey’s Account, the yellow fever epidemic opens up avenues 
for citizenship for Jones, Allen, and other black citizens called upon to fill in the gaps in white 
civic organization. 
This confidence and managerial acumen presents a measure of stability within 
Philadelphia’s moment of crisis as well as the suggestion that internally, the free African 
community has its own institutions that shadow and, during the fever and the crisis of white 
government, function more efficiently than the white-run government. In this context, the 
Narrative not only showcases black benevolence or sentiment, but more importantly, it 
demonstrates the strength of black institutions with their own “peculiar” brand of republican self-
government providing an ethics and structure to guide a black civil society, Jones and Allen 
acting as representatives between it and the city’s other institutions.129  These institutions 
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provided a tactical position, that is an internal organization and public presence, from which 
black citizens could not only “make use of the cracks” in established structures of power, but 
also structure their own projects in republican governance.130 They had limited and uneven 
involvement with the city’s civic sphere before the fever, often petitioning the city for the ability 
to provide services for black communities that no other institution would.131 The FAS, for 
instance, arranged to lease part of Potter’s Field (formerly the city’s Stranger’s Burial Ground) 
from the city in 1790, conducted marriage ceremonies, and kept records of marriages and 
births.132  At times parallel to, and at times intersecting with white publics, this black 
counterpublic represented by the FAS and FAC “oscillates” between positions in relation to 
other publics.133  The epidemic presented a momentary break in public and civic institutions that 
gave free Africans, the institutions they built, and other marginal groups the opportunity to 
practice citizenship on the public stage in ways heretofore limited by racial logics governing 
access to the public sphere.  
Each of these moments demonstrates black citizens’ civic power, their desire for and 
implementation of modes of self-government, not just as free persons of color treated as “slaves 
of the community,” but as citizens who take control of their own civic presence and activities as 
partners in an increasingly dynamic civic arrangement.134  The notion of management suggested 
in Carey’s civic republican model shifts from how institutions and the state can reign in or 
control variously interested constituencies to how institutions and the state can best empower and 
facilitate mutual aid amongst citizens.  That is, the ethics of neighborliness animating individual 
actors in Narrative changes the relation between citizens and civic institutions.  Where Carey’s 
respectable citizens show their respectability in terms of their management, Narrative’s leaders 
(Jones, Allen, Rush, Clarkson) enable other citizens to join in the collective recovery effort:  
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Clarkson reaches out to free Africans (even if under false pretenses), Rush trains Jones and Allen 
to bleed and tend the ill, the FAS, in turn, liberates and superintends prisoners, Jones and Allen 
train people as nurses, etc.135  While Narrative does not eliminate all criteria for authority or 
inclusion—Jones and Allen report that they screened prisoners before releasing them—it does 
suggest that these criteria should be dynamically based on meeting the community’s needs.  This 
ever-widening cast of societies suggests that the successes in Philadelphia’s recovery were not 
based on the strength of a virtuous elite, per se, but rather on the ability of its various 
constituencies to recognize the potential partner in each other.   
The “Address to Those Who Own Slaves” expands the purview of their print exchange 
beyond Jones, Allen, and Carey to include “late publications” like Jefferson’s Notes, the 
correspondence between Jefferson and Banneker, and the ongoing struggle with Episcopal and 
Methodist governing bodies over the status of St. Thomas and Bethel churches.136  At the same 
time, it builds on Narrative’s examples of the individual and collective efforts of black citizens 
during the fever and its model of an incorporative neighborly ethics of citizenship to propose an 
“experiment.” “We believe,” they write, “if you would try the experiment of taking a few black 
children, cultivate their minds with the same care, and let them have the same prospect in view, 
as to living in the world, as you would with your own children, you would find upon the trial, 
they were not inferior in mental endowments.”137  Such a proposal responds to Jefferson’s wish 
in his reply to Banneker “to see a good system commenced, for raising the condition, both of 
their [slaves’] body and mind, to what it ought to be” as well as worries on both pro- and anti-
slavery fronts that, once free, Africans would still be incompatible citizens.138  Jones and Allen’s 
framing their response to racist logics as an experiment based on observation and experience 
combines Enlightenment and late-eighteenth-century empiricism and views of character as 
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malleable, open to “cultivation” through proper care.139  Ultimately, “Address” harnesses 
neighborliness as both citizenship practice and empirical method to produce a formula for black 
citizenship. 
To claims that the slaves’ “baseness is incurable” or, as Jefferson argues, “the blacks, 
whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the 
whites in the endowments both of body and mind,”140 Jones and Allen present their own “degree 
of experience”: 
a black man, although reduced to the most abject state human nature is capable of, short 
of real madness, can think, reflect, and feel injuries, although it may not be with the same 
degree of keen resentment and revenge, that you who have been and are our great 
oppressors, would manifest if reduced to the pitiable condition of slave.141 
 
Just as black citizens displayed more real sensibility during the fever, enslaved Africans have 
maintained a remarkable degree of humanity even in the midst of their enslavement.  The 
passage directly confronts Jefferson’s claims that enslaved Africans’ “griefs are transient,” that 
“afflictions…are less felt, and sooner forgotten,” with not only the suggestion that Africans feel 
as deeply as Europeans, but that Jefferson and others’ expectations of “resentment and revenge” 
bespeak more a white propensity for violence or revenge than the lack of feeling on the part of 
the enslaved.142  The “Address” opens with the suggestion that looking for “superior good 
conduct” from the enslaved would be “unreasonable,” and yet “experience” has shown Jones and 
Allen that enslaved Africans also exceed reasonable expectations.  The double move questions 
standard paradigms for measuring the humanity of slaves and recalibrates the comparison from 
one between ancient Greeks and Romans to one between contemporary enslaved Africans and 
their white masters. Again, the comparison gestures back to Narrative’s scenes of black citizens 
overcoming the dread of the moment—a dread they shared with white citizens—as they went 
about their work.  Both points emphasize black self-regulation over white self-interest; both 
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points build on Jones and Allen’s experiential authority and narrative perspective, not necessarily 
to question the effects of enslavement or standards of civilization, but rather to suggest that white 
observers like Jefferson do not have sufficient experience to report accurate data.   
Narrative establishes the importance of first-hand observation from the outset, suggesting 
that “respectable citizens” could not relate the proceedings of the black people, but rather had to 
solicit Jones and Allen’s authority, “[seeing] that from our situation…we had it more fully and 
generally in our power, to know and observe the conduct and behavior of those that were so 
employed.”143  Jones and Allen’s observations of the efficacy and nuances of bleeding as a 
cure—they note, for instance, that bleeding at the early onset of symptoms had greater effects 
than at later stages and that the patient’s positive emotional state was correlated with recovery—
further establish their empiricist credentials, their ability to analyze evidence and practically 
apply their conclusions.  The “Address,” in turn, applies this observational “power” as a counter 
not only to Jefferson, who appeals to scientific “experience” and his own “observations” in 
Notes, but also advocates like Rush, who eventually admits the fallacy of black immunity to the 
yellow fever, but who also thought black skin a curable condition.144   
Jones and Allen’s request for the experiment of education combines this sensory 
empiricism with a neighborly civic and social ethos.  Education was essential to the production 
of future citizens, and national debates about education swirled around questions of how best to 
educate citizens for republican citizenship.  Rush, for instance, argues, “our Schools of learning, 
by producing one general, and uniform system of education, will render the mass of the people 
more homogeneous, and thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceable government.”145  
He saw these institutions as training grounds “to convert men into republican machines.”146  The 
homogeneity many saw as essential to republican government could be produced through a 
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unified system of education, offsetting other points of difference.  The students coming out of 
this system, joined in the same program of intellectual and physical instruction, will form “such 
ties to each other, as add greatly to the obligations of mutual benevolence.”147  These ties 
reproduce the structures of neighborly contact created during the fever, structures that, if 
temporary, created a society based in mutual aid rather than competition or hierarchy.   
The proposal of educating black children “with the same care” and “prospect in view” as 
white children challenges those who would try this experiment to try it in a neighborly frame.  
This “care” demands the same degree of rigor and breadth as that for white children, the same 
training for republican government, creating the same “ties” between them.  Training black 
children with the same “prospect in view” suggests that they be trained for full political and 
economic participation in the republic as members of what Rush calls a “great, and equally 
enlightened family” in which benevolence flows horizontally between fellow citizens, rather than 
vertically between citizens and (their) former slaves or lesser sorts.148  That is, they should be 
educated with the expectation of their contribution and with the assurance that access to the full 
range of liberties will be available to them.  Beginning with children in their formative years 
would produce a new generation fit for participation in a “uniform and peaceable government,” 
because they would have received the same republican training that commentators like Rush 
prescribed for the general public.  This approach contrasts sharply to the rhetoric of Jefferson or 
even antislavery activists like the Quaker-dominated PAS who viewed Africans, free and 
enslaved, as objects of study or benevolence, a problem to be solved, but rarely as partners or 
fellow citizens.149 
Neighborliness as an approach to emancipation, then, goes beyond momentary 
benevolence in the face of inequality and oppression, requiring instead structural adjustments 
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and long-term planning.150  By suggesting a trial of educating children, rather than the trial of 
unaided emancipation (gradual or immediate) or a trial of giving freed slaves land and 
independence, the “Address to Those Who Own Slaves” subtly critiques the efficacy of gradual 
emancipation programs (or at least the logics of pupilage underwriting them), suggesting that 
emancipation and equal access to central institutions like education were inseparable.  Just as the 
Samaritan of the New Testament or Narrative’s poor black man attend to the suffering beyond 
the immediate, short-term, injuries, so too must any project of emancipation be accompanied by 
a program of structural adjustment.  This experiment requires a scientific approach to policy that 
rejects conventional wisdom, producing the fellow citizenship that racist logics preempt by 
encouraging a view of free and enslaved Africans as neighbor-citizens rather than potential 
threats.  Such a program follows the neighborly logic articulated in both Banneker’s letter and 
Narrative:  make the good neighbor’s incorporative move; do unto black children as you would 
your own, and they will become as your own children in the process. 
Jones and Allen’s call for an educational experiment requires less a leap of faith on the 
part of white citizens and more a larger study building on the data Jones and Allen’s Philadelphia 
and other like “experiments” already provide.  Though many were born into slavery, black 
Philadelphians have nevertheless learned how to be true republican citizens through their own 
experience and the tutelage of Anthony Benezet, Rush, and others.151  In the short time during 
the epidemic, and under intense duress, Jones, Allen, and others learn bleeding techniques from 
Rush (or more accurately from “copies of the printed direction for curing the fever”), coordinate 
a corps of nurses, carters, and other relief workers, and manage convict laborers.152  Individual 
black Philadelphians and black societies acted out of an ethics of neighborhood that sustained 
them where the bonds of society appeared to fail almost everywhere else.  How much more 
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could black citizens, or any other marginalized group, contribute to the common weal if their 
children were given the advantage of a formal instruction under conditions in which success was 
expected?  Narrative demonstrates that this community of black citizens, finding freedom during 
the crisis, has proven itself more than ready for the task of republican citizenship.  
Recognizing the platform Carey’s Account provided, Jones and Allen take the 
opportunity to extend their public liberties into spheres that were otherwise out of reach.  They 
present neighborliness as a citizenship practice animated by a real sensibility that creates the 
permeable civic space.  They then mobilize this political argument in the service an antislavery 
appeal and call for structural readjustments that would ease the transition between enslavement 
and citizenship.  Narrative reveals the extent to which black print production reflects the inner-
workings of black counterpublics, but it also suggests that even in such spaces, black writers 
sought and found ways to assert their own authority within civil society.  Despite Jones and 
Allen’s efforts, however, the coming decades were characterized more by decline and 
retrenchment than progress, a trend that would lead both men to reconsider their future in the 
U.S. and to give serious consideration to emigration projects.153  
Still, Narrative had an effect.  On April 4, 1794, about four months after Narrative’s first 
printing, Carey issues a pamphlet ostensibly in response to a flyer by “Argus” accusing Carey of 
opportunism, but he also pointedly confronts Jones and Allen’s Narrative.154  By then, Carey’s 
fourth edition had replaced his quotes from Lining about black immunity with a paragraph 
debunking the theory, and in the fifth edition he changes the section accusing black workers of 
extortion from the “vilest of the blacks” to “some of those who acted in that capacity [as nurses], 
both coloured and white.”155  Jones and Allen’s words also inspired the coming generation of 
black activists.  David Walker builds on their notion of world citizenship and piety in his Appeal; 
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Hosea Easton picks up the Samaritan formula in his A Treatise on the Intellectual Character, and 
Civil and Political Condition of the Colored People of the U. States (1837), arguing that only by 
acting “the part of the good Samaritan” can the nation “open an effectual door through which 
sympathies can flow, and by which a reciprocity of sentiment and interest can take place”;156 and 
Robert Purvis cites events during the fever in his 1837 defense of black suffrage in Pennsylvania, 
asking, “Does this speak an enmity which would abuse the privileges of civil liberty to the injury 
of the whites?”157  Purvis’s words seem to echo Jones and Allen’s.  Each case references 1790s 
Philadelphia as a touchstone in the theoretical and historical development of black citizenship.  
Narrative combines two central threads that subsequent chapters will unfold in more 
detail:  black writer’s engagement with the critical political concerns of their day as a function of 
their own lived experiences and how the texts they produce operate within a web of publics and 
audiences.158  Neighborliness does not eliminate interests or disagreement altogether.  Indeed, a 
neighborly approach to citizenship requires a mode of participatory politics that maximizes 
contact and exchange between citizens to ensure that one citizen’s neighborliness does not turn 
into unilateral oppression.159  It is to the role of participatory politics in citizenship that this 
dissertation now turns.  The activists in the coming years become even more focused on formal 
political participation, but, as the black state conventions reveal, the results are also more 
paradoxical.  As the next chapter demonstrates, negotiating the contending imperatives of 
practical political ends, contemporary political discourse, and the need to persuade an 
increasingly hostile white public produced performative texts that provide a meta-commentary 
on the nature of U.S. citizenship. 
                                                
1 “Reply of the Free African Society (Philadelphia, PA) to the Union Society of Africans (Newport, RI) 
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and political interactions than a coherent ideology.  Not every invocation of republicanism invoked these concepts in 
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Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson Liberal Beginnings:  Making a Republic for the Moderns New York:  
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which these writers mobilized dominant discourses as tropes in the service of articulating a politics “faithful to 
collective experience and useful to black emancipation” (“Early” para 24-25). 
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(Philadelphia:  Dobson, 1786), 15 
14 Account, 11. 
15 Account, 11.  As Joyce Appleby explains, “Far from pitting merchants against farmers, rich against poor, 
or the commercially inclined against the self-sufficient, the Jeffersonians assumed that a freely developing economy 
would benefit all.”  See Appleby, Liberalism, 275.  As “An Essay on the Utility of Newspapers in the United 
States,” an January 1, 1794 editorial in the Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, explains, the 
“property” provided a stronger call to patriotism in the early nation than did love of country, customs, religion or 
any number of other calls to nationalism:  “Will not a Turk, or a Spaniard fight as bravely for his Koran or his 
Crucific, as any Republican for his property?  Let history; let facts decide.”   
16 As Wood and others observe, the austerity of classical republicanism had become softened: “Virtue 
became less the harsh self-sacrifice of antiquity and more the willingness to get along with others for the sake of 
peace and prosperity” (216).  Structures of politeness, love, and fellow feeling replaced fear and obligation; the 
market became a space where citizens could strengthen these bonds rather than the space of inherent corruption.  By 
1780s, no one was under the illusion that people were not self-interested.  “As a result,” argues Eric Foner, “it was 
necessary to take great care in constructing governments, so as to balance competing group interests and prevent any 
one faction from attacking the liberty of others” (88).  See Radicalism, 189-216, Foner, Tom Paine and 
Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 88-93; Rogers, “Republicanism”; Kalyvas and 
Katznelson, 3-7; and Rogers Smith, Civic, 137-164.  For a discussion of the “language of sin” used to suggest that 
political inactivity or inability to hold to the civic values of the community caused retribution, see Hammer, Puritan 
Tradition, 114. 
17 Account, 9-10.  Carey’s use of the term “anarchy” resonates with the Federalist’s fear of the spread of 
anarchy from the French Revolution.  See Pernick, 120-122. 
18 Account, 11.  As Foner’s discussion of price control in the 1780s suggests, many these debates focused 
on merchants or other suppliers’ inflating prices in times of scarcity (Tom Paine, 146-148). 
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19 Account, 11-12. 
20 Ibid., 12. 
21 Ibid., 30, 31. 
22 Ibid., 30-31. 
23 The breakdown of familial ties crystalized the overall absence of “republican affection” during the crisis.  
The “self-love” that thinkers like John Adams argued worked outward from self to family to nation, etc., turned 
completely inward.  See Wood, Radicalism, 219-221. 
24 Account, 31. 
25 Carey’s rhetoric, for instance, reproduces Hamilton’s warning of war between states in Federalist No. 8, 
the conditions of war between individuals in Philadelphia demonstrating the potential collapse resulting from the 
absence of a strong federal system:  “The populous states would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous 
neighbors.  Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained.  War, therefore, would be desultory 
and predatory.  PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars.  The calamities of individuals would 
make the principle figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.” Publius, “Federalist No. 8” 
in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York:  Signet, 2003), 61. 
26 Account, 78-79. 
27 Ibid., 78. 
28 Ibid., 59. 
29 Ibid., 59. 
30 Ibid., 59-60. 
31 See Wood, Radicalism, for a description this republican “character” or civic humanist ideal that includes 
“integrity, virtue, and disinterestedness” (103).  In this discourse, virtue depended on independence from the market 
and was less concerned with the “private virtues” Carey outlines in Account’s opening (e.g. “prudence, frugality, 
and industry), but rather what Wood describes as “public virtues”:  “sacrifice of private desires and interests for the 
public interest….[, and] devotion to the commonweal” (104).  Wealthy men, presumably like Girard and Helm, “had 
an obligation to serve the state” (104).  By the end of the eighteenth century, this version of republicanism had been 
softened to a less demanding standard of politeness or sociability.  Carey’s Account suggests that, stripped of the 
economic and political stability that rewarded this genteel behavior and made it more available to a wider range of 
people, this standard could no longer induce people to work towards a common rather than individual good.  Put 
slightly differently, the yellow fever epidemic created a climate in which individual interests that once worked 
towards a general prosperity now worked against it.  See also Kalyvas and Katznelson, 3, and David F. Ericson who 
differentiates between the “classical republicanism” of Cicero and the modern republicanism of Jefferson and 
Adams, which, in his analysis, reads more like a subset of liberalism in its emphasis on “liberty and happiness.”  See 
Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism:  The Debates over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery (Chicago:  
U of Chicago P, 1993), 3-5.  Like Ericson, I read republicanism more as a political style, a set of ideas and rhetorical 
tropes, than as a coherent ideology or “historical force,” yet I do not read republicanism as a subset of an ascendant 
liberalism either.  I am more persuaded by the argument of Wood and those who follow him that republicanism 
morphed into something resembling what we call liberalism in the U.S. between roughly the mid-eighteenth century 
and the mid-nineteenth centuries.  
32 Account, 68. 
33 Ibid., 95. 
34 My reading of Carey is informed by Ed White’s caution that we not lose sight of republicanism as a 
“lexicon” with “roots in the top-down managerial project of colonization” through which the battle to control the 
nation’s direction was waged.  See The Backcountry and the City:  Colonization and Conflict in Early America 
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 9-10.  This two-tiered model also corresponds with traditions 
of protective democracy that, as Michael Marinetto explains, “regarded the state as providing a legal and 
institutional framework that enabled individuals to live ordered lives whilst pursuing their selfish interests in a free 
market” (105).  The active citizen becomes “banished” as governing is separated from the governed, allowing the 
citizen to pursue his or her own interests more freely.  I use two-tiered civic republicanism here rather than 
“protective democracy” or other variant because I want to emphasize that this management structure includes both 
the state/government and the workings of civil society and the public sphere and to distinguish between the classical 
democracy of ancient Greece and the less directly democratic classical and civic republicanisms of early modernity.  
See Marinetto, “Who Wants to Be an Active Citizen?:  The Politics and Practice of Community Involvement” 
Sociology, 37, no. 1 (February 2003), 105; and David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford:  Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 74.   
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35 As David Held explains of Madison’s logic in the Federalist Papers:  “The theoretical focus is no longer 
on the rightful place of the active citizen in the life of the political community; it is, instead, on the legitimate pursuit 
by individuals of their interests and on government as, above all, a means or the enhancement of those interests.”  
See David Held, Models of Democracy, 74 
36 See Wood, Radicalism, 189-216; and Foner, Tom Paine, 88-93 
37 Account, 54-55. 
38 Ibid., 32-33. 
39 Ibid., 33. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 30-31.   
42 Even before the yellow fever, Benjamin Rush was looking for a cure for black skin (Dain, 24). One of 
the most famous examples of the fear of blackness both as a contagious physical or moral disease and as the nation’s 
original sin is Jefferson’s “Fourteenth Query” in Notes on the State of Virginia, which expresses both a fear that the 
African-American presence in the U.S. will be its downfall as the two races cannot co-exist and a sense of dread for 
the day when a vengeful God would strike down the nation for slavery: “I reflect that God is just: that his justice 
cannot sleep for ever…The Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a case” (Notes, 289). 
Jefferson’s rationale evolved into justifications for black colonization by both whites and black, while Rush’s 
science was a part of the bourgeoning American ethnology.  See Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia in Writings 
(New York:  Library Classics of America, 1984); and Bruce Dain A Hideous Monster of the Mind; Jared Gardner 
Master Plots:  Race and the Founding of an American Literature, 1787-1845 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998). 
Racial markers provided convenient signifiers for civic and social collapse.  Black presence becomes 
metonymically linked to white absence such that the former takes moral pressure and culpability off of the latter 
during the fever.  Brooks argues that Carey’s language “reflects postemancipation anxieties about the meanings of 
race” as well as “the frailty of white fellow-feeling.” Carey and others, Brooks continues, sought to establish “an 
inverted, opponential relationship between the well-being of Philadelphia’s white and black communities” through 
which vilifying and ostracizing one group could become the rallying cry of another. Brooks continues, “the medical 
error [African-American immunity] that endangers the black community is ‘salutory’ for whites; the fever which 
endangers the white community benefits black criminal ‘opportunism’: the fever seized upon whites, and blacks 
seized upon the fever. Black care givers become but another element of the epidemic assault on the white 
population”  (American Lazarus 165-66). Philip Gould situates Carey’s use of African-American Philadelphians as a 
metonym for the “failure of white benevolence” as well as fears of a mercantile economy spinning out of control “by 
likening ‘blackness’ to the specter of market forces,” and Sally Griffith suggests that extensive praise of the African-
American community “would undercut [Carey’s] dramatic narrative of community regeneration.”  Gould “Race,” 
172, and Griffith 54.  See also Carroll Smith-Rossenberg, “Black Gothic: The Shadowy Origins of the American 
Bourgeoisie” in Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America, ed. Robert Blair St. George (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2000), 252-255.  The literature on ways in which white populations used black communities and as 
their unifying foil is expansive. See for instance: Morrison, Playing in the Dark; Dana D. Nelson, National 
Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1998); Theodore Allen, The Invention of the White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control v. 2. The Origin of 
Racial Oppression in Anglo-America (New York: Verso, 1994). 
43 Account, 77.  The same sentence appears in Carey’s Fourth edition, but with a footnote debunking the 
error of black immunity. 
44 Account, 77-78.  See also, John Lining, “A Description of the American Yellow Fever in a Letter from 
Dr. John Lining Physician at Charles-town in South Carolina, to Dr. Robert Whytt Professor of Medicine in the 
University of Edinburgh” in Essays and Observations, Physical and Literary. Read before a Society in Edinburgh, 
and Published by Them, vol. 2 (Edinburgh:  G. Hamilton and J. Balfour, 1756), 407. 
http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/servlet/ECCO.  According to Everett Mendelsohn, 
Benjamin Rush had an earlier copy of Lining’s account that was published near the end of the century.  See 
Mendelsohn, “John Lining and His Contribution to Early American Science” Isis 51, no. 3 (September 1960), 278-
292.  http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/stable/226508 
45 See Goddu, Gothic, 31-51, for an insightful reading of commerce as “diseased discourse” in the early 
nation in Charles Brockden Brown’s yellow fever novel, Arthur Mervyn (1800).   
46 Jones and Allen were aware of this tendency in public logic, explaining:  “Mr. Carey pays William Gray 
and us a compliment; he says our services and others of their colour, have been very great &c.  By naming us, he 
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leaves these others, in the hazardous state being classed with those who are called the ‘vilest.’” See Narrative, 12-
13.  Carey’s motivations for his account of the African-American volunteers remain unclear, particularly given his 
“seemingly impeccable eighteenth-century antislavery credentials,” which include publishing anti-slavery essays 
and works by Phyllis Wheatley and Prince Hall in his periodical, The American Museum. As historian Philip 
Lapsansky notes, if we believe that Carey’s attempts to praise and placate Jones and Allen individually may have 
been well intentioned, Carey’s text still underwrites a larger negligence: “if the selfless efforts of this unnamed mass 
of most humble Philadelphians could be minimized and dismissed, what hope was there for the wider acceptance of 
blacks as freemen and citizens?”  Lapsansky, “‘Abigail, a Negress’: The Role and the Legacy of African Americans 
in the Yellow Fever Epidemic,” in A Melancholy Scene of Devastation, 69. 
47 See Nelson, “Representative/Democracy:  Presidents, Democratic Management, and the Unfinished 
Business of Male Sentimentalism,” in No More Separate Spheres, eds. Cathy N. Davidson and Jessamyn Hatcher 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002) for a discussion of managed democracy (330-332, 348n19) and White, The 
Backcountry and the City, 9-10, for how this management operated through republican discourse in the early U.S. 
48 Indeed, much of the scholarship on Narrative posit Jones and Allen as attempting to show how black 
citizens were somehow better republicans than their white counterparts.  These scholars then evaluate Narrative in 
terms of how well it succeeds in positioning black virtue.  Gould, for instance, suggests that Narrative ultimately 
fails, or at least falls victim to the same tensions it critiques, precisely because Jones and Allen’s concerns with their 
financial losses undercuts their claims to benevolent disinterest.  Other lines of argument emphasize Narrative as a 
vehicle of institution and community building, as an indication of what Richard Newman, Joanna Brooks (following 
Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic) and others theorize as a black print counterpublics and countercultures of modernity.  
Paralleling my argument about Jones and Allen’s Narrative in the context of late eighteenth-century discourses of 
citizenship, is my own contention that Narrative offers a third way, one that situates Jones and Allen within a 
broader social history of citizenship even as we continue to theorize how they and other black activists structured 
communities outside of official civic spaces.  See Gould, Barbaric Traffic, chapter 5; Brooks, American Lazarus, 
Introduction, and “Early American”; Newman, “Black Founders,” and his introduction to Freedom’s Prophet. 
49 Narrative 7.  Narrative is the first publication to be copyrighted by African Americans.  See Brooks 
“Early American,” 19; and American Lazarus, 168.  
Jones and Allen formed the FAS in 1787, just a few months before the adoption of the federal Constitution, 
“to support one another in sickness, and for the benefit of their widows and fatherless children.” Though Allen 
parted ways with the FAS in 1787 in part because of the society’s increasing adoptions of Quaker customs, he again 
worked with Jones to found the FAC in 1791.  The two again part societal ways when the majority of the FAC voted 
to affiliate themselves with the Episcopal Church, Jones remaining with the majority to become Bishop of the 
African Church of Philadelphia at St. Thomas and Allen leading the Methodist contingent to found Bethel Methodist 
Episcopal Church. “Preamble,” 15.  Du Bois famously describes the FAS in Philadelphia Negro as “more than a 
mere club,” but rather the “the first wavering step of a people toward organized social life” (19).  Du Bois, 
Philadelphia Negro, 19.  See also Newman, Freedom’s Prophet, Julie Winch, Philadelphia‘s Black Elite:  Activism, 
Accommodation, and the Struggle for Autonomy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 5-7; Nash, Forging, 
112-133. 
50 Narrative, 13.  As the fever set in, many observers became away that descriptions of black immunity 
were inaccurate, but they continued to promote the idea.  Carey may have known as early as October 1793.  In a 
letter possibly addressed to Carey, Rush explains, “the merit of the blacks in their attendance upon the sick is 
enhanced by their not being exempted from the disorder.  Many of them had it, but in general it was much milder 
and yielded more easily to art than in white people.”  Letter, 29 October 1793 in Letters of Benjamin Rush, ed. L. H. 
Butterfield (Princeton): Princeton University Press, 1951), 731.  Other yellow fever narratives also admit the error of 
assumed black immunity, the “lessons” of black fatalities, Lapsansky observes, “were not lost on whites.”  See 
Lapsansky, 68. 
51 Wood, Radicalism, 216; Smith, Civic, 137-164. 
52 Indeed, “the black people were looked to” in the first place because the “few people were willing” to cart 
away the dead even “when offered great rewards.”  See Narrative, 4. 
53 Narrative, 8. 
54 Samuel Otter similarly notices how Narrative shifts the cause of inflation from racial/character 
explanations to market forces.  My argument here builds on Otter’s observation about how Jones and Allen “turn 
Carey’s scenario and syntax against him” to suggest that Narrative’s inversion of Carey’s specific syntax provides a 
useful point of departure for a critique of commercial syntax more broadly.  See Samuel Otter, Philadelphia Stories: 
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America‘s Literature of Race and Freedom, Kindle Edition (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2010), 508-510 
[Kindle edition], 36 [print edition]. 
55 Narrative, 7; Account, 76-77. 
56 Narrative,7; Account, 10-11. 
57 Account, 77. 
58 Narrative, 9. 
59 We might think of this mirroring in terms of signifyin(g) or “rewriting the received textual tradition” in a 
way that clears space for black citizens in republican discourse, but what I want to get at here is how, intentionally 
or not, Narrative’s economic angle deconstructs its own logic even as it exposes white duplicity.  See, Gates, 
Signifyin(g), 123.  Again, my argument here builds on Gould’s observation that economic discourse seems to pin 
Jones and Allen into a corner (Barbaric, 186-187); however, as the next section suggests, Narrative’s civic 
intervention operates on a different register altogether. 
60 Both white and black workers could stood to gain political ground through their efforts during the fever, 
though neither did, at least not much. Pernick explains, “The white Republican mechanics who served as volunteers 
were ignored by the city’s Federalist elite and were resented by the many voters who had fled, but their political 
exclusion was less severe than the scornful ingratitude shown to Richard Allen’s and Absalom Jones’s black 
followers” (137).   
61 Appleby, Liberalism, 275. 
62 Narrative, 8.  This passage has been central to the recent debate between Gould and Brooks over how to 
situate Narrative vis-à-vis dominant early national discourses and black countercultures of modernity.  The 
equivalency between pilfer and privateer, Gould argues, “is the Narrative’s major flaw.  While demonstrating the 
unmatched benevolence of African Americans, it also tries to establish the equivalence between Anglo- and African 
Americans, an equivalence that is problematically predicated on economic self-interest” (Barbaric, 186-187).  
Joanna Brooks has argued that Gould’s reading is symptomatic of a larger tendency to read early black political 
discourse as an appropriation of republicanism and other dominant discourses.  This tendency ignores the ways that 
early black writers built their own countercultures and traditions out of their collective experiences of oppression 
and successes in institution building.  Taking into account the specificity of the African American experience in 
Philadelphia, Brooks observes: “However civil and politic the phrasing of the Narrative…it is also a text that 
condemns the failures of market forces during the 1793 yellow fever epidemic. This tract resonates with the 
impassioned and embittered voices of two men who are themselves only a few years free from chattel slavery, who 
witness that the slave trade continues with the legal sanction of the U.S. government…who daily face the well-
meaning but noxious paternalism of white community advocates…and who have seen the fragility of fellow-feeling 
and sympathy revealed during the yellow fever epidemic” (“Early,” par 24).   
My own take is that while the passage does suggest the equivalency Gould notes, it does so in a way that 
signifies acerbically on how one must prove benevolence—in terms of money lost instead of lives saved—and on 
the tendency of whites to hold black people to a standard that they, themselves, cannot attain.  From this perspective, 
Jones and Allen are not necessarily arguing that black citizens are more virtuous than their white counterparts, but 
rather that racial expectations taint question of virtue or benevolent disinterest from the start. 
63 The reference to and legal ambiguity of privateering would not have been lost to Jones and Allen’s 
readers.  Accusing whites of privateering resonated with the still-fresh Citizen Genet Affair in which Edmond-
Charles Genet’s privateering activities in Charleston, SC, and Philadelphia threatened the U.S.’s policy of neutrality.  
On Privateering during the Revolutionary era, see Robert H. Patton, introduction to Patriot Pirates:  The Privateer 
War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution (New York:  Pantheon Books, 2008), xix-xxi.  On 
Citizen Genet see Douglas Bradburn, Citizenship Revolution:  Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 
1774-1804 (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 2009), 110.  Moreover, as Otter observers, “Alluding to 
the lawful pirates who had been involved in the international slave trade since the seventeenth century, the term 
‘privateering‘ expands their comparison to include local and systemic violations:  the extortion of money and the 
appropriation of lives.”  Otter, Philadelphia Stories, 523-535 [Kindle], 37 [print].   
64 Narrative, 8. 
65 Privateering requires a negotiation between at least two parties:  a private ship-owner and a government 
issuing a letter of marque.  The letter of marque authorized the non-military vessel to “capture…merchant ships 
belonging to an enemy nation” (“Privateer,” OED).   
66 Kloppenberg, 22. 
67 Narrative, 7. 
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68 Both Jones and Allen were former slaves whose family members had been sold when both men were 
relatively young—Jones’s mother and siblings in 1762, Allen’s parents and younger siblings in the 1770s to settle 
his master’s debts.  See Daniel C. Littlefield, “Revolutionary Citizens, 1776-1804” in To Make Our World Anew:  A 
History of African Americans to 1880, ed. by Robin D.G. Kelley and Earl Lewis (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 142-143; and Newman, Freedom’s Prophet, 34. 
69 Anthony Benezet, “Observations on the Enslaving, Importing, and Purchasing of Negroes” (Philadelphia:  
Henry Miller, 1766), 4.  
70 In February 1793, President George Washington signed the Fugitive Slave Act, creating a means for 
enforcing the Constitutional right of slave owners to recover their “property.”  Other measures hostile to black 
citizens included the Naturalization Law of 1790, restricting naturalization to “free white persons” and the Militia 
Act of 1792, restricting militia service to white men.  These two Acts are related in their articulation of white 
manhood as the standard for citizenship.  While the 1790 Naturalization Law “guaranteed that Indians and blacks 
would not be welcomed as future equal citizens,” the Militia Act of 1792 “effectively ratified” this guarantee by 
restricting militia service, “one of the most potent symbols of male citizenship in the new American republic,” to 
white men.  As Douglas Bradburn has observed, that a racial designation in the Naturalization Law “needed to be 
stated represented an awareness of the type of citizens they act expected to create.”  The lack of debate about this 
language in Congress, he continues, further “reflected a racist indifference to the status of blacks in the new 
American nation.”  See Bradburn, Citizenship, 260; and Nash, Forging, 119. 
71 “Petition of Absalom Jones and Seventy-Three Others to the President, Senate, and House of 
Representatives,” 330-331, in Early Negro Writings, ed. by Dorothy Porter.  Congress overwhelmingly resolved to 
condemn the petition.  See Bradburn, Citizenship, 254; and Annals of Congress, 6th Cong., 1st sess., House of 
Representatives, 229-45. 
72 Narrative, 12, 11. 
73 While the FAC was a religious institution, it served as a center for civic activity.  On the history of the 
FAS and FAC and the importance of religious institutions to black politics and civic life as well as an account of 
Allen’s business ventrues see Newman, Freedom’s Prophet, Julie Winch, Philadelphia’s Black Elite, 4-25; Nash, 
Forging, 112-133; James T.  Campbell, Songs of Zion: the African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States 
and South Africa (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995); George, Carol V. R.  Segregated Sabbaths:  Richard 
Allen and the Emergence of Independent Black Churches, 1760-1840, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1973); 
Cornel West and Eddie S. Glaude, Jr.’s Introduction to African American Religious Thought:  An Anthology, edited 
by Cornel West and Eddie S. Glaude, Jr. (Louisville:  John Knox Press, 2003), xi-xxvi; and Glaude,  “Of the Black 
Church and the Making of a Black Public” in African American Religious Thought 338-365. 
74 Neighborliness was one avenue by which political thinkers were attempting, in s/f writer and cultural 
critic Samuel Delany’s terms, to “[cut] the world up in different ways socially and rearranging it so that [they] may 
benefit from the resultant social relationship” (193).  My discussion of neighborliness is influenced in part by 
Delany’s notion of “contact,” in Times Square Red, Times Square Blue. Delany observes, “in a democratic city it is 
imperative that we speak to strangers, live next to them, and learn how to relate to them on many levels” (193). See 
Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, 126-129, 193. 
75 Though neither Narrative nor the FAS letter use the term “neighborliness,” the term is useful for 
connecting all of the concepts both documents outline as characteristics of the “good citizen”:  piety, charity, 
concern for the stranger and the suffering, etc.  Moreover, neighborliness connects Narrative’s ethos to other texts 
that trade in a similar discourse of neighborliness articulated through readings of the Samaritan’s narrative.  It was 
foregrounded in Quaker debates about commerce and slavery and, as I point out later in this chapter, Granville 
Sharpe uses this logic as part of his argument against slavery.  Benjamin Banneker also references Golden Rule 
logics by way of Job in his letter to Thomas Jefferson:  “put your soul in their souls’ stead;” thus shall your hearts be 
enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards them (326-327).  Consolidating these concepts:  “real sensibility,” 
charity, caring for the orphaned, widowed, and estranged, mutual aide, etc. under the term neighborliness allows me 
to connect Narrative to how others were using similar forms to espouse more capacious notions of belonging.   
See Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2” in The 
Antislavery Debate:  Capitalism and Abolitionism as Problems of Historical Interpretation, edited by Thomas 
Bender, John Ashworth, and David Brion Davis (Los Angeles:  University California Press, 1992), 156-160. 
76 John Saillant’s reading of Lemuel Haynes’s politics and theology also informs the way I am reading 
Jones and Allen’s Narrative.  Saillant reads Haynes as using the rationalism is New Divinity sermonizing to 
combine theology with natural rights discourse to argue for black liberation and political equality more broadly.  See 
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Saillant, “Lemuel Haynes and the Revolutionary Origins of Black Theology, 1776-1801” Religion and American 
Culture 2, no. 1 (Winter 1992), 79-102.   
My use of “narrative formula” builds on Joanna Brooks’s “From Edwards to Baldwin Heterodoxy, 
Discontinuity, and New Narratives of American Religious-Literary History,” Early American Literature, Volume 
45, Number 2, 2010, 428.  I find the term useful here, because Narrative uses the parable’s overall structure and 
tenor without explicitly referring to it.  Jones and Allen’s audience would have readily recognized such a narrative 
formula.  As historian Gary Nash conjectures of the black citizens’ attitude as they began their efforts, 
“Philadelphia’s black Christians would act as Good Samaritans, reenacting the drama of the despised man who aided 
a fellow human in desperate need when all the respected men of the community turned their heads.”  Yet, beyond 
the allegorical value of this narrative trajectory and its social inversions, the Good Samaritan formula offers a civic 
grounding from which we can draw a critique of civic republican logics.  That is, rather than read the formula as a 
suggestion that black Philadelphians were better republican citizens, I want to suggest that the formula and the 
overall Narrative offer an alternative to civic republicanism in much the same way that Jesus of Nazareth uses the 
parable to offer an alternative to what had become traditional interpretations to Mosaic Law. 
The structure of a parable works particularly well in this capacity, because, as Paula M. Cooey has 
observed, parables are not reducible “to a single ethical or religious teaching, but [consist] instead of a constellation 
of features and interactions.”  “Chief among these features,” Cooey continues, “is a characteristic inversion of 
economic, political power that further subverts conventional expectations.”  Cooey, Willing and the Good, 6.  The 
suggestion that early African-American writing worked through Old and New Testament scriptures is not new; 
however, further study might demonstrate that the strategic use of particular scriptures from different testaments 
might have contrasting and even conflicting meanings: one as a book of divine election and retribution, the other as 
a book of divine forgiveness and equality.  In reference to the Bible and race, Joanna Brooks argues:  “By adapting, 
politicizing, and indigenizing mainline religious discourses, African Americans and Native Americans also 
established a platform for their critical interventions into early national formulations of race” (American Lazarus, 3).  
See also Nash’s Race and Revolution, 75, and Newman’s Transformation. Both offer a discussion of the 
role of religious doctrine and the church played in forming African-American communities as enclaves for resisting 
political, social, and psychological oppression.  In his intervention into the still-prevalent republicanism/liberalism 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CIRCULATING CITIZENSHIP IN THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE 1840s 
 
We have launched into a new position.  Our fathers sought personal freedom—we now contend 
for political freedom. “An Appeal to the Colored Citizens of Pennsylvania” (1848) 
  
…behind the mask of deference lies the authentic demand.    
Samuel Otter, Philadelphia Stories (2010)1 
 
1.  Introduction 
While the Pennsylvanians’ distinction between personal freedom and political freedom 
understates the political nature of the previous generation’s work, the comparison does signal a 
change in the practices of citizenship between the 1790s and the 1840s.  Jones and Allen’s 
neighborly citizenship emphasized a permeable civic sphere maintained through an ethics of 
committed neighborliness and the imperative to care for the suffering stranger.  By the 1840s, 
voting had become one of the central practices of citizenship and means of policing the civic 
imaginary:  it was a symbol of fellow citizenship among the men who voted and a reminder that 
those not allowed to vote were not only inferior, but also under the power and protection of those 
who did.2  Recognizing the changing significance of voting in national civic discourse and their 
own explicitly political needs beyond emancipation, black activists interpreted suffrage as the 
defining right of citizenship, the right that connected citizens in a community, and a citizen’s 
most powerful defense in a republican government.  Just as the struggle against slavery and 
kidnapping spawned the National Conventions of the 1830s, activism for political rights fueled 
the state conventions in the 1840s.  The proceedings of the state conventions offer key arguments 
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about participatory politics as a practice of citizenship, while the form itself offers an alternate 
trajectory for how participatory politics could be enacted.    
This chapter examines the Proceedings of the Black State Conventions of the1840s as 
political documents central to an understanding of citizenship practices in the antebellum U.S.  
Philip S. Foner and George E. Walker rightly claim, “for keen analyses of the issues outlined and 
for breadth of research and argument, these addresses are among the outstanding political 
documents of the period,” reflecting “a cross-section of this community” more than any other 
aggregate of texts outside of the black press itself.3  While many scholars quote from these texts, 
here, I foreground the black state conventions as distinct and important political and cultural 
phenomena, as important as the black press, the slaves’ narratives, and the National Conventions 
to our understanding of early African American political culture and U.S. political culture more 
generally.4  The conventions provide, in the words of the 1848 “Appeal to the Colored Citizens 
of Pennsylvania,” “a living commentary on the principle that governs American legislation, and 
controls American justice.”5  Though the state conventions focus on voting rights rather than on 
citizenship as such, their articulation of the relation between participatory politics and citizenship 
in terms of the circulation of civic power indexes the changing meaning of citizenship and 
political participation in the antebellum U.S. more broadly.  The state conventions’ focus on 
voting rights as “the life blood of political existence” helps us understand the cultural work of 
voting in creating a functional civic network out of an increasingly diversified citizenry.6  
Circulation also provides an apt heuristic for analyzing how the conventions functioned 
as a political form.  Conventions offered a means for black citizens to pool their collective civic 
power, circulate this power more freely in public space, and attempt to harness the civic powers 
of a broader public for their cause.  Moreover, as they submitted petitions and appeals to state 
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constitutional conventions, delegates to the black state conventions and the people they 
represented participated, if often in a limited way, in the processes of constitutional revision.  
Even if such revisions ended in or upheld black disfranchisement, black citizens’ presence as a 
political cohort was still recorded in official archives.7  The printed proceedings of the 
conventions (including minutes, addresses, petitions, and reports) extended and circulated this 
civic presence via the periodical press and pamphlets, formally modeling and enacting the 
delegates’ vision of republican citizenship as the texts moved among white and black audiences 
and state institutions.8  In the state conventions’ most radical appeal directly to voters, delegates 
invoke the people’s authority over state institutions and their power to revise or dissolve the civic 
compact when these institutions fail to be responsive to the people.  This new community 
becomes connected not through the formal franchise, but rather through audiences’ reading, 
consuming, and acting on these civic texts.  The Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, 
then, are important not only because of the arguments they make for and about suffrage, but also 
for the work they do as texts, as performative speech acts that seek to manufacture the very 
citizenship practices from which the delegates had been excluded.9  
 
2.  Why Voting? Why State-Based?:  Citizenship Practices in the 1840s 
Maintaining and circulating a public presence as an explicitly political community was 
crucial to the conventions’ overall project.  Even as suffrage served as one of the primary 
political and cultural points of identification for white manhood, it became an even more 
powerful symbol of dis-identification and political and legal disempowerment for black citizens.  
In the decades before the Fourteenth Amendment provided a national standard of birthright 
citizenship, citizenship was measured in large part by what the citizen could or could not do:  e.g. 
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pay taxes, vote, travel between states, own property, run for political office, etc. The Federal 
Constitution is notoriously silent on the definition of citizenship except in the context of 
naturalization, while the several states simply use “citizen” (or “citizen and inhabitant”) as part 
of the criteria for office holding and various protections, without actually defining citizenship 
beyond inhabitance.  Each state had its own criteria for these rights and protections, with the 
Federal Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause knitting these disparate rules into a 
patchwork approximating national citizenship.10  As states began instituting universal white 
manhood suffrage, democratic governance, particularly in the form of voting, became 
increasingly identified as the defining act of full citizenship.  The linkage of voting and white 
manhood resulted in an ascriptive conflation of citizenship practice with race and gender that 
provided a national standard for citizenship identity in the absence of explicit Federal guidelines. 
Citizens who could not vote or had limited access to other rights, then, were not fully 
citizens before the law.11  Instead, as Georgia state courts argued in 1843, such people were in a 
perpetual “state of pupilage.” 12  The restriction of the right to vote contributed to what historian 
Douglas Bradburn describes as the “denization” of black citizens.  States increasingly defined 
black Americans as “inhabitants,” “denizens” or wards of the state who had some basic rights 
and obligations (rights to property and public education in some states, tax requirements, etc.) 
but whose status varied from state to state.13  By the end of the 1840s, only Maine, 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island offered unrestricted suffrage to black citizens.14  
Over the previous two decades, other states had instituted or were in the process of instituting 
universal white male suffrage, but disenfranchised virtually all of the black population in the 
process.  The loss of the franchise became foundational to further state-sanctioned stripping of 
black civil rights and symbolized a forcible removal of black citizens from the civic imaginary 
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itself.15  This logic created a circular argument: black people cannot vote, so they are not full 
citizens; black people are not full citizens, and therefore should not be allowed to vote.16   
The state-based nature of the functional institutions of racial oppression, that is how civic 
and social exclusion operated in public policy and social custom, created some of the tensions 
historians have noted within more national movements.17  In New York, for instance, the state’s 
$250 property requirement for voting sanctioned, if in a limited way, black political 
participation, but this participation was tempered by the recent history of enslavement and the 
state’ 1821 gradual emancipation provision, which at the very least, fostered the perception of 
dependence on the state’s Whig and abolitionist establishment.18  If black activists in New York 
seemed more willing emphasize direct involvement with the political process through voting and 
supporting specific parties, it might also be because they had Pennsylvania as an example of 
where inactivity on these fronts could lead. Pennsylvania, in contrast, did not constitutionally 
restrict black suffrage until the 1838 constitution explicitly limited voting to “every white 
freeman.”20  However, the threat of white violence coupled with the success of some black 
communities, particularly in Philadelphia, in creating civic organizations and working through 
and with white politicians and activists made politics in the form of seem voting less urgent.  
When the state did ratify the constitutional revision restricting the vote to white men, black 
Pennsylvanians were just as insistent as their New York counterparts in protesting the change 
and, when that failed, pushing for revision, but a constitutionally required ten-year hold on any 
amendments in Pennsylvania made appeals for legislation less productive than calls for 
wholesale constitutional change.  The difference in the two populations’ historical experience 
and the difference in how the states enacted their policies—property qualification vs. outright 
denial—had a dramatic effect on how each group proceeded.21  Western states like Ohio, Illinois, 
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and Michigan had even stricter rules governing black movements that made convention 
participants question whether the state and federal government even recognized them as citizens, 
particularly in the wake of the Compromise of 1850.22  The complexities that local policy 
presented for national movement-building prompted McCune Smith to lament in an 1854 article 
for Douglass’ Paper:  “You cannot pick out of five hundred free colored men in the free States 
who equally labor under the same species of oppression.”23 
In light of these interstate differences, black activists were continually balancing the 
benefits of national conventions (particular for anti-slavery initiatives, fundraising, and 
institution-building) and more local associations calibrated to deal with the specificity of local 
politics and variations in racist practices.24  During an 1840 debate about reviving the national 
conventions, the Colored American typifies many antebellum commentators’ vacillation between 
national and local forms:   
State conventions called for a local and special object, fixed upon by the people, would 
be likely to be regarded as matters especially their own, matters with the continuance or 
overthrow of which, depended their own rise or fall, and they would be likely to adopt 
measures with greater harmony, and carry them out with more efficiency, than in our 
opinion, would be done by a National Convention, and each State taking into 
consideration their own local disabilities, would answer all the purposes of a National 
Convention. 25  
 
Local specificity was critical, because where the rhetoric of citizenship had nationalist tones, the 
instrumentalities of citizenship, the institutions that outlined the contours and limits of who could 
or could not be a citizen were primarily under state control.26  It was a matter of scale:  focusing 
on the national, as the Colored American suggests, obscured the many more local modes of 
political organization that were successful, at least for a time, in creating a sustained black 
political presence.27  Our scholarly focus on national black organizations and a national “black 
press” to obtain answers to questions about black political strategy and theory, operates 
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anachronistically, imposing post-Civil War Federal politics on what was essentially a far more 
locally-determined political field.  These activists were thinking nationally, but their national 
political sensibilities were in dialogue with and framed by local exigencies and interests.   
The state conventions of colored citizens were a central feature of this changing political 
paradigm.  As the national convention movement lost its steam in the early 1840s and as the rift 
between black activists and the white anti-slavery establishment widened, these local meetings 
provided a forum for discussing issues germane to the particularities of each state’s brand of 
racial oppression.  As the Colored American posits, success on the state level could more 
efficiently accomplish change on the national level, because organizations at the state level could 
focus on single issues—education, suffrage, desegregation, etc.—that were of more immediate 
concern to activists of all stripes, allowing for tighter organization and strategic alliances.  And, 
for them, any progress on this political and social front translated to progress in the antislavery 
cause. 
Groups organized specifically to address constitutional franchise restrictions date back to 
at least 1837, when Robert Purvis and group of black activists meeting Pittsburgh, PA, formally 
protested the soon-to-be-successful attempt to disenfranchise black men in Pennsylvania.28  Their 
“Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens, Threatened with Disfranchisement, to the People of 
Pennsylvania” outlines the legal and historical basis for black citizenship in Pennsylvania, with 
an blistering critique of justifications for black disenfranchisement.29  The “colored inhabitants” 
of New York were the first to organize a statewide convention expressly addressing franchise 
rights in 1840, and the New Yorkers met in 3 subsequent conventions between 1841 and 1845 
for the express purpose of repealing the property requirement.30  Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
Indiana, and Ohio all held at least one state convention during the 1840s.  After the passage of 
 97 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, black citizens would hold similar conventions in most other 
states focused more on coping with new threats of re-enslavement in addition to local issues.31 
The conventions were more than a single event; rather, they were a constellation of 
events and texts ranging from debates on the necessity for a convention and initial meetings and 
advertisements to select delegates, to the convention itself and the circulation and public reading 
of “Proceedings” afterwards.32  Indeed, much of the convention process, issuing calls, passing 
resolutions, committee reports, debating, voting, etc., was geared towards generating this 
publicity.  The conventions began in print with calls issued months before the meetings and 
circulated in black and abolitionist newspapers such as Colored American, Liberator, North Star 
(in the late 1840s), and National Anti-Slavery Standard, as well as more mainstream papers like 
the New York Daily Tribune.33 These Calls for a Convention usually included a list of 
grievances, solicited statistical data and reports on the state of the black population, and asked 
cities and counties to organize locally to elect delegates and raise money.34  The highly 
publicized organizing process—the resulting calls for local public meetings, the local meetings 
themselves with their voting on resolutions either supporting or condemning the intended 
convention, and the printing of these resolutions in newspapers—was all part of the convention’s 
showcasing black civic power and citizenship in practice.   
The delegates usually convened in the state’s capital city (Harrisburg, PA; Albany, NY; 
Columbus, OH; etc.) or another major city in a church or public meetinghouse for daily and 
evening sessions.35  While some conventions were open to the public or allowed participants to 
sign in on site, others required delegates to submit credentials, proving their participation in the 
local nomination process.36  During the convention, delegates nominated officers, selected 
committees, and debated and passed resolutions on staple topics such as education, economic 
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development, temperance and other moral reforms, and general resolutions encouraging the 
community to continue to work towards its own elevation.  The conventions commissioned 
county and city committees to develop the conventions’ programs, including petition drives and 
“other matters in connection with our rights.”37  The conventions commissioned committees to 
collect statistical data on the state of their communities:  the number of temperance and literary 
societies, employment spreads, the availability of education, etc.  During the evening sessions or 
public meetings, delegates and other activists offered speeches on pertinent issues, such as 
education, temperance, and economic development.38 
Finally, delegates issued the “Proceedings” or “Minutes” of the convention along with 
two to three addresses to the public, one to the white “voters” or “people of the state,” appealing 
to them for constitutional amendments and general support in the form of petitions.39  The other, 
addressed to their “colored fellow citizens” requested their continued support of uplift programs 
and their participation in the statewide petition drive.  Most state conventions printed limited 
copies of their proceedings in pamphlet form, distributing them to states’ assemblies and selling 
them to support the costs of the convention itself and the costs of carrying out its programs.  
They also circulated their addresses, if not the entire proceedings, through the period press.40  
The documents were often much shorter than AASS conventions or the Nation Colored 
Conventions (probably due to the costs of printing), containing the order of business and election 
of officers, the convention’s resolutions, and the convention’s addresses to the public.41  Some 
conventions strategically delayed reprinting the proceedings in newspapers to maximize the 
distribution of pamphlets; the convention organizers could then cite this consumption as a sign of 
public approval.42  Even so, the conventions cite the periodical press as the medium through 
which its cause would be fought.43   
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After the state convention, delegates returned home to organize county and city 
auxiliaries to carry out the convention’s petition drive and other programs.44 This proliferation of 
documents, a veritable cacophony of voices, and constant agitation created a politicized space—
different from a periodical, pamphlet, fair or other form of publicity, yet combining elements of 
each—that resonated with recognizable events ranging from the Continental Congress and the 
U.S. “Declaration of Independence” to contemporaneous states’ conventions.45  These 
conventions, then, began and ended in print, producing and circulating documents at each 
juncture in a way that kept their claims to full citizenship constantly in the public eye. 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the Convention of the Colored Inhabitants of the State 
of New York in 1840 and the 1848 State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Pennsylvania.  I 
turn to New York, because it was the first statewide convention and provides a model for how 
black activists used the form. Through a theory of civic circulation and power, the delegates 
destabilize race or condition-based arguments against black suffrage by demonstrating how the 
lack of franchise rights, that is blocking the circulation of civic power, creates the very 
conditions used to justify the restriction of these same rights.  Even as they argue on the basis of 
common manhood, however, the delegates’ circulation-based arguments justify a more radical 
expansion of republican citizenship.  The 1848 Pennsylvania convention suggests a potentially 
revolutionary practice.  In the tradition of David Walker’s Appeal and sublime appeals to the 
people more generally, the convention calls for citizens to take responsibility for an electoral 
system that, they argue, has substituted arbitrary standards for republican principles of self-
government.  By circulating new civic texts in the form of petitions, these citizens could harness 
their collective civic power to re-assert their authority over the state.  Exploring these two 
conventions together helps reveal the synergy between staging, print practices, and political 
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participation in offering an alternative mode of citizenship practice even as official channels 
continued to close. 
 
3. Power and Circulation:  The Making of a Citizen 
The 1840 “Convention of the Colored Inhabitants of the State of New York” convened in 
Albany, NY, from August 18-20; approximately 140 delegates represented counties across the 
state.46  Building on petition drives begun in the 1830s, the convention was organized to create 
auxiliary committees to facilitate a concerted petition drive.47  Delegates proposed and voted on 
resolutions mostly concerned with the significance of suffrage and the most practical means of 
convincing the State Assembly to abolish property requirements.  Finally, the convention 
appointed a committee of six to draft an “Address to the People of the State of New York,” 
outlining the convention’s arguments for unqualified suffrage, and a shorter “Address to Their 
Colored Fellow Citizens,” admonishing them to lend their full support to the petition drive.48  
Both addresses were printed and sold in pamphlet form with the convention’s proceedings in 
New York City.49  In subsequent years, Henry Highland Garnet, McCune Smith, and other 
convention participants would submit the convention’s proceedings and petitions to the State 
Assembly.50  When delegates carried the convention’s 2,093-signature petition to the Assembly’s 
Judiciary Committee in 1841, they represented black political interests physically and textually.51   
The New York delegates recognized the cultural work of voting as the central conduit of 
civic power, creating the abstract (if not material) equality essential to citizenship practice.  The 
delegates to the New York Convention of Colored Citizens claim that even “the poorest and 
humblest citizen” has access to public “respect, deference, and consideration,” because he is a 
voter, a member of the civic trust.52  All voters, the delegates posit, participate in common and 
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have a common share in sovereignty insofar as their votes counted equally, regardless of 
political, cultural, or ethnic differences.  Whatever qualified a citizen to vote, by default, made 
that citizen a part of the sovereign body, a primary citizen responsible for how the government 
was constructed.  Citizens who did not meet these criteria become secondary citizens.53  Without 
a share in sovereignty, the ability to give or refuse consent, these secondary citizens were the 
responsibility of the primary citizens.  In a republican sense, they were politically and materially 
dependent on the primary citizens.  Including them in the electorate would taint the political 
process, because these citizens could not be counted on to vote rationally or independently.  Like 
children, they had not reached (and never could reach) the age of majority, and so depend on the 
primary citizens to make decisions for common protection and common weal.54  In this sense, 
electoral politics linked manliness and voting as mutually constitutive elements of citizenship.55  
In the context of this direct conflation of voting with manliness, the convention’s 
“Address to the People of the State” emphasizes their own manhood in order to dislodge the 
conflation of whiteness with manhood:  “we base our claim upon the possession of those 
common and yet exalted faculties of manhood.  WE ARE MEN.”56  Even though some of the 
delegates can trace their ancestry through several generations of free men, some of whom fought 
in the Revolution and the War of 1812 and helped build the Erie Canal, for them, manhood 
supersedes any other qualification (historical or material) or other differences between 
disenfranchised black men and the unrestricted voting population.  “We can find no nation,” they 
write “that has the temerity to insult the common sense of mankind, by promulgating such 
sentiment as part of its creed” as skin color.  The black delegates are men:  patriarchal protectors 
of home, property owners (or at least those with the potential for it), taxpayers, fathers, husbands, 
producers, defenders of the state, and so on.   
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They isolate common manhood, without racial distinction, or more accurately, as 
inclusive of black men as the foundation for republican citizenship and suffrage as the defense 
and manifestation of that citizenship.  They are men (or not women or children), therefore not 
only are they inherently capable of political participation, but, more importantly, their nature as 
men dictates that they seek it out.  “Man is a creature of law,” the “Address” posits, “his nature 
adapted to government and its various functions.”57  Man’s essential nature compels members of 
a community to desire to participate in the political affairs of that community.  Black men, just as 
white men, are therefore compelled by natural law to pursue politics.   
While the convention’s emphasis on manhood as the least common denominator of 
politics limits the scope of their democratic intervention from our current vantage, their emphasis 
on political participation as essential to republican citizenship and appeal to a broader notion of 
human political desire suggests more radical implications.  To their appeal to natural rights, the 
delegates add a natural law of civic power and circulation:  1) a human being’s innate drive to 
political participation and self-determination does not disappear in the absence of institutional 
structures or sanction; rather, it manifests through other forms and outlets; 2) citizens most 
productively pursue politics as a collective and in a climate where this civic power can flow 
freely; 3) republican governments provide structures through which citizens can exercise this 
power productively, but do note create this power.58  The resulting configuration of civic power 
reverses the temporal logic that a citizen must in some way demonstrate respectability and gain 
public trust before earning political rights.  The practice of citizenship, rather than the citizen’s 
identity, creates the virtue and independence characteristic of the republican citizen.  By 
restricting black access to the franchise, the state has not acted to protect republicanism, but 
rather has “manifestly violated” its “principles.”59  In so arguing, the 1840 New York convention 
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separates the formal structures of consent and deliberative politics from their racially ascriptive 
underpinnings, instead figuring political participation as the source of respectability and public 
trust. 
Participatory politics, including voting, function as a “channel” connecting citizens in a 
political community, gathering and directing their collective civic powers.  Without access to its 
“pure and refreshing waters” of free political exchange, the black citizens have been “made 
aliens and strangers in the country of our birth.”60  Rather than an individual property or 
privilege (a “franchise” in the literal sense), the delegates frame the franchise as a public 
resource (res communes) like flowing water.61  This trope of flowing water had potent political 
and economic ramifications in the age of the Erie Canal.  Opened in 1825, the Canal connected 
the Hudson River at Albany, New York, (the state’s capital) to the western “frontier” of Buffalo, 
NY, opened new territories to settlement, led to an economic boom, and symbolized the free 
circulation of ideas and national unity more generally.62  Preventing access to the Canal or other 
waterways could practically isolate a community, hindering economic expansion and 
communication with the rest of the nation, and could deprive the nation of that region’s 
resources.  Similarly, the convention suggests, preventing access to franchise rights effectively 
isolates the disfranchised, cutting the means to accumulating wealth, power, and property, as 
well as their ability to contribute to the civic good.  Ultimately, both the state and the 
disenfranchised lose. 
The race-based property qualifications turn the means of citizenship practice, a public 
property, into private property, an end in itself to be passed down from favored son to favored 
son in a way that reproduces the “stale primogenital fallacies of the blood-dyed political 
institutions of the old world.”63  It effectively creates an aristocracy masquerading as 
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republicanism and produces the hierarchies it purports to simply reflect.  That is, if republican 
citizenship is based on equal ownership of and access to political institutions, then the state’s 
racial qualification makes its government something other than republican, instead making New 
York a feudal state.64 
If the circulation of waterways offers a central trope for how the franchise connects 
citizens as a functional collective, the trope of circulating blood reveals how this common 
network promotes material and social prosperity for those with access and material and social 
degradation for those without it.  The franchise is, as the convention’s form petition put it, an 
“instrument of their elevation,” not a goad or reward for it.65  Blocking access to the franchise “is 
like extracting the living principle from the blood of the system.”66  “Is it any wonder,” they ask, 
“that our energies have been relapsed, that our powers have been crippled, our purposes 
nerveless, our determinations dead and lifeless?”67  “From this” outside repression, the 
convention tells its fellow colored citizens, “proceeded our degradation.  This has been the 
source of our suffering and oppression.”68  The cultural and political advantages of the franchise 
open access to political and economic opportunities:  “those resources of pecuniary and 
possessional [sic] emolument, which an unshackled citizenship does always ensure”—
inaccessible to the disfranchised.69  Where the framers of New York’s 1821 constitution argued 
that black men needed the property qualification because their blackness signified inferiority 
(either because of prolonged enslavement, in which case the qualification would serve as a spur, 
or because of immutable racial differences), the black delegates argue that the state’s policy had 
functioned to create an ontological and teleological signification of black skin that was not 
empirically evident before.70 
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Figured in terms of either waterway or vital force, the differences in access produce the 
material distinctions apparent in 1840 that white citizens then anachronistically read as the basis 
for the $250 qualification.  A generation removed from enslavement, black New Yorkers 
remained “shackled” to slavery’s legacy of political oppression and economic exploitation, not 
because slavery made them unfit for citizenship, but because New York’s constitution 
reproduced slavery’s subjugation. 71  Prescriptive franchise requirements create material and 
political conditions of dependence and corruption (or the perception of it).  The state and white 
voters, in turn read the effects of the voting restriction as justification for their original 
implementation and continuation.  What the delegates analyze as the effects of unnatural voting 
restrictions, the white voters read as the manifestation of natural differences.  Causes (franchise 
requirements) become the effects, and effects (dependence and degradation) become the 
causes.72  Put somewhat differently, the delegates model of civic power suggests that condition-
based arguments have confused the means of citizenship practice (political participation) with 
their ends, a sense of community and shared responsibility for the common good.73   
The delegates’ analysis of how civic power circulates and accumulates, confronts how 
white citizens have used condition-based arguments to truncate the exercise of black civic power 
by first positing that political participation makes citizens better political agents; the 
responsibility creates the traits that political participation requires.  Political participation 
“unshackle[s]” citizenship, makes citizens functional, providing a structure of identification by 
dividing civic responsibility (responsibility to and ownership of the civic good) among citizens 
and making each accountable to the other.74  Far from requiring inherent virtue or racial and 
gender homogeneity, political participation fosters the characteristics it requires through 
communal practice.  The trope of circulating blood illustrates how the suffrage creates 
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commonality within a body politc without requiring homogeneity.  In a passage calibrated to 
demonstrate the importance of franchise rights to the convention’s black readers, the convention 
argues: “the possession of the franchise right is the life blood of political existence.  It runs 
through all the convolutions of our civil state.  It connects itself with our literary immunities, 
enters into our ecclesiastical associations, and blends with our social and domestic relations.”75  
Franchise rights, as formalized and institutionally protected political participation (a “self-
protecting instrument”) and a gateway to other rights and resources, would protect other political 
and public spaces from the encroachment of a hostile racial majority or a powerful economic 
minority.76  The franchise protects public discourse (“literary immunities”) and links all the 
interest-based civic and social institutions that could otherwise atomize a community, creating a 
common network (as either waterway or circulatory system) through which differences can be 
mediated. Citizens’ dedication to republican citizenship, with its “eye to individual freedom” as 
articulated in the “Declaration of Independence” and the U.S. Constitution, provides “the 
connecting chain that runs through the whole mighty mass of humanity...the common sympathies 
and wants of the race,” that is, the human race.  Figured as blood, the franchise displaces the 
biological bases for fellow citizenship; fellow citizens become “related” through their joining of 
civic power under the auspices shared political channels.77  Citizens do not have to share the 
same political or cultural views or even particularly like each other so long as they agree that 
republican government is the medium through which these differences should be worked out. 
But there is something more basic to this theory than the belief in a specific mode of 
participatory politics.  Even if franchised and disfranchised citizens do not share the common 
blood of suffrage, they do still share the basic human need for political self-determination, the 
need to expend civic energy.  Legislation cannot alter this need.  As such, the convention further 
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argues, the will to participation may dull due to disuse or appear fragments due to 
disorganization, but the power itself never disappears entirely.  If black citizens’ civic “powers” 
do not appear in evidence, it is not due to their absence.  The civic energy remains, but it lacks 
the circulation and “natural and legitimate exercise” that directs it into citizenship practice.78 
“The powers that should have been thus employed, have not lain dormant,” the convention’s 
“Address…to the Voters of the State” explains:  “Powers will have exercise, either healthy or 
unhealthy.  The impartial and proscriptive non-suffrage act, has been to us hurtful in the extreme.  
The powers that should naturally have been thus exercised, were wrested from their legitimate 
employment.”79  Without an outlet for the natural inclination towards self-determination, excess 
civic power will flow into political rebellion, violent revolution, criminality, or movements like 
the “Convention of the Colored Inhabitants of the State of New York.”  The convention’s 
language echoes Alexander Hamilton’s contention for a strong federal government in Federalist 
No. 13:  “Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very 
great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious 
arrangement of subordinate institutions.”80  Where Hamilton’s arguments focus on creating a 
federal government strong enough to direct a diverse and wide-ranging civic body, the 1840 New 
York convention warns that such a government must be able to encompass all of its citizens to 
be productive.  Unable to pursue happiness by means of political engagement, debate, 
compromise, agitation, etc., disenfranchised citizens will naturally seek extra-governmental and 
eventually extra-legal means.  This lack of an outlet could also result in civic atrophy.  Like a 
gangrenous limb, the rot can and will spread to the rest of the community, because, despite the 
social boundaries, the root republican principles that provide the community’s foundation and 
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facilitates exchanges between individuals will always be compromised.  Moreover, the buildup 
of unfocused, unused energy, like the buildup of water at a dam, could simply explode.   
The New York convention’s theory of circulation and civic power reveals the relation 
between conventions and citizenship practice, suggesting that we read the convention itself as a 
manifestation of black citizens’ desire for political participation.  With only restricted access to 
the electoral mechanisms that were quickly becoming the dominant instrument of citizenship in 
the antebellum U.S., black citizens worked through extralegal conventions, a potentially more 
democratic and revolutionary citizenship practice that electoral politics were beginning to 
replace.  Just as Jones and Allen framed their Narrative as a response to an encroachment on 
their liberty, so too do the state conventions situate their claims as a call for restoration and 
fulfillment rather than dissolution.  The black state conventions eschew complete dissolution, 
however, because, some argue, the U.S. Revolution already established the break from monarchy 
and the Federal Constitution already guarantees their rights of citizenship.81  Rather, they situate 
themselves in the tradition of nonviolent, constitutional revolution.   
 
4. Why Conventions? Why Colored?:  Citizenship through a “Different Medium” 
What I have suggested is that the conventions mobilize a theory of civic power in which 
the circulation of civic power through political participation makes citizenship functional, 
especially in lieu of a national standard for citizenship.  The New York convention leverages this 
argument to frame their claims to suffrage as a fulfillment of natural law, rather than a “foreign 
issue” or imposition on the rights of white citizens.  Yet, presenting these claims through a 
“Convention of the Colored Inhabitants of New York” is just as important as their theoretical 
arguments.  Antebellum conventions were an outgrowth of the democratic practices that hearken 
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back to pre-revolutionary committees of correspondence and turn-of-the century democratic-
republican societies.  Initially organized to facilitate communication between colonial resistance 
groups in the years preceding the revolution, committees of correspondence lacked official 
standing, instead basing authority in the local voting processes.82  As colonists became 
increasingly frustrated with colonial authority in the 1770s, these committees began assuming 
the power and responsibility of official governance, ultimately providing, contends Edward 
Countryman, “the means by which people excluded under the old order entered fully into 
politics.”83  These committees forged crucial infrastructure for the Continental Congresses, the 
framing of state constitutions, the break with Britain, and for the preservation of the Revolution 
in the nation’s first decades.84   
After the revolution, the political framework modeled in the local committees of 
correspondence remained in the form the democratic-republican societies and other associations 
of the late eighteenth century that were not quite political parties or official organizations, but 
also not ancillary to the political process.85  By the 1830s, this direct engagement with 
government produced the sense that citizens “speak in the language of command, and not of 
prayer, to their Representatives.”86  People who did not or could not assume this civic tone were 
apparently not citizens.  Between 1835 and 1849, seven states held constitutional conventions to 
revise standing constitutions or to frame new ones in their path towards statehood.87 These local 
organizations and the public and deliberative process of constitution drafting and ratification 
created a democratic ethos from the bottom up that netted what we now popularly describe as 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Republicanisms.88  Each of these instances shares the sense that 
government rules through the consent of the governed, and when established representational 
structures fail to reflect the views of the consenting people, the people need to take more 
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radically democratic measures.  When states were no longer responsive to citizens’ needs, these 
local structures could become agents of revolutionary change—often rhetorically channeling the 
Revolution—manifesting in violence as in the Whiskey Rebellion and the U.S. Civil War or, as 
was increasingly the case, in conventions seeking constitutional change. 
The Dorrite Convention of 1841 demonstrates the potential of the convention as a 
political form and outlet for civic power.89  During the early 1840s, disenfranchised white 
citizens in Rhode Island organized suffrage associations that petitioned the state legislature 
initially for suffrage rights and then for a state constitutional convention to reform Rhode 
Island’s suffrage requirements.  When the 581-signiture petition and subsequent state 
constitutional convention both failed, the suffragists “responded by affirming the right of 
citizens, inherent in the people’s sovereignty, to call a constitutional convention on their own—
to bypass the assembly, elect delegates, draft a constitution, and ratify it in the manner of states 
during the Revolutionary period.”90  The subsequent People’s Convention and constitution 
seriously threatened to supplant the incumbent government of Rhode Island in part because, like 
the pre-revolutionary committees of correspondence, the Dorrites had begun to act as if they 
were the state government.  They presented themselves as more able to set aside private interests 
for the common good than the (apparently) self-serving Charterites.  They elected representatives 
on a more democratic basis, drafted and ratified a new state constitution, and planned to legislate 
at the beginning of the session, falling short when the representatives balked at occupying the 
statehouse.91  Though the Dorrites never supplanted the incumbent state government, and the 
subsequent changes to the state constitution fell short of the movement’s aspirations, the Dorr 
rebellion demonstrated the potential power of appealing to the public’s sense of sovereignty and 
serves as a prominent, if extreme, example of the hopes people invested in conventions. 
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Moreover, if movements like the People’s Convention demonstrate the potential power of this 
extra-governmental form, their emphasis on franchise rights reflects a moment in U.S. political 
history when citizens exchange more direct citizenship practice—in the form of conventions and 
the like—for more abstracted political participation in the shape of voting.  
My argument here is not necessarily that the black conventions did anything particularly 
differently from other conventions, but rather, that the choice of this form—the convention and 
circulated proceedings—signifies in certain recognizable and performative ways that an address 
or addresses (without the accompanying frame) could not. The countless petitions, conventions, 
meetings, parades, and other non-governmental forms of citizen participation during the 1830s 
and 1840s were not, from the antebellum citizen’s view, ancillary or symbolic political 
demonstrations.  Rather, they were a viable, visible, and a potentially revolutionary mode of 
civic engagement in which voting was just becoming accessible to masses of white men.92 
Though not seeking to supplant state governments, as such, the black state conventions worked 
through the same logic: by serving in the capacity of political representatives who had a share in 
the state’s collective sovereignty and by taking their entitlement to such rights as given even in 
the absence of official sanction, the delegates conventions engaged in the political process in fact 
even if they do not do so in law.   
The problem facing black activists from the outset, however, was that this populist 
impulse, as it resulted in a more democratic public sphere for white men, often did so through 
explicitly excising white women and people of color from the consenting public, resulting in a 
majority apathetic, if not outright hostile, to further democratic expansion.93  Ironically, had the 
People’s Convention extended their program to include rather than exclude black Rhode 
Islanders, the coalition may have succeeded in overthrowing the Rhode Island oligarchy.94  In 
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this way, the Rhode Islander’s prove the New York convention’s point:  refusing a more 
expansive circulation of civic power, the Dorrites fell short of their political goals.  And, like 
the1841 People’s Convention, the delegates to the black state conventions needed to either 
convince state legislators that enfranchising them was worth risking the ire of their white 
constituents or convince both legislators and a majority of white voters that their claims were not 
only just, but critical to the state’s continued prosperity.   
Even as the 1840 New York convention presented convention a reasoned argument for 
suffrage rights, then, its success depended on the performance and presentation of these 
arguments to the public.95  As Ray observes, the impressions the convention left on the attending 
audience—”many of the leading men in Albany of the Whig political party, and of public 
matters”—and readers of the convention’s proceedings were at least as important to the delegates 
as the outcome of the debates and their theoretical soundness.96  The Whig onlookers provide a 
moment of Hegelian recognition, but with an ever-present caveat of difference—”as one of their 
own class said to us”—that reemphasizes the power differential between the convention 
delegates (since many could not vote) and the white voters and legislators who make up part of 
its audience.97  The need for formal recognition exposes tensions inherent in these conventions as 
simultaneously practices in and signs of citizenship and at the same time stagings adhering to 
certain stylistic conventions and dependent on voter affirmation for validation.98  Ray’s 
comments reveal the measure of aesthetic judgment and persuasion always attendant to 
deliberative politics, especially in lieu of a civic space fraught with inequity.99 
While the convention, the event itself, staged black citizenship practices, providing an 
outlet for black civic power, the documents surrounding the convention—the Calls and debates 
leading up to the event and the Proceedings and reports following the event—circulated to gather 
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the public approval needed for constitutional change.  Integral to this staging, then, was how 
convention organizers shaped the political community of “colored” citizens the delegates 
claimed to represent.  The delegates needed to define colored citizens as a group with shared 
political claims against the state while not reinforcing the sense that they were a separate people.  
The 1840 New York convention’s analysis of how differences in political rights produced 
material distinctions not peculiar to black citizens as a people was one point of attack, but the 
battle over black political identity began before the first delegates ever arrived in Albany.  The 
debate about the necessity, efficacy, and purpose of a convention of colored inhabitants, before 
the 1840 New York convention also reveals the political exigencies that influence how these 
conventions shaped their public presences and approached their respective audiences.   
White and black activists alike were often ambivalent towards the “complexional” nature 
of these conventions.  William Whipper, James McCune Smith, and other black activists 
opposed the 1840 convention because of the expense, the possible diffusion of labor, and their 
sense that the suffrage movement would be better served by an interracial coalition under the 
umbrella of human rights.100  After the convention, William Whipper famously penned a set of 
three letters to the Colored American critiquing the 1840 Convention’s emphasis on color as “in 
direct opposition to the ‘rights of humanity.’”101  White anti-slavery activists like Nathaniel 
Rogers, editor of the National Anti-Slavery Standard, accused the organizers of repeating the 
prejudices of white men in addressing their call to colored citizens.  Rogers’s June 18, 1840, 
editorial addresses itself to the organizers as a “friend” and then argues:  “We oppose all 
exclusive action on the part of the colored people, except where the clearest necessity demands 
it.”102  Rogers continues, “time should be taken to discuss the measures to be employed 
deliberately; and the people should be made distinctly to understand that our country is your 
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country; our God your God.”103  The language implies that at best the conventioneers’ actions 
were too hasty, showing a lack of rational deliberation; at worst, Rogers’s commentary implies 
that this deliberation could only occur with their (white) legitimating presence and direction.104   
Defending the convention against such attacks forced supporters to grapple with the 
meaning of “color” as an organizing principle, questions of agency vis-à-vis fracturing anti-
slavery organizations, and the tensions between presenting black citizens as autonomous 
individuals and the public’s tendency to read their political actions as the result of white 
patronage or pawns in the jockeying of political parties.105  In these terms, the exclusive 
gathering is merely provisional—when the caste system no longer exists, “there will then be no 
longer special interests to be attended to.”106  One such defender, “Sidney,” responds to William 
Whipper’s letters in one of the clearest articulations of a pragmatic political black nationalism in 
early African America:  “Whenever a people are oppressed, peculiarly (not complexionally), 
distinctive organization or action is required on the part of the oppressed, to destroy that 
oppression.  The colored people of this country are oppressed; therefore the colored people are 
required to act in accordance with this fundamental principle.”107  In much the same vein, 
Samuel Ringgold Ward responds to Rogers’s Standard editorial by pointing out white 
abolitionists’ racial privilege and myopia: their inability “to see a colored man when in the 
company of other whites necessitates such a convention.”108  Ward upbraids Rogers: “had you a 
colored skin from October ‘17 to June ‘40, as I have, in this pseudo-republic, you would have 
seen through a very different medium.”109  Sidney and Ward connect being “colored” to a 
historical experience of oppression and to a mode of seeing this oppression as an issue of 
political power and representation.  Being colored in this instance signifies in much the same 
way as being property-less might in other circumstances.  To have a “colored skin,” their 
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analysis suggests, is to be without property in whiteness, a property worth about $250 in New 
York.110  This material and historical perspective gave Ward and Sidney a theoretical and 
experiential understanding of politics different from their white partners in anti-slavery activism.   
The convention welcomed white attendance—even needed their approbation—but Ray 
maintains that any political progress will require the kind of publicity that only a gathering 
arranged by an autonomous black political collective could provide.  The political exigencies and 
the way race frames and suffuses these politics supersede the sentimental affiliation Rogers 
suggests in proclaiming, “every abolitionist should be a colored person in this case.”111  Every 
abolitionist, Ray argues, cannot be a colored person, because being “colored” is a function of 
social and political constraints that white citizens do not share.  This division is evident in anti-
slavery conventions in which the black participants are “looked upon as playing second fiddle 
to” the white callers.112  Black abolitionists could lecture and even preside over the meetings, but 
the decisions would always come down from the white leadership.113 Such an event, a “different 
medium,” would demonstrate to the state that, rather than operating as puppets to abolitionist 
organizations, black citizens desired the franchise for their own and the state’s benefit, “that as 
citizens we should possess the privileges and immunities of citizenship: and…we are as capable 
of appreciating and exercising those rights as others.”114  It would position them as political 
agents rather than objects of legislation or the political wards of the Whig establishment.  It 
would allow black citizens to exercise their own civic power. 
The debates preceding the convention positioned the delegates as representatives of a 
political community of colored citizens.  After the convention, the delegates use print to extend 
the convention’s performance, with the circulation of the collected “Proceedings” or 
“Minutes”—that included debates, resolutions, addresses, and petitions—and the conventions’ 
 116 
form petitions that articulated the delegates’ central position in a shorter form.115  If the suffrage 
acts as the official conduit of civic power, these Proceedings serve as an unofficial, alternate 
route, connecting black citizens to an otherwise inaccessible civic sphere.  The organizers of the 
1840 New York convention were keenly aware that the convention’s legitimacy depended as 
much on how well it executed its business as a deliberative body (or at least how well it 
presented this execution to the public) as it did on what the convention actually decided.116  Ray 
reiterates again and again, that the “Proceedings” represents the convention’s “respectable and 
noble” character, revealing the delegates’ ability to conduct business without “angry debate,” 
settling differences “amicably and yet without compromise.”117  Indeed, the form of these 
debates and resolutions carries at least as much weight as their content because the text confirms 
Ray’s claim that the convention adhered to a republican style of politics.   
Adhering to the republican style meant that all of the proceedings needed to observe 
parliamentary procedure and reflect the delegates’ sense of civility.  And, because audiences 
would read any sign of disorder as confirmation of black difference, the minutes needed to be 
especially scrupulous on this point.  Rather than including transcriptions or details of debates 
between delegates, —as the National Conventions are notorious for doing and as state 
constitutional conventions did—the proceedings mention the disagreement as a matter of 
procedure.  The minutes for the New York convention include the substance of disagreements 
(no matter how heated), but not the actual back and forth, in a way that frames it as a democratic 
process of revision.  For example, when some delegates (C. B. Ray, T. S. Wright, E. P. Rogers) 
supported a resolution encouraging black citizens to buy property to meet the franchise 
requirements for practical reasons, others (H. H. Garnet, U. Boston, A. Crummell) opposed it 
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because the resolution implied consent to the current requirement.  The convention records the 
debate over the resolution as follows: 
A very spirited debate arose on this resolution, owing to the exception taken to that part 
of it which asserted that the obtainment of a certain amount of property, “elevates us to 
the rights of freemen”….  The discussion on the resolution, continued till near the close 
of the session, when Mr. Ray introduced an amendment, which was strongly opposed, 
owing to its containing…the same objectionable feature as the original resolution. 
 
The minutes exclude the actual back and forth, instead offering the procedural commentary:  
“spirited debate,” “discussion,” introduction of an amendment, opposition to the amendment, etc.  
They adjourn without a resolution and return to the question later, but “after some further 
discussion…laid [it] indefinitely upon the table.”118  This presentation offers enough description 
to give readers a sense of the stakes involved in the resolution’s language, the delegates’ astute 
attention to this language (mirroring similar debates about semantics during constitutional 
conventions), and the democratic process through which the convention negotiated this impasse.  
Without the messy details of individual arguments, however, even this clearly divisive issue (it 
consumes the better part of two sessions after all) reads relatively smoothly. 
The minutes do not mention the debate again, but later that evening, after several reports, 
two resolutions appear that resolve the tensions around the original proposal:  “Resolved, That 
we recommend to our people to become possessors of the soil within the limits of this State” and, 
Resolved, That in recommending our people to possess themselves of the soil, we 
no less protest against that clause in the Constitution of the State which requires a 
property qualification of us…considering it wrong in principle, sapping the foundation of 
self government, and contrary to all notions of natural justice.119 
 
These two resolutions register and synthesize the primary disagreements over the original 
proposal as dialectical progression.  Like other resolutions, the proceedings do not record the 
vote count, nor do they give the names of who proposed which parts of these adopted 
resolutions.  Where the debate account registers the political fault lines, the new resolutions 
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appear as if none of the earlier exchange and deadlock had occurred.  In its linear progression, 
this presentation functions dialectically to meld discordant voices into a, coherent representative 
civic voice.  But the differences themselves do not disappear.  The proceedings, as Mark 
Schoenfield has suggested in the context of eighteenth-century British periodicals, produce an 
“institutionally heteroglossic” structure, at once ephemeral—the record of a singular event, 
situated in a particular political moment—and at the same time “compiled” and “collected” as a 
record of the political moment.120  Internally, the resolutions relate to each other dialogically in a 
call-and-response sequence mediated, as it were, by the “third party” of the overall corporate 
author as a product of public democratic exchange.121  The pieces of the proceedings also 
dialogue with each other:  the preamble with the resolutions, the resolutions with the addresses, 
the resolutions with each other, etc. This formal structure, at once a dialectical progression 
through compromise and at the same time a dialogic interplay between distinct voices and 
sections, no less than the resolutions’ content demonstrates the deliberative politics that 
opponents claimed were beyond black citizens’ mental capacities or social conditions.  The 
convention itself shows the delegates doing the work of the republican citizenship through a 
form that models how republican governments should channel and focus citizens’ civic energy.  
As the next section suggests, the convention’s staging reaches full effect when audiences 
encounter the parts of the proceedings as a package. 
 
5.  “Not very courteous language, indeed, for petitioners”:  Convention as Sublime Appeal 
So far, I have used the 1840 Convention of the Colored Inhabitants of New York to 
outline the relation between citizenship practice and political participation in terms of 
circulation:  the circulation of civic power through channels of participatory politics vitalizes 
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citizenship practice.  Restricting this circulation can result in the distressed social conditions a 
white public has increasingly ascribed to racial difference.  The state conventions themselves are 
a manifestation of black citizen’s civic power, and delegates use this specific form in lieu of 
official franchise rights to press for constitutional change. 
More than the 1840 New York convention, the 1848 State Convention of the Colored 
Citizens of Pennsylvania explicitly cites the creation and movement of collective texts (petitions) 
as a tool for textually joining politically separate communities.  The convention issued “An 
Appeal to the Colored Citizens” and “An Appeal to the Voters of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania,” printed with the original proceedings and reprinted in Samuel Ringgold Ward’s 
Impartial Citizen a year later.122  Composed by the same committee, the “Appeals” make up 
most of the Proceedings.123  Aimed at separate audiences but printed side by side, the “Appeals” 
mirror the dialectic-dialogic model of deliberative politics presented in the debate-to-resolution 
sequence during the convention itself.  While the “Appeals” position each audience dialogically, 
addressing white voters and colored citizens separately, the call for each audience to work 
towards expanding citizenship rights through drafting petitions operates dialectically, creating 
fellow citizenship.  This circulation of petitions from both groups could connect civic power 
through citizenship practices that reaffirm citizens’ commitment to republican governance.  Just 
as the Erie Canal connected separate segments of the nation, the “Appeals” serve as a conduit 
connecting citizens’ civic power.  Just as the lines separating newspaper columns signal that each 
article belongs to the same institutional structure, the 1848 convention’s “Appeals’” 
institutionally heteroglossic structure connects its separate audiences as fellow citizens.   
The oscillation in how the “Appeals” deploy the term “appeal” produces the 
institutionally heteroglossic relation between audiences and maps how the 1848 Pennsylvania 
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convention’s transition between seeking approval and redress from white voters (supplication) 
and a more radical sense of sublime appeal more in the strain of a jeremiad or manifesto.  The 
OED offers several definitions of “appeal” in play during the 1840s: an appeal to authority for 
vindication or to overturn the ruling of a lower court; to level a criminal charge before a tribunal 
or “impeachment of treason or felony”; and an appeal to country, “the people,” or a higher 
principle.124  Where the first two instances maintain a separation between voters and nonvoters—
citizens without civic authority addressing citizens with civic authority—, the last instance calls 
on the collective civic power of Pennsylvania’s citizens to revise or draft a new constitution.  
The “Appeal to the Colored Citizens” offers court proceedings as the guiding metaphor 
for both “Appeals”:  “We intend suing for our rights as men; where the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the government is the Court, and 400,000 legal voters the jury, our own conduct 
being the witnesses, and true republican principles the law.”125  The “Appeal” defines “true 
republican principles” through reference to the Declaration of Independence:  “‘that all just 
governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed.’”126  Regardless of perceived 
deficiencies in the black population, the fact that colored citizens are “governed” by the state of 
Pennsylvania forms the basis of a contract that entitles them to franchise rights.  Pennsylvania’s 
1837/38 constitutional convention, by denying colored citizens the right to give consent, and yet 
requiring their obedience and loyalty, violates this fundamental republican law.  The “Appeal to 
the Voters,” then, applies to the state and voters (addressed as “Sirs”) as institutional superiors, 
“the source of power from which the fundamental Laws of this Commonwealth must derive their 
origin, power and sustenance,” able to overturn the constitutional convention’s initial ruling.127  
Yet, by appealing to the voters in this legal context, the “Appeals” present the delegates as 
equals—advocates rather than supplicants—critiquing institutional errors from a position of 
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moral and legal authority.  Just as the act of organizing and addressing the public through a 
convention enacts citizenship even as it speaks from outside the official sphere, appealing to the 
voters rather than simply addressing them implies the moral equality of the appealers as 
recognizable legal agents, despite the imbalance in institutional authority. 
Like their New York counterparts, the Pennsylvanians’ refuse the calculus that black 
citizens must elevate themselves before enfranchisement, yet they also recognize that the means 
to enfranchisement requires a publicity campaign.  Even as the “Appeals” lay their case before 
the voters, seeking impartial justice based on the laws of republicanism, the “Appeal to the 
Voters” reveals the inherent danger to minorities when contract-based arguments meet consent-
based structures or when republican principles meet racist public opinion.128  Where Lord 
Mansfield based the 1772 Somersett judgment on the “language” of British law, Pennsylvania’s 
voters will be judging colored citizens based on their actions, even though such “evidence…has 
no foundation in established precedents.”129  Even if the voters were to judge colored citizens 
based on republicanism, the voters are so diverse in “every quality of prejudice” and 
interpretation of republicanism (which “they are not bound by oaths to support”) that their 
judgment is capricious.130  As such, while the delegates appeal to law and principle in the 
“Appeal to the Voters,” the “Appeal to the Colored Citizens” still requests that colored citizens 
not give white voters an excuse for relying on their prejudices.  Colored citizens should “avoid 
any unjust cause of offence,” but instead, should work to gather support from a wide a range of 
citizens.  This anxiety over public whim suggests that while the practices of citizenship should be 
open to all citizens, this same openness makes achieving equality for disempowered citizens or 
non-citizens difficult in practice, especially when voters decide exactly who qualifies and are not 
obligated to follow any standard outside the one of their own making.   
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And it is precisely because the 1837-38 constitutional convention manipulated white 
prejudice for political gain that the 1848 convention comes before the public, ten years later, to 
“sue” for their rights, rather than simply request them.  In this sense of “appeal,” the delegates 
“accuse” voters “of a heinous crime whereby the accuser has received personal injury or wrong, 
for which he demands reparation.”131  Despite explicitly positioning the voters as members of the 
jury and the state government as judge in the “Appeal to Colored Citizens,” both the “Appeal to 
Colored Citizens” and the “Appeal to the Voters” ultimately take on a tone of accusation and 
judgment, resting on republican law.132  In rhetoric that prefigures Douglass’s “Oration,” the 
“Appeal to the Voters” reviews the state’s history of republicanism through its own documents:   
We need not search among the antiquated records of the past for a successful 
vindication of our claims to impartial laws.  These emblems, of our State’s humanity are 
imperishably recorded in the sublime appeals of her distinguished statesmen.   
We do not appear before you as the supplicants for any new form of government 
which is opposed to the foundation principles of republicanism; we only ask the favor of 
the application of your own principles to your civil code….  You claim that your own 
Independence Hall is the sacred spot where your republicanism was born, cradled and 
received a national baptism, and from whence the same vestal fire of freedom is 
encompassing the globe.133   
 
The black population, the delegates write, have watched the white population’s “soul stirring 
appeals in behalf of republicanism, in foreign lands,” and cannot help but believe that voters 
would want the same “progress of free principles” in their “own dearest Pennsylvania.134  The 
delegates situate Pennsylvania as the exemplar of republicanism to the world.  The proliferation 
of documents (quotes from the state constitution, the declaration of independence), monuments 
(Independence Hall, etc.), and events within the “Appeal to the Voters” form the basis of a 
covenant between the state and its citizens.135  The “you’s” throughout the “Appeal to the 
Voters” punctuates the voters’ responsibility for their own laws and how these laws violate the 
state’s self-proclaimed republican principles.136  As outside witnesses, the “we” of the “Appeal 
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to the Voters” excoriates the “you,” the “Appeal’s” audience: they should be humiliated by the 
contemplation of what is written in the law.  The emphasis on the contractual or covenant nature 
of republicanism the “Appeal to the Voters” shifts the argumentative burden from the meaning of 
blackness and ostensible material and ontological differences between types of citizens to the 
principles of republicanism as applied to all citizens.  
While the “Appeal to the Voters” engages the Voters’ responsibility and patriotism, 
suggesting that the current voters risk forsaking the legacy of their forebears, the “Appeal to 
Colored Citizens” excoriates these same voters for breaking their state’s republican contract for 
personal gain.  In so doing, the “Appeals” offer an incisive analysis of how electoral politics 
structured through racial hierarchies worked to limit democratic citizenship even as it appears to 
create a more democratic public sphere.  The “Appeal to Colored Citizens” argues that racism 
functioned as a “passport to power” that allowed white citizens to limit potential political 
opposition as much as they could. They suggest that the state’s elite and white citizens more 
generally have deliberately refused to base their decisions on the very standards they themselves 
claim to use, and have instead used suffrage restrictions to suppress republican governance and 
to disfranchise not only citizens who could not vote, but also to better control those citizens who 
could. As the “Appeal to the Colored Citizens” argues with chagrin:   
They [Reform Convention] were cunning logicians, and well knew that no argument 
founded on condition would meet the false prejudices of their constituents.  They knew 
that the period had long since passed when it would be possible to frame a standard of 
condition that would separate the white from the colored people. 
So they disfranchised us…assuming condition as their reason, and complexion as 
their standard.137   
 
The constitutional convention delegates based the franchise requirements on social and economic 
condition only to make whiteness the standard for measuring them in a way that smoothed over 
differences between white men.138  Race was never an indicator of civic worth, but rather the 
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“capital” funding a shell game in which race substituted for reason or republican principle, 
giving the sense that all white citizens were abstractly equal, when the delegates were actually 
trying to make the political field as unequal as they could.  
In one sense, electoral politics worked in preventing this more wholesale power grab; in 
another sense, the ratification reveals just how vulnerable the electorate can be to manipulation.  
Just because universal white manhood suffrage seems to work in favor of all white men, does not 
mean that a more democratic sphere was the intent.  Many of those who supported the suffrage 
restriction “would not only have disfranchised us, but the poor of every nation, and whole 
political parties, that were opposed to them in the bargain.”139  By focusing voters’ attentions on 
protecting their shared interests in whiteness against incursions from a black mass or any easily 
isolated “others,” those in power could more easily mask their maneuvering for more control.140  
Where the 1840 New York convention theorizes and stages citizenship based in part on 
the prevailing logic of the republican style, the 1848 Pennsylvania convention theoretically 
dismantles white civic duplicity.  Though the delegates to the constitutional convention are guilty 
of pandering to racial prejudices, their white constituents are equally guilty for holding and 
acting on these “false prejudices.” 141  The problem of racial condition is not in black identity, but 
rather in the gaze.  So long as white voters give ontological, normative, and moral value to skin 
color, black citizens will never become “elevated” enough.  For the “Appeals’” black readers, 
giving an account of racial oppression that indicts white duplicity and arbitrariness instead of 
black condition or behavior eliminates the improvement-then-rights tactics even as it provides 
reasons for continuing to support moral and material uplift, not for the sake of impressing a 
white public, but rather as good in and of themselves.   
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As appeal to a higher authority, then, the “Appeals” acknowledge the authority of white 
voters as ultimate sovereigns of the state.  As appeal of a crime, the “Appeals” call white citizens 
to account for breaking the nation and the state’s founding compacts, when Pennsylvania, as the 
former capital and birthplace of some of the most renowned patriots, should be at the vanguard, 
protecting these compacts.  3) Lastly, because the racialization of rights threatens the very fabric 
of republican government in the state, the “Appeals” appeal to all citizens to revise or dissolve 
the existing contract.142  The invocation of “the sublime appeals of [Pennsylvania’s] 
distinguished statesmen,” particularly the “Declaration of Independence,” through the structure 
of a convention that calls its own addresses to the public “appeals” directly links the 1848 
convention to a national tradition of government by consent and continuing revolution.143  This 
approach shifts voters’ attention away from a systems-off citizenship in which the would-be 
citizen must attain a certain standard before earning full rights to a systems-on citizenship in 
which, according to the state and nation’s founding contracts, all governed citizens receive all the 
rights of citizenship until they “[forfeit] their rights” by committing a crime.144 
The “Appeals” reference the “Declaration” in a way that suggests conservation of the 
current form of government while justifying revolution.  The “Appeal to the Voters” reassures 
the public that the convention is not calling for a radical change in government, citing the 
Declaration’s assertion “‘that governments long established should not be changed for slight and 
transient causes,’ and all experience has proved, that as a people we are disposed to suffer 
present evils ‘rather than fly to others we know not of’.”145  The “Appeal to the Colored 
Citizens” likewise justifies its claims through he Declaration’s assertion “that all just 
governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed,” again suggesting that the 
“Appeals” are simply citing the basic premises of the current government.146  Yet, despite the 
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reassurance that the colored citizens are not seeking radical change in the quoted passages from 
the Declaration, the ellipsis between the clause invoking the consent of the governed and the 
clause invoking the conservation of institutions suggests a more radical edge.  Nested between 
these justifications for working within the current system, the Declaration offers reasons for 
dissolution: “That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” The call to a more radical democracy in the ellipsis 
between the two clauses quoted separately in the two “Appeals” mirrors the unspoken, yet 
insistent call for a more radical interpretation of republicanism between the two “Appeals” more 
generally, an appeal to directly confront racist state policies as a danger to the legitimacy and 
stability of the civic compact as a whole.   
As recompense for their collective negligence in allowing the state to compromise its 
republican creed, the state convention appeals to citizens, both white and black, to exercise their 
collective sovereignty and draft a new civic compact.  More than referencing founding 
documents, then, the convention asks white voters to join them in producing new texts:  “Our 
object in assembling is not only to petition the Legislature ourselves, but also to solicit you to 
petition…to instruct [legislators] in a course of action.”147  Together, the “Appeals” seek to build 
an interracial coalition of petitioners, a new interracial majority, around the issue of voting 
rights.  Like the “Dorr War” earlier in the decade, this call to petition had revolutionary potential, 
provided the white public cooperated, but they refuse the race-based exclusions that were part of 
the Dorrites’ failure.  The collective action on the part of the whole people could make the state 
of Pennsylvania stronger, allowing it to join other states that have “succeeded in establishing a 
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republican form of government where men of all complexions enjoy an equality of rights” like 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont.148  The act of petitioning—not simply signing a pre-
formulated petition, but actively creating and circulating them in conjunction with the 
convention’s work—could realign the terms of community affiliation in a way that matches the 
boasted efforts to spread republicanism abroad and could establish and demonstrate consensus 
about a more egalitarian notion republican government.  This sense of appeal, with its framing 
through a convention of representative citizens and its resonances with the Continental 
Congress’s “Declaration” allows the delegates to “reframe the meaning of popular sovereignty” 
by invoking a ritual of consensus that supersedes any existing government.149 
The Pennsylvania Convention’s more confrontational style reads less like the theoretical 
treatise on the meaning of the franchise from the 1840 New York addresses and more like a 
manifesto in the tradition of David Walker’s Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World 
(reprinted in 1848 by Garnet with his 1843 “Address to the Slaves” and biography of Walker) 
and the 1837 “Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens,” respectfully asking the state for redress, but 
maintaining a position of moral and legal judgment.  Invoking these more familiar documents in 
their title and tone, the Pennsylvania convention’s appeals call for the black population to work 
towards their own political liberation with or without the state’s sanction even as they argue that 
the Constitution secures black citizens’ rights:  “Slaves have but learned to lick the dust, and 
stifle the voice of free inquiry; but we are not slaves—our right to natural liberty, and qualified 
citizenship, is guaranteed to us by the Constitution.”150  Like Walker’s Appeal and the 1837 
“Appeal of Forty Thousand,” the “Appeal to Colored Citizens” dismantles the racial illogic by 
which colored citizens had been disfranchised as a part of a larger call to colored citizens to take 
control of their own political fates.  In this way, the “Appeals” may begin with notes of 
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deference, but they have elements of the manifesto at their core:  an articulation of a new 
political position and policy for black Pennsylvanians and an ultimatum directed at the state that 
these citizens will no longer equivocate about their political rights as citizens.   
If the voters do not overturn the legislature’s ruling, it will not be a verdict on the 
“condition” of the colored citizens, but rather, an admission that the state cannot hold up to its 
own professed standards.  Where New York’s Charles Ray emphasizes the recognition of Whig 
onlookers and the presentation of the New York Convention, the Pennsylvanians take the white 
gaze out of the equation:   
We shall live and labor in the glorious anticipation of success; but if it should prove 
otherwise, and you should not consent to repeal the sentence you have passed on 
Providence, we shall derive the rich consolation that in making this appeal we have 
discharged a duty we owe to ourselves, to freedom, and republicanism—to posterity and 
to God.151 
 
Even though colored citizens need the voters’ support to regain the suffrage, they do not depend 
of these voters for their political identity.  If the voters reject the “Appeal,” then the voters have 
failed, ultimately usurping the natural order and rendering their constitution invalid via its own 
republican logic.  The declaration echoes the warning the “Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens” 
issued a decade earlier: “no amendments of the present Constitution can compensate for the loss 
of its foundation principle of equal rights, nor for the conversion into enemies of 40,000 
friends.”152  Ultimately, colored citizens will be justified in separating from a government that 
refuses consent from its whole people.  
Focusing on one meaning of “Appeal” obscures the whole and misses the complexity of 
the Pennsylvania delegates’ position.  More than the “Appeal to the Voters,” the “Appeal to 
Colored Citizens” directly confronts the voters’ criminal negligence in accepting truncated 
republicanism; yet, because the two Appeals were printed side-by-side as a part of the same 
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Proceedings, the “Appeal to the Colored Citizens” speaks to the white audience even as it 
ostensibly addresses a black audience.  The result is that while the “Appeal to the Voters” 
acknowledges white voters and legislators as the governing authority, inheritors of the state’s 
revolutionary heritage, and responsible (if not contractually obligated) to continue the progress 
of republican governance, the “Appeal to the Colored Citizens” accuses the white voters of using 
this power to corrupt the form of government they claim to protect.  This doubling allows the 
convention to request even as it condemns, to ask for judgment even as it dispenses its own 
judgment, and to approach the voters as non-threateningly as possible even as it shapes a unified 
black political community through a sense of righteous indignation.153  Each instance represents 
an algorithm depending on audience reception, a step-by-step protocol leading to either 
citizenship practices that are more democratic on one end or grounds for disassociation on the 
other.   
The common belief in republican governance (stronger than racial, political, or cultural 
homogeneity) should be the central point of identification between citizens, not the many 
differences that might otherwise separate them.  The 1840 New York convention frames 
disfranchisement as the death of citizenship; the Pennsylvanians’ invocation of the sublime 
appeal reveals that the collective struggle to correct institutional wrongs may well be where the 
practice of citizenship truly begins.  It is no coincidence that prominent figures in the 
conventions of the 1840s—Garnet, Alexander Crummell, and Martin R. Delany—would later 
argue that, if the nation continued to be unresponsive, the colored citizens of the U.S. should take 
their civic power elsewhere.154  If the good citizen in Jones and Allen’s Narrative makes 
neighbors out of strangers through empathetic identification, the black state conventions attempt 
to join citizens through participatory politics, making their fellow citizenship stronger.  Yet, as 
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the next chapter suggests, the economic changes of the early nineteenth century were as 
important to citizenship practices as political changes, and as white voters in Pennsylvania and 
New York reaffirmed suffrage restrictions, black activists collectively and individually made the 
case that economic interest might offer routes to political power that persuasion and electoral 
politics could not. 
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41 Where other conventions, particularly those of the American Anti-Slavery Society featured copious 
speeches from individual members, printed over several weeks in the National Anti-Slavery Standard and the 
Liberator, the state conventions of colored citizens seldom recorded addresses other than the collective addresses to 
the citizens.  
42 The 1840 New York convention, for instance, sold pamphlets for one dollar per dozen out of the office of 
the Colored American in New York City.  Charles B. Ray delayed reprinting the proceedings in the Colored 
American until those pamphlets had nearly sold out. 
43 As the delegates to the 1848 State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Pennsylvania argue, “we must 
draft on the benevolence and liberality of the press; for without its favourable influence, no cause, however pure, 
may hope to succeed, and with it truth and justice must prove invincible.”  A report by John Mercer Langston during 
the 1851 State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Ohio likens the press to a field of battle:  “Of the means for the 
advancement of a people as we are, none are more available than a press.  We struggle against opinions.  Our 
warfare lies in the field of thought.  Glorious struggle!  Godlike warfare!  In training our soldiers for the field—in 
marshaling our hosts for the fight—in leading the onset, and throughout the conflict, we need a Printing Press, 
because a printing press is the vehicle of thought—is a ruler of opinions.”  PA 1848, 125; and “Minutes and Address 
of the State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Ohio,” in Foner and Walker, Proceedings, 1:265. 
44 The Colored American, for instance records a series of smaller public meetings taking place in 
Manhattan and the surround boroughs where groups passed resolutions in approbation of the state convention’s 
resolutions and passed form petitions.  See Colored American, 21 November 1840, 5 December 1840, 19 December 
1840, 12 December 1840. 
45 See Jay Fliegelman, Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of 
Performance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 144-151. 
46 Phyllis Field, The Politics of Race in New York, 4; and Pease and Pease, They Who Would Be Free, 182-
186.. 
47 See Harris, Shadow, 222.  The petition drives began in 1837 and continued throughout the 1840s.  
Initially led by Charles B. Ray and Philip Bell, the drive generated a Standing Corresponding Committee of “colored 
young men” that expanded to the New York Association for the political Elevation and Improvement of the People 
of Color by 1839, and ultimately resulted in the New York State convention movement. 
48 This committee included a who’s-who of established and up-and-coming black activists:  Alexander 
Crummell, J. Sharp, Theodore S. Wright, Patrick H. Reason, Charles B. Ray, and Charles Lenox Remond. 
49 When they appeared in the Colored American, however, the addresses were separated by about a month, 
the address to colored citizens appearing on 21 November and the address to the state appearing on 19 December of 
1840. 
50 Phyllis Field reports that between 1837 and 1842, “the legislature received equal suffrage petitions from 
blacks in New York, Albany, Oneida, Dutchess, Erie, Onodaga, Schenectady, Orange, Queens, and Rensselaer 
counties among others” (45).  See also Pease and Pease, 182-186. 
51 Swift reports that the petition carried 2,093 signatures, a significant increase from the 620 collected in 
1837.  Garnet was invited to speak before the judiciary committee on February 18, 1841.  Garnet left the capital 
confident that the state assembly would repeal the franchise qualification, writing to the Colored American on 
March 13, “I think therefore, gentlemen, we may not hesitate saying to our brethren throughout the Empire State, 
that the God of Israel has written with his omnipotent finger upon our future prospects, those all-glorious words: - 
‘Hold up your heads, ye wronged and injured people, for victory is declared unto you,’” only to see the provision 
voted down (forty-six to twenty-nine) that April.  See Swift, Black Prophets, 125-127, and CA, 13 March 1841. 
52 NY 1840, 20.   
53 As Rogers Smith observes in the context of the Crandall ruling, states increasingly separated democratic 
citizenship from “political self-governance,” instead insisting, writes Smith, “citizenship had multiple classes, with 
only the most fortunate or worthy receiving full political privileges.”  See Smith, Civic, 256.  See also Bradburn’s 
denization thesis in Citizenship Revolution, 335-371. 
54 See Smith, Civic, 256-257. 
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55 As Joyce Appleby explains, “those excluded from voting came to view it no longer as a class distinction 
but rather as a male prerogative that the avidity of public interest in politics only enhanced.” Appleby, Inheriting the 
Revolution, 30. 
56 NY 1840, 22.  In the face of an individualizing market landscape that fostered competition more than 
fellow feeling, Nelson argues, the expansion of political entitlement bound white “men together in an abstract but 
increasingly functional community that diverted their attention from differences between them” (National Manhood 
6). 
57 NY 1840, 20. 
58 Like the Federalist Papers, the New York Convention’s “Addresses” engages with developing theories 
of energy and power. See, Charles R. Kesler, introduction to The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New 
York:  Signet, 2003), xvii.  See also Christian G. Fritz, American Sovereigns:  The Constitutional Legacy of the 
People’s Sovereignty before the Civil War (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), 236-247, for a 
discussion of collective sovereignty, especially in the right to “alter, reform or abolish” their government. 
59 NY 1840, 12.  As one resolution asserts, the property qualification is “a violation of every principle of 
justice, anti-republican, and repugnant to the assertion of man’s equality upon which our government is founded.”  
NY 1840, 8. 
60 NY 1840, 20.   
61 In water rights law, moving water belongs to no one (res nullius), to the whole community (res 
communes), or is under public control (res publici).  Even when an individual gains rights to the water for a 
particular purpose, it is only a “usufructory” right, contingent on that individual’s not wasting the resource or 
otherwise making it unusable for others.  See Vito A. Vanoni ed., Sedimentation Engineering, 2nd ed.(Reston, VA: 
American Society of Civil Engineers, 2006), 378; and Anthony Scott, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 63-70. 
62  Then Mayor of New York City Dewitt Clinton’s famously describes the Canal in 1825 as “a bond of 
union between the Atlantic and Western states…. an organ of communication between the Hudson, the Mississippi, 
the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes of the north and west and their tributary rivers,” that would “create the greatest 
inland trade ever witnessed.”  The new avenues of transportation will streamline communication, creating a boom in 
trade and the arts, and, as the center of this access point, Manhattan “will become the granary of the world, the 
emporium of commerce, the seat of manufactures, the focus of great moneyed operations and the concentrating 
point of vast disposable, and accumulating capital, which will stimulate, enliven, extend and reward the exertions of 
human labor and ingenuity, in all their processes and exhibitions.”  View of the Grand Canal, 20, qtd. in Frederick 
Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West (New York:  Collier Books 1962), 21.  
63 NY 1840, 22. 
64 Historian Benjamin Quarles eloquently summarized, “The central paradox of white American society 
was to think equality but to practice inequality—a succession of English monarchs had been replaced by an equally 
divine-right aristocracy of skin color.”  See “Antebellum Free Blacks and the “Spirit of ’76.’”  The Journal of Negro 
History. 61, no. 3 (July 1976), 229.  
65 NY 1840, 10.  This petition was drafted by a committee led by Patrick L. Reason, ratified by the 
convention as a whole, and circulated to statewide auxiliaries along with the Proceedings and Addresses. 
66 NY 1840, 16. 
67 NY 1840, 16. 
68 NY 1840, 16. 
69 NY 1840, 18. 
70 While New York Whigs argued to keep the property requirement for all male citizens, black and white, 
the much more popular Democratic party argued for universal white male suffrage.  Democrats excluded black men 
from the suffrage for several practical political reasons, the leading one being that black voters had historically 
supported Whig candidates, in some places holding the balance in any given election.  They also expressed fear that 
given the concentration of blacks in certain districts (due in no small part to housing and economic discrimination), 
that black voters would carry these districts entirely.  Such empowerment would inevitably result in black men 
attempting to run for office and participate in jury trials, which would be a “gross insult” to “southern gentleman” 
visiting the state with their slaves.   
Still others relied on more obviously racist rhetoric, claiming that the state’s and the nation’s democratic 
institutions were created by and for white men, and that only white men were capable of participating in them.  As 
John G. Ross of Genesee County argues, 
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all men are free and equal, according to the usual declarations, applies to them only in a state of nature, and 
not after the institution of civil government; for then many rights, flowing from a natural equality, are 
necessarily abridged, with a view to produce the greatest amount of security and happiness to the whole 
community.  On this principle the right of suffrage is extended to white men only.  
Genesee supports this exclusion by arguing first that black men do not contribute significantly to the 
defense or the “common burthens” of the state, but rather, as another delgate points out, exist in the same state of 
dependency as women and children. Similar arguments ignored black participation in the Revolutionary War and the 
War of 1812 as well as black contributions to the state’s tax base.  At the root of many of these arguments was an 
anxiety that extending the franchise to members of a supposed degraded and inferior race, would somehow 
contaminate or further weaken the otherwise pure state.  Genesee concludes his comments with such an articulation 
of inherent difference:   
they are a peculiar people, incapable, in my judgment, of exercising that privilege with any sort of 
discretion, prudence, or independence.  They have no just conceptions of civil liberty.  They know not how 
to appreciate it, and are consequently indifferent to its preservation.  
Under such circumstances, it would hardly be compatible with the safety of the state, to entrust such a 
people with this right….  neither would it be safe to extend it to the blacks.   
When the New York convention of 1846 returns to the issue of black suffrage, rhetoric like Ross’s appears more 
often, articulated with even more conviction complete with references to the curse of Cain, one delegate arguing that 
his constituents “believed our own white race were the only ones capable of self-government—that if the negroes 
should be admitted, our republic would soon be degraded to a level with those of Mexico and South America.”  And 
John J. Hunt would echo Ross’s sentiments at the 1846 New York State Constitution Convention, if in slightly 
different terms:  
We (said he) want no masters, and least of all no negro masters, to reign over us.  We contend for self 
government.  We hold that no man who is not a part of the republic’s self—who is not a bona fide citizen, 
shall have any voice in the state….  They [delegates in support of black suffrage] forgot that negroes were 
aliens—aliens, not by mere accident of foreign birth—not because they spoke a different language—nor 
from any petty distinction that a few years consociation might obliterate, but by the born distinction of 
race—a distinction that neither education, nor intercourse, nor time could remove—a distinction that must 
separate our children from their children for ever. 
For Hunt, the suffrage was not a right, but “a kind of franchise, bestowed or withheld as the public good demanded,” 
and the public good demanded that it be withheld from blacks, because they were not a part of the “public”—the 
“republican self”—whose good the convention was intended to promote.  See Reports of the Proceedings and 
Debates of the Convention of 1821 Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New 
York: Containing All the Official Documents Relating to the Subject, and Other Valuable Matter, 180-181, and 
Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of New 
York: 1846, 777-786. 
71 NY 1840, 18. 
72 In 1848, the Pennsylvania convention would articulate this reversal more directly:  “assuming condition 
as their reason, and complexion as the standard,” the Pennsylvania State Constitutional Convention disenfranchised 
black citizens.  That is, through a bait and switch, the convention argued that black citizens were too degraded to be 
trusted with the vote, yet race, not material condition, was their measure of civic worth.  I discuss how the 
Pennsylvania convention confronts this logic later in this chapter. See PA 1848, 128. 
73 On the “Condition” debates, see Rael, Black Identity, 193-200; Melish, “The ‘Condition’ Debate and 
Racial Discourse in the Antebellum North,” Journal of the Early Republic. Special Issue on Racial Consciousness 
and Nation-Building in the Early Republic 19, no. 4 (Winter 1999):  651-672. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3125137. 
74 NY 1840, 18. 
75 NY 1840, 16. 
76 NY 1840, 18.  The delegates extend this reasoning in their 1845 “Address to the People of the State of 
New York,” arguing that in qualifying their right to vote with a property clause, the state government has deprived 
them of “their check upon oppression, their wherewith to buy friends, their panoply of manhood—in short, they are 
thrown upon the mercy of a despotic majority.”  NY 1845, 39 
77 NY 1840, 22. 
78 NY 1840, 20. 
79 NY 1840, 20. 
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80 Federalist Papers, 92-93.  As Charles R. Kesler explains, the language of mathematics and pervades the 
Federalist’s attempt to delineate the powers and necessities of a strong Federal Constitution.  The Convention of 
Colored Inhabitants of New York uses this same language to outline the state governments responsibilities to all of 
its citizens, regardless of race.  See, Charles R. Kesler, introduction to The Federalist Papers, xvii. 
81 This rhetoric of fulfillment aligns with Bercovitch’s analysis of the rhetoric of errand and the revolution 
as “the unfolding of a redemptive plan” that, in the hands of the Federalists, translated into continuing revolution as 
a ritual of consensus that reaffirmed rather than threatened national identity and stability or at least their ability to 
manage them.  See Rites, 37-49.  I will deal with the conventions’ relation to the Federal Constitution more 
explicitly in the section of the 1848 Pennsylvania Convention. 
82 See Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (New York:  Hill and Wang, 1985), 109.  
83 Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution:  The American Revolution and Political Society in New 
York, 1760-1790 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 294.   
84 See James Roger Sharp American Politics in the Early Republic:  New Nation in Crisis (Yale University 
Press, 1995), 89. It might be useful here to think about these conventions in light of Jay Fliegelman’s work on the 
Declaration of Independence.  For Fliegelman, the Declaration operates as both “the description of independence as 
the necessary consequence of [King] George’s actions and the document’s own status as a performative utterance.”  
It is both “aggrieved narration and a proclamation of rights.”84  Similarly, the state conventions are both a narrative 
of citizenship rights lost, of citizenship lost, and a performance of citizenship—a claim that citizenship rights are 
inherent to all men, yet a performance in need of affirmative judgment to take effect.  See Fliegelman, Declaring 
Independence, 151. 
85 Massachusetts Republicans, for instance, had been organizing conventions to democratically nominate 
candidates for office and to conduct other party business since the federalist/anti-federalist battles of the late 
eighteenth century.  Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy:  Jefferson to Lincoln (New York:  Norton, 
2005), 120.  Wilentz offers an excellent analysis of the complicated interactions between the nascent Republican 
Party and the democratic-republican societies that helped them unseat Federalists in federal and state governments in 
the 1790s and early 1800s.  See also James Roger Sharp, American, 86-89. 
86 Ingersoll argued against entering the “Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens, Threatened with 
Disfranchisement, to the People of Pennsylvania” (1837) into the convention’s official record, because, contrary to 
the notion of a right to petition, Ingersoll argued that citizens instructed their representatives; citizens did not make 
requests of them.  See Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, vol. 3, 
687. 
87 The following states held conventions: Michigan, 1835; New York, 1846; Pennsylvania, 1837-1838; 
New Jersey, 1844; Wisconsin, 1846 and 1847-1848; Illinois, 1847; and California, 1849.  See Bertoff, Republic, 
158-159n6. 
88 As historian Sean Wilentz and others demonstrate, this brand of democratic practice developed in the 
messy back and forth between local, territorial, state, and national institutions, not as a necessarily coherent, 
coordinated movement as such.  See Ed White, The Backcountry and the City:  Colonization and Conflict in Early 
America (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy; and Woody 
Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York:  Hill and Wang, 2007).  
89 Isenberg cites the Dorrite Convention as installing “the convention as a new kind of public and political 
forum and, perhaps for the first time, [sanctioning] revolution as a constitutional rather than a natural right” (14).  
While the Dorr Convention was certainly the most widely known and most successful convention of its kind, it was 
by no means the only one.  In the flurry of state constitution-making, a sense of political empowerment proliferated 
throughout the U.S. that put aside the violent protest of the early nation over the form of the government—at least 
for a time—in favor of change through more formal structures. 
90 Formisano, 164-165.  See also Marvin E. Gentleman, The Dorr Rebellion:  A Study in American 
Radicalism, 1833-1849 (New York:  Random House, 1973); George M. Dennison, The Dorr War: Republicanism 
on Trial, 1831-1861 (Lexington:  University Press of Kentucky, 1976); and Arthur May Mowry.  The Dorr War; or, 
The Constitutional Struggle in Rhode Island [1901] (New York: Chelsea House, 1970).  Christian G. Fritz’s last 
chapter on the Dorr Rebellion and the People’s Constitution in American Sovereigns:  The Constitutional Legacy of 
the People’s Sovereignty before the Civil War (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), is also useful. 
91 Formisano, 168.  In this context, it is worth mentioning again that the convening of the 1849 State 
Convention of the Colored Citizens of Ohio in Ohio’s statehouse was not empty symbolism.  Rather, the meeting 
created a strong metonymic relation between the colored citizens of Ohio’s advocacy and the operations of the 
official state government.  
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92 The Dorrite Conventions or “Dorr War” of 1841-1842 and their proposed “People’s Constitution” 
provide a potent example of the revolutionary potential in these movements.  Isenberg cites the Dorrite Convention 
as installing “the convention as a new kind of public and political forum and, perhaps for the first time, [sanctioning] 
revolution as a constitutional rather than a natural right” (14).  See also Formisano, 164-165 and Fritz, 246-276. 
93 Historians and political scientists alike have identified the inverse relation between the two.  Rogers 
Smith has argued that disenfranchising black men made universal white manhood suffrage possible.  The state 
conventions of New York and Pennsylvania would seem to substantiate Smith’s reading.  Even if the delegates do 
not argue Smith’s point explicitly—that is the price of white suffrage is black suffrage—the anxiety that removing 
property and other restrictions on the franchise without including some other caste distinction pervades these 
debates.  As Patrick Rael succinctly puts it, “In a sense, blacks paid the price for the white working class’s political 
participation.”  See Rael, Black Identity, 202.  
94 The Charterites maintained property requirements for naturalized citizens, apportioned legislative seats 
so that power remained in the hands of the rural Democrats, and enfranchised African-Americans who tipped the 
balance of power in their favor in subsequent elections.  Interestingly, Dorr lobbied to include provisions for black 
enfranchisement in the People’s Constitution, but the majority of his supporters refused, prompting Frederick 
Douglass, William Lloyd Garrison, and other antislavery activists to denounce the People’s Constitution as a whole. 
The resulting political climate in Rhode Island remained resistant to popular democratic practices, and instead 
continued as what Formisano describes as a “limited, oligarchic republicanism lasting well into the twentieth 
century.”  See Formisano 164-165, 173. 
Other states would cite Rhode Island’s strategic enfranchisement of African-Americans as a reason for 
maintaining racially exclusive voting laws.  This rhetoric appeared again and again in the New York debates and 
New York Press.  As one New Yorker argues in just before the 1845 state constitutional convention: “Admit them 
[supporters of black suffrage], and in a few years these ‘balance-of-power-men’ will increase so rapidly upon our 
hands, that we shall have not only a negro Chief Magistrate of the State, but they will continue to urge a ‘NEGRO 
CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY,’ around whom the Northern Abolitionists are resolved to cluster in 1848” 
“Fifteen Thousand Negro Balance-of-Power-Men Wanted, by the Whigs and Abolitionists!” from Daily (NY) 
Globe, reprinted in NASS, 9 October 1845.   
95 See Isenberg, xiv, and Rogers Smith, Civic, 167. 
96 NY 1840, 6.  In some ways, the onlookers’ approval mirrors the function of authenticating documents in 
narratives by former slaves.   
97 NY 1840, 6.  David Swift has read the regular attendance of Whig politicians as a sign of equality and 
respect.  See David E. Swift, Black Prophets, 124.  I agree with Swift in the sense that the convention provided a 
opportunity like no other for spectators of all stripes to see black citizens in their political element.  Rays comments, 
however, also suggest that the black delegates felt the institutionally imposed differences even if the white attendees 
did not.   
98 Of conventions in general and minority conventions specifically, Isenberg argues, “given the importance 
of antebellum constitutional conventions and spontaneous conventions...the conventions had a decidedly 
performative, staged, and theatrical quality” (213n10). 
99 For more on the distinction between deliberative and persuasive models of civil society, see Brooke, John 
L.  “Consent, Civil Society, and the public Sphere in the Age of Revolution and the Early American Republic.” 
Beyond the Founders:  New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic.  Eds. Jeffrey L. 
Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher.  (Chapel Hill:  University North Carolina Press, 2004), 
207-250. 
100 Smith eventually attended the 1841 convention as a delegate from New York City in accordance with 
his popular nomination. See “Reviving the Black Convention Movement,” in Peter C. Ripley, ed., Black Abolitionist 
Papers, vol. 3, The United States, 1830–1846 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 345–51; and 
James McCune Smith “Position Defended,” Colored American, August 15, 1840. Smith most likely penned this 
letter because the Colored American did not print his remarks in opposition to the convention in two previous 
meetings; see Ripley, Black Abolitionist Papers, 3:349 n. 1. For a detailed account of these tumultuous meetings and 
competing organizations like Thomas Van Rensellaer and David Ruggles’s American Reform Board, see Alexander, 
African or American, 103–13; and Pease and Pease, 175-182. 
100 Colored American, February 6, 1841. Sterling Stuckey has collected Whipper’s letters with a series of 
responses by “Sidney” in appendix 2 of Sterling Stuckey, ed., The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). 
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101 Colored American 6 February 1841.  Sterling Stuckey has collected Whipper’s letters with a series of 
responses by “Sidney” in appendix 2 of The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). 
102 “Colored Convention,” NASS, 18 June 1840. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ray’s anxiety over reception does not completely dispel this implication. 
105 See for instance, “Fifteen Thousand Negro Balance-of-Power-Men Wanted, by the Whigs and 
Abolitionists!” reprinted in National Anti-Slavery Standard.  October 9, 1845. 
106 “A Convention.” Colored American. 2 May 1840. 
107 “William Whipper’s Letters No. 4,” CA 13 February 1841.  See also Stuckey, 161. 
108 “Samuel Ringgold Ward to Nathaniel Press. Rogers.” BAP, 341. 
109 Ibid.  Emphasis added. Ward’s “different medium” works as a particularly apt description of how this 
debate positioned Standard against the Colored American, the major publications through which it occurs.  The 
debate over the convention coincides with a changing of the guard at the Colored American as editorial duties shift 
from Samuel Cornish to Charles B. Ray.  Indeed, the debate provides an opportunity for Ray to assert the paper’s 
new direction even as he and others use the Colored American to frame the convention’s public presence.  He 
installs the paper as representative of black public opinion and as a watchdog (and preserver of black rights of 
oversight) over anti-slavery activism.  See Eric Gardner’s Unexpected Places: Relocating Nineteenth-Century 
African American Literature (Jackson:  University Press of Mississippi, 2009) for another account of how black 
editors could leverage state conventions to bolster a paper’s legitimacy (5). 
110 For a discussion of “whiteness as property” see Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property” in Critical Race 
Theory:  The Key Writings That Formed the Movement, eds. Kimberele Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and 
Kendall Thomas (New York: New Press, 1995), 276-291 
111 “Colored Convention.”  NASS. 18 June 1840. 
112 “The Convention.”  CA. 27 June 1840.  See also Pease and Pease, They, 80.  In a more instrumental 
sense, black activists could never showcase their own political views acumen through these organizations because 
whites “will always form the majority of such Conventions, and the sentiments and opinions thus promulgated will 
go forth as the sentiments and opinions of white men.”  Over ten years later, William J. Wilson would describe a 
similar scene as a “hungry white crowd […] so large that the black specs pass[ed] unobserved by the chiefs in 
command” (Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 15 April 1853, qtd. in Pease and Pease, They Who Would Be Free, 80).  
“The National Anti-Slavery Standard vs. The Convention.”  CA, 11 July 1840.   
113 See for instance Stephen A. Myers 3 March 1842 editorial for the Northern Star and Freeman’s 
Advocate (Albany, NY).  Writing as “M.,” Myers censures white abolitionists for not hiring black citizens, 
concluding, “while they [white abolitionists] continue to express their disapprobation and indignation of the 
prejudice on account of complexions, and consider it cruel and unjust in others, we shall labor to inform them that 
we are not insensible to the prejudice which exists in their minds” (377).  In later years, black activists like William 
J. Wilson and James McCune Smith would direct pointed criticisms along the same lines towards abolitionist leaders 
like Lewis Tappan.  See “Editorial by Stephen A. Myers” in BAP vol., 375-379.  Pease and Pease summarize the 
predicament:  “There is little question that Negro participation was made as visible as possible.  Yet this visibility 
seldom carried with it the leverage with which to mold the antislavery movement, at least on the national level.”  
Pease and Pease, They Who Would Be Free, 80. 
114 “The Convention.” 
115 See Rogers Smith, “Citizenship and the Politics of People-Building,” Citizenship Studies 5, no. 1 
(2001):  73-75. 
116 Each juncture was judged by its adherence to formal cues that resemble Robert Hariman’s account of a 
republican style:  “the manners of legislative address, seating, and the like…refraining from violence, recognizing 
social status, observing parliamentary customs, and acting as if oneself and one’s opponents always were motivated 
at least in part by civic virtue and the duties of public office” (122-123).  See Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry 
of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 122–23.  On the “theatrical” quality of conventions, see 
Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship, 213 n. 10. 
117 NY 1840, 6. 
118 NY 1840, 10 
119 Ibid., 12. 
120  Schoenfield uses institutional heteroglossia to describe how the British periodical press managed 
identities by “[consolidating] distinct authorial voices into single corporate, authoritative voices” through 
pseudonymity and editorial framing such that the speaker’s identity was always “entwined” with the periodical’s 
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institutional structure.  Because of this entanglement within the system of the bound periodical, “the periodical 
article—the language of which was often borrowed from prior texts, quoted from contemporary ones under review, 
and echoed from one article to the next—was institutionally heteroglossic.”  See Schoenfield, British Periodicals 
and Romantic Identity: The “Literary Lower Empire” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3, 36-37. 
121 Bakhtin writes, “This interaction, this dialogic tension between two languages and two belief systems, 
permits authorial intentions to be realized in such a way that we can acutely sense their presence at every point in the 
work; he makes use of this verbal give-and-take, this dialogue of languages at every point in his work, in order that 
he might remain as it were neutral with regard to language, a third party in a quarrel between two people (although 
he might be a biased third party).”  Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, 
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 314.  
122 Ward reprinted the 1848 appeals almost a year later in Impartial Citizen with an article on “Progress 
Among Colored Men” amid a spirited debate with Douglass over the pro- or antislavery nature of the U.S. 
Constitution and the need for explicitly political activism. 
123 This committee of seven included William Whipper, Abraham Shadd, J. F. Dickson, J. J. G. Bias, 
Robert Purvis, M. W. Gibbes, and Samuel Van Brakle.  Ironically, Whipper, who opposed the first New York 
convention of colored citizens because of its “complexional” nature, was a key member of the 1848 convention in 
Pennsylvania.  In the intervening years, Whipper had come to realize that white politicians were using condition as a 
code for racism.  From as early as the 1838 constitutional change in Pennsylvania, Whipper’s political outlook had 
shifted away from the elevation first model.  For an excellent treatment of the complexity of Whipper’s evolving 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP:  LABOR AND REPRESENTATION IN JAMES MCCUNE 
SMITH AND WILLIAM J. WILSON’S URBAN JOURNALISM 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
By the 1840s and 1850s black reformers not only began claiming their labor, slave and 
free, as “an integral part of their identities” but also, as historian Leslie M. Harris argues, began 
seeing “in meaningful labor a path to equality.”1  These activists were responding to the 
increased linkage of race and labor in political discourse, the material exigencies of a modern 
U.S. market economy, and the constraints both placed on black citizenship.  Even in the decades 
just before the revolution, labor was a hotly contested concept in terms of citizenship practice.  
By the 1830s, however, citizens were coming to understand their economic selves and ideals as 
coextensive with and, in some cases, the same as, their civic selves.  This connection between 
labor and citizenship was even more important for black citizens, whose relation to their own 
labor and the market was complicated by the economics of enslavement.  In the absence of 
political representation, black activists searched for economic representatives, men and women 
who could earn “credit” for their communities in the civic economy, advocating for them in a 
market that was increasingly figured as the space for, rather than threat to, citizenship practice.   
This chapter analyzes developing schematics of economic citizenship—the relation 
between representations of labor and laborers, the civic credit and political power accrued 
through such representations, and the idealized subjectivity of the economic citizen—through 
readings of William J. Wilson and James McCune Smith’s pseudonymous correspondences as 
Ethiop and Communipaw in Frederick Douglass’s Paper from 1851 to 1854.  Through his 
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columns as Douglass’s Brooklyn Correspondent, Wilson offers a form of economic citizenship 
in which a “black aristocracy” would “represent” or advocate for its community economically 
and politically among the nation’s “monied class.”  Wilson develops this tactic out of his 
understanding of a U.S. political economy resembling more an oligarchy than a republic with 
economic interest and control of productive resources offering more direct routes to social and 
political power than public or civic channels.  Smith’s correspondences, in contrast, investigate 
the representativeness of the black laborer:  how representative is this figure of the overall type, 
how well does this type match a historical sense of species development, and what can we learn 
about the trajectory of black citizenship and U.S. republicanism from studying these 
representatives?  For him, the representative citizen belongs to the middling class, the average 
person of prosperity, if not wealth, forming polity rather than aristocracy.2  
Smith and Wilson, moreover, use their various personae to model the subjectivity needed 
to navigate developing economic structures, often critiquing each other’s “conceptions of truth,” 
that is the epistemologies through which each frames the representative economic citizen.3  
These correspondences, then, are a part of a larger battle over not only developing capitalist 
political economics, but also the terms for evaluating the representational structures that 
transform labor to civic value and shifting understandings of representation and citizenship more 
broadly.  Their example highlights the degree to which black conceptions of citizenship unfold 
not just in speeches, conventions, and pamphlets, but also through a highly creative community 
of letters.4 Focusing more specifically on Wilson and Smith’s negotiation of forms of economic 
citizenship and black urban life allows us to map the processes by which citizenship was being 
imagined in the 1850s as neither civic republican, nor democratic, but rather as economic.   
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2.  Economic Citizenship:  “Productive” Labor in Black and White 
In Chapter 2, I outlined the contours of a two-tiered civic republicanism in which a 
managerial elite provided the civic regulation that allowed ordinary citizens to safely pursue their 
own interests in the market.   In this model, virtuous citizenship was measured by the citizen’s 
ability to separate the economic self from the political self, following the dictates of civic duty 
and protocols of sociability while in pursuit of self-interest in a market that was figured as 
separate from civil society.  The managerial structures that Carey identified in the form of federal 
institutions provided regulations intended to foster a climate conducive to these economic 
pursuits while also protecting against corruption and offering a safety net during crises.   
The market revolution of the early-to-mid-nineteenth century ushered in new 
understandings of citizenship and how economic self-interest and labor defined the citizen.5  As 
waged labor spread, wealth became more concentrated, and political participation became 
untethered from property (for white men), political economic discourse emphasized “productive” 
labor, rather than wealth or freedom from labor, as enabling virtuous citizenship.6  Groups from 
bankers to waiters claimed their own slice of civic value through reinterpreting the meaning of 
productive labor, appealing to a flexible labor theory of value.7  To capitalists and merchants, 
production suggested management of people and finances; to manual laborers like “mechanics,” 
it suggested “honest” work with hands and raw materials, and to an increasing array of entry-
level workers like clerks, whose work included menial chores, it suggested access to professional 
training.8  Each group staked claims not only to the productive value of its work, but, more 
importantly, to the power of that work to cultivate the characteristics of virtuous citizenship:  
developing sound mental habits and physical vitality, contributing useful services and goods to 
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the community, and showing the citizen’s capacity to redirect excess desire into productive 
channels that theoretically flowed towards property, the foundation of republican equality.9   
This labor discourse developed alongside a compensatory narrative of upward mobility in 
a liberal market.10  If a man worked hard, spent frugally, and lived morally, the rhetoric went, he 
could look forward to a change in position and independence, including eventually owning 
property and/or starting a business.11  As historian Jonathan A. Glickstein suggests, even free 
labor advocates were attempting only “to democratize and defend, rather than fundamentally 
transform or jettison, the capitalist order of the North.”12 In an economic world characterized by 
an increasing concentration of wealth and an expanding labor market in which mobility, if 
upward, did not lead inexorably towards independence, these narratives suggested equality of 
opportunity, if not of success or access.  Failure in the market was, in turn, internalized as a 
failure of the private self, not of the market or the social and political structures constituting it.  If 
each citizen did not become independent or otherwise escape waged labor, if all citizens, while 
created equal were not equally endowed with property or access to the means of production, the 
community was at least benefiting from, in Emerson’s terms, “the knowledge, that in the city is a 
man who invented the railroad,” which “raises the credit of all citizens.”13  Just as popular 
participation in electoral politics could valorize a sense of democratic equality despite tending 
towards less democratic results, popular participation in the market economy offered a sense of 
corporate enterprise with the assurance that, just as elected officials represented a constituency, 
the economically successful reflected the (potential) vitality of the whole.   
Cultures of respectability buttressed the resulting economic citizenship, modeling the 
subjectivity best suited to operate in a market society.14  Like late-eighteenth-century sociability, 
respectability provided a civic ethos and moral grounding for what otherwise seemed, as 
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Emerson put it, a “system…of war.”15  It emphasized competency and the performance of traits 
that signaled prudence, temperance, and self-reliance, the kind of rational autonomy that 
industrialization and wage labor seemed to preclude.  In a social landscape where identities 
seemed indeterminate, protocols of respectability—ways of dress, habits of consumption, 
displays of thrift and self-control, hard work etc.—helped make the status of economic citizens 
visible to each other while cloaking market antagonisms in a sheen of polite, collective striving.   
Moreover, a host of popular entertainments supported by and supporting logics of white 
manhood offered ways of absorbing even seemingly unruly working classes and immigrants.  
Figures like the Bowery b’hoy, popularized in plays like Ben E. Baker’s “New York as It Is” and 
urban sensation literature like George Foster’s New York by Gaslight, oriented working whites as 
civic heroes—flawed, yet essential people of whom audiences should be proud.16  Figures like 
the b’hoy, Foster explains, symbolized the “free development of Anglo-Saxon nature,” which had 
only begun to reach its full potential in the U.S.17  Working class viewers and readers could enjoy 
a their free-spirited flouting of social convention, even as critics refigured this spirit as part of the 
development of the white American type, an urban counterpart to Davey Crockett that can be 
found in any city. Coupled with the extension of the franchise to virtually all white male citizens 
and the outlet of westward expansion, prospects for the “common [white] man” appeared bright 
indeed.   
While white citizens and European immigrants recouped “productive” labor, variously 
defined, as a signifier of citizenship and consolidated national identity, the same structures of 
economic citizenship barred black workers.18  Black writers continued wrestling with symbolic 
systems that stigmatized black people through the labor they performed, a hardening racial caste 
system that saw certain “degraded” occupations as natural for black citizens, and popular 
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imagery that treated black economic aspirations as at once threats to civic order and at the as 
same time empty comedic performances.19  Employments that earned more money and had 
greater prospects for upward mobility, like clerking, were closed to black workers even in 
abolitionist circles, and discriminatory permit practices often prevented black entrepreneurs from 
taking advantage of more lucrative opportunities like carting.20  And because of this continued 
association with black citizens’ menial occupations with notions of dependence, white workers 
felt that working in close proximity to black workers or working at similar tasks lowered their 
own status.21  As a result white laborers enforced racial lines with violence and hostility, and 
officials used this violence as a pretext for enacting and maintaining restrictive policies.22 When 
white and black workers did cooperate in unions and for workers’ rights, they met opposition 
from white employers and black activists alike.23  As European immigration increased in the 
1840s, competition stiffened over even the waged jobs African Americans traditionally held.24 
By 1855 eighty-seven percent of New York’s black workers occupied menial or unskilled 
positions, including bootblacking, waiting tables, domestic service and the like.25  The trend for 
most of the black population, then, was one of either stultifying immobility or steady decline.   
The fugitive slave law, colonizationist and racial scientific rhetoric, and black labor 
statistics all coalesced to support a pervasive sense that black people were forming a permanent 
underclass and could not, nor were ever meant to, become proper U.S. citizens.26   As Horace 
Greeley, editor of the New York Daily Tribune, put it in 1843, “So long as they remain pretty 
generally bootblacks, tavern-waiters, clothes-scourers, &c., from seeming choice; the right to 
vote will be of precious little account to them.”27 Greeley’s conceit that black “condition” was a 
matter of “seeming choice” further illustrates the sense that black citizens were simply not 
equipped to operate as economic, let alone as political, agents.28  The civic order represented by 
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commentators like Greeley and the state constitutional conventions that I analyzed in Chapter 3 
saw the representative black citizen as a bootblack or servant, “from seeming choice,” who could 
not profit from the added burden of politics.29  Moreover, the nation, from this perspective, had 
nothing to profit by incorporating them as anything more.  The cultural representation and 
economic underdevelopment of black citizens, then, were mutually constitutive.30   
Just as labor theory offered new ways for defining white citizenship, however, it also 
provided new ways for framing black activism.31  Even before the market revolution of the 1820s 
and 1830s, black activists had been developing rubrics of economic citizenship and cultures of 
respectability, partly as a response to racism, but also for the same reasons as white citizens:  
they believed the habits associated with respectability—thrift, education, self-control, hard work, 
etc.—would lead to material success and elevation.32  Yet, if most activists agreed that labor 
identity was central to black progress, they disagreed about how to resolve the tension between 
orders of representation, that is between ideal image and material exigencies, or even the 
language with which to frame their arguments.  As one activist asserted in frustration, many were 
“aiming at the same thing, but…had a different way of getting at it.”33  Representations of black 
labor were “of material of double strength,” argues the Committee of Social Relations and Polity 
at the 1853 Colored National Convention, “having for [their] composition our condition,” that is 
the lack of economic and political power, “and strong prejudicial feelings generated from that 
condition.”34  Solutions, then, had to confront both the lack of economic power and policies that, 
paradoxically, maintained the conditions used to justify them. 
During the 1848 National Convention of Colored Freemen, these tensions famously 
erupted into full debate, revealing not only how activists framed their positions on labor but also 
how their claims to representative narratives were central to crafting them.  John L. Watson 
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(OH), fugitive slave and prosperous barber and bathhouse owner, and J. D. Patterson, a waiter, 
confronted activists like Martin R. Delany, “who,” in their view, “were in the editorial chair and 
others, not in places of servants” for “cast[ing] slurs upon those, who were in such places from 
necessity.”35  (These “slurs” reportedly included Delany’s claim that he would “rather receive a 
telegraphic dispatch that his wife and two children had fallen victims to a loathsome disease, 
than to hear that they had become the servants of any man.”36)  Watson and Patterson were less 
concerned with the image of the laborer than with the necessities of a stable income; better a 
“degraded” bootblack than a beggar.37 They suggest that Delany and others’ vision was not in 
line with realities on the ground.  Watson agreed that the emphasis on gaining better situations 
was desirable, but the language of condemnation was alienating.  “We know our position and 
feel it,” he protests; black citizens did not need to be told that their work was not respected in the 
dominant political economy.  They needed, instead, both a way to articulate their contributions 
more positively and to be encouraged even as they worked their way up.  
In opposition to Watson and Patterson and in support of the convention’s fourth 
resolution—”the occupation of domestics and servants among our people is degrading to us as a 
class, and we deem it our bounden duty to discountenance such pursuits”—A. H. Francis (NY) 
and David Jenkins (OH) offered narratives of their rise to lucrative self-employment that mapped 
well onto both popular notions of respectability and the upward trajectory of the classic slave 
narrative.  Francis, for instance, recounts his rise from having “been in nearly all the avocations 
named in the Resolution” to “owning a mercantile business of $20,000 or $30,000 a year.”38  
Though the resolution’s language echoed white commentators, who, just two years before, had 
used the same characterizations in their arguments against black suffrage, it also reflected many 
of the delegates’ sense that their own success served as templates that others could follow, proof 
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that the template was successful.  Moreover, these delegates were no doubt concerned that 
readers (both black and white) would take any equivocation on uplift as capitulation.  The 
narratives accompanying these arguments, then, mattered as much as the arguments themselves.   
While delegates continued debating, with Convention President Frederick Douglass 
attempting to mediate with marginal success, a more salient economic model emerged in the 
Convention’s “Address to the Colored People.”39  Black communities needed economic power—
representatives in trades and industries and proportional ownership of the nation’s productive 
resources—not only to counter prevailing representations of black labor, but more importantly, 
so “that other members of the community shall be as dependent upon us, as we upon them.”40  
“We must not merely make the white man dependent upon us to shave him,” the “Address” 
continues, “but to feed him; not merely dependent upon us to black his boots, but to make 
them.”41  As Douglass explained during the debate, there was nothing degrading about useful 
work; rather, “what is necessary to be done, is honorable to do.”42  Even so, the “Address” 
concludes, the greater the utility citizens could fill, the more power citizens could accrue for 
themselves and their communities, both black and white.43  A more equitable distribution of 
dependence would bring a more equitable distribution of power. 
Respect replaces respectability as the “Address” focuses less on publicity and more on 
the power of mutual dependence:  “To be dependent, is to be degraded,” the convention notes in 
the republican style; however, complete independence “would be absurd and impossible, in the 
social state.”44  While “independence” may be “an essential condition of respectability,” mutual 
dependence yields “respect.”  Black citizens must create systems of mutual dependence for “the 
necessaries of life.”45  This notion of mutual dependence carries Jones and Allen’s late-
eighteenth century neighborly ethics into the mid-nineteenth century market.  To secure equal 
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citizenship, people must not only be willing to be neighborly, they must also have the material 
capacity to be good economic citizens:  “the equality which we aim to accomplish, can only be 
achieved by us, when we can do for others, just what others can do for us,” that is to “render 
[our] share to the common stock of prosperity and happiness.”46  Put differently:  make others as 
dependent on you as you are on them.  The state becomes a corporate body as the convention 
renders the market as a space where equality is produced outside of civil society by means of 
economic force (figured benignly as dependence), rather than political participation or consent. 
Even as the convention’s maxims operate through the rhetoric of respectability, then, its 
shift to “respect” suggests the delegates’ recognition that, by the late 1840s, respectability was 
not materially grounded enough to explain prejudice’s cultural and economic matrices fully or to 
offer a rubric for creating political equality out of economic power.47  If black economic power 
could not persuade white citizens of black equality, at least structures of mutual dependence 
would mute prejudice’s adverse effects.48  The 1848 Convention’s debate and “Address” 
highlight two movements that this chapter will analyze in more detail through Smith and 
Wilson’s subsequent correspondences:  1) black activists were refining an economic policy based 
on mutual dependence that incorporated contemporary understandings of economic citizenship 
with more traditional uplift strategies; and, 2) this project required not only a shift in political 
economic thinking, but also new representivities—understandings of the relationship between 
cultural representation, political and economic power, and the structural conditioning of black 
and white subjectivies——commenserate with the demands of economic citizenship.49 
Smith and Wilson’s debate as Communipaw and Ethiop is particularly useful here 
because they explicitly set out to interrogate and create representative structures specific to urban 
black labor in New York.50  Wilson’s Ethiop column pushes the convention’s overall argument 
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further, suggesting a model of economic representation that emphasizes the centrality of the 
“monied idea” to creating and sustaining the proper position in relation to power.  Wilson’s ideal 
representative would apply the vision modeled in his sketches to the problems of black 
citizenship, standing in a position to understand the overall circulation of economic power with 
the savvy of a flâneur, but with the material capacity and ethical commitment to directing this 
circulation in the community’s interest.  Smith’s Communipaw, like Watson and Patterson, 
resists the diminishing attention given to civic virtue, offering a long historical and sociological 
point of view in place of their appeals to present exigencies.  The subjects of his “‘Heads of the 
Colored People,’ Done with a Whitewash Brush” offer insights from which he generalizes about 
the “average colored person,” suggesting that the middling sorts, not an elite, will impel not only 
black progress, but also national renewal.  Ethiop and Communipaw’s debate with each other 
and other pseudonymous correspondents for Douglass’s Paper served as a vehicle for circulating 
a general economic ethos and, as Todd Vogel suggests of the black press more generally, for 
“reset[ing] the terms of public conversation” to offer a different “quality of representation.”51  
The correspondences attempt to make visible the often-invisible lives of black workers as 
something more than an undifferentiated mass, but rather as a heterogeneous and dynamic 
community with economic and political potential.52   
 
3.  “Position is everything”:  Ethiop’s Black Aristocracy as Counter to U.S. Oligarchy 
Born in 1818 to a family of Shrewsbury, NJ, oyster harvesters, William J. Wilson moved 
to Brooklyn, NY, in the 1830s where he opened a boot-making shop.  He began teaching in 
Brooklyn in 1842 and was later named principal of Colored Public School No. 1.  In later years, 
he opened a reading room in the city and acted as editor (if not in name) of several papers, 
 155 
including the Weekly Anglo-African.  He was active in the New York suffrage movement, a 
member of the famed Committee of Thirteen, and a regular delegate at the national conventions 
of the 1850s.53  He began writing for Douglass’s Paper as Ethiop, the paper’s “Brooklyn 
Correspondent,” on December 11, 1851, and continued writing under that moniker for various 
publications, including the Anglo-African Magazine, into the early 1860s.  Of Wilson’s physical 
presence, William Wells Brown observes, “he is under the middle size; his profile is more 
striking than his front face; he has a rather pleasing countenance, and is unmixed in race; has fine 
conversational powers, is genteel in his manners, and is a pleasant speaker upon the platform,” 
and Brown describes his Ethiop sketches as “some of the raciest and most amusing essays to be 
found in the public journals of this country,” arguing, “few men are capable of greater or more 
successful efforts than William J. Wilson” when it comes to sketch genre.54   
Through Ethiop, Wilson wields his descriptive talents to offer his own assessment of 
economic citizenship’s capitalist core, its “monied idea,” taking up and revising other activists’ 
arguments that the proper representivity will lead to equality for black citizens.  Framed as an 
urban guide “among ye taking notes,” Ethiop sets out to reveal how racism veils the city’s 
economic doings and how focusing on surfaces leads black folk in particular to mistake an 
insubstantial respectability for the substance of economic power.55  Ethiop uses two central 
metaphors for his analysis: through the metaphor of the stage, he outlines social categories and 
maps each class’s role within the overall economic drama; the figure of the veil, in turn, provides 
a heuristic for how race obscures the more antagonist and anti-democratic aspects of this 
structure.  He suggests that a change in position in relation to this staging—both economically 
and narratively—is the only viable solution to counter a speedily solidifying racial caste system.  
From such a position, Ethiop’s proposed black aristocracy would be able to navigate and manage 
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what Ethiop sees as the functional equivalence of market and civic practices.  Viewing the civic 
and economic landscape through the subjectivity modeled by Ethiop’s column, black aristocrats 
could remove the city’s racial veil, a veneer of collective enterprise and “true republicanism” on 
the surface of mutual antagonism and oligarchy.56  
Manhattan is “one vast show,” Ethiop explains in one of his earliest letters, a stage where, 
if they could, the “looker on” would “see, as [he] saw,” three rather coherent categories of people 
distinguished by their racial and class performances:  “The whites exhibited the two features, 
wealth and poverty; while the blacks exhibited an intermediate one.”57  Rich and poor whites 
play extreme roles, but they have essentially the same character within the context of the social 
show, united in the same project of accumulation through a culture of capitalism: 
the same white, ghost-like, motionless face, the same hawk-line nose, and thin, livid lip, 
and restless, wolf-like countenance, indicative of keen scent after what is another’s… The 
propensity for grasping and appropriating, are as indelibly stamped in every face, as the 
mark of Cain; and though players, all, ‘tis all the same, whether priest, prince, or 
beggar.58  
 
Ethiop’s reading refigures white enterprise as a string of appropriations amounting, in the end, to 
mutual hostility, Emerson’s “system…of war”; for white characters, upward mobility happens at 
another’s expense, and the features now associated with Anglo-Saxons, like the mark of Cain, 
serve as a reminder of this principle, both a curse on humanity and an inheritance.59  What binds 
them, then, is not a common ethnic, religious, or national heritage, despite popular belief in one, 
but rather an “independent, self-interested manhood,” what Ethiop calls the “monied idea.”60 
Capital and interest, not religion, republicanism, or participatory politics, are the 
governing principles of U.S. citizenship practice.  “Money,” Ethiop posits in his December 25, 
1851 correspondence, “is the ruling idea.”61  “The Alpha and Omega of everything here,” he 
continues “are dollars and cents; of necessity, therefore, nothing is admissible but what will 
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produce it.”62  Ethiop fills his correspondence with these aphoristic phrases—”It is idle to believe 
that American prejudice and oppression, have any other than a monied basis,” “Interest 
Jonathan’s pocket, and you have his confidence,” etc.—leading to his penultimate verdict:  “Art, 
science, philanthropy, humanity, religion; all the higher qualities and feelings are calculated in 
dollars and cents, and sacrificed, if necessary, to this same God.”63  Ethiop extends Hamilton’s 
reasoning in Federalist No. 30—“Money is, with propriety…the vital principle of the body 
politic… that which sustains its life and motion”—to suggest that making money has become the 
nation’s “life and motion,” its end and “essential function,” not a means to that end.64  Capital, 
once seen as a threat to civic virtue, has been raised above it, the standard for measuring all other 
values. “Whatever does not pay,” Ethiop quips, “answers not Jonathan’s purpose.”65   
Though he outlines the economic basis of U.S. citizenship with cynicism, Ethiop does not 
oppose it.  Rather, he opposes how racial caste limits opportunities for the black citizens to take 
advantage of all the market could offer and to have representation in the upper economic class.  
While “the whites have their poor and degraded,” they also have “their rich and elevated, whose 
number is legion.”66  Black communities, in contrast, “present but one phase—a low flat surface” 
that only reinforces white assumptions and buoys white efforts.67  The problem is not the 
existence of classes, but rather the relative absence of class diversity within black communities 
and how this perception and enforcement of uniformity functions within the system as a whole.68  
Though Ethiop acknowledges the same antagonistic strain in antebellum capitalist culture that 
Narrative outlines in civic republicanism, he is more concerned with unpacking its racial logic so 
that black citizens can take advantage of its possibilities than with changing its basic operations.   
Through the figure of the veil (or curtain), Ethiop illustrates how a strictly enforced 
homogeneity of black labor structures white cultures of capital.  Black performers serve as stable 
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functionaries; they “hold up, as it were, the veil of the plot, and perform certain other easy 
services.”69  Holding up the veil of the plot gestures towards the surplus value that black labor 
provides—as porters, washerwomen, bootblacks, waiters, etc.—, an economic backdrop against 
which wealthy whites have made their fortunes and that allows working whites to occupy 
positions that, if not more productive, gain more civic credit.  Even recent European immigrants 
fleeing oppression in their homelands and unused to U.S.-style racism, he argues, can “build 
thereon at the expense of the blood, and sweat, and tears, and groans of the oppressed of this 
land.”70 At the same time, black figures provide a nationalizing backdrop, an always-available 
empty signifier, “sufficient to swivel up about all the Anglo-Saxon courage and energy there is 
extant in a sizable nut-shell that may be put and worn in any one of their breeches pockets.”71  
Despite the mutual antagonism on rich and poor white faces, the availability of this backdrop of 
negative blackness, on literal stages as in minstrelsy and on the streets, salves poverty’s wounds, 
empowering its bearers with a sense of belonging through a “common sense of whiteness,” the 
promise that their Anglo-Saxon character will win out.72  
As a result, while black citizens “hold up the…veil” of the city’s economic play, they 
remain excluded from its principle action.73  Ethiop sees this material and cultural assault 
resulting in psychic damage as black communities fall victim to “the bug-bear ‘CANNOT’…[,] 
a hideous monster pursuing us everywhere.”74 Though the “monster” exists in the overt threat of 
white violence, it manifests more ominously in the seemingly innocuousness of everyday life, 
the “mundane and the quotidian,” as Saidia Hartman would later term it: “Well may we scoff at 
black skins and wooly heads,” Ethiop concludes a year later, “since every model set before us for 
admiration has pallid face and flaxen head, or emanations thereof.”75  This sense of 
powerlessness “makes a young woman feel she is a negative being,” “drives the trader from the 
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stand, the mechanic from the workshop,” and “scares our children in the streets.”76  Black 
citizens have internalized the current social order as the only possibility out of fear and necessity, 
preventing would-be entrepreneurs from opening shops of their own because of a cocktail of 
discriminatory policies, hostile whites, and a lack of support from their own communities.  Such 
is the monster’s power that Ethiop feels its presence himself:  “It even now, impudently steals up 
behind [him], while [he] write, and seizes [his] elbow,” forcing him to conclude his letter.77  
Under such conditions, “respectability” had been reduced to pageantry as a new 
generation has learned to value appearances over substance.  Ethiop describes black youths who 
have mastered the signs of respectability—clothing, genteel mannerisms (bordering on 
“dandyism”), education, etc.—while lacking the economic practices and material power 
respectability was meant to produce and signify.78  Chasing after “petty by-paths” in the market, 
“the drapery and tinsel of education,” and believing that “appearing well, would make up for not 
doing well,” they remain “trapped on the wrong side of [the business] curtain, pretending to 
touch the real in their appearance…but never coming close.” 79 The public sees “wives and 
daughters of men, whose occupations are of questionable propriety, promenade our streets, laden 
with the richest silks of the Indies, and decked with all the gew-gaws of wealthiest whites, often 
outrivaling them in the splendor of their attire.”80 Such men and women decorate the cover of 
Foster’s collected sketches, overlooking white men at work and business, the black man’s cane 
curled like a monkey’s tale, suggesting the comical nature of his façade [figure 1].81 These 
hyper-visible black citizens totter between working white citizens, who look every bit as poor as 
the black youth might actually be, black men and women of “questionable propriety,” and rich 
white citizens who may not look as fashionable and may not be as educated as their black 
counterparts, but who nevertheless have political power over them. 
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Figure 1:  N. Orr’s 1850 cover of New York by Gas-Light.  Courtesy, AAS. 
 
Even as he recasts contemporary arguments faulting black citizens’ culture and habits for 
their political economic position, Ethiop reminds his readers that this labor representivity—these 
cultural representations of blackness and the structural conditioning of black and white 
subjectivity they mask—results from a systematic pedagogy of domination.  Through the cultural 
production of racial knowledge, white citizens and “all the world are taught to look at both 
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[white] deeds and men through a magnifying glass of their own construction, which invariably 
pronounces upon all favorably.  You look and behold! it is good!”82  While for Foster, Emerson, 
and others, Anglo-Saxon power results from hard work, self-culture, and self-reliance, Ethiop 
contends, “their great men…owe as much, and often more, to position,” to the lens through 
which they see and are seen, “than to either their own energies or abilities—more to their system 
of puff, boast, and brag, than to any real merit in them.”83  Put differently, white success is as 
much a result of a combination of power (position) and control of representation (puff, boast, and 
brag) in the shape of a mythological whiteness, “at the same time both imperfectable and 
unquestionable,” as it is of individual labors (merit).84   
Throughout his column, Ethiop returns to the idea that art and culture work as lenses 
conditioning ways of being in the world.  It’s not (just) that black laborers are in degraded 
positions, but rather that all things white are exalted over all things black, and, worse, even black 
successes are veiled, “[receiving] from the same system an amount of hoots, hisses and pious 
curses.”85  If white society has in its service a magnifying glass, Ethiop concludes, “[l]et us have 
a glass of our own…and we, too, may see and teach others to see our own men and deeds as they 
ought to be seen—as they are.”86  But the black lens must be more than the uplift narratives 
offered in conventions and papers; it must be coupled with economic leaders able to guide “the 
people” in productive directions that confront the material conditions framing and codifying the 
white lens.  “Who, then,” he asks, “are the guides of the people….  Who ought to be?  Certainly 
those whose capacities and energies have led them beyond the pale of mere speculative theories 
to palpable and practical results.”87 Ethiop’s answer to this query is not to refigure the centrality 
of economics to U.S. citizenship practices, but rather to reorient black citizens’ relation to the 
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nation’s economic and cultural power structure through black economic representatives, a black 
aristocracy.   
Ethiop introduces the idea of a black aristocracy in one of his earliest correspondences, 
arguing, “Let those of us who can, (and they are many) turn their attentions to the monied 
interests in this country; and once fairly in the field, the disabilities complained of, would 
disappear as an evening cloud.”88  “A black aristocracy must be had,” Ethiop concludes, to 
cultivate the “best means” for not only producing black economic citizens, but also reconfiguring 
the operations of economic citizenship more broadly.89  Noting that modern industrial capitalism 
has created untenable inequalities, stripping the city of its humanity, Ethiop nevertheless argues 
that a black aristocracy can establish balance through proper management and negotiation: 
Alas, it is a sad reflection, that amidst so much brick and mortar, amid so much splendor, 
here is so much of misery and degradation; society is organically diseased here. I venture 
to say that there is more wretchedness, more misery, more degradation, here in this 
metropolis amidst the superfluity of philanthropy and religion, than can be found in any 
whole nation outside of Christendom…..  Society here needs renovating, soul and body; 
and it is the office-work of those to whom I belong to effect it; this is their true mission.90  
 
Wilson, like Jones and Allen, realized that economic practice and racial structures were 
integrally connected, dangerous not just to racial minorities, but to all citizens.  The inverse 
relation between the signs of modernity (“so much brick and mortar”) and general prosperity 
suggests a greater dissonance, a disease affecting both the city’s thought life (soul) and its 
material condition (body).  The state and established civic structures (“the superfluity of 
philanthropy and religion”) have proven ineffective or collusive in creating these conditions, 
partly because both were governed by the same antagonisms Ethiop notes on the streets in earlier 
sketches.  Instead of offering a check on the deleterious effects of industrialization, they have 
become supportive of it.  
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Rather than need regulation from civil society as a civic republican model might suggest, 
in Ethiop’s rendering, the market’s logics of interest become the medium through which the 
disorder might be corrected.  “[Engaged] in the various industrial and accumulating enterprises” 
of the country, the black aristocracy could cure society of this “disease” from inside the market, 
forging links between society’s dis-integrated constituencies.91  Where Jones and Allen’s 
Narrative rejects self-interest as a viable mode for civic engagement, and Carey’s virtuous civic 
republicans manage the state from a civil society wholly outside the market, Ethiop embraces 
both interest and the market, if pragmatically.  Recognizing that power and representation were 
already structured hierarchically, most prominently in the “slave oligarchy,” but no less so in 
Northern capitalist cities, Ethiop proposes a means of “renovating” this hierarchy so it works 
towards more just and humane, if not more egalitarian, ends.  The black aristocracy’s “business,” 
then, involves managing not only capital, but also communities, both black working classes and 
white monied classes, “to the one, offering encouragements and affording substantial aid; to the 
other, acting as a sort of rectifier of errors - a pruner of excesses; a grand conservator of the 
whole social machinery.”92  Oscillating between two constituencies, the black aristocracy could 
understand both, operating at once as visible public guardians and at the same time behind the 
scenes (or “curtain”) as the fraternal organization invoked in “grand conservator.”93  They could 
counter the psychic and material violence of whiteness (“CANNOT”), creating a foundation 
from which to demand equality for black citizens, while focusing the economic elite’s attention 
on constructing a more just society on the whole.94  
Two factors contribute to the black aristocracy’s ability to balance market interest and 
community responsibility:  1) Ethiop’s conception of the market’s function as a surrogate for the 
participatory politics from which many black citizens have been barred, and 2) the black 
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aristocrats’ ability to move fluidly between multiple spaces and points of view, while “feeling” 
their “position” in relation to black communities.  Ethiop sees the monied classes operating by 
the same mechanisms of circulation that the black state conventions apply to participatory 
politics.  Channeling Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Tocqueville’s articulation of “interest 
rightly understood,” Ethiop argues that if black communities focused on cultivating a monied 
class, “[s]teamboat and railroad stocks would, in the regular course of things, be as much in their 
[the black aristocracy’s] hands as others.  Their interests and the white’s would be in common; 
and of necessity, an interchange and similarity of feelings would exist between the parties.”95  
Ethiop takes this economic growth as a natural process in which the properly managed 
accumulation of assets will lead inexorably to ownership of central resources.  As black 
entrepreneurs engaged more fully in this growth, increasingly common financial interests among 
the monied classes would outweigh prejudices, and because “money is the ruling idea,” changes 
in and coming from the monied classes would necessarily (or organically) lead to changes in 
society as a whole, as changes in the head lead to changes in the body.  State-supported 
discrimination in transportation and other business establishments, for instance, would disappear 
as black investors became owners of significant stock in them or related operations, and their 
“influence…would forbid the idea of recommending” colonization.96 
Ethiop realizes that the community’s experience with oppression and caste makes the 
notion of an aristocracy “unpalatable,” especially given its contemporary usages in reference to 
the “slave power” and land monopolies; but, he argues, “it is as much to the interest of our 
people to sustain it as to the class sustained.”97  “Happily,” he writes in language reflecting Whig 
notions of the “harmony of interests” and the arguments of contemporaries like Tunis Campbell, 
“the varieties of our composition make some prefer to arrange, and some to work after 
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arrangements.”98  Because they understand this mutualism, the black aristocrats “naturally 
discharge” their duties to the community “as do the trees put forth their leaves in summer, or 
their fruits in due season,” so that they resemble less the European variety, “of mushroom growth 
and existence,” and more Emerson’s “nobles” who “nature provides…in every society” to direct 
the collective “powers…by love.” 99 These aristocratic trees remain rooted in the community, 
bearing fruit in an organic way that contrasts sharply to the “brick and mortar” associated with 
the current landscape, because Ethiop balances the aristocrats’ capitalist individualism with a 
fellow feeling based on logics of mutual interest and community responsibility.100 
Mapping the civic-market relation in this way reverses the trajectory laid out in the black 
state conventions in the previous decade—that political equality leads to material equality—
suggesting that black citizens can create a more equitable society by force of interest, if not by 
persuasion or principle.  The market would then become a more republican base for broader 
social renovation—more republican because of the more representative sampling of the 
population constituting it, even if actual political institutions were not.101  In this way, Ethiop’s 
economic citizenship foreshadows what historian Jeffrey Sklansky identifies in the late-
nineteenth century:  “growing acceptance of finance capital and wage labor as the new grounds 
of economic democracy, not its antithesis.”102  The dollar supplants the ballot as black aristocrats 
enter the market as representatives among the power-wielding economic elite, “elevated” by “the 
community who sustain them” to counter white oligarchy.103  They are representative, not in the 
sense that they reflect every citizen’s character and potential, but rather in a more overtly 
political sense, through what Nadia Urbinati figures as a relationship of “control (on the part of 
the represented) and responsibility (on the part of the representatives).”104  They act as a 
specialized professional class whose job (“office work”), explains Ethiop, is to carry the will of 
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their “people” into the economic seat of power, to “[take] advantage of the infant condition of 
growing Towns by securing good business localities especially, not only as a source of profit to 
themselves, but as a great means of inducting Africo-America into the business world.”105 As 
their economic position short-circuits the power of white representivity, the black aristocrats’ 
ability to feel and share the views of the community that sustains them would keep them 
responsive to their constituents. This representativity contrasts to forms offered in either the 
National Convention of Colored Citizens or in white cultures of capital, which are grounded in a 
sense of the representative as “like” those represented, instead suggesting a more political notion 
of the representative as professional advocate.  Ethiop’s black aristocrats’ capitalism becomes 
inseparable from the overall project of community empowerment:  they are capitalists in the 
market, communitarians at home.106 
Black aristocrats would be able to balance these seemingly contradictory impulses 
because they would operate in the world with the subjectivity modeled in Ethiop’s sketches, 
constantly moving between spaces oriented on a vertical axis.  Harnessing the narrative mobility 
of the literary sketch, Ethiop oscillates between the “Heights” of Brooklyn, where he can “look 
down…upon that goodly city” clear of obstructions; and the streets, where he walks about, 
sometimes in disguise, close enough to “use [his] own eyes and ears, and arrive at [his] own 
conclusions.” 107  From Brooklyn, the “bright Eye of the morning in the back-ground, [guilds] 
beautifully all before and around,” its position north of Manhattan offering an elevated space for 
observation and the needed distance and time from the center of activity to interpret the 
disorienting experiences of city life.  These experiences must, nevertheless, be had first-hand for 
accuracy and to cultivate the proper ethical “feeling.”108 On the ground, Ethiop acts as a 
participant observer (sometimes disguised), proclaiming in his first correspondence:  “And now.  
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Good gentle folks,/Ethiop’s again among ye, taking notes.”109  Like the flâneur that, as Dana 
Brand suggests, attempts to make “the rich diversity of modern urban experience accessible to 
his audience, through the production of images in the context of journalism,” Ethiop’s columns 
“paint” day-to-day practices, providing a geographic, cultural, and economic compass for his 
readers.110  Ethiop, then, has a transcendent vision of the whole from above (Ethiop’s images of 
the “bright Eye of the morning” invoking the image of Emerson’s floating eyeball) and the 
personal identification with the community, the confluence enabling Ethiop to draw aside the 
“dark veil of mystery” to understand the workings of the overall social drama.111   
The black aristocracy could refigure black representivity with similar movements in 
relation to political economic spaces, managing the city’s contending interests on behalf of black 
citizens through what Urbinati describes as the “continuing and mediated relation between 
situated citizens and representatives.”112  They would become emblems of black “corporate 
capacity,” creating a more materially grounded culture in which coming generations understand 
how the “great business curtain” works and, with this understanding, can distinguish between 
“actual” and “imaginary” power.113  “The presence of such a class to urge, assist and otherwise 
encourage,” writes Ethiop, “would cause the really ambitious to step out from among the masses 
continually and climb up to it.”114  This steady climb would, in turn, create a more representative 
economic citizenry, disrupting cultures of capital that depend on black surplus labor and a 
negative blackness and that have resulted in a broader civic breakdown.  That is, black aristocrats 
would build the cultural and material structures through which this class of representatives and 
civic managers could be reproduced, creating a population that increasingly resembled, at least in 
part, the productive economic habits of its representatives.  No longer holding the veil of the 
play, no longer functioning as expendable support, black citizens could transform the play itself.   
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Here, then, is the crux of Ethiop’s economic citizenship and the source of the black 
aristocracy’s sense of identity and responsibility:  communities will produce economic 
representatives who understand their relationship to the community as one of responsibility and 
responsiveness.  Their collective work will eventually net a new generation of economic citizens, 
whose investments will give them the power needed to make themselves competent participants 
in the structures of economic representation.  Just as the proper narrative and visual position 
allows Ethiop to see through the veils separating black citizens from real power, the proper 
economic position would allow them to break through to economic power, creating unofficial 
modes of representation and advocacy in lieu of official political oligarchy.  
 
4.  Communipaw’s Polity of the “best average colored” Citizens. 
Where Ethiop’s model of economic citizenship depends on the ascendancy of a 
representative aristocracy to counter U.S. oligarchy, Smith’s Communipaw questions the notion 
of economic citizenship altogether.  His sketches, particularly the “Heads of the Colored People, 
Done with a Whitewash Brush” series, pull citizenship practice out of the market; or, more 
precisely, they subordinate market interests to a narrative of civic ideals, highlighting the average 
citizen’s sphere of existence, the little republics they create out their homes and communities.  
Against Ethiop’s calls for an aristocracy to renovate U.S. oligarchy, Communipaw invokes an 
ethos of commonwealth republicanism, a polity based on the middling sorts and focused on 
cultivating a “public spirit” that cherishes liberty and freedom as its highest end.115  
Communipaw deduces that Ethiop, in his focus on the current relation between civic 
ideals and economics, has fallen victim to the veil figured in his own analysis, throwing money 
at what is essentially not a question of capital or management, but rather of ideals and civic 
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ethos.  He responds directly to Ethiop’s “monied solution” on 12 February, associating Ethiop 
with the constant refrain from Sir Walter Scott’s popular Heart of Midlothian or Tales of My 
Landlord (1818, reprinted in Philadelphia in 1852):  “‘Jean! will siller do’t?’” (will silver do 
it?).116  Through the allusion, Communipaw implies that Ethiop’s “dollar remedy” intensifies the 
decay his black aristocracy is supposed to renovate.  By assuming that, as one of Heart’s 
characters famously puts it, “siller [silver] will certainly do it in the Parliament House, if ony 
[any] thing can do it,” Ethiop and others who suggest an economic solution to racial caste 
capitulate to structural inequalities, cynicism, and moral ignominy as normative facets of 
economic citizenship.117  Moreover, just as “everyone” knew Scott, not “Jedediah 
Cleishbotham,” authored Heart (and that Wilson was Ethiop!), everyone would recognize that 
Ethiop’s aristocracy would simply be a pseudonymous repackaging of U.S. oligarchy.118 
Communipaw agrees with Ethiop’s assessment of the centrality of money to U.S. culture 
and politics—in Communipaw’s terms, “gold” has become the “Key Stone of American morals 
and religion”—but he comes to very different conclusions about solutions for black communities 
and the nation more generally.119  The pursuit of gold, Communipaw observes, “builds houses, 
‘nets the land with railroads,’ tills the soil – in short, hastens the day of less physical and greater 
mental labor.”120  But it also “contract[s] the soul,” making one unfit or unable to take advantage 
of the new capacity for mental development.  “Hence,” argues Communipaw, “American society 
is a poor, dumb, blind dog to whom the sun in the heavens and the sweet harmonies of nature, 
and the deeper harmonies of humanity are as a closed book.”121 Material accumulation has 
outstripped citizens’ capacity to act humanely towards each other or to deal ethically with the 
demands of the economic citizenship Ethiop himself describes.122   
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Ethiop’s aristocracy, because of its very position in relation to wealth, would not be able 
to resist cooptation by the overall marketization of the civic ethos and would be unable or even 
unwilling to cultivate the sense of “feeling” central to Ethiop’s model.123  For Communipaw, this 
lack of feeling is not a fault of the people so much as the logical concomitant of wealth itself.  In 
passages suggestive of late-eighteenth century debates, Communipaw argues that bonds of 
economic interest are neither substitutes for nor generative of “bonds of sympathy.”124  “Gold,” 
rather than enabling renovation, “freezes up the humanities and all their surroundings,” because 
“the beginning of such association was money; the middle progress of it, money; the aid of it 
money.”125  Communipaw’s maxims trump Ethiop’s faith that his aristocrats would remain 
responsive to the communities that nurtured them.  “The wealthy,” Communipaw continues, “are 
never a progressive class; they are by necessity conservatives.  Cotton would become king.  
Hundred thousand dollar black men would be no better than hundred thousand dollar white 
men.”126 Communipaw invokes the wealthy northern black businessmen and the “rulers of the 
five-points,” who either cater to a white-only clientele or whose money comes from businesses 
of ill-repute, and the southern black men who own slaves, suggesting that the black aristocrats 
would not only conserve intraracial class barriers, but would also conserve, and perhaps 
perpetuate, the racial caste in the name of wealth.127  If money is the ruling idea, and 
Communipaw and Ethiop agree that it is and that it has been bad for society, then producing an 
aristocracy would only perpetuate its faulty premises, further exposing black citizens to its 
atomizing properties.   
Communipaw’s critique of Ethiop and the nation’s “monied idea” reflects not only 
McCune Smith’s observation of U.S. culture, but also his training and research in natural history, 
specifically his understanding of how class worked and his belief that caste systems not only 
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inhibited progress but could also cause stagnation and regression.128  “If we look at the sources 
whence nations advanced in civilization draw their intellectual power, “Smith argues in 
“Civilization; Its Dependence on Physical Circumstance” (1859), “these sources will be found to 
spring from the common people—the physically vigorous.”129  Essays like “Lecture on the 
Haytien Revolution” (1841) and “On the Fourteenth Query of Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on 
Virginia” (1859) further outline his understanding of the relation between labor and progress:  
laboring classes are the source of a nation’s progress, the “stirrer[s]-up of true civilization”; and, 
wherever caste is “established…civilization is arrested, and either remains stationary…or sinks 
back into barbarism.”130  Black Americans, free and enslaved, represent the nation’s progressive 
class those “whose ‘common destiny’ is ‘labor’,” and they will be the guardians of its republican 
promise and the source of its progress in the arts and in political thought.131 
Where Ethiop sees characters in a social drama, Communipaw, like Smith, sees varieties 
of the human species contributing to an evolutionary process, a process in which liberty and 
“human brotherhood,” not money, are the ruling ideas.  Through Communipaw, Smith reframes 
an evolutionary discourse in millennial terms, reading the current fervor for gold as an 
“intermediate” epoch, the “ichthyosauri and plegiosauri,” linking the past to a future era of more 
perfect human brotherhood.  Just as the prehistoric amphibious reptiles that seemed to Georges 
Cuvier “best to deserve the name of monster” were understood as links in the evolution of 
contemporary species, “wealth and caste,” like the “only half lunged” creatures, link two 
civilizational epochs, but do not represent the more beautiful “systems” to come.132  Looking 
forward to this system, Communipaw sees a millennial reign of “Liberty,” calling on readers to 
“seek Liberty,” in a revision of Matthew 6:33, “with the full and entire energies of our soul, 
and,” he predicts, “the smaller matters of personal comforts will be added to us.”133  
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Contemporary capitalism may be part of that evolution, but, like the prehistoric reptiles, it 
is a very crude one.  “Our present weal,” Communipaw concludes, “can only be better by a 
nobler idea,” a return to first principles, rather than an adaptation to current errors.  In a model 
with Aristotelian undertones, Communipaw suggests that the “middle tens…the rising and 
progressive class,” not a wealthy elite, will continue evolving and perfecting the nation’s civic 
ideals, because “they seek the upper tendon– not for its wealth, but for its position” through 
“thrift, punctuality, enterprise and persistent energy, such as the pursuit of mere wealth never 
stirred up in the human soul.”134  Only through the efforts of these middling folk, who, in 
Aristotelian terms, “possess the gifts of fortune in moderation,” their souls made vibrant through 
their labor, will the relation between economics and civic ethos be brought into balance.  If the 
majority of the free black population occupies so-called degraded positions at the moment, 
Communipaw offers a compensatory narrative, similar to Foster’s recuperation of Mose, that 
black laborers possess the collective experience and the rough moral stuff out of which this class 
can most productively be formed.  Communipaw is not after simple inclusion.  Rather, through 
Communipaw offers a “counter-statement of [a] political subject,” as Nikhil Pal Singh would 
later posit of black politics more generally, struggling “to widen the circle of common 
humanity.”135  Communipaw’s common folk, even the single mother working as a 
washerwoman, are the last hope for republican citizenship.  “We must work this out here,” that is 
liberty and human brotherhood, “or for ages the chance may not come again.”136  That “work,” 
not waged labor, constitutes black citizens’ civic virtue. 
Communipaw’s “Heads of the Colored People” concretizes this evolutionary and salvific 
process through ten sketches detailing the lives of black citizens identified by trade:  news-
vender, bootblack, washerwoman, sexton, steward, editor, inventor, and schoolmaster. Two 
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focus on single women, a washerwoman and a schoolmaster, making a living on their own, while 
the others follow men (single and married) starting lives and families after New York’s 1827 
emancipation.  Through these installments, often appearing next to Ethiop’s column on page 
three, Communipaw rethinks the relation of these people to the civic community, repositioning 
some of Ethiop’s most degraded laborers as representative citizens based on their ideals, not their 
finances, and resituating citizenship practice in the home and civil society, as personal 
fulfillment displaces money as the ruling idea.  This strategy is particularly evident in “The Boot-
Black,” “Heads of the Colored People” No. 2. The sketch models how one could and ought to 
strive towards moral and material success, and at the same time, celebrates those whose lives 
began in slavery, plodded upward through hard work, and ended established in the middle class.  
Appearing on 15 April 1852, “The Boot-Black” begins as Communipaw’s reminiscence of a 
formative figure from his childhood, a man who provided an image of responsible manhood:  
“Man and boy I have known that stride and that smile as long, if not longer, than my earliest 
recollections of—cake.”137  More than personal reflection, however, “The Boot-Black” suggests 
how the virtues associated with labor, regardless of its status, could “stir anew the current of life” 
and cultivate in post-emancipation New York the same kind of civic ethos associated with 
agrarianism and the artisan republicanisms of the 1820s and 1830s.138   
Situating stories of black labor, family, and civic identity in a post-emancipation world 
was central to Communipaw’s project.139  The bootblack was a slave, “part of the livestock,” at 
the Livingston manor until he, like many black New Yorkers in 1827, “finding himself in 
possession of himself…took sloop and came down to the city.”140  Communipaw’s 
reconstruction of Emancipation Day resists what scholars note as “a kind of constructed 
amnesia” about the legacy of Northern slavery even as the slavery was constantly foregrounded 
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in (white) labor discourse.141  Similarly, the News-vender, another of Communipaw’s characters, 
spends the better part of his young-adult life evading slave-catchers after his escape from a 
Virginia plantation (that Communipaw strongly suspects to have been Thomas Jefferson’s), until 
a shipwreck leaves him with both legs amputated at the knee.  Both narratives suggest that the 
insistence on a liberal market contributes to this amnesia, because it ignores how the economics 
of slavery complicated black citizens’ relation to the market and property and continued to frame 
not only the associations between black labor and “degradation,” but also the entire national 
economy.  Ignoring these historical realities by asking black workers to find civic worth in the 
same market that valued and continued to value them as “livestock” not only alienates black 
citizens from their newly-acquired (and threatened) freedom to work, but also elides the 
limitations created by the Fugitive Slave Act and the legacies of Whig patronage and paternalism 
that continued to haunt black politics in New York.142   
Communipaw’s historicized reading allows him to use the bootblack and others to sketch 
what he sees as the progressive ideals and habits gained from labor “made with a will,” ideals 
and habits important not only for black citizens, but also for the future of the state.143  
Bootblacks, Communipaw reflects, “as a class are thrifty, energetic, progressive.  Free muscles, 
steadily exercised, produce free thought, energy, progress.”144  The passage plays on “free,” 
signaling the importance of both the physical exertion involved in the work and how the 
Bootblack’s freedom to labor (his emancipated muscles) and to choose a profession produces the 
progressive energy Smith attributes to laboring classes more generally in “Civilization.”145  
Emphasizing physical exertion, moreover, mitigates the image of luxury the bootblacking itself 
existed to support and strengthens its connection to the kinds of manual labor more often 
promoted as productive of mental character, like blacksmithing or agriculture. If, as Jefferson 
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posits in Notes, “it is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigour,” 
then Communipaw’s bootblack would show how this spirit could thrive in the city in the least 
likely of homes.146 
Indeed, the sketch emphasizes the bootblack’s home as the central location for his civic 
and economic identity, valorizing its function as a site of resistance even as the sketch recovers 
the important work of women in the urban economy.147 The bootblack’s wife is central to the 
family’s overall success.  As Communipaw explains, “at first, business was slow with him, and 
both were dependent on the labors of the laundress,” her services advertised on “a modest piece 
of tin announc[ing] ‘Washing and Ironing done by Mrs.,’” hung outside their rented basement 
apartment next to his own sign.148  Their economic and domestic life reflected the typical 
economic arrangement of urban New Yorkers.  The jobs men, particularly black men, could find 
were often not enough to support a family.149  Instead, women were the primary earners.  The 
passage lacks the negative moral judgements often found in contemporary accounts of black 
women working.150  In contrast to contemporaries like Ethiop and Martin Delany, who would 
read her work as, in Delany’s terms, a sign that “we are all a degraded, miserable people, inferior 
to any other people as a whole, on the face of the globe,” Communipaw weaves it into a narrative 
of a family’s economic and social emergence after emancipation.151  
The bootblack and his wife work so that their children might have an education and a safe 
economic and domestic environment:  “his boy should have as much learning as money could 
buy…. These hopes and resolutions gave renewed force and longer reach to his studies…lent 
new vigor to his right arm.”152  Conforming to gender values of his day, the bootblack hopes for 
a son who could take full advantage of everything education and his growing funds could offer, 
but they have daughters instead.  The children, however, “only added to t
 176 
hero,” and with these energies, his business and property grow:  “now a separate apartment from 
his kitchen parlor and above ground, yet at a most economical rent.”153  Though “Bootblack” 
reinforces some gender conventions, particularly concerning marriage, the nuclear family, and 
the patriarchal role of the father, it also suggests that such conventions should not be used to 
obscure material fact or become grounds for condemning people whose honest labor underwrites 
the very civic virtues the conventions were intended to foster.  The girls grow up to be 
independent, one “teaching in a private school of her own, assisted by her only surviving sister, 
and pupil.”154  The two girls, though unmarried, symbolize the bootblack and his wife’s success, 
even as the bootblack realizes a personal dream he thought would have to wait for the next 
generation:  he opens his own shop.  
Working through this trajectory with a bootblack makes “elevation” accessible to a larger 
group than Ethiop’s black aristocracy allows.  And, in contrast to Ethiop’s reliance on 
representative and exceptional leaders, “Bootblack” presents an immanent model, an example of 
a middling type, an example of what the common laborer and his family might achieve:  “One 
former bootblack, is now a merchant tailor in Newark; another a self-relying farmer in Essex 
County.”155  It is no accident that Communipaw’s other examples go on to be “self-reliant” on 
the one hand and a businessman an on the other.  The two examples echo the 1848 Convention’s 
revised resolution; they worked at so-called degraded labor “where necessity [compelled them] 
to resort thereto as a means of livelihood,” and, as Douglass suggested, they left these 
“situations” once they could.156 Moreover Smith had real-life, well-know referents for his sketch.  
One of the great (intentional) ironies of “The Boot-Black” is that Wilson was himself owned a 
bootmaking shop before becoming an educator and rising to prominence within the community.  
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 Still, the main character of this sketch prospers as a bootblack; he does not leave the 
“degraded situation,” despite knowing “that his calling was looked down upon”: 
wiser than dandy opinion, he found it and has proved it - Ethiop and Horace Greeley to 
the contrary notwithstanding - well fitted for him to exercise by means of it, all the 
faculties which make a man useful to his family and a credit to the State: he was 
willing…to stoop to conquer, and he has conquered:  and he laughs to scorn the capering 
principle martyrs who would rather starve…than handle a shoe-brush.157   
 
Communipaw links Ethiop to Greeley, accusing both of the same “dandy opinion” Ethiop 
condemns young men for, namely of mistaking money and status for actual wealth and progress 
and of refusing to “stoop to conquer,” that is censuring labor that could be instrumentally 
productive in the name of symbolic dignity.158  Because of the bootblack’s attitude towards his 
work, bootblacking becomes, for him, a craft akin to tailoring or writing (Communipaw 
compares “boot polishing” to “word polishing”), making him less a casual worker and more an 
artisan who develops his business as he hones his craft and builds his family.159  Rather than 
elevate the man out of his labor, then, Communipaw rearticulates the terms for evaluating labor, 
transforming the bootblack’s relation to the market and society in a way that Ethiop’s “monied 
idea” could not, by emphasizing the bootblack’s ideals and middling aspirations.  
By presenting his representative citizen as average, even in his distinctiveness, 
Communipaw critiques the tendency to focus on the exceptional man’s individuality and 
difference from the group, a tendency that leads to statistically skewed results.160  Bootblacking, 
Communipaw concludes, “is the calling which has produced the best average colored men, and 
has made men of character, not of wealth.”161  The sketch seems to bear this progression out, 
providing a concrete example of Communipaw’s theory of economic citizenship:  the bootblack 
and his wife sought liberty and uplift for themselves and their family first; the business success 
was added in the process.  Indeed, by the time Communipaw offers his narrative, the bootblack 
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has one of the “most distinguished boots our city boasts of,” he regularly supports the youth at 
the Free African School, he was “elected church-warden” at St. Philip’s, and he “owns a fine 
property in sight of the Manor on which he was ‘raised,’ and on which…he and his children 
might have remained in brutal ignorance.”162  The bootblack’s home has become a model 
republic in its own right, and Communipaw’s framing of him as a type suggests that his model 
can and is being reproduced across the city.  One bootblack could never generate the kind of 
change Ethiop and Communipaw both seek, but as a representative (average rather than 
exceptional) of a much larger class, his success presages the greater revolution to come.  
“Heads,” then, intervenes in an economic debate that relied too much on assumptions that a more 
elevated job, measured against a flawed white standard, was a more (civically) productive one. 
The bootblack shows the movement from slavery to freedom to citizenship, not through 
aristocratic management, but through hard-working, critical and self-critical, self-government.  
Even as “Bootblack” contests Ethiop’s aristocracy, Communipaw’s narration models a 
subjectivity calibrated to negotiate competing demands of civic and market spaces.  Where 
Ethiop’s aristocrats “feel” their position through an oscillating perspective on a vertically 
oriented physical and political economic plane, Communipaw’s representative citizen inhabits an 
interstitial space on a horizontal axis.  Smith situates Communipaw at “the poste of door keeper, 
not to the Senate…but to the outermost enclosure leading to the Republic of Letters.”163  The 
Republic of Letters invokes a space where, Communipaw explains, “if they be but true” to their 
ideals, citizens can live “free from caste, and Cass and Filmores.”164 Moreover, contrasting the 
Republic of Letters to the Senate, Communipaw also implicitly taps into the anti-aristocratic 
impulses of the French Enlightenment and the revolutions of the 1840s, echoing Paine’s use of 
the Republic as a model for egalitarian polity:  “As the republic of letters brings forward the best 
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literary productions, by giving to genius a fair and universal chance; so the representative system 
of Government is calculated to produce the wisest laws, by collecting wisdom from where it can 
be found.”165  The young Smith invokes this structure in his 1837 travel journal for the Colored 
American that I discuss in Chapter 1:  “the genius of the institutions of America,” he explains is 
their “gathering around them and fostering mechanical genius and enterprize [sic.] from every 
portion of the Globe.”166   The yet-unrealized “genius” of U.S. republicanism is its inclusivity, 
the promise of a form of government and national culture that could incorporate new peoples and 
ideas based only on the principles of hard work and ingenuity, not race or class.  Figured as a 
doorkeeper, Communipaw’s ideal representative would ensure that this free circulation remained 
robust, providing a transformative bridge between the “heads,” or genius, of the colored people, 
a condemnatory black elite, and a republic that has heretofore rejected them.   
Communipaw links the intellectual and civic project of the Republic of Letters to the 
citizens whose work would disqualify them from a more restrictive notion of a bourgeois public 
sphere by identifying this project with laborers like bootblacks and whitewashers 
(“Heads…Done with a Whitewash Brush”).  Where “The Boot-Black” outlines the material and 
ethical grounding of Communipaw’s economic citizen, “The Whitewasher” demonstrates how 
these citizens view their relation to power, not as elite representatives on the “Heights,” as 
Ethiop might suggest, but rather as a governing polity of ordinary people, whose silent work 
belies their deep understanding of how power circulates and their ability (yet untapped) to direct 
this circulation.  Whitewashers, Communipaw explains, exert an “invisible but irresistible power, 
before which parlor doors, chamber doors, and all other fastenings and hindrances at once give 
way.”167  Whitewashers developed this power as a part of their skill at their craft, a perfect 
combination of physical work and intellectual acumen (“Our whitewasher,” for instance, “is a 
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chemist…in his way”).168 Likewise, the “secret of [Douglass’s] power,” Smith’s 1855 
Introduction to My Bondage and My Freedom explains, is his history as a laborer.  Douglass is 
“a Representative American man— a type of his countrymen,” not despite having been a slave 
and having worked as a “degraded” laborer in freedom, but precisely because he has “passed 
through every gradation of rank comprised in our national make-up, and bears upon his person 
and upon his soul every thing that is American.”169  Labor, in this model, is one of several 
activities that not only creates material security, but also develops the habits and subjectivity for 
the work of collective governance.   
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5.  Ideal Projects vs. Real Limitations. 
 So far, I have outlined how Wilson and Smith map competing logics of economic 
citizenship and representivity through their correspondences as Ethiop and Communipaw, the 
one suggesting that a model of black aristocracy could counter white oligarchy, the other 
suggesting that the nation’s civic life must be reoriented away from the market towards a 
middling laboring polity.  While the overall arc of Ethiop and Communipaw’s debate responds to 
a larger trajectory towards economic citizenship, they are also deeply embedded in the everyday 
happenings in the city, constantly adjusting in response not only to each other, but also to New 
York’s volatile political, economic, and racial milieu.  And it is this engagement with 
contemporary events that provides the criteria by which they evaluate each other and through 
which each writer frames his response to the other.170 
Where Communipaw’s sketches suggest Ethiop’s reading of economic citizenship 
contributes to historical and political amnesia, Ethiop accuses Communipaw of forwarding a 
dangerous romanticism, too concerned with an idealized past and future and not focused enough 
on present economic and political dilemmas.  In a May 13 response to “Bootblack,” Ethiop 
situates Communipaw’s “Heads” in a romanticized past lacking “faithfulness” to the harsher 
realities of a “monstrous” present.  True, Ethiop admits in response to “Boot-black,”  
a determined man, no matter how low his condition, or what his color, despite all 
opposition, may, if he persevere, raise himself up to the highest niche in the profession he 
marks out for himself; and, at the same time, have not only a name and a praise among 
men, but something more substantial for himself and children.171 
 
Yet, such men are, by and large, exceptions to a general rule of racial oppression and economic 
mediocrity—they do well on their own for their families, but cannot do much for their 
communities on the whole.  By way of illustration, Ethiop describes a recent trip to St. Philip’s 
Episcopal Church—the church Smith regularly attended and where Communipaw’s bootblack 
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meets his wife.  Ethiop reminisces about his own arrival at “Old St. Philip’s!!!” where he heard 
his “first sermon” after arriving in the city and where he “first saw one whose shadow ever 
walketh by” his side (a memory further implicating Wilson in Communipaw’s “The Bootblack”).  
Yet, in direct contrast to the nostalgic “Bootblack,” Ethiop leaves the past to describe a 
disappointing present.172  When he arrives expecting to see the lasting effects of the bootblack’s 
presence, he encounters an “atmosphere” that “seemed cold and strange”:   
I listened - but heard not, as once, the short quick-step of the little old man, as his goose-
quilled shoes squeakingly glided up the aisle, announcing, by their presence, to 
everybody, that “meeting was now in.” He was not, there!!!  
And as I bowed my head in silence, I heard a voice; but oh! it was not the meek 
and heavenly voice of the Rev. Peter Williams; it was another’s….  I looked, and lo!! it 
was a white man!!! a dictator sent to dictate to his flock, and he did dictate: and they, I 
fear, alas! have learned too well how to submissively obey. 173 
 
Neither the bootblack’s familiar step nor Rev. Peter Williams, first rector of St. Philips, is 
present.  The fact should not have surprised his readers, since Rev. Williams died in 1840.  The 
observation does, however, date Communipaw’s account and suggests that the bootblack and his 
type are dated as well, symbols, like the church’s “old hanging chandeliers,” of a bygone era.174  
The “relief of the past” eludes Ethiop as he struggles to come to terms with present 
realities, the irony of contemporary events at St. Philip’s increasing the sense that 
Communipaw’s sketches describe a historical moment that, perhaps, never was.175  The paper’s 
readers had no doubt read “St. Philip’s Church and the Fugitive Slave Law” from two weeks 
earlier, George T. Downing’s account of the church’s capitulation to its white pastor in support 
of the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law.176  As Downing explains, Smith submitted an 
announcement from the Committee of Thirteen “inviting the congregation to a meeting to take 
measures against kidnapping” in the wake of Horace Preston’s enslavement.177  Instead, “his 
satanic majesty,” the “Reverend Pastor,” pledged his all-black congregation’s support of the law, 
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and they agreed, not because they supported the law, but rather because “blacks will submit to 
whites, and bear nothing from one of themselves, even though it be proper.”178  This flashpoint 
suggests that the bootblack and others may have found a measure of personal success and 
independence, but without the power to change institutions and black citizens’ sense collective 
authority (a white Episcopacy appointed the white rectors, after all), this success dies with them.  
The large Episcopal congregation and black communities by extension will continue to 
“submissively obey” white authority, simply because it is white, as long as men like the 
bootblack remain isolated in their success, rather than rising to the occasion like an “[Oliver] 
Cromwell.”179   
Just as Communipaw’s romantic vision of the past and projected future has very little 
connection to reality, Ethiop suggests, so too do Communipaw’s economic insights—his quest 
for a guiding ideal—lose touch with material realities and the mechanics of the “real” economic 
world.  They reproduce the same economic veiling that glosses material inequality in white 
cultures of capital, “deaden[ing] susceptibilities it should have quickened,” as black citizens 
become satisfied with individual success.180  Communipaw isn’t exactly Ethiop’s virtuous, non-
materialist adversary.  All of his protagonists are deeply imbedded in the market—identified only 
by trade—, and he validates the “Bootblack” with examples of other bootblacks who left the 
profession for more lucrative ventures, but Communipaw obscures this fundamental material 
underpinning in his narration. Communipaw’s call for patience and his long historical telos could 
be read as disingenuous at best and a surrendering of black agency to the regimes of racial power 
he is resisting to be opposing at worst.  Neglecting the “real” of capital in favor of a salvific 
evolutionary process, Communipaw’s well-intentioned depictions—a perversion of “natural” 
economic processes—could come back to crush the community he’s working to bolster, “and 
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he,” Ethiop quips in an April 8 correspondence, “like poor Frankenstein, may well exclaim, ‘Oh! 
horrid monster, was it for this that I created you?’”181  The reference links Communipaw to both 
Mary Shelley’s novel and contemporary political caricatures.  “The Modern Frankenstein” 
appeared in the January 1852 issue of Lantern, featuring a shocked Horace Greeley, who, 
thinking he was creating black humanity from a pre-figured template, finds himself facing a 
nightmarish monster [figure 2].182   
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Figure 2:  Frank Bellow, “The Modern Frankenstein,” Lantern 31 January 1852. 
Notice the stick-like drawing on the wall in the background. 
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Ethiop’s analogy replaces Greeley with a cringing Communipaw, whose ideals, though 
fascinating in theory, suggest a grotesque, unnatural caricature of citizenship in practice.  
Perhaps, as Ethiop’s visit to St. Philip’s illustrates, Communipaw’s classical model would create 
a more docile, but no less destructive monster, one too strong for even Dr. James McCune Smith 
to subdue.  Trapped materially by a changing economic landscape on one side and 
philosophically by a romanticized past on the other, Communipaw’s “conceptions of truth” 
remain in “shackles.”183   
By concluding this chapter with Ethiop’s critique of Communipaw, I do not mean to 
suggest that Ethiop’s vision was either more accurate in his historical moment or that it offers a 
better vision and critique of economic citizenship.  One of Communipaw’s central critiques of 
Ethiop’s economic agenda was his sense that “to the mass of us, such pursuit would be vain, as a 
reality, for the reason we could not” obtain that much wealth under an economic and political 
regime skewed toward anti-democratic white, not simply self, interest.184  The following year 
bore Communipaw’s argument out as the real estate opportunities and the already-available 
foundations for an aristocracy in Manhattan disappeared.  In 1853 the city condemned Seneca 
Village and bought out its black residents to make space for Central Park.185 This land grab not 
only destroyed a well-established black community, but also eroded that community’s political 
power, because the state’s payment was not enough to allow them to reestablish themselves in 
the city.  Without the $250 in property the state required for voting, they were effectively 
disenfranchised.186  At the same time, the white economic elite Ethiop suggested would yield to 
the force of black economic power supported the fugitive slave law, and the private owners of 
the city’s public transit system continued requiring black patrons to ride in segregated cars, 
despite an 1854 court ruling against such practices.  The court, in turn, reversed its course not 
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five years later, ruling in favor of the Sixth Avenue Railway Company against James W. C. 
Pennington, who the company unceremoniously ejected in 1855.187 
In hindsight, however, Ethiop’s analysis turns out to be the more accurate of the two in 
terms of his assessment of the century’s economic and political trajectory as the corporation 
replaced the “self-employed household” as the primary unit of economic production.188  Ethiop’s 
notion of black aristocracy combines corporate organization and its concomitant shift in notions 
of individual autonomy with a guiding ethic of communal solidarity and democratic logics of 
participation, prefiguring, in a way, the economic philosophy of Booker T. Washington’s Negro 
Business League and the civic philosophy of W.E.B. Du Bois’s call for “talented tenth” fifty 
years later.189  And, as labor historians point out, Communipaw’s vision of a polity of the 
middling folk, while accurate in its articulation of the increasing significance of middle class 
values, if not power, misses the mark in its hope that these common folk, black or white, could 
maintain a sense of artisan republicanism in the face of industrialization.190  Economic 
development would become an even more critical point of attack for Wilson, Douglass, and 
others as they began shaping policy and institutions for freedmen and women after the Civil 
War.191   
Still, Communipaw’s emphasis on a polity of middling laborers and on participatory 
politics poses a productive critique not only of Ethiop’s aristocracy, but also of this trajectory:  
What costs must the “community” pay for ceding their civic ideals and their challenge to the 
promises of the “true republicanism” Ethiop himself invokes to these structures of economic 
citizenship?  Communipaw’s warning against relying on bonds self-interest to counter racism 
without a concomitant change in the nation’s commitment to liberty proves prophetic as state and 
national institutions continued to articulate, in increasingly explicit and violent terms, the ways 
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that black interests did not matter.  Where black aspirations became more insistent, so did white 
resistance, culminating in the violence of “Bleeding Kansas” in the middle of the decade and, in 
New York City, the 1863 Draft Riots.  As the decade wore on, the effects of the Fugitive Slave 
Law, the inconsistencies of state actions and federal decisions favoring then retracting black 
rights, increasing competition and hostility from working-class whites combined with 
recalcitrance from white employers and the dearth of masters willing to take on black 
apprentices, and the constant threat of violence led many black city dwellers to move to Canada 
and to more rural areas in the state.192  Even as their newspaper personae attempted to 
recouperate urban spaces, Wilson and Smith encouraged the in-state movement, outlining with 
other reformers the city’s deleterious effects in conventions and addresses.193   
While the Communipaw and Ethiop debate may read like a simple binaristic conflict 
between intellectuals—what Singh usefully frames as the conflict in U.S. between liberal civic-
republican tendencies paradigmatically outlined in the Washington-Du Bois debate—, Smith and 
Wilson were more often than not collaborators in public fora like the state and national 
conventions and in institutions like the Committee of Thirteen.194  That they stage this theoretical 
debate in Douglass’s Paper even as they cooperate in practice suggests the importance of public 
and open critique not only to their activist community, but also to citizenship practices more 
broadly.  The next chapter analyzes the role of critique as a practice of citizenship, returning to 
Ethiop and the questions of access and the national imaginary raised in Communipaw’s 
“Whitewasher” as black writers grapple with the meaning of citizenship and participatory 
politics following the violent closures of the Kansas-Nebraska crisis and Dred Scott v. Sanford. 
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Democratic:  New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850, 20th Anniversary Edition  
(New York:   Oxford University Press, 2004), 14-15.   
Work on the social and economic changes in the U.S. during these decades is expansive.  I draw my 
understanding of the market revolution as a conceptual framework for interpreting the years between the War of 
1812 and the Civil War from:  Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2000); Stuart M. Blummin, The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social 
Experience in the American City, 1760-1900 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1989); Wilentz, “Society, 
Politics, and the Market Revolution.” in The New American History; Jonathan A.  Glickstein, American 
Exceptionalism, American Anxiety:  Wages, Competition, and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States 
(Charlottesville:  University Virginia Press, 2002); Nicholas K.  Bromell, By the Sweat of the Brow:  Literature and 
Labor in Antebellum America (Chicago:  University Chicago Press, 1993); Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free 
Men:  The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War.  (1970)  2nd ed. (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Melvyn Stokes, introduction to The Market Revolution in America:  Social, Political, and Religious 
Expressions, 1800-1880. eds. Mlevyn Stokes and Stephen Conway (Charlottesville:  University Press of Virginia, 
1996); David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness:  Race and the Making of the American Working Class (New York:  
Verso, 1991); and Patrick Rael, “The Market Revolution and Market Values in Antebellum Black Protest Thought,” 
in Scott Martin, ed., Cultural Change and the Market Revolution in America, 1789-1860 (Lanham, Md., Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2004), 13-45. 
6 As Bromell puts it, “The struggle over their meaning is part of a political struggle, for whoever can claim 
to be society’s foremost workers can lay claim also to social and political prerogatives.”  See Bromell, Sweat, 22.  
7 As Wilentz explains, this “labor theory could be used either to defend ‘productive’ capitalist 
entrepreneurship or to condemn it,” and it could give labor still “dependent” on employer wages a sense of 
independence.  See Wilentz, Chants Democratic, 158, and Harris, In the Shadow of Slavery, 97-98. 
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8 “Mechanic” became a sort of catch-all title for manual laborers with “the capacity to unite craftsmen as 
proud republican workers.” See Roediger, Wages of Whiteness, 51-52.  
9 Wilentz observes that this paradigm builds on the republican style, adjusting its emphasis on 
commonwealth, virtue, independence, and equality to meet the new social demands of the market revolution (Chants 
Democratic, 14).  See also, Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution, 5-11.   
10 As labor historians like Roediger, Glickenstein, Foner, and Blummin have suggested, realities on the 
street ran in the opposite direction:  wage labor proliferated, upward mobility stagnated (if it existed at all), and labor 
became more subdivided, requiring less skill, but more work.  See for instance Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness, 
Glickenstein’s American Exceptionalism, Foner’s Free Soil, and Blummin’s Emergence of the Middle Class. 
11 As Joyce Appleby observes, “A new conception of politics converged with a new appreciation of 
enterprise, and a new character ideal was created:  the man who developed inner resources, acted independently, 
lived virtuously, and bent his behavior to his personal goals—not the American Adam, but the American homo 
faber, the builder.”  See Inheriting, 11.  Antebellum readers absorbed advice literature from writers like Horace 
Mann, Henry Ward Beecher, and William A. Alcott that created what Karen Halttunen has usefully framed as the 
“nineteenth-century version of the Protestant work ethic” along with narratives of self-made men who, by dint of 
hard work, rose from obscurity to financial success.  See Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women:  A Study 
of Middle-Class Culture in America (New Haven:  Yale University Press), 26-30.   
12 See also Glickenstein, American Exceptionalism, 4-6. As Foner explains, “American economists sought 
to reconcile wage labor with the idea of the New World as a classless utopia by insisting that in the United States, 
industrious and frugal laborers could save money, purchase their own homes, and eventually acquire a farm or a 
shop, thereby escaping the status of wage labor and assimilating into the republic of property holders” (xxi). Though 
labor advocates posed democratic equality and autonomy in opposition to the market liberalism of nascent 
capitalists, and free labor republicans protested regimes of “wage slavery,” they all upheld the basic premise that 
free enterprise nurtured republican character. See Foner, Free Labor and “The Idea of Free Labor in Nineteenth-
Century American,” an addition to the 1995 edition of Free Labor; Mcguir Ian, “‘Who ain’t a slave?’: Moby Dick 
and the Ideology of Free Labor,’” Journal of American Studies 37.2 (2003): 287-30.; Glickstein, American 
Exceptionalism, American Anxiety:  Wages, Competition, and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States 
(Charlottesville:  University Virginia Press, 2002), 25; Sklansky, Soul‘s Economy:  Market Society and Selfhood in 
American Thought, 1820-1920 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 3; and, Wilentz, “Society, 
Politics, and the Market Revolution” in The New American History, 72-78. 
13 Emerson, Representative Men in Essays and Lectures (New York:  Literary Classics of the United States, 
1983), 615. As Nelson’s paradigm of “presidential representivity” based on her reading of Representative Men 
suggests, Emerson’s “representative” fosters and then fulfills the citizen’s desire “for self-subordinating civic unity 
and national ‘wholeness,’ to desire power for our Representative…instead of heading the power we can generate 
between us” (224-225).  Emerson calls for citizens to see in the Representative one who could create a “new field” 
of thought:  the “system…of war, of an injurious superiority” in which “a man comes to measure his greatness by 
the regrets, envies, and hatreds of his competitors” becomes a place where “there is room,” where there “are no self-
esteems, no exclusions” (Representative Men, 625).  This representivity works, in part, because the office of the 
President and Emerson’s Representative were modeled after the pyramidal organization of a corporation, linking 
ways of thinking about the market and politics in terms of management.  My argument here builds on Nelson’s to 
suggest a structure of economic representivity or economic citizenship in which the successful self-made man (be he 
artisan, banker, capitalist, or land speculator) serves much the same representative function as the President.  By 
buying into the notion of an unbiased liberal market and by ascribing the economic representative’s success to his 
shrewd and virtuous labor in that market, citizens staked their claim to a piece of the  “spiritual and moral rewards,” 
of his success. See Nelson, “Representative/Democracy:  Presidents, Democratic Management, and the Unfinished 
Business of Male Sentimentalism,” in No More Separate Spheres, eds. Cathy N. Davidson and Jessamyn Hatcher 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 224-230; Sklansky, Soul’s, 3-4.   
14 Antebellum “respectability,” like late-eighteenth century “republicanism,” was a style, a set of diverse 
tropes deployed in a multiplicity of ways that ultimately tied market success to self-government and hard work, 
rather than manipulation and exploitation.  Scholars have noted that “respectability” developed in response to the 
uncertainty the market revolution caused.  Economic changes created opportunities for self-making as well as 
opportunities for deception, leading the bourgeoning middle classes to look for ways to differentiate themselves 
from working men and women.  Even as varying forms of a middle class emerged, it was becoming difficult to 
differentiate between this class and the working classes from which they’d sprung.  Cultures of “respectability” 
became the means by which this emerging group created and policed its own identity.  Patrick Rael observes,  
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respectability “served as a master value, encompassing a host of traits—not all of them compatible—that came to 
define an ideal for human character in an expanding market society” (Rael, “The Market Revolution,” 28).  
Glickstein has suggested that U.S. working-class respectability developed not only in contrast to slave labor, but also 
in contrast to “Europe’s ‘pauper’ laborers,” emphasizing the “market rewards” available to American workers. It 
retooled turn-of-the-century civic republican ethics in the form of the virtues of the liberal market.  See Glickstein, 
American Exceptionalism, 34-35; Appleby, Inheriting, 21; and Rael, “The Market Revolution,” 28; and “African 
Americans, Slavery, and Thrift,” 190-193.  For a detailed account of how “white collar” jobs like clerking helped 
shaped the visible performance of respectability even as the work’s changing requirements and increasing 
resemblance to “degraded” work like portering pushed the discourse’s limits, particularly as it became more closely 
associated with the black workers who traditionally did it, see Brian Luskey, “Jumping Counters in White Collars:  
Manliness, Respectability, and Work in the Antebellum City,” Journal of the Early Republic 26 (Summer 2006), 
173-219.  
15 Emerson, Representative Men, 625. 
16 Following Gutman and Rawick, Roediger suggests that part of the impetus for the minstrels and their 
attendant racism was a white longing for the fetishized pre-capitalist pleasures:  drinking, holidays, less regimented 
workdays, etc.  On Mose particularly, he writes:  “When Mose appeared in 1848, according to one contemporary 
account, ‘pit and galleries joined in the outcry’ as many recognized themselves in his performance.  He quickly 
became an American urban hero, a ‘tough melon but sweet at the core’, gracing the parades of artisan based 
volunteer fire departments even in an outlying city like Nashville by the early 1850s’” (Wages of Whiteness, 95-96, 
99-10). This is not to cover up the real tensions between nascent classes, but rather to give a broad strokes overview 
of how popular representations compensated for economic inequality through cultures of whiteness. 
17 George Foster, New York by Gas-light and Other Urban Sketches, ed. Stuart M. Blumin (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1990), 170.  Whether intentional or not, Foster’s sentiments echo Emerson’s 
characterization of the “Saxon race” in Representative Men:  “Every child of the Saxon race,” writes Emerson, “is 
educated to wish to be first.  It is our system” (625).  Both Foster and Emerson’s comments indicate that the general 
sense of opportunity was not only tied to the expanding purview of economic possibility, but was also linked to and 
constitutive of racialized ways of thinking about such possibilities.  That is, while the market may offer the chance 
for upward mobility and a fuller expression of republican self-government, only men of Saxon or Anglo-Saxon 
stock are capable of taking full advantage of it. 
Though generally a rogue throughout the play, Mose is also a fireman.  True to form, Mose helps the poor, 
works in the volunteer fire department, and, in the penultimate scene “dashes into [a] Burning Building” to save a 
child.  In so doing, Baker’s character takes the popular image of the unruly hoards of rowdy, usually immigrant, and 
manual laborers and recovers it as a source of entertainment and pride. Indeed, as Richardson points out, Mose is 
juxtaposed to a successful businessman, Harry Gordon, who turns out to be “old school chum.”  The two may 
occupy divergent class positions, but they are made of the same stuff.  See Gary A. Richardson, “Plays and 
Playwrights:  1800-1865” in The Cambridge History of American Theatre, eds. Don B. Wilmeth and C. W. E. 
Bigsby (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1998), 277; Thomas Allston Brown, A History of the New York 
Stage from the First Performance in 1732 to 1901 vol. 1 (New York:  Dodd, Mead and Company, 1903), 284.  On 
the effects of plays like “New York as It Is” and the cultures it appropriates on the contemporary literary 
imagination see Andrew Lawson, Walt Whitman & the Class Struggle (Iowa City:  University of Iowa Press, 2006). 
18 See Leon Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1961), 156-157.  Indeed, as Litwack frames it, black laborers “allowed the whites to assume 
aristocratic airs on occasion” (157).  That is, as black workers filled menial positions, they helped ameliorate fears of 
downward mobility and, at the same time, allowed whites, who may not have been in any better economic position, 
to accrue social capital in whiteness.   
19 Popular images of black work and black workers included Joe dancing for eels, bootblacks and 
washerwomen pervade public discourse, and those with middle-class aspirations fell into a particularly entertaining 
kind of dandy.  [See figure 1].  Todd Vogel has rightly identified this unworkable position between economic 
aspiration, duplicitous public sentiment, and shrinking economic opportunities as a “crisis over the relationship 
between labor and citizenship.”  See Vogel, “The New Face of Black Labor,” in The Black Press:  New Literary and 
Historical Essays, ed. Todd Vogel (New Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press, 2001), 39. 
20 Litwack observes:  “In filling the menial occupations, Negroes not only acted ‘naturally’ but performed, 
at the same time, a valuable economic and psychological service for white society” (156).  As the 1848 convention’s 
“Address to the Colored People” put it, “a little less pride, and a little more industry on [the white employer’s] part, 
may enable him to dispense with our services entirely.”  “Address to the Colored People,” North Star, 22 September 
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1848.  On the abolitionist front, black activists censured the Tappans during an 1854 NFASS convention for refusing 
to hire black clerks while agents within the NASS continually complained that the organization refused to hire an 
African American for more than lecturing or other lower-level tasks. See Harris In the Shadow of Slavery 226-227; 
and Litwack, 156.  
21 Litwack, 158, and Luskey, “Jumping,” 185-189. 
22 Such was the case when New York City refused to grant black citizens carting licenses in the 1840s. As 
Harris has explained in the context of carting in New York, the city often policed racial boundaries and prevented 
black workers from more lucrative occupations by not granting them permits to do certain kinds of work and by 
strictly enforcing punishments for those operating without permits. Litwack notes that at least since the late 
eighteenth century, the refusal of financial institutions to extend credit to black entrepreneurs limited their economic 
options. Litwack also suggests that these structural adjustments occurred in response to white violence against black 
cartmen, using the protection of black workers to justify discrimination.  See Harris, Shadow, 217-218; and Litwack, 
North of Slavery, 154-159. 
As Marable explains in How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political 
Economy and Society, 1st ed. (Boston: South End Press, 1983), “Capitalist development has occurred not in spite of 
the exclusion of Blacks, but because of the brutal exploitation of Blacks as workers and consumers.  Blacks have 
never been equal partners in the American Social Contract, because the system exists not to develop, but to 
underdevelop Black people” (2).  Underdevelopment does not imply a lack of development, but rather, it signifies 
structures of inequality and exploitation, particularly between minority groups and capitalist orders.  The antebellum 
market revolution netted black “underdevelopment” as black labor provided the surplus value, the “various 
necessary menial duties,” that allowed whites to pursue more productive avenues.  See Marable, 2-8; Litwack, 158.  
23 Harris offers an account of key conflict along these lines around whether or not black waiters should 
unionize with white waiters for higher wages or if they should remain in black organizations like Tunis G. 
Campbell’s First United Association of Colored Waiters.  See Shadow, 242-245. 
24 As Douglass explains in “Learn Trades or Starve,” “The old avocations, by which colored men obtained 
a livelihood, are rapidly, unceasingly and inevitably passing into other hands; every hour sees the black man 
elbowed out of employment by some newly arrived emigrant, whose hunger and whose color are thought to give 
him a better title to the place” (Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 4 March 1853).  See, Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, 
xviii; and Litwack, North, 162-166.  Litwack reports that while black citizens held the majority of servant jobs in 
New York City in 1830, “twenty years later, Irish servants outnumbered the entire Negro population by ten to one” 
(166). 
25 Litwack, North of Slavery, 155. 
26 African Americans also joined the move west with some success, particularly in California.  An 1852 
Meeting of the Colored People of New York passed resolutions condemning, then Governor Washington Hunt’s 
recommendation “to the Legislature the appropriation of State funds for the purpose of transporting a portion of the 
citizens of the State to a barbarous country, thousands of miles beyond the limits of its territory.”  “Meeting of the 
Colored People of New York,” Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 5 February 1852. 
27 New York Daily Tribune, August 25, 1843 
28 New York Daily Tribune, August 25, 1843.  For a discussion of how Greeley, like many other relative 
supporters of black rights, traded in the “common language” of black condition, see Melish, “The ‘Condition’ 
Debate and Racial Discourse in the Antebellum North,” Journal of the Early Republic. Special Issue on Racial 
Consciousness and Nation-Building in the Early Republic 19, no. 4 (Winter 1999):  657-659. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3125137. 
29 See my discussion of black disenfranchisement in Chapter 3.  As Litwack succinctly puts it, “Such racial 
stereotypes as these reinforced the determination to keep Negro labor in its proper place; they both explained and 
justified the economic plight of northern Negroes” (North, 156).  Historian James Brewer Stewart offers a slightly 
different configuration of this confluence of racialization and class in the concept of racial modernity:  “color lines 
that had hitherto been so sharply contested around conflicting claims of ‘respectability,’” before the 1830s “become 
indelibly drawn.  Nearly impossible to revise, they were buttressed by a system of democratic white politics 
premised on the modern assumption that ‘nature‘ had always divided “black” and “white” as inferior and superior, 
and always must” (693).  See Stewart, “Modernizing ‘Difference’:  The Political Meanings of Color in the Free 
States, 1776-1840,” Journal of the Early Republic 19, no. 4 (Winter, 1999):  691-712. 
30 See Carla Peterson, “Capitalism, Black (Under)Development, and the Production of the African-
American Novel in the 1850s,” American Literary History 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992), 560.  Peterson builds on 
Marable’s argument to suggest that in the “free” North, industrialization excluded blacks not only from 
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entrepreneurship and capitalist profit but from the ranks of manufacturing labor as well. Policymakers of the period 
legitimated this exclusion through a recasting of romantic racialism: the moral underdevelopment of blacks, which 
imprisoned them in a permanent childlike state, necessarily deprived them of the competitive drive that would 
enable them to become partners in the capitalist enterprise and overcome economic underdevelopment” (560). 
31 Historians have documented a range of ways black that communities tried to take advantage of a market 
that seemed to reward merit and industry indiscriminately, with sporadic success.  These attempts, however, were by 
turns caricatured, threatened with mob violence, and thwarted by official policy, making black workers, a base upon 
which to further clarify the whiteness of economic citizenship.  See Litwack 184-185; Harris, Shadow, especially 
Chapters 3 and 7 for a particularly salient account of New York; Pease and Pease, They Who Would Be Free, 
especially Chapter 7; and Rael, “The Market Revolution.” On the cultural demeaning of these attempts, see, for 
instance, Edward Clay’s “Life in Philadelphia” and the “Bobolition” broadsides of the 1820s or Foster’s depiction of 
the Five Points in New York by Gaslight from the 1850s.  See Eric Lott’s Love and Theft:  Blackface Minstrelsy and 
the American Working Class (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) for a discussion of the connection between 
the rise of blackface minstrelsy and the increased racial hostility of the white working class towards free blacks in 
the north.  Patrick Rael provides a useful reading of minstrel broadsides in the mid-nineteenth century (161-172).  
For a thorough treatment of these images, see Chapter Four, “The Deepest Dark,” of Sarah Burns’s  Painting the 
Dark Side:  Art and the Gothic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley:  University of California 
Press, 2004). 
32 This point becomes important in my later discussion of Smith’s “The Bootblack,” because the sketch 
attempts such a recovery through the linked narratives of domesticity and capitalist upward mobility. Scholars have 
debated about both the origins of black respectability in white middle class values and about whether this politics 
signals assimilation, accommodation, or varying degrees of appropriation.  For an excellent summary of this debate 
and the stakes involved for each position, see Patrick Rael’s introduction to African American Activism before the 
Civil War:  The Freedom Struggle in the Antebellum North (New York:  Routledge, 2008), 1-38.  Rael ultimately 
dismisses the assimilation argument, or at least the pejorative tone it takes in contradistinction to a more radical 
conception of black protest.  My own sense is that the meaning of respectability and its relation to the American 
mainstream varies not only from context to context, but also from writer to writer with aims ranging from political 
and social inclusion to complete independence.  Jones and Allen, for instance, call for black citizens to live sober 
lives in their “Address” appended to Narrative.  As the First Annual Convention of the People of Colour put it in 
1831, “Education, Temperance and Economy, are best calculated to promote the elevation of mankind to a proper 
rank and standing among men, as they enable him to discharge all those duties enjoined on him by his Creator” (5).  
Freedom’s Journal and the Colored American admonished black citizens to pursue education, moral and economic 
uplift, and to live sober, decorous lives (or to at least present such lives publicly).  This emphasis on the salvific of 
productive labor also led black activist, as other reformists, to advocate for farming and country life as healthier, 
more affordable, and more in keeping with notions of republican virtue.   
Parades also fostered communal identity and self-respect while demonstrating black respectability to the 
public, and publications recounted the success stories of well-known figures like James Forten and the overall 
progress of black communities after emancipation as proof of black potential.  See Caleb McDaniel, “The Fourth 
and the First: Abolitionist Holidays, Respectability, and Radical Interracial Reform,” American Quarterly 57, no. 1 
(March 2005):  129-151; Tavia Nyong’o, Uncommon Memory: The Performance of Amalgamation in Early Black 
Political Culture. Ph.D. diss., Yale University (2004), 36-72; Shane White, “‘It Was a Proud Day‘:  African 
Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North, 1741-1834“ Journal of American History 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 13-
50; and, Harris, “From Abolitionist Amalgamators” in Rael, African American Activism before the Civil War, ed. 
Patrick Rael, 266-267. 
33 Report of the Proceedings of the Colored National Convention, held at Cleveland, Ohio, On Wednesday, 
September, 6, 1848 (Rochester:  John Dick, 1848), 5, in Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Negro 
Conventions, 1830-1864, ed. Howard Holman Bell (New York:  Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969).  As 
Leslie Harris has suggested, this changing market landscape and the emergence of a new generation of black 
activists led to conflict about “the value of upholding the manual labor blacks performed and the working-class lives 
they lived as dignified and honorable and the undeniable economic and political power inherent to middle-class 
education and occupations.”  Harris, Shadow, 229.  See also Pease and Pease, They Who Would Be Free, 124-143. 
34 Proceedings of the Colored National Convention, Held in Rochester, July 6th, 7th and 8th, 1853 
(Rochester:  Office of Frederick Douglass’s Paper) in Bell, Minutes, 21. 
35 Report (1848), 5.  See Harris, 218-219. 
36 Report (1848), 5. 
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37 Harris’s work suggests that Watson’s words probably represented the views of more urban black laborers 
than Delany’s, particularly in lieu of the dearth of work of any kind after the depression of the 1840s and the 
increased competition from European immigrants.  Patterson reported that he heard Delany claim that he would 
“rather receive a telegraphic dispatch that his wife and two children had fallen victims to a loathsome disease, than 
to hear that they had become the servants of any man” and that “white mechanics” would respect black citizens only 
“if we became mechanics, etc.”  In the Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People in the 
United States (1852), Delany returns to the subject in greater detail with a caveat at the beginning of Chapter 23, “A 
Glance at Ourselves,” no doubt tailored to assuaged the objections of readers sympathetic to Patterson’s point of 
view:  “As an evidence of the degradation to which we have been reduced, we dare premise, that this chapter will 
give offence to many, very many, and why? Because they may say, ‘He dared to say that the occupation of a servant 
is a degradation’” (200). 
38 Report (1848), 6. 
39 To mediate, Convention President, Frederick Douglass rose to “suggest a Resolution so as to suit both 
parties”: 
He thought that as far as speakers intimated that any useful labor was degrading, they were wrong….  He 
had been a chimney-sweep….  He had been a wood-sawyer.  He wished not that it should stand thus:—
White Lawyer—Black Chimney-sweep; but White Lawyer, Black Lawyer, as in Massachusetts; White 
Domestic, Black Domestic.  He said:  Let us say what is necessary to be done, is honorable to do; and leave 
situations in which we are considered degraded, as soon as necessity ceases. (6) 
Douglass’s testimony apparently breaks new ground:  he admits to having been a chimney sweep.  As the recording 
secretary observes, Douglass “was probably the first that had ever made the announcement from the public stand.”  
This break in protocol mirrors Douglass’s previous break with tradition earlier in the decade, when, as an anit-
slavery lecturer for the American Anti-Slavery Society, he began recounting his life in slavery (eventually published 
in 1845 as Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass).  This event was a milestone in black anti-slavery activism, 
because before Douglass, the minutes suggest, most lecturers were hesitant to tell their stories. What I want to 
suggest here is that this moment of telling also presents a shift in the discourse that enables Communipaw’s “Heads” 
and Wilson’s Our Nig.  The moment also presages Truth’s “Aren’t I a Woman.” 
Even as Douglass stands in momentarily as a Representative Man, however, some of his amendments were 
rejected, suggesting the limits of his representivity, the limits of creating a single narrative, particularly in the 
standard uplift form, for such a diverse population. The minutes report:  Douglass “was followed by several 
gentlemen, when Messrs. Patterson, Copeland and Douglass, severally proposed amendments, which were on 
motion rejected. […]  The 4th Resolution was adopted with but one dissenting vote.”  Douglass’s image was vexing 
in this and other moments, because even as he (or his image) offered ways to rethink black identity in relation to 
labor, his meteoric rise to success and cultivation also reinforced middle-class narratives like Francis and Jenkins’s.  
Still, his efforts did result in an addendum to the original resolution:  “except where necessity compels the person to 
resort thereto as a means of livelihood”—in part, because he weaves a representative narrative in which the 
republican rhetoric of independent labor could coexist with the reality of black working classes restricted to 
traditionally degraded positions by increased wage labor and prejudice.  Douglass, then, meets the dual requirements 
that the resolution encourage black citizens, for whom prejudice had resolved into caste lines, and that it also compel 
them to seize any opportunity for upward movement.  Report (1848), 6, 13. See also Harris, Shadow, 229. 
40 “An Address to the Colored People,” Report (1848), 19. 
41 Ibid., 20.  As Patrick Rael puts it, “attain a position of power within the market that would let them 
command the equality they were owed.”  Rael, “Thrift,” 9.  See Litwack, 170-171.  Douglass repeats these themes in 
“Learn Trades or Starve!” (1853), suggesting his strong role in crafting the 1848 “Address”:  “Men are not valued in 
this country, or in any country, for what they are, they are valued for what they can do.”41  He also uses the same 
parallelism:   “Learn Trades or Starve!” Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 4 March 1853. “We must show that we can do 
as well as be; and to this end we must learn trades.  When we can build as well as live in houses; when we can make 
as well as wear shoes; when we can produces as well as consume wheat…then we shall become valuable to 
society.”  By 1853, Douglass focused more on correcting what he saw as a misplaced emphasis on luxury and the 
appearance of respectability without attending to its material foundations.  As I suggest in this chapter, I believe that 
Smith, Wilson, and others’ debate within Frederick Douglass’s Paper helped Douglass refine his own approach, 
which he outlines most concisely and comprehensively in “Learn Trades or Starve!” and “Make Your Sons 
Mechanics and Farmers – Not Waiters, Porters, or Barbers.” 
42 Report (1848), 6. 
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43 The convention updates republican distrust of luxury and those occupations that cater to luxury.  As the 
convention argues in this “Address” and as Douglass echoes it in “Learn Trades or Starve!” (1853), such work has 
its “foundation chiefly, if not entirely, in the pride and indolence of the white people,” making them highly unstable 
such that “a little less pride, and a little more industry on his part, may enable him to dispense with our services 
entirely” (“Address” 20). By 1853, Douglass was coming down much harder on the side of Delany and others who 
sternly called for black citizens to avoid menial jobs, suggesting that training children for such occupations 
amounted to sin:  “HE WHO OMITS TO GIVE HIS SON A TRADE WHEN HE CAN DO SO, IS GUILTY OF 
DEGRADING HIS OWN BLOOD, AND OF PERPETRATING THE DEGREDATION OF HIS RACE.” 
44 “An Address to the Colored People,” Report (1848), 19.  Again, the “Address” echoes the arguments of 
neighborliness and mutuality I outlined in Chapter 2.  
45 Ibid., 20. As Patrick Rael puts it, black activists were proposing that communities “attain a position of 
power within the market that would let them command the equality they were owed.”  See Rael, “Thrift,” 9.  This 
rhetoric still reflected a republican distinction between dependence and independence, but, as the convention 
suggests, updated to reflect the realities of the antebellum economy.  See Vogel, “New Face,” 38-40.  
46 “An Address to the Colored People,” Report (1848), 20.  
47 “An Address to the Colored People,” Report (1848), 19.  
48 Harris frames the distinction I’m making here in terms of a shift from moral reform to “more pragmatic 
methods of improving the condition of black citizens,” which was not a new development, “but rather a shift in 
emphasis” (218).  What I am suggesting here is that this shift in emphasis still traded in terms of respectability, but 
with much less emphasis on the moral and public-performative aspects of the discourse and more on its material 
underpinnings, the referent for the more overt signs.  Black activists focused on labor because that area of life was 
central not only to black identity, to U.S. civic identity more generally.  Citing the degrading condition of the labor 
traditionally done by black citizens (and therefore the degradation of black citizens themselves) was a central point 
of attack for state convention arguments against black franchise.  Moreover, as political avenues closed and as 
various moral reform strategies proved ineffective, black activists found labor to be one area of life in which 
ordinary black citizens could exercise a kind of agency, if in a limited way.  See also Rael, “Market Revolution,” 28-
33.  As Rael argues, “In a competitive market economy ruled by the tenets of classical liberalism, respectability 
could accrue only to those who participated fully and equally in the race of life” (33).  While I agree with Rael and 
Harris, my distinction between respectability and respect attempts to get at how this strategy shifted in emphasis 
towards independence not only in terms of labor, but also independence from tactics of persuasion.  I want to 
separate the cultural cues of respectability from the material power suggested in respect.  They are mutually 
constitutive, but separate issues as my discussion of Communipaw and Ethiop will make clearer. 
49 I use representivity to refer to this slippage between political representation and artistic representation, 
specifically as they relate to developing U.S. labor narratives.  My use of representivity combines scholarship on 
two terms:  representivity and representativity.  I have developed this particular reading of 
representativity/representivity from Dana Nelson’s sense of representivity as “the subjective internalization of 
particular norms of representation,” or how citizens come to desire a particular kind of representation.  To Nelson’s 
productive critique of representivity as an “aestheticized relation” in which citizens submit and conform themselves 
to the figure of the symbolic representative, I add Nadia Urbinati’s sense of representativity as a relationship of 
“control (on the part of the represented) and responsibility (on the part of the representatives)” in ways that are 
“eminently political and moral but not juridical and legal.”  This last part is important for my discussion of Smith 
and Wilson, because they are looking for models of representation that can confront and circumvent the 
consolidation of racist state authority.  That is, even as Ethiop and Communipaw suggest a structure of 
representivity that seems to conform to Nelson’s caution about its installation of hierarchy, Communipaw’s work 
offers a more interactive practice than Emerson or the options available.  I also chose the term representivity/tativity, 
following Nicholas Harrison’s work in Postcolonial Criticism, because of its “slipperiness.”  Both Ethiop and 
Communipaw give the sense that the representative should speak for the community in some important way, but 
they differ on how the representative speaks, to whom, and towards what ends.  Importantly, neither sufficiently 
theorizes the degree to which the represented speak back.  See Nelson, “Representative/Democracy:  The Political 
Work of Countersymbolic Representtaion,” 218; and “Representative/Democracy:  Presidents, Democratic 
Management, and the Unfinished Business of Male Sentimentalism,” in No More Separate Spheres.  Edited by 
Cathy N. Davidson and Jessamyn Hatcher, 325-328; Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy:  Principles and 
Genealogy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 48-50; and Harrison, Nicholas.  Postcolonial Criticism:  
History, Theory, and the Work of Fiction (Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 92-103. 
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50 New York State is a particularly useful for this analysis, because the state’s $250 property qualification 
for black male suffrage directly linked political representation to economic and racial representation. 
51 See Vogel, introduction to The Black Press, 1; and Otter, “Philadelphia Experiments,” American Literary 
History 16, no. 1 (Spring 2004):  111. 
52 Like their Philadelphia predecessor, Joseph Willson, whose Sketches of the Higher Classes of Colored 
Society in Philadelphia (1841) rendered images of the economic elite of black Philadelphia, Smith and Wilson offer 
accounts of “contours, rather than details; patterns of behavior, rather than individual acts.” As Samuel Otter has 
suggested of Willson’s Sketches, his concern was not simply to offer a “counter-representation” of Philadelphia’s 
black community, but rather to present a different “quality of representation” (111).  They could avoid the 
temptation to make every image or illustration fit one consistent moral, economic, or political frame or to neatly tie 
up loose ends.  They could enter into a situation in medias res, so to speak, and leave just as quickly for another, not 
always related, topic. Taking up this project ten years later, Smith and Wilson set out to “paint” with “brush” and 
“crayon,” respectively, the lives of New Yorkers—Smith focusing on types, Wilson searching for representative 
individuals, both bending their work to the contingencies of debate.   See for instance E., 8 January 1852:  “If my 
picture has its shades, it also has its lights:  indeed there are some bright spots , brighter than I can paint them.”  
Communipaw paints “Heads” with a “Whitewash Brush”:  “a short brush and dry paint,” with which he “cannot do 
these clumsy portraits without spattering some people, as I learn by their squealing” (“The Whitewasher”).  That 
does not mean that there was not a sort of governing order to this seeming chaos; rather, meaning in the sketch 
comes from the collision and the spaces between narrative and descriptive elements.  See Otter, “Philadelphia 
Experiments,” 111. 
53 See “William J. Wilson to Frederick Douglass,” BAP, vol IV, 144-145n11. 
 54 William Wells Brown, 1863, The Black Man, His Antecedents, His Genius, and His Achievements (New 
York, Thomas Hamilton), Documenting the American South.  Chapel Hill:  University Library, The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999), 230-235, http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/brownww/brown.html. 
55 E., 11 December 1851.    
56 E., 20 December 1851. 
57 E., 26 February 1852.  Child likewise describes the city’s population as “like mute actors, who tramp 
across the stage in pantomime or pageant, and are seen no more” (“Letters from New-York.—No. 10,” NASS, 21 
October 1841, 79).  This categorizing move is yet another convention of the urban sketch.  See Dana Brand’s The 
Spectator and the City in Nineteenth-Century American Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
for a description of how this convention works in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd” (1840) (10).  Foster 
likewise takes his readers to “Fashionable, aristocratic Broadway,” to “see and hear” the various types that circulate 
around Broadway (70).   
It might be useful here to think of Jared Gardner’s “master plot’ of American literature and culture through 
which white Americans construct a “third race,” separate from their British forebears, yet made racially pure 
through the abjection of black and American Indian racial others. See Master Plots:  Race and the Founding of an 
American Literature, 1787-1845 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 1-24. 
58 E., 26 February 1852.  The mark of Cain in this context also suggests Ethiop’s potential engagement with 
Hobbes (in Latin), who uses Cain as one of his paradigmatic examples of “the natural condition of mankind” as a 
war of all against all.  In this invocation of Leviathan, Ethiop is suggesting that the state and civic structures that 
should have maintained a more republican sense of commonwealth have failed or have become subsumed under the 
“monied idea.”  See Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind,” in The Cambridge companion 
to Hobbes‘s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111.   
59 Here, Ethiop echoes Emerson’s characterization of the “Saxon race” in Representative Men:  “Nobody is 
glad in the gladness of another, and our system is one of war, of an injurious superiority.  Every child of the Saxon 
race is educated to wish to be first. It is our system…” (625).  According to Biblical tradition, Cain’s descendants 
founded the first cities, the ancient precursors to New York City.  Both Emerson and Ethiop use Hobbesian readings 
of human nature to ground their understandings of economic citizenship. 
60 See Nelson, National Manhood, 46; and E., 25 December 1851. 
61 E., 25 December 1851. 
62 E., 25 December 1851. 
63 E., 22 January 1852.  Tocqueville famously describes Ethiop’s mechanism of interest in Book 2, Chapter 
8 of Democracy in America (New York:  Library of America, 2004) as “interest rightly understood,” through which 
Americans explain “almost all the actions of their lives by the principle of self-interest.”  “It must therefore be 
 197 
                                                                                                                                                       
expected,” concludes Tocqueville, “that personal interest will become more than ever the principal if not the sole 
spring of men‘s actions.”  (611-13). 
64 Federalist Papers, 184.  Ethiop was not the only reformer who configured citizenship and laborer in this 
way.  As Todd Vogel explains, William Ellery Channing “encouraged the accumulation of money as a worthy end,” 
but, in confirmation of Ethiop’s reading of U.S. economic citizenship, “power and money in this new formulation 
became the end.  If workers,” Vogel concludes, “continued as manual laborers, then their hope for a better life 
shrank.”  See Vogel, “The New Face of Black Labor,” 42, 37-54. 
65 E., 22 January 1852 
66 E., 22 January 1852. 
67 E., 22 January 1852. 
68 E., 1 July 1852. 
69 E., 26 February 1852. 
70 E., 26 February 1852.  
71 E., 26 February 1852; and E., 30 July 1852. 
72 Negative blackness, as Saidiya Hartman suggests, “cultivated a common sense of whiteness only as it 
reinforced the subjugated status of blacks.”  See Scenes of Subjection:  Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in 
Nineteenth-Century America (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 29.  As I argue in the next chapter, even 
non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans could benefit from this racial commons sense so long as they subscribed to or simply 
did not contradict its overall premise of white supremacy. 
73 It might be useful here to think of Jared Gardner’s “master plot’ of American literature and culture 
through which white Americans construct a “third race,” separate from their British forebears, yet made racially 
pure through the abjection of black and American Indian racial others. See Master Plots:  Race and the Founding of 
an American Literature, 1787-1845 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 1-24. 
74 E., 5 February 1852 
75 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 4; and E., 11 March 1853.  This regime creates a negative blackness (or 
American Africanism as Morrison describes it) that is as much a currency in this economy as a positive whiteness.  
As Morrison explains in Playing in the Dark, “[w]hat became transparent were the self-evident ways that Americans 
choose to talk about themselves through and within a sometimes allegorical, sometimes metaphorical, but always 
choked representation of an Africanist presence” (17).Franz Fanon’s Black Skin/White Masks and The Wretched of 
the Earth and Edward Said’s Orientalism remain the key texts to our understanding of this system. 
76 E., 5 February 1852 
77 E., 25 January 1852.  
78 And, as Douglass later argues, the very occupations the market offers (as waiters, porters, and barbers) 
“beget…improvidence, wastefulness, a fondness for dress and display.”  “Catering to the pride and vanity of 
others,” Douglass concludes, black youths “become themselves proud, vain, and foppish.”   See “Make Your Sons 
Mechanics and Farmers – Not Waiters, Porters, and Barbers,” Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 18 March 1853. 
79 Ward’s “Letters from Canada No. 1” (December 11, 1851) describes a similar scene in Philadelphia 
among lighter-skinned black Philadelphians who “were they born in the British Empire, and had they never been 
identified with the cursed negro race of the United States, this snobism would seem natural and plausible. But they 
are like you and me, natives of the South, and some of them, like you and me, ex-slaves. The ridiculousness of this 
very, very small aping of aristocracy, is sufficiently disgusting be sure, but its sanction and encouragement of 
negro-hate, makes it especially condemnable. Such folks ought to be reckoned among our enemies.” 
80 E., 1 January 1852.  This imagery brings to mind both Foster’s description of “painted [demons],” 
“magnificently attired, with their large arms and voluptuous bosoms half naked….  Their complexions are pure 
white and red, and their dresses are of the most expensive material, and an ultra fashionable make….  India shawls, 
of that gorgeous scarlet….  But for their large feet and vulgar hands, they would be taken for queens or 
princesses….” [figure 2].  See Foster, 71,72. 
81 I am grateful to Janice Simon for this insight in her commentary on a version of this chapter given at the 
American Studies Association Conference in 2008.   
82 E., 30 July 1852.  Where Emerson posits, “Every child of the Saxon race is educated to wish to be first,” 
Ethiop suggests that white (or Saxon) children are taught that they are first, no matter the quality of their striving or 
lack thereof.  See Representative Men, 625 (emphasis mine).  Plays like “New York as It Is” act as one such 
“magnifying glass,” augmented by commentaries like Foster’s and Emerson’s that celebrate “Saxon” enterprise.  
Emerson summarizes the value of such imagery in Representative Men in terms similar to Ethiop’s:  “Other men are 
lenses through which we read our own minds” (615). 
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83 E., 30 July 1852. 
84 Barthe, Mythologies, 130. 
85 E., 30 July 1852 
86 E., 30 July 1852. 
87 E., 15 January 1852 
88 E., 25 December 1851. 
89 E., 22 January 1852. 
90 E., 22 January 1852. 
91 E. 22 January 1852. 
92 E., 22 January 1852. 
93 Perhaps Ethiop is referencing to The Society of Odd Fellows or Freemasons or he may have something 
like New York’s Committee of Thirteen in mind.  In Masonic history, the office of Grand Conservator dates back to 
the Biblical figure of Adam, the first Guardian and Superior Grand Conservator of the order.  John Stauffer has 
suggested that the collection of pseudonymous writers for Douglass’s Paper, including Ethiop and Communipaw, 
represent “the literary counterpart to the black masonic ‘Odd Fellows.’”  A black lodge of the Independent Order of 
Odd Fellows was organized in the 1849 and was composed of men and women who were highly active in New York 
City’s black activist circles.  See Stauffer, Introduction to The Works of James McCune Smith, xxxi-xxxii; and 
Steven, Craig, “The Rise and Influence of the New York African Society for Mutual Relief, 1808-1865,”  
Afro-Americans in New York Life and History 22.2 (July 1998), 7.  
94 E., 15 January 1852. 
95 Perhaps Ethiop has in mind the sort of Enlightenment coffeehouse culture that, as Gordon Wood 
describes in an eighteenth-century context, fosters “mingling in drawing rooms, clubs, and coffeehouses—partaking 
in the innumerable interchanges of the daily comings and goings of madder life—created affection and fellow 
feeling.”  Wood, 217-218.  As Nelson has argued in her reading of Federalist logic, “self-interested manhood will be 
the governing principle for capitalist citizenship” (46).  Ethiop suggests that the bonds of capitalist citizenship could 
not only supersede “particular ones of family, class, and region,” but also of race, at least between the capitalists. 
96 E. 22 January 1852. 
97 E., 8 January 1852.  John N. Still and others similarly argue that black-owned banks or investment firms 
would at least allow “our cooks, stewards, whalemen, and others” to make their earnings productive in “corporate 
bodies” dedicated to the benefit of the community (109).  Still suggests that so-called unproductive labor, like 
domestic or service work, could still become productive through the investment of wages. 
98 E., 1 July 1852.  Harris’s reading of Campbell’s First United Association of colored Waiters reveals a 
similar strain of thought:  “The association’s expressed goal was to produce ‘an identity of interest between the 
employer and the employed,’” as Campbell asked waiters to remain in the city to work during the summers to 
“establish a mutual feeling of confidence and good will between the employer and the employed.” Shadow, 244.  On 
“harmony of interests” rhetoric, see Wilentz, “Society, Politics, and the Market Revolution” in The New American 
History, and Lang’s reading of Francis Bowen in The Syntax of Class:  Writing Inequality in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2003), 1-2. 
99 E., 22 January 1852.  See also, Emerson “The Young American” in Essays and Lectures, especially 224-
230. Emerson makes a similar distinction between his version of nobility and the English aristocracy:  “The 
[English] aristocracy, incorporated by law and education, degrades life for the unprivileged class” (229).  Indeed, 
Ethiop’s conception of the black aristocracy seems to build on a model of Community in which, as Emerson posits, 
government falls into “gradual contempt…and the increasing disposition of private adventurers…assume its fallen 
functions” (225).  In Ethiop’s model, the state has failed to create structures of equality for all citizens, and has 
actually worked to create inequality; so “private” citizens must take over as, in Ethiop’s terms, “grand conservators 
of the social whole social machinery.”  E., 22 January 1852.Emerson, “The Young American” in Essays and 
Lectures, 224, 225. 
100 Ethiop follows a logic similar to the economics of marginality Carla Peterson describes in the The 
Garies and Their Friends, a model that, even as it endorses capitalism, “celebrates not so much individual 
achievement as the way the characters attend to the collectivity, returning surplus value to the community rather 
than serving their own special interests” (578).  See Peterson, “Capitalism, Black (Under)Development, and the 
Production of the African-American Novel in the 1850s,” American Literary History, 4.4 (Winter, 1992), 559-58.  
For a discussion of Delany’s Blake as a similar figure, set against the Romantic individual, see Andrews, “The 
1850s:  The First Afro-American Literary Renaissance,” 48.  Peterson, however, argues that Blake becomes so 
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entangled in Blake’s difference from the masses, that the serial leaves the question of who will govern in Cuba after 
the resolution largely unresolved. 
101 Wilson’s black aristocracy resembles the culture of respectability fostered by an earlier generation of 
activists, including Jones, Allen, Forten, and Prince Hall.  These activists acted as representatives and advocates for 
their communities to white elites and the state.  More than their economic stability, these activists’ high moral 
standing served as a passport, attesting to their capacity to lead. The authority and representivity of Ethiop’s 
aristocracy, however, arises primarily out of their economic positions.  Where Jones and Allen came to prominence 
as religious leaders, the black aristocracy will rise out of their own skill and entrepreneurial acumen and through the 
community’s collective effort to cultivate their enterprise. 
102 Sklansky, Soul’s Economy, 3. 
103 E., 8 January 1852.  In this context, Ethiop’s proposal for an aristocracy follows Aristotle’s binary in 
which an aristocracy is the constitutionally correct variant of rule by the few, and oligarchy is the deviation from 
that model.   
104 Urbinati, Representative Democracy:  Principles and Genealogy, 48-50. 
105 E., 27 May 1852.  In this particular sketch, Ethiop explicitly identifies this group as a class of capitalists:  
“Such is the rise of property on business thoroughfares, that I am fully persuaded that what few capitalists we have, 
have greatly erred” in not taking up the opportunities the real estate market presents.  He goes on to offer examples 
of prosperous black entrepreneurs and potential aristocrats in the Fulton Street district:  a “cartman with license, the 
first I think obtained by any colored man in this city”; further down the street “what is perhaps one of the most 
extensive sale stables” in New York, one that just happens to be “owned and conducted by a colored man”; and 
around another corner another “colored” horse dealer and a “colored lady” who just opened a drink stand.” 
Unlike other reformers who look upon the city with sentiments Lydia Maria Child describes on Moving 
Day as “a suppressed anathema on the nineteenth century, with its perpetual changes,” or “J.T,” another 
correspondent for Douglass’s Paper, who argues vehemently against land monopolies and capitalism more broadly, 
Ethiop’s critique embraces the potential this indeterminacy and constant change offers.  See “Letters from New 
York,” NASS, 1 May 1843; and J.T., DP, 3 June 1852; 30 July 1852. 
106 See Carla Peterson on Garies in “Capitalism,” 57; and Nicholas Buccola’s discussion of Douglass’s 
liberalism in “Each for All and All for Each”: The Liberal Statesmanship of Frederick Douglass The Review of 
Politics 70 (2008), 400–419.  As Buccola argues, Douglass “offered a variety of reasons for a deeper sense of 
connection and responsibility to others,” including an emphasis on how mutualism served self-interest and on bonds 
of sympathy. 
107 E., 22 January 1852 and 11 December 1851. 
108 E., 22 January 1852. 
109 E., 1 January 1852.  Like Dickens’s “Spy Police,” Ethiop is “invisible and never out of hearing…in the 
market or the street—the drawing room—the café—or the church,” providing a panorama of “‘NEW YORK AS 
NOW,’” that is, “MEN and THINGS in NEW YORK.” (“Spy Police,” Household Words, 21 September 1850, no. 
26, 612-613; 11 December 1851).  Ethiop’s style also invokes a host of popular theatrical, literary, and historical 
references playing on the theme, including:  “New York as It Is,” “New York at a Glance,” New-York as It is: 
Containing a General Description of the City of New-York (1837), and Dickens’s American Notes for General 
Circulation [check title].  Since Jean Fagan Yellin’s groundbreaking work on Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents and Jennifer 
Rae Greeson and Teresa Goddu’s work on the gothic, scholars have become more attentive to the connections 
between the urban sensation genre and developing literary sensibilities in the slave narrative and black anti-slavery 
more generally.  Carl Ostrowski, for instance, writes “the genres of the slave narrative and the city-mysteries novel 
shared numerous points of contact in the 1840s and 1850s as a result of their position within the overlapping print 
cultures of abolition and labor reform.... rich field of intertextuality in which literary devices and rhetorical postures 
passed readily back and forth across racial and generic boundaries, in a process that was mediated by the structures 
and agencies of the antebellum publishing trade” (493).  This chapter in some ways continues this line of criticism 
by insisting on the overlapping and interplay of generic conventions, yet it also suggests that the slave narrative may 
not be the only, or even the primary, site of interplay.  
Invoking these generic conventions with phrases like “New York as now” and formal cues like his strolling 
through the city gives Ethiop’s “Brooklyn Correspondent” column an air of documentary journalism as he renders a 
view of the city with “shades” and “lights…bright spots, brighter than [he] can paint them.”  E. 8 January, 1852.  As 
Dana Brand and others have shown, by the time Ethiop began appearing in Douglass’s Paper in the 1850s, readers 
were well acquainted with this genre as a way of understanding and depicting cities from Irving’s Knickerbocker 
sketches to Poe’s gothic fiction (Brand 73). 
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110 As Dana Brand suggests, the flâneur sets out to “impose order upon the potentially disorienting diversity 
of the city, by reducing it to accessible images that could be collected and consumed.”  See Brand, The Spectator 
and the City, 7.   Originally identified by Baudelaire as “the painter of Modern Life,” the flâneur became a popular 
journalistic narrator through which to view the diverse bustle that was the modern, industrializing city.  In “The 
Flâneur,” Walter Benjamin describes the flâneur’s vision as “diorama” and “panorama literature…which, as it were, 
reproduce the plastic foreground of those panoramas with their anecdotal form and the extensive background of the 
panorama with their store of information” (35).  The flâneur’s vision works particularly well in the marketplace 
where it can take in the mixture of types and discourses that Bakhtin has aptly described as carnivalesque. 
111 E., 26 February 1852.  
112 My observations here are guided in part by Grossman’s reading of the literary infusing Publius’s 
concern with political point of view in the Federalist.  See Reconstituting the American Renaissance, 17-18; 
Urbinati, 50, emphasis original.  Urbinati explains that this kind of “reflective adhesion” between representatives 
and the people they represent offers the kind of dialogic model of representivity essential to democratic politics. 
113 E., 15 January 1852.   
114 E., 15 January 1852 
115 See Vogel, “The New Face of Black Labor,” 37-54, for a discussion of how black periodical writers 
discourse of republicanism “in an attempt to redefine their role in the nation.” 
116 The series in general, and Heart in particular, was one of the most successful of its time in Europe. 
117 Communipaw also associates Ethiop with Cassius Clay, Horace Mann, and others attending the 1852 
National Colored Convention in Ohio who followed the 1848 convention’s logic if black citizens could demonstrate 
and cultivate economic independence, which citizens would “respect” them and racial prejudices, no longer justified 
by material conditions, would fall by the wayside.  On the 1852 convention and this strategy, see Litwack, 172-174.   
118 Sir Walter Scott, The Waverley Novels, by Sir Walter Scott, Complete in 12 Vol., Printed from the Latest 
English Ed., Embracing the Author‘s Last Corrections, Prefaces & Notes, (Philadelphia:  Lippincott, Grambo, and 
Co., 1852), 377, Making of America. http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/.   
119 C., 26 February 1852.  Here, the republican fear of commercial corruption is recast as antebellum 
anxieties about capitalism.   
120 C., 26 February 1852. 
121 C., 26 February 1852.  For similar contemporary arguments, see Horace Bushnell’s “The True Wealth or 
Weal of Nations,” an 1837 address at Yale.  For a more detailed discussion of Bushnell and the Romantic tradition 
through which both Bushnell and Smith shape their thought, see Sklansky, Souls, 33-38. 
122 Communipaw follows Tocqueville’s warning, “If, on the achievement of equality, citizens were to 
remain ignorant and course, it would be difficult to predict what ridiculous excesses their selfishness might commit 
and one would not be able to foretell to what shameful depths of wretchedness they would plummet for fear of 
sacrificing something of their own wellbeing to the prosperity of their fellow men” (613).  Communipaw’s sketches 
attempt to prevent this dire prediction by mapping out a path through which citizens develop a sense of 
commonwealth even as the nation becomes more prosperous. 
123 Leslie Harris’s work on black class development in New York confirms Communipaw’s fears.  Even as 
middle class black leaders turned their eyes towards labor and labor discourse as a medium for uplift, the political 
gulf between them and the black workers they would lead widened.  See Harris, Shadow chapter 7.   
124 C., 12 February 1852. 
125 C., 12 February 1852.   
126 C., 12 February 1852. 
127 See Harris 255-257.  As Harris notes, this district and its black entrepreneurs were made famous in 
accounts of the city like Dickens’s American Notes for General Circulation (1842) and George Foster’s New York 
by Gaslight (1850).  Both collections feature scenes of brothels and bars ostensibly owned by blacks, but actually 
rented and leased from white owners.  Still, men like dance-hall owner Peter Williams represented some of New 
York City’s wealthiest black citizens, and, as Harris suggests, they “presented a challenge to black reformers’ efforts 
to establish morally perfect, middle-class definitions of black workers and entrepreneurs” (257).  Segregation, 
ironically, provided opportunities for the development of a black professional and middle class, but it came with a 
price.  Black restaurateurs and barbers, for instance, were compelled to segregate against black patrons for the sake 
of cultivating white clientele. It seems that Ethiop’s plan might work, with working class blacks seeking education 
and training for upward mobility; however, as Litwack observes, “the segregated Negro community provided a 
limited number of opportunities for a Negro bourgeoisie and sharply curtailed the amount of social mobility.”  See 
Litwack, North, 178-180.   
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128 Smith’s focus on the classification of social types and groups rather than individuals corresponds with a 
post-1848 drive towards social taxonomy and the birth of sociology.  See Sklansky, Souls Economy, particularly 
chapter three, “The Birth of American Sociology.” 
129 “Civilization,” AAM, 8; Collected Works, 251. Some evidence suggests that the essay was originally 
drafted in 1844.  A version of Smith’s argument appeared in “The Influence of Climate on Longevity:  With Special 
Reference to Life Insurance,” printed in the May 1846 issue of Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine.  
Smith follows the social statistics of Quetelet and Prichard.  Adolphe Quetelet published the landmark 
social statistical work, A Treatise on Man, and the Development of His Faculties in 1835.  In Treatise, Quetelet 
claims that through careful observation, one can find the average data for any given nation.  This normative cure can 
then be used to predict any physical or mental aspect of that nation‘s population.  From this statistical work, Quetelet 
develop the body mass index, a measure still in use today.  
130 “Civilization,” Anglo-African Magazine, 15-16; Collected Works, 261, 251. 
131 “Civilization,” 251.  Note Smith and Wilson on the nation’s real art.   
132 Just as the Genesis narrative begins with the Spirit of God passing over the waters, so will the new era 
begin:  “by and by the spirit of God will pass over the great deep and the mountains and the dry land and the 
atmosphere…and higher laws and higher organizations will come into existence.”  C., 26 February 1852.  On 
Plesiosaurus, see “Plesiosaurus,” in Zoological Recreations (1849), 346; and “The Bridgewater Treatise,” in 
Southern Literary Messenger 5, no. 71, 553.  
133 C., 26 February 1852. “But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things 
shall be added unto you” (Matt 6:33).  The alluded to verse in Matthew comes almost at the end of a chapter in 
which Jesus admonishes his audience to be wary of outward displays of piety for show and to not worry about 
attaining worldly possessions. This same scripture contains other well-known cautions concerning wealth and the 
dignity of humble service that many of his readers would have known, just as they would have been familiar with 
Ethiop’s references to urban sensation. 
134 C., 12 February 1852; C., 26 February 1852.    
135 See Singh, Black Is a Country, 44. 
136 C., 26 February 1852. Communipaw anticipates Du Bois in his vision of the U.S. as the first, and 
perhaps the last, nation through which this ideal can be realized, but prioritizing material gain over liberty, or, worse, 
equating the two will disrupt this development. 
137 Cited hereafter as “Bootblack.” 
138 This formulation of bootblacking revises the ideal of the land-owning, self-sustaining agrarian as the 
ideal republican citizen for the modern urban subject.  The image of Jefferson’s “chosen people of God” (Notes 
290), whose work shelters them from the corrupting forces of the market and keeps them independent, was a 
powerful alternative for black activists seeking methods of political and economic empowerment that did not place 
their communities at the mercy of white employers. See Query XIX on “Manufactures.” 
Artisan republicanism, particularly as Wilentz configures it in Chants Democratic, suggests that the 
middling merchants and artisans of the late-eighteenth, early-nineteenth century “added equality” to discourses of 
republicanism, “the liberal idea that all citizens should be entitle to their natural civil and political rights under a 
representative, democratic system of laws.”  This notion of equality was based not only on their economic worth, but 
also on a reconfiguration on how their labor, skilled, but traditionally viewed as not sufficiently dependent or 
refined, fostered the civic virtue required for self-government.  Until the mid-1830s, this group included “the 
‘producing classes,’ an amalgam of ‘honorable’ anticapitalist small masters and wage earners,” but became 
increasingly disaggregated as economic crises and the rise of trade unionism created tension between the widely 
disparate groups.  See Chants Democratic, 14-17; Carl Ostrowski, “Slavery, Labor Reform, and Intertextuality in 
Antebellum Print Cutlure:  The Slave Narrative and the City-Mysteries Novel.“  African American Review.  40, no. 
3 (Fall 2006): 493-506; and Michael Denning, Mechanic Accents: Dime Novels and Working Class Culture. 
139 See Roediger, Wages of Whiteness, 44.  As Roediger suggests, the language of labor and class in the 
U.S. developed with the workers’ full consciousness not only of the “dream of a republic of small producers but also 
against the nightmare of chattel slavery” (44). 
140“Bootblack.” Philip Livingston (1716-1778) signed the Declaration of Independence; Federalist, Robert 
R. Livingston (1747-1813) served as Chancellor of the council of Revision in the New York state legislature as the 
state assembly debated the terms of slave emancipation.  Livingston vetoed a version of gradual emancipation that 
limited black citizenship rights (particularly voting), arguing that they could not be abridged based on race (Malone 
28).  Livingston also negotiated the Louisiana Purchase in 1803; and Edward Livingston (1764-1836) served in the 
House of Representatives, in the Senate, and as secretary of state (Stauffer 236-237n22). 
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141 Of the narrative Stauffer writes,  “It is a classic tale of self-making, which McCune Smith sees as a 
powerful antidote to racism and caste” (Collected Works 195).   See also Melish, 653. 
142 See Harris, Shadow, 97-98. 
143 See also my discussion of Jones and Allen’s orientation to the market in Chapter 2.  
144 “Bootblack” 
145 “Bootblack” 
146 Jefferson, Notes, 291.   
147 See Reid-Pharr’s introduction to The Garies and Their Friends (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), which describes such domestic spaces as “the center of black political life, the place at which 
community is formed and resistance is mounted” (xi-xii).  See also Peterson’s discussion of the economics of 
marginality and Lang’s discussion of Garies in Syntax of Class, 42-58.  In Communipaw’s reading, maintaining the 
home or the family as the central economic unit does not necessarily reinforce patriarchy as such—Smith’s own 
history and his work in institutions like the Orphan’s asylum gave him an appreciation for a variety of “family” 
structures (my later discussion of the Washerwoman likewise disrupts this narrative).  See Harris, Shadow, 157-168. 
148 “Bootblack” 
149 See Harris 170-172, Litwack 214-246, and Pease and Pease 68-93. With “The Washerwoman,” 
Communipaw explores a more sensitive subject, the single black mother—sensitive because single working women 
were often viewed as promiscuous, add to that blackness and a light-skinned child—a ready-made fallen-woman 
narrative.  Communipaw, however, offers her narrative as a work in progress.  Having a child is not the end, and 
neither is marriage as in the Romance tradition.  Rather, the end for the washerwoman is earning enough money to 
purchase her sisters‘ freedom, and this departure, like the news-vender’s post-slavery narrative speaks to a 
continuum between slavery and freedom that white antislavery tended to neglect. 
 150 Smith’s “Heads,” particularly “The Washerwoman” sketch, contributes to what Xiomara Santamarina 
has analyzed as “working womanhood,” nineteenth-century narratives that foregrounded the significance of “self-
supporting labor to [black women’s] gendered and raced subjectivity” and “invoked republican rights rhetoric that 
emphasized the independence-producing, or character-building, potential of their wage labor” such that the 
characteristics originally signaling the black women’s heterodoxy, translate into heroism.  See Santamarina, 
Belabored Professions:  Narratives of African American Working Womanhood (Chapel Hill:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), x, 10. 
151 Delany’s particularly harsh criticism that the preponderance of black women making a living as 
washerwomen indicates that “we are all a degraded, miserable people, inferior to any other people as a whole, on the 
face of the globe” may have inspired Communipaw’s sketch even more than Ethiop’s articles.  Delany, Condition 
(1852), 199. 
152 “Bootblack” 
153 “Bootblack.” 
154 “Bootblack.” 
155 “The Bootblack.”  Here, Smith is no doubt referencing one of the New Yorker’s who took advantage of 
the land offered by Gerrit Smith.  Unfortunately, as Harris reports, the reality was not quite as optimistic as Smith’s 
tone.  One “shoemaker,” named James Henderson, and his family Harris notes, “attempted to make a living on 
Essex County land they had received from Gerrit Smith,” but “when James froze to death in the forest in 1851,” his 
family was forced to return to the city, his six children place in the Colored Orphan Asylum for six years until his 
widow could “retrieve them.”  See Harris, Shadow, 278. 
156 Report (1848), 13, 6. 
157 Italics original C., 15 April 1852.  
158 As if echoing and revising Emerson’s thoughts on labor in “The American Scholar,” in which he argues 
that in discovering the “true dignity of his ministry,” a man connects himself with the One Man, and thus finds 
independence and self-actualization (53-54), Communipaw’s bootblack creates his own status.  As Mullins suggests: 
“For such persons, the pursuit of ‘uplift‘ and ‘respectability‘ was usually not possible to any meaningful extent, 
leaving them with two options:  either make the best of a marginal social position and menial labor, or take some 
extreme form of action” (78). 
159 Like Wilentz’s artisans, the bootblack in some ways stands against the mechanization of work.  He is a 
craftsman, whose art provides a critique of more “industrial” developments like patent leather that fail to hold up. 
(“Bootblack”).  Yet, bootblacking was still viewed as unskilled, casual labor.  So while Communipaw’s narrative 
works through and perhaps builds on the developments Wilentz’s describes, it also represents a shifting labor 
dynamic in the sense that Communipaw’s independent laborer, his artisan brings the craft to the labor.  Rather than 
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aspire to jobs associated with the middle class—a developing white middle class—Communipaw finds the a black 
middle class traveling down a different, divergent path.  A path that may not enjoy the current growth of wealth, but 
that will survive the current stage of economic development “at a less expense of moral excellence…to prove the 
human to be one brotherhood” (C., 26 February 1852). 
160 Even as Ethiop, Delany, and others offer representative men as examples of black potential, these texts 
also risk individualizing them so much that their political purpose as symbols for the group gets undercut.  
Communipaw might suggest that the link between the “hero” and the community that Andrews notes in Blake is 
disrupted as soon as the focus shifts from the hero’s position as representative of a type to his difference and 
separation from the group. 
This strategy contrasts to the well-documented narrative of what Tavia Nyong’o has productively theorized 
as the “black first” in texts like William Wells Brown’s encyclopedic The Black Man, His Antecedents, His Genius, 
and His Achievements (1863), Delany’s biographies of successful black men in Condition, or the iconography of 
Crispus Attucks.  As Nyong’o explains following David Theo Goldberg and Paul Gilroy, the black first functioned 
“potentially but not automatically…as an antinomian counter-culture to modernity,” carrying the tension of 
potentially “tending towards a reaffirmation of American culture, and” simultaneously “acting as a radical critique 
of the idea of culture itself” (50).  The danger in the black first is a kind of “representational exceptionalism” haunts 
“the black first, ensuring that the only alternatives seem to be for black achievement to go unnoticed or to be 
condescended to” (48).  It is this danger that I believe Communipaw’s “Heads” attempts to circumvent.  See Tavia 
Amolo Ochieng’ Nyong‘o, Uncommon Memory: The Performance of Amalgamation in Early Black Political 
Culture. Ph.D. diss., Yale University (2004), 36-72. 
161 “Bootblack” 
162 “The Bootblack.”  This image completely upends Child’s description of the beggar seated in front of the 
slave-trader’s home and likewise tempers Ethiop’s criticism of the lack of seriousness among the black population in 
the decades following emancipation.   
163 “The Black News-Vender.”   
164 “The Black News-Vender.”   
165 Goodman, 1; Paine, Common Sense, Rights of Man, and other Essential Writings, 283-284.  
As the subtle allusion to Psalm 84:10 suggests, the post of door-keeper to the Republic of Letters is 
preferable to a leading position, perhaps as an aristocrat, in “the tents of wickedness,” or, in this case, a corrupt state 
built on economics of enslavement.  Psalm 84:10 reads:  “For a day in Your courts is better than a thousand./I would 
rather be a doorkeeper in the house of my God/Than dwell in the tents of wickedness.” 
166 Smith, “Dr. Smith’s Journal,” CA 2 December 1837; Works 12.This “transformative impulse,” writes 
Goodman, “is the constructive result of this critical position” of betweeness (2).  The Republic of Letters “is an 
image of the nation in which blacks are neither heroes nor villains but humans—complicated men and women 
struggling to survive in a retrograde society that has rejected them.  McCune Smith’s characters define themselves 
not so much in terms of race, class, and gender, but in terms of their work, which is the key to their character…. 
work brings autonomy, and there is no essential difference between man and woman, black and white, rich and 
poor” (Stauffer 188).  This space, however, was not completely egalitarian.  Rather, historically it was strongly 
gendered male and assumed a level of literacy and philosophical sophistication that only a small percentage of the 
population could obtain.  
167 “The Whitewasher.” 
168 “The Whitewasher.” This vision of the whitewasher further confirms Smith’s claims in “Civilization” 
that “the people…are the source of intellectual as well as political power; they are not only bones and sinew, but 
also the heart and brain of a nation” (AAM, 8; Collected Works, 251).   
169 Introduction to My Bondage and My Freedom in Douglass Autobiographies, 132. 
170 This adaptability is in part a function of the periodical medium through which Ethiop and Communipaw 
Wrote.  As Todd Vogel has argued, the ephemeral quality of the press “made the writers nimble.  They could plunge 
into the public conversation and get their views out immediately” (“Introduction” 2).  See also Ernest, Liberation 
(Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 279. 
171 E., 13 May 1852. 
172 Here, I’m working from Lukács differentiation between description, which “contemporizes everything” 
and narration, “recounts the past” (5).  Communipaw, in contrast, narrates a past, that, as I will discuss in a moment, 
reveals a kind of deception in Ethiop’s present.  Benedict Anderson describes this contemporaneous nature of the 
newspaper as a bedrock of imagined community.  Indeed, Ethiop’s descriptions connect all of Douglass’s readers 
(imagined for him as black) as a part of a collective community sharing a concern for its development.  New York 
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operates as the center of this community, or more like its epicenter, the space from whence all of its major trends 
and tendencies radiate and can be observed.  See Georg Lukacs, “Narrate or Describe,” in Writer and Critic, trans. 
Arthur D. Kahn (New York:  Grosset, 1970), 130; and Anderson, Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2006), 63. 
173 E., 13 May 1852.  Ethiop was probably referring to William Morris, “rector of Trinity School” who 
acted St. Philip’s “officiating minister” from 1849 to 1860, but was never officially named “rector.”  As Craig D. 
Townsend’s history of black Episcopalians in New York city explains, all of the men filling the position after Peter 
Williams through 1860 “were white,” and while, Townsend explains, Morris was “dedicated to St. Philip’s and 
enormously helpful to the parish both as pastors and as allies in the effort to gain admission to the convention,” they 
were only part-time and the parish, contra Ethiop’s caricature, “wanted a black priest” (152).  See Townsend, Faith 
in Their Own Color:  Black Episcopalians in Antebellum New York City (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
2005), 151-152. 
174 E., 13 May 1852. 
175 E., 13 May 1852. 
176 Downing, “St. Philip’s Church and the Fugitive Slave Law,” Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 29 April 
1852.  
177 “St. Philip’s”  Note about Preston Case 
178 “St. Philip’s” and E., 13 May 1852.   
179 References to Cromwell recur in Douglass’s Paper and abolitionist rhetoric, usually mentioned next to 
revolutionary leaders like George Washington for his “just severity.”  See Frederick Douglass’s Paper, 9 October 
1851. 
180 E., 8 April 1852. 
181 E., 8 April 1852. 
182 As Burns has revealed, Frankenstein became a common image for the destructive, frightening, or 
otherwise abject other.  See Burns, Painting in the Dark, 114. 
183 E., 8 April 1852. 
184 C., 12 February 1852. 
185 Harris, Shadow 266. 
186 Ibid., 266. 
187 Add bit about rich black folk like smith not employing or patronizing or catering to other black folk? 
188 See Sklansky, 4. 
189 Cite/Explain 
190 See, for instance, Blumin, The Emergence of the Middle Class; Wilentz, Chants Democratic; Glickstein, 
American Exceptionalism; Bromell, By the Sweat of the Brow; and Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men.  As the 
1848 convention predicted, Irish immigrants pushed many black New Yorkers out of those occupations forming the 
backbone of Communipaw’s “Heads,” eliminating a once stable niche in the labor market.  See Harris, 264-265. 
191 See for instance, Paul D. Moreno’s discussion of black activists’ relation to white unions and the 
founding of the Colored National Labor Union in 1869 in Black Americans and Organized Labor:  A New History 
(Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 8-81, especially, his discussion of the competing labor 
theories of value informing white union and abolitionist/Republican notions of free labor.  Where the former 
emphasized economic independence and the artisan republicanisms from earlier in the century, the latter emphasized 
individual ownership of the self and labor (11-12, 23-26). 
192 See Litwack, 164-168. 
193 Many black activists as well as other reformers were advocating migration out of urban centers in favor 
of subsistence (and later market-driven) farming as a path towards elevation. Mary Ann Shadd Cary, for instance, 
writes to North Star “that [the black population] should direct [their] attention more to the farming interest than 
hitherto…” because, she argues, “the estimation in which we would be held in power, would be quite different, were 
we produces, and not merely, as now, consumers” (32).  But the rural life was also attractive for its perceived moral 
advantages.  Smith himself suggested the country as preferable to the city as a part of a Committee of Three in a 
report to the 1851 Convention of Colored Citizens in Rochester, NY, titled “Report on the Social Condition of the 
People of Color Around New York City, and on The Best Means of Ameliorating the Same.”  The report was 
published in Douglass’s North Star and Greeley’s New York Daily Tribune.  All quotes here come from the North 
Star version. Smith reports,  “all city life is, after all, a kind of hot-house forcing of human beings” that forces black 
men to work “as servants, porters, &c.” with the result that their “manhood is, in a measure, demeaned, lowered, 
kept down” (“Meeting of the Colored People of New York”).  The committee’s solution:  “leave the city, its 
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seductions, its oppressions and baleful atmosphere, and seek to expand our elbows, our lungs and our energies in the 
free air of the rural districts” (“Meeting”).   
The drop in New York City’s black population began in the 1840s.  Harris notes that the city’s population 
dropped by “over 2,500” between 1840 and 1850 and by fifteen percent in the five years following passage of the 
Fugitive Slave Law.  This decline, however, did not include Ethiop’s Brooklyn, which saw a rise in population over 
the same time, in part because some migrating from New York went only that far.  This demographic shift account, 
in part, for Ethiop’s optimism.  Recall that he is Frederick Douglass’s Paper’s “Brooklyn Correspondent” and 
claims Brooklyn as his home.  See Harris, Shadow, 275-278. 
194 See Singh, 46-47; and William J. Moses, Creative Conflict in African American Thought :  Frederick 
Douglass, Alexander Crummell, Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Marcus Garvey (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48. 
 206 
CHAPTER V 
 
CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE ANGLO-AFRICAN MAGAZINE, 1859-1860 
 
1. Introduction 
In a February 1860 article for the Anglo-African Magazine, William J. Wilson, writing as 
Ethiop, asks, “what for the best good of all shall we do with the White people?”1  Laced with 
sarcasm, Ethiop’s essay invites readers to rethink U.S. history as a narrative of white duplicity 
and avarice that ultimately threatens projects of republican citizenship: 
Twice have they quarreled with, stripped off, and fought the mother who gave them 
origin and nursed them till they were grown; and once have they most unmercifully 
beaten their weaker and more pacific neighbor; and then despoiled him of a large portion 
of his lands, and are now tormented with longing after the balance. 
If we go back to an earlier page in their history, we find them stealing and 
appropriating what?  Why, men, women and children from abroad and consigning them 
to a perpetual bondage…2 
 
Viewing the sordid history of familial violence (the American Revolution and War of 1812), un-
neighborliness (the U.S.-Mexican War), and theft in property (American Indian land) and 
persons, Ethiop concludes that white Americans are “no nearer the solution of the problem” of 
self-government “than they were at the commencement of their career.”3  Where the Declaration 
of Independence and Constitution promised a republican form of government, Ethiop finds “a 
long continued, extensive, and almost complete system of wrong-doing.”4  Following Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, even the Judicial Branch seems to have “reverse[d] the very principle of law,” 
giving “wrong, injustice and inhumanity the benefit of the doubt” over “right…justice…[and] 
humanity.”5  Something has gone equally awry with civic judgment.  The “recent death struggle” 
in Kansas suggests that “those honest and frank differences of opinion that beget and strengthen 
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sound opinion,” the critical debate essential to participatory politics, have been replaced by “low 
petty captiousness and cowardly vindictiveness.”6  As a result, the land of “E Pluribus Unim,” a 
land intended to cultivate equality amongst diversity, has become instead a land of “prejudices, 
bitter hates, fierce strifes, dissensions, oppressions, and frauds.”7  Events in the 1850s had given 
Ethiop little faith that white Americans could acquire the critical sensibilities needed to achieve 
the republican ideals articulated in the nation’s founding documents.  They must either 
physically withdraw from the U.S.—an idea that strikes him as equally “wrong in conception” as 
black removal—or stop being “white” altogether.8   
Ethiop’s question—”What then shall we Anglo-Africans do with” white people?—, at 
once facetious and at the same time deadly serious, opens space for a more pressing intellectual 
project:  what to do about a particular avaricious attitude and set of framing narratives that close 
off U.S. citizenship to whites only.9  Using Ethiop’s questioning as a guide, this chapter 
examines models of critical citizenship—practices that press against and through the boundaries 
of citizenship—in the Anglo-African Magazine (AAM). As Anna Secor notes, “The discourses 
and practices of citizenship can be seen as founding a… proprietary, circumscribed space of 
rationalization” that separates the citizen from the stranger.10  Against and in tension with this 
separation, the AAM mobilizes an intellectual project that produces a version of the permeable 
civic space theorized in Jones and Allen’s Narrative.  By assuming the imperative and the ability 
of “Anglo-Africans” to “do” something with white Americans, contributors to the AAM take 
critical stance that not only interrogates the content of U.S. citizenship and its histories, but more 
importantly challenges the closure of citizenship and critique itself through national fantasies of 
white superiority.11   
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Wilson, in particular, uses his “Afric-American Picture Gallery” series, appearing in the 
AAM from February to October 1859, to map out the possibilities and problems of critical 
citizenship as a challenge to modes of civic memory and institutional framing.  Wilson moves 
readers through spaces of alternate ordering, from a picture gallery to a maroon society, that 
actuate a critical stance against utopian projections of national wholeness, white or otherwise, 
and the closures of citizenship such projections enable.  The critical citizen becomes an agent of 
consciousness raising, in constant circulation, expanding the realm of possibility of the civic 
imaginary in a way that shifts the focus of citizenship from creating an acceptable or respectable 
blackness to contesting frameworks of citizenship and the kinds of civic judgment that authorize 
such distinctions.12   
 
2. Matters of Taste and Law:  A Critique of National Judgment 
Events during the 1850s, from the Compromise of 1850 to the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas 
debates, provide flashpoints indexing the decline in civic judgment Ethiop notes in 1859.  Each 
moment—the Kansas Nebraska Act, Anthony Burns’s rendition, Dred Scott v. Sandford, and the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates—represents a closure of the sensible, what could be thought, seen or 
heard, about citizenship.  Frederick Douglass registers this closure in1854 while speaking on the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act in Chicago, IL, linking the political climate to an increased deployment of 
the term “white” as the political center of gravity.  “The word white,” Douglass contends, “is a 
modern term in the legislation of this country,” a symptom of “our national degeneracy” that 
installs a “limitation of humanity and human rights” not present at the drafting of the 1787 
Constitution.13 As a result, “every inch of ground occupied by the colored man in this country,” 
Douglass tells his audience, was “sternly disputed” from the “ballot box” to the “altar.”14  
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Politics before and during the 1840s, in Douglass’s view, removed political rights from all but a 
small percentage of black citizens through constitutional debate and popular vote; politics in 
many new territories and states after the 1840s used “white” or the concept of popular 
sovereignty to remove the question of black political equality altogether. 
While Douglass overlooks earlier federal legislation like the 1790 Naturalization Law 
that explicitly restricted naturalization to white men and the history of state-level 
disenfranchisement I cover in Chapter 3, his claim points to a larger trend within U.S. politics 
during the 1850s.  Douglass’s sense of intrusiveness was not just because of Illinois’s and other 
states’ Black Codes, which penalized black citizens who attempted to move into the state as well 
as those who aided them.15  Rather, the version of popular sovereignty the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
authorized allowed citizens within a state to decide whether to allow or disallow slavery, 
essentially authorizing them to legislate black humanity.16  As historian Nicole Etcheson 
suggests, black settlers were “caught between two hostile forces”: one side sought to secure the 
territories for white free labor, the other for slaveholding, but few envisioned black citizens 
sharing in that process.17  Instead, they were a problem the nation had to “do something” about.  
Even among those opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska act because they saw slavery as a moral 
question beyond the purview of legislation, attitudes towards black people, free and enslaved, 
ranged from apathy to outright hostility, but proved in practice, if not always in law, that the U.S. 
“Government was established on the white basis,” as Stephen A. Douglas later declared.  People 
of color might share in that government, but only through white consent.18  The “crisis” in 
Kansas was increasingly a crisis in the maintenance of a putatively white union and the rights of 
white people, whether as laborers or as property holders, within that union. 
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The problem, however, was not confined to the new states and territories at the center of 
the conflict over slavery.  Days after Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Anthony Burns, 
a fugitive slave living in Boston, was returned to slavery.19  As per the Fugitive Slave Act, a 
federal commissioner tried Burns without a jury.  Despite fiery vigilance committee meetings, an 
attempted rescue, and attempts to raise the $1200 needed to purchase Burns’s freedom, Burns 
was escorted to Boston Harbor on June 2, 1854, by what was then, according to history Gordon 
S. Baker, “America’s largest show of military force in peacetime” with official approval from 
President Pierce.20  “Thousand upon thousands of people,” one observer noted, crowded 
buildings lining Burns’s route to “gaze upon [the] strange spectacle.”21  Boston Mayor, Jerome 
V. C. Smith, and others hailed the event as a triumph of law and order and a necessary measure 
for the preservation of the Union, while most white abolitionists seemed long on fiery rhetoric, 
but short on action. All in all, Burns’s return to slavery offered a microcosm of Northern 
sentiment.  The nation was not heading inexorably towards civil war.  Instead, many Northerners 
were attempting to maintain a delicate balance:  they bemoaned the spread of slavery suggested 
in the Kansas-Nebraska Act, repudiated enslavement and the Fugitive Slave Act on principle, but 
shied away from direct action on behalf of actual fugitives and black citizens, especially when 
such actions could be seen as a disturbance of the peace.  
Contemporary critics like Henry David Thoreau read events in 1854 as indicative of the 
degeneration of national judgment or the nation’s critical sense.  The failed attempt at violent 
rescue during Burns’s trial and the apparent festive atmosphere around his rendition led Thoreau 
to comment on the public’s shallow “taste” and the constraints that the public’s concern with the 
preservation of past revolutions and the wholeness of the union placed on justice.  Popular 
opinion or “Fame,” Thoreau laments in “Slavery in Massachusetts”: 
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does not finely discriminate, but coarsely hurrahs.  She considers not the simple heroism 
of an action, but only as it is connected with its apparent consequences. She praises till 
she is hoarse the easy exploit of the Boston tea party, but will be comparatively silent 
about the braver and more disinterestedly heroic attack on the Boston Court-House, 
simply because it was unsuccessful!22 
 
The tea party receives praise because it fit easily within a story of liberty achieved without a 
direct call to action in the present.  Bostonians could claim proclaim the revolution complete, the 
union perfected, and their own role as its conservators. Yet, preserving the Union by way of 
appeasing Southern slaveholders had evacuated republican institutions of the critical element that 
made them republican:  a majority with the taste for the “sweet” music of justice and the 
willingness to act on that recognition.  Thoreau reflects, “the judge still sits grinding at his organ, 
but it yields no music, and we hear only the sound of the handle. He believes that all the music 
resides in the handle, and the crowd toss him their coppers the same as before.”23  Rather than 
listen for the sound of justice or injustice, citizens listen for and applaud the hollow sounds of the 
instrument itself.  In their preoccupation with a revolutionary past and maintaining the sanctity of 
the union—a vision that framed self-government as a recognition of property rights over human 
rights or Massachusetts law—judges, legislators, and the public had mistaken the institutions that 
facilitate self-government for actual self-government.  Keeping the instrument intact, keeping the 
vision of national wholeness alive, was sufficient. 
If Thoreau took the state of public discourse as an opportunity to muse on the 
shallowness of civic taste, Douglass read Burns’s rendition and the spectacle surrounding it as 
proof that the nation’s critical sense had been inverted: “How sweet to the ear and heart of every 
true American are the shrieks of Anthony Burns, as the American eagle sends his remorseless 
beak and bloody talons into him!! How grateful to the taste and pleasant to the eye, is the warm 
blood of the sable fugitive.”24  The image of a Promethean Burns, suggestive of both gothic 
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horror and revolutionary potential, becomes a symbol of national beauty, but not as a call to 
resistance in defense of human rights.  Instead, white Americans celebrate the punishment of one 
who would steal (himself) from them.  Douglass’s “true American” hears the “discord” of 
injustice, not as discord at all, but rather as sweet music.  That is, where Thoreau assumes a 
transcendent link between beauty and justice, Douglass here sees beauty as contingent on 
popular response, and a system, an instrument, working all too well to cater to and perhaps invite 
such responses.  Douglass’s play on “taste” makes the image all the more macabre, slipping 
between the flavor of Burns’s blood in the eagle’s beak and the pleasure the image invokes in 
viewers.  Here, Douglass shows more similarities to the emigration movement he otherwise 
opposed, foreshadowing his own consideration of Haiti in the early 1860s.25  As delegates to the 
1854 National Emigration Convention posit:   
all the Conventions heretofore held by the whites in this country, of whatever political 
pretensions… have thrown themselves upon the declaration:  ‘To sustain the Constitution 
as our forefathers understood it, and the Union as they formed it; all of which plainly and 
boldly imply, unrestricted liberty to whites, and the right to hold blacks in slavery and 
degradation.  
 
In both readings, it’s not that the public failed to discern the deeper beauty of attempts to free 
Burns, as Thoreau suggests, but rather that they found beauty in the system that saw him returned 
to slavery.  Maintaining the wholeness of this system took precedence over human rights and, in 
the 1854 Convention’s reading, not only authorized, but also required enslavement and 
oppression. 
The rise of an explicitly anti-slavery Republican party in the mid-to-late 1850s and 
denunciations of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) would seem to belie Douglass’s critique of 
national judgment and the convention’s interpretation of white politics, at least in the North.  
Justices Benjamin R. Curtis’s and John McLean’s dissenting opinions, as well as newspaper 
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editorials, were quick to point out the license Justice Roger B. Taney’s opinion took with the 
history of black citizenship, and the dangerous diversion the lower and higher court rulings took 
from prior precedence.26  Taney famously ignored the history of black political and military 
involvement to argue that, when the Constitution was framed, people of African descent “had for 
more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they 
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”27 In dissent, McLean noted that 
several states had granted “persons of color” voting rights and, by logical extension and tradition, 
had “recognized them as citizens…. in the slave as well as the free States.”28  Further, the 
making of “citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors” through the “late treaty with 
Mexico” at the conclusion of the U.S.-Mexican War suggested that even subsequent color-based 
restrictions passed by the states did not negate the potential for any “freemen” to be Federal 
citizens.29 
McLean’s dissent, however, also revealed how remonstrances against Taney’s opinion 
cut both ways, defending black citizenship while denigrating black citizens as potentially 
distasteful, confirming Douglass and others’ analyses.30  Even as he affirms black citizenship and 
the immorality of slavery, McLean also admits that the government was “not made especially for 
the colored race” (an echo of Stephen A. Douglas’s “this Government was established on the 
white basis”).31 For McLean, the history of black political participation and traditions of 
birthright citizenship guaranteed the recognition of black citizenship in law.  Whether a “colored 
citizen” would necessarily be an “agreeable member of society,” however, “is more a matter of 
taste than of law.”32  Rather than challenge the notion that portions of the citizenry could be 
disagreeable—that is, rather than challenge the public taste—and its potential effects, McLean 
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concludes that given the history of U.S. citizenship, “it must be admitted that we have not been 
very fastidious.”33   
By distinguishing between taste and law, McLean was attempting to forestall how the 
Court’s decision, especially Taney’s notion of “dual citizenship,” negated both the restrictions on 
slavery outlined in the Missouri Compromise and Federal power over citizenship more broadly.34  
Yet, how McLean deployed the separation also elided how public taste or consent, especially 
given new instantiations of popular sovereignty and the response to Burns’s rendition, created 
law and affected citizenship in practice.  By suggesting the potential distastefulness of “colored 
citizens,” McLean tells a story that allows for a distinction between them and white citizens, a 
difference that, if it didn’t touch citizenship in terms of Federal law (which it did), nevertheless 
tacitly situated black citizens as somehow outside the consent-giving or sovereign “we” who 
judged such matters.  In so doing, McLean affirms Douglass’s sense that, in the public imaginary 
and in political practice, black citizens had been “deemed…intruder[s]” despite constitutional 
rights suggesting the contrary.35 
The campaign discourse of the late 1850s, especially in Abraham Lincoln’s negotiation 
between Constitutional rights and “political and social equality” during his 1858 debates with 
Stephen A. Douglas, demonstrates the political consequences of McLean’s framing.36  Lincoln 
opens the crucial fourth debate with Douglas playing the question of racial equality for humor:  
“While I was at the hotel today,” he begins, “an elderly gentleman called upon me to know 
whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality between negroes and white 
people.”37  Perfect equality here invokes three pillars of white fear:  “making voters or jurors of 
negroes… qualifying them to hold office,” and allowing them to “intermarry with white 
people.”38 After audience laughter at the absurdity of the question, Lincoln articulates the 
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position he holds throughout the debates, “I have no purpose to introduce political and social 
equality between the white and black races,” to continued applause.  Drawing on popular racial-
science, Lincoln concludes:   
there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will 
forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality.  And 
inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position 
of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the 
superior position assigned to the white race.39 
 
Whether or not Lincoln’s comments reflected his personal philosophy is less important here than 
how he deploys the rhetoric of racial difference to elicit the audience’s response.  While he 
consistently critiqued Douglas’s notion of popular sovereignty and Justice Taney’s Dred Scott 
opinion as they relate to the potential spread of slavery, Lincoln, similar to McLean, does so in a 
way that reaffirms the civic tastes that underwrite them.  He asserts the right of black citizens to 
equal protection under the law—in Lincoln’s terms, “the right to life, liberty and, the pursuit of 
happiness” and “the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own 
hand earns”—, but only after establishing his support for white supremacy.  “Not want[ing] a 
negro woman for a slave,” Lincoln quips to “cheers and laughter,” does not mean “want[ing] her 
for a wife.”40  The question of racial equality is literally laughable.   
Lincoln’s use of free labor rhetoric in support of black natural rights receives white 
applause, but only within this framework:  1) physical differences exist and necessitate 
hierarchy; 2) white superiority within this hierarchy must be asserted and defended; and 3) 
advocacy for black rights so long as such advocacy does not disturb the first two assumptions.41  
While black citizens had basic rights under the law, then, those laws were not, to return to 
McLean, “made especially for them.”42 More, the social and political landscape needed to be 
structured so as to maintain inequalities between white and black citizens for the protection of 
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white interests.  The notion of racial competition for “position” masks how the operations of 
state and social power created and enforced these very inequalities.  Rather than the agents of 
racial oppression through positive law and social and economic practice, white citizens become 
potential victims.  Political, social, and economic differences among white citizens become 
subordinate under not only the sense of racial accomplishment, as I have suggested in my 
analyses of voting and economic citizenship, but also the sense of collective fear.  
Orators like Lincoln and Douglas circulated and cultivated (whether intentionally or not) 
a taste for white supremacist themes as shorthand for national unity.43  Through his debates 
speeches, Lincoln mobilized what S.S.N., writing for the AAM in 1859, identifies as “a fantasia 
on some national melody,” a “romance” created with “poetic license used with the facts of 
history” for audience appeal. “Almost every American writer or speaker, who would gain 
applause for himself, or a good hearing from his audience,” S.S.N. explains,  
is sure, Paganini-like, to play upon this one string…Now the Thema [sic] is “Anglo-
Saxon Energy,”—(invading Mexico, perhaps), now, “Anglo-Saxon Enterprize,”—(re-
opening the Slave trade!), then “Anglo-Saxon Piety,” (with holding bibles from Slaves, 
and hating negroes generally!)…variations on the martial, religious, mechanical and 
general superiority of the great Yankee nation.44 
 
Orators and artists travel across the country (physically and in print) to provide virtuoso 
performances before on themes following romantic theories of racial destiny:  the notion that 
each “race” or people had a unique character and historical trajectory and that “Anglo-Saxon” 
destiny was superior to all others.  The “romance,” with “fulsome laudations of what they call 
‘THE GREAT AGLO-SAXON RACE,’” sutures “the wounds they themselves inflict on the ‘Apostate 
American People,’” wounds Ethiop notes as a history of violence and theft in “What Shall We 
Do?”45  The audience, in turn, enables and authorizes artists to operate within a fixed thematic 
range, lending themselves as “stops to an organ, to be played upon, as the performers conclude 
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with a grand Fugue movement, on ‘Anglo-Saxon blood.’”46  The formal structure of the fugue—
a contrapuntal repetition on a single theme—ensures that each voice, no matter how “tonally” 
different, and each subject, no matter how ostensibly divisive, repeats the central theme:  
superiority of “Anglo-Saxon blood.”47  While, as S.S.N. notes, this structure occurs in multiple 
forms—speeches, treatises, visual arts, etc.—the fugue metaphor gets to the heart of the managed 
polyphony that creates a consensus of white nationalism and through which peoples of European 
descent, whether Angle, Saxon, French, or German, could be “washed and become regenerated” 
as white Americans, so long as they, like Lincoln, stuck to the theme.   
The collective performance ultimately frames citizenship in a utopian promise of white 
wholeness:  individual citizens are not only distilled from historical subjects, but, as Thoreau’s 
reading of Massachusetts citizens reveals, look back to create a historical frame suitable to their 
new collective “Anglo-Saxon” identity.48  The performance offers a sense of empowerment to 
those whose identities the framing manages (e.g. those who applauded Lincoln or Douglass’s 
Promethean Burns), but expels as dangerous and unpalatable those whose identities it cannot 
manage, refuses to acknowledge, or exorcises in the framing process.  The resulting frame does 
not necessarily negate critique as such (Ethiop describes a public contentious to the point of 
dissolution, and the Lincoln Douglas debates were quire heated); rather, it permits only “honesty 
and truth…of a certain character,” policing “truth” in a way that inhibits the critical sense: the 
capacity to resist, poke holes in, or see beyond what the utopian promise, the circular fugue 
structure, makes sensible.49 
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3. Reading Anglo-African Wise:  The Anglo-African Magazine’s Critical Project 
And yet, those people excised from the national imaginary do not go away.  As Judith 
Butler points out, the excluded always return to haunt the space of politics that excluded them.  
Such haunting, she continues, “become[s] politically effective precisely in so far as the return of 
the excluded forces an expansion and rearticulation of the basic premises of democracy itself.”50 
Ethiop’s insistence on doing something with white people is a reassertion of agency over the 
framing of citizenship, wresting control of the narrative from white hands.  Douglass, too, 
reasserts himself, claiming his intrusiveness as a right and practice of citizenship rather than a 
violation of it.  The editors and contributors to the AAM were dedicated to forcing such an 
expansion and rearticulating of the premises of citizenship, to reopening its structure through 
cultivating a different kind of critical sensibility with a “taste” for unmanaged, participatory 
plurality. The AAM, in form and content, suggests a model of citizenship as a self-reflexive, 
dialectical process of becoming.  While from the position Douglass’s “true Americans” this 
project haunts the promise of national wholeness, from the perspective the critical citizen, the 
promise of wholeness itself becomes the object of exorcism.  
Longtime newspaperman Thomas Hamilton founded the Anglo-African Magazine in 
1859 as an outlet for “the twelve millions of blacks in the United States…to assert and maintain 
their rank as men among men…[to] speak for themselves.”51  “No outside tongue,” proclaims 
Hamilton’s “Apology,” “however gifted with eloquence, can tell their story; no outside eye, 
however penetrating, can see their wants.”52  Hamilton’s mission statement echoes similar 
proclamations in black periodicals from the first edition of Freedom’s Journal (1827), which 
opened with “We wish to plead our own cause.  Too long have others spoken for us.”53  And 
Hamilton would have been well versed in this tradition and the art of publishing from his work 
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on anti-slavery papers like Colored American, the Mirror of Liberty and the National Anti-
Slavery Standard.54  Where his predecessors gave the most space to abolitionist articles and 
immediate events, however, Hamilton devoted most of the AAM to scholarship and to 
“uphold[ing] and encourag[ing] the now depressed hopes of the thinking black men, in the 
United States.”55  The magazine ran for sixteen issues from January 1859 to April 1860 with a 
subscription base of about 500.56  The AAM opens with an image and biography of Alexander 
Dumas, reproduces sheet music and lyrics from A. J. R. Connor’s “My Cherished Hope, my 
Fondest Dream”; offers scholarly essays like the four-part “Statistical View of the Colored 
Population of the United States” and William C. Nell’s “Colored American Patriots”; and 
publishes serialized fiction like Martin R. Delany’s Blake.57  
The AAM’s most striking feature is its diversity:  the monthly bursts at the seams with 
contending discourses, philosophies, and political sensibilities.  Hamilton, for instance explicitly 
opposes black emigration:  it cannot “aid our cause to found an empire in Yoruba,” he argues, 
“they might as well have built a batter at Gibraltar to destroy Sevastopol.”58   Yet, the AAM also 
prints articles offering a range of views, from J. Holland Townsend’s “Our Duty in the Conflict,” 
which promotes fighting for “political equality of the races in this country,” to James T. Holly’s 
six-part “Thoughts on Hayti,” which calls on the “colored people of the” U.S. to help develop 
Haiti as “the most advanced negro nationality,” capable of defending the rights of African 
descended peoples around the world.59 When Hamilton argues in his “Apology,” “The negro is 
something more than mere endurance; he is a force,” he is relying on a construction of racial 
destiny similar to the “Anglo-Saxon” romance S.S.N. critiques.  His larger project, however, 
invokes “the negro” as the “force” of ideas or the critical method demonstrated in subsequent 
articles.60  The articles are unified, not by their conformity to a single construction of blackness 
 220 
or black destiny, but rather in their attitude towards historical memory, and commitment to 
political self-determination.   
The neologistic “Anglo-African” invokes less a racial-political group and more a critical 
method centering on the confluence of ideas and tensions the term “Anglo-African” invokes.  In 
contrast to the “romance” S.S.N. outlines, with its fugue-like management of national identity 
and critical discourse, the AAM’s critical project offers a more democratic mode of reading—a 
participatory model of performance—that invites readers to take part in constructing the 
“meaning” of the “text.”  Even as S.S.N. wonders at how “we have become by some mysterious 
process—’Anglo-Africans,’” he must admit with some chagrin that “the fact must be patent for 
are we not writing for an Anglo-African magazine?”61  Just as State Conventions’ “Proceedings” 
collected the differentiated voices and interests of delegates under its corporate authorship, the 
institutionally heteroglossic space of the AAM creates an imagined community of Anglo-
Africans, fleshed-out, so to speak, through the collective efforts of its contributors.62  The 
unfixed nature of the neologism, James Clifton suggests, “forces [readers] to construct readings 
from a debris of historical and future possibilities.”63  In the AAM, this “radical indeterminacy” 
initiated a collective and participatory project of building different, if not entirely new, idioms of 
citizenship and peoplehood as a direct assault on an “Anglo-Saxon” romance that attempted to 
codify a single white national subject. The “fact” of “Anglo-African-ness” is “patent,” not 
because “Anglo-African” is any more accurate identity than any other—writers use different 
terms (colored, black, Afric-American, African, etc.) and S.S.N. himself prefers to be simply 
“American”64—; rather, the magazine and those contributing to and reading it create a 
community of “Anglo-Africans,” an imagined maroon community allied through an intellectual 
project that itself disturbs the narrative of a white or Anglo-American ascendancy.65  
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As John Ernest and Heather Russell have argued, black writers were crafting ongoing 
projects of “liberation historiography” that countered the content of histories that limited their 
humanity and agency and called into question “the entire matrix of Historiography” and 
Literature.66  Texts like the AAM, Ernest continues, were venues in which writers could “speak 
Anglo-African wise,” that is, they could “address the eternal by speaking historically—to give 
voice to principles sounded throughout history by people of various backgrounds” with an 
“understanding of race as a systemic construction” based on “successive and layered 
violations.”67  It is this critical stance towards race that makes the text “Anglo-African.”  Yet, the 
contributors to the AAM were also invested in cultivating a readership of citizens who could read 
“Anglo-African wise,” that is readers with the critical judgment by which to see around the 
corners of systems that maintained white supremacy.   Reading Anglo-African wise, cultivating a 
taste for projects like the AAM, citizens would not only see Anthony Burns as a Promethean 
hero, but they would also be compelled to act on his behalf and in the spirit of his resistance.   
 
4. The Critic and His Discontents:  Washington’s Bones and the Corpus of U.S. Citizenship 
William J. Wilson’s “Afric-American Picture Gallery” (AAPG) provides a useful case 
study of how the AAM postulates critical citizenship.  Through the AAPG Wilson disrupts the 
national romance of whiteness, offering a perspective that could correct the faulty judgment 
variously cited by Thoreau, Douglass, and S.S.N.  I am concerned here not so much with the 
content as with the critical attunement that Wilson models in his sketches and how Wilson uses 
Ethiop’s intellectual development to outline the problems of critical citizenship and to cultivate a 
critical stance that would allow Ethiop and his readers to get outside the consensus of myth, to 
see things differently.68   
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The AAPG series ran in the AAM in seven installments, from February 1859 through 
October 1859, in which Ethiop writes sketched descriptions of at least 27 “pictures.”69  In 
contrast to Wilson’s city-sketches for Frederick Douglass’s Paper, however, Ethiop functions 
less as Wilson’s print alter-ego and more as a dynamic character, the art critic at work, through 
whom Wilson develops the aesthetic sensibility, necessary not only for liberation of black 
citizens, but also for the maintenance of democratic citizenship more generally.  By anchoring 
Ethiop’s sketches in a seemingly disordered array of images—imaginary or otherwise—Wilson 
develops Ethiop’s (and his readers’) taste for a conception of collective memory as a web of 
associations—some contradictory, some incriminated, some inspiring—suggesting that the 
proper attitude of citizen to national symbolic is the attitude of the critic to the work of art. 
The AAPG is not so much about physical space, though Wilson remains committed to 
creating actual picture galleries and reading rooms, but rather the AAPG is a metaphorical 
articulation of a historical, cultural, and intellectual project of critical citizenship.70 Like the 
articles and images that make up the AAM, the images populating the AAPG range from Phillis 
Wheatley and Toussaint L’Ouverture to the Underground Railroad and “Sunset in Abbeokuta” to 
George Washington and “The First and Last Colored Editor.”  Picture galleries are ideal spaces 
for developing this critical positioning, because they allow patrons to encounter multiple 
seemingly discordant sites in “a single real place.”71  Visitors enter the gallery “on the south 
side” and almost immediately encounter “The Slave Ship,” a picture hanging “near the entrance” 
offering a “faithful” image, “even to every shrub, crag and nook,” of seventeenth-century 
Jamestown harbor.  Featured prominently in the image are “the slave ship,” “Dutch-modeled and 
ugly, even hideous to look upon, as a slave-ship ought to be,” and “a group of emaciated 
Africans, heavily manacled, the first slaves that ever trod the American continent.”72  Visitors’ 
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entrance into the Gallery, the Gallery’s founding moment, contrasts sharply with images of the 
Puritans entering an untamed, dangerous wilderness or John Smith’s struggle to conquer an 
unyielding landscape.  The Europeans themselves bring with them the wild savagery of gothic 
America, symbolized not by the racialized, dark wilderness, but by the slave ship, “his Satanic 
Majesty…the devil” its “firm friend and companion.”73  The entire image, recalling J. M. W. 
Turner’s “Slave Ship” (1840) and John Ruskin’s description of it in Modern Painter, maintains 
the view of the ship “girded with condemnation,” but without the suggestion of imminent 
punishment [figure 3].74  The gallery calls upon patrons to see slavery as central, rather than 
peripheral, to the nation’s history and Europeans as its gothic villains, not its victims.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Turner’s “The Slave Ship,” 1840. 
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Ethiop’s sketches mix Wilson’s previous project of guiding readers through cultural 
geographies with the conventions of catalogues from galleries like New York’s Düsseldorf 
Gallery, Ruskin’s Modern Painter, and articles about the state of “American Art” and art 
audiences in The Illustrated Magazine of Art.   Surrounding Ethiop with history paintings in 
particular taps into the role exhibition halls, art unions, and galleries served in antebellum culture 
as popular entertainment and as pedagogical conduits for shaping civi identity and ethics.75 
Ethiop reflects on how these images form public judgment:  “Pictures are teachings by example.  
From them we often derive our best lessons.”76  “A picture of a great man,” Ethiop continues in 
an echo of contemporary thought, acts as a storehouse of collective memory that “calls up the 
whole history of his times,” recalling past events, but also leading the spectator to “the 
philosophy of them.”77  These memories become “reimpressed” on the spectator’s mind.  They 
overlay the particularities of individual experience and difference with older impressions in a 
palimpsest that creates a common sense of origins, shared values, and the universal experience of 
the national subject and civilized humanity.  In this way, the public space of the picture gallery 
offers a model of collective and participatory remembrance.78   
Yet, as S.S.N’s reading of public oratory suggests, this collective memory can result in 
alienation and closure (for some), when a priori limitations are placed on the range of 
participants or the scope of what gets remembers, continually reproducing prefabricated 
“theme,” instead of the dialectical movement between collective and particular Ethiop describes.  
In Wilson’s framing of the sketch series, however, working through the gallery becomes a 
project of critical memory that installs critique as a normative function of reading history and 
acting in the present.79  The art itself instills a self-reflexive ethos into the Gallery.  In the same 
space as “The Slave Ship,” the Gallery shifts readers’ attention to “The First and the Last 
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Colored Editor,” a “small, but neat picture” hanging “on the north side of the gallery.”80  In the 
painting “quite a young man” sits at a desk piled with copies of previous colored newspapers 
from Freedom’s Journal to Frederick Douglass’s Paper, reading the first editorial of the First 
Editor, who, “unperceived by the Last Editor, is looking intently over his shoulder.”81  Ethiop 
provides critical purchase for reading this folding of past and future in the visual image:  “The 
scene is the linking together of our once scarcely hopeful past with the now brightest present.”82  
The image places before visitors the past, present, and future of the “Afric-American” in a way 
that suggests a conversation between them, juxtaposing ostensibly incompatible sites of 
enslavement with sites of freedom, scenes from the distant past with scenes of a distant future.  If 
Atlantic slavery erased intergenerational continuity, the image also suggests that future 
generations can find roots in the texts previous generations created and the “cultural grounding” 
those texts have to offer.83  
The Gallery lacks any discernable arrangement, the paintings “put up out of the way, 
many of them, than hung for any effect,” with large paintings next to small, oil next to 
watercolors, and sculptures interspersed.84  Through images like “The Slave Ship” and their 
juxtaposition to other scenes like “Sunset in Abbeokuta,” “The Underground Railroad,” or a bust 
of Ira Aldridge, the Gallery’s structure compels Ethiop’s ostensibly moody eye to connect the 
dots between what Houston Baker calls the “embarrassing, macabre, and always bizarre” history 
of the Atlantic world and the resilient expressive political culture that this chaos and contingency 
cultivated.85  While a picture of George Washington “recalls to mind the American Revolution,” 
a portrait of Thomas Jefferson “brings before the mind in all its scope and strength…the 
Declaration of Independence.”  This ostensibly “unstudied arrangement” leads Ethiop to 
comment on the connections between images, and, more importantly, the mental processes they 
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invoke.  Despite the poignancy of portraits of Washington and Jefferson, it is the portrait of 
Tousaint L’Overture that “carries us forward to the times, when its [the Declaration of 
Independence] broad and eternal principles, will be fully recognized by, and applied to the entire 
American people.”86  This ostensibly “unstudied arrangement” leads Ethiop to comment on the 
connections between images, and, more importantly, the mental processes they invoke.  The 
portrait “force[s] upon” Ethiop’s mind the whole history of the Haitian people, a history that 
invokes for him a future in which the Declaration of Independence might be fully realized, not as 
a product of a specifically white U.S. revolution, but rather as a constitutive element of an 
ongoing hemispheric revolutionary process in which the successful slave revolution offers the 
key to “the sublime idea of freedom.”87  The positioning of the three revolutionaries creates a 
triptych, inviting visitors to provide the narrative between paintings—to fill in the empty spaces 
on the wall. 
At the same time, Ethiop numbers his written entries, suggesting his negotiation between 
the disorder in the Gallery’s layout and his own tendencies as a critic to make sense of and draw 
lessons from it and to report these lessons to his readers.88  Whether or not “The First and the 
Last Colored Editor” or “The Slave Ship” has a physical referent, Ethiop’s translation of the 
images Wilson sets before him constructs an almost novelistic double-voiced discourse between 
Ethiop-the-critic-observer and the painting-object-of-critique, both characters in Wilson’s 
sketch.89  Combined with Ethiop’s meditation on the pedagogical uses of art, we can read his 
sketching as a primer on how to read events in time—past, present, and future.  As I have 
suggested of the sketch as a literary form in the previous chapter, this seeming “whimsicality” 
allowed the writer to refuse neat conclusions in favor of tentative associations in a way that 
resists dominant systems of narration and ordering.90  The gallery’s disorderliness and the 
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provisional quality of Ethiop’s sketching cultivate reading practices that resist the closure and 
timelessness of citizenship’s utopian promise and its attendant amnesias and expulsions. 
Wilson demonstrates the payoff of this reading practice in Ethiop’s sketch of “Mount 
Vernon” where the past and present of slavery haunt grounds sacred to the national mythology.  
George Washington and Mount Vernon’s image were hotly contested precisely because of his 
status as both the “Father of the Nation” and slaveholder.  Mount Vernon, Ethiop muses, “has 
something to do with every spring of the machinery of American society; social, political, and 
religious.”91 Like the ubiquitous Mount Vernon canes “manufactured from some of its decaying 
relics” that “men walk by,” the nation walks by a national mythology propped up by 
Washington’s remains.  Junius Brutus Stearns’s “Washington as a Farmer at Mount Vernon” 
(1851), for instance, features George Washington presiding over a prosperous plantation with 
slaves at work, children at play, and the first President benevolently conversing with what might 
be his overseer [figure 5].  The whole image communicates the continuity between the ideal (and 
ideally dead) Washington and the vision of a nation of virtuous overseers.  Presented just a year 
after the Compromise of 1850, the painting shows the proslavery ideal of the benevolent master, 
but through George Washington, this ideal and the economic system it represent, become 
inextricably linked with the foundations of the nation.92  
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Figure 4:  Junius Brutus Stearns, “Washington as a Farmer at Mount Vernon,” 1851, oil on 
canvas, Virginia Museum of Fine Arts. 
 
 
Reframed in Ethiop’s sketch, however, Stearns’s contented slave returns to haunt the 
grounds, as his descendants remain family property.  Ethiop’s “Mount Vernon” features 
“Decay…written by the Artist’s pencil more legibly than in letters.”93  Paralleling the decaying 
Washington canes, a national crutch, Ethiop shows Washington’s bones weakened by time and 
in the care of slaves—perhaps descendants of those he set free at his death.  As he scans the 
painting, Ethiop comes across Washington’s tomb:  
The first thing that here arrests the eye is the recently dug up coffin of Washington; just 
behind which stands the ghost of his faithful old slave and body servant; while in front, a 
living slave of to-day stands, with the bones of Washington gathered up in his arms, and 
labeled “For Sale” “Price $200,000; this negro included.”  “Money wanted.”94 
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The scene uses the same techniques as “The First and Last Colored Editor,” ancestors from the 
past presiding over the events of the present.  Ethiop’s image literally frames the “corpus” of 
Washington, the abstracted ideal citizen, in the arms of the discorporated black slave, the sale of 
the two amounting to a bargain for a national icon.95  The image recalls Frederick Douglass’s 
sarcastic excoriation of white Americans for relying on the virtues of their ancestors to “excuse 
some folly or wickedness of their own.”96  The image Wilson sets before Ethiop, however, 
suggests that the past had its own “wickedness” in need of covering. 
If the Mount Vernon and Washington of the past could still be invoked for utopic 
purposes, the Mount Vernon of the 1850s confirms Ethiop’s reframing.  Throughout the 1850s, 
Mount Vernon was in dire disrepair.  The Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association set to raising the 
estimated $200,000 (not coincidentally the price of Washington’s bones + slave in Ethiop’s 
sketch) needed to purchase the property from John Augustine Washington, who himself owned 
or employed slaves.9798  But Congress and other would-be supporters, even members of the 
MVLA, were hesitant, if not hostile to the idea of monumentalizing that Mount Vernon, 
precisely because of its present condition.  Discussions about Washington’s home inevitably 
circled back to debates over slavery as either a national institution or a national sin. As Horace 
Greeley writes, “Here we have Mount Vernon transmogrified into a regular slave shamble, 
where human beings are sold out to the highest bidder—the proprietor living on their wages—
until they are returned on his hands.”99  In Greeley’s analysis, Washington’s heirs have defiled 
the idyllic Mount Vernon of the old, “transmogrifying” the utopian ideal into a dystopic 
nightmare (reality), the one a beautiful inspiration, the other a gothic horror.   
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Figure 5:  Eastman Johnson, The Old Mount Vernon, 1857.  Later in the decade, artists like 
Eastman Johnson offered realist paintings Mount Vernon from the perspective of its current 
slaves with the white proprietors conspicuously absent.   
 
 
The AAPG makes visible the aporia that exhibitions at the National Academy of Design 
or the American Art Union and even anti-slavery rhetoric generally covered.  Rather than the 
narrative of decline from utopia to dystopia, Ethiop’s “Mount Vernon” presents narrative that 
negates the binary.  The panorama of past, present, and future images like “Mount Vernon” 
present allows for a sense of time as, to borrow from Achille Mbembe, “an interlocking of 
presents, pasts, and futures, that retain their depths of other presents, pasts, and futures, each age 
bearing, altering, and maintaining the previous ones.”100  If Washington’s image has been 
excised from the present scenes of Mount Vernon slavery, either in attempts to re-appropriate the 
space as national monument or in efforts to maintain Washington’s iconic status, his bones 
remain wrapped in the bargain—or his slaves remain wrapped in the bargain with his bones—
and both Washington and his former slaves, like the First Colored Editor, continue to hover.   
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Even if readers were aware of the inspiration for at least some of these sketches—
portraits of Wheatley, Washington, and Jefferson were in circulation enough—Ethiop’s 
movement through the Gallery and his method of analysis provide models for how they could 
approach objects, those monuments, songs, orations, that worked to consolidate citizenship as 
utopian promise of wholeness.  Images like “Mount Vernon” and spaces like the AAPG 
redistribute the sensible of citizenship, that is, they allow (or force) viewers to see what had been 
covered or deemed unseeable and unhearable (e.g. Washington’s former slave) or to see common 
images (e.g. “The Slave Ship”) from a different angle. Yet, as the next sections suggest, even as 
Wilson uses Ethiop to outline a liberatory aesthetics and to train his readers how to read 
critically, the AAPG series also suggests that even the critic must be wary, lest he or she begins 
to “speak too metaphorically” and loses touch with an ethical responsibility to engage actively in 
the moral world. 
 
5. “Wild Sublimity”:  The Black Forest’s Critical Stance and the Slave Sublime 
The style of Wilson’s sketches changes midway through the series as description gives 
way to dialogue and character development as Ethiop’s role shifts from authoritative chronicler 
to limited narrator and inexperienced sojourner.101  Three characters—Ethiop, Bernice, and 
Tom—form a triptych that parallels the diachronic reflection of “The First and Last Colored 
Editor,” but this triptych also synchronically suggests a range of potential subjectivities or modes 
of critical citizenship.  Wilson moves Ethiop from quietly reflecting on a “beautiful picture,” 
titled “The Black Forest,” in the gallery to “the grandeur and wild sublimity [of the Black 
Forest’s] native landscape” outside of the AAPG, where he encounters Bernice, who holds his 
former master captive.  Ethiop then returns to the AAPG, where Tom, the gallery attendant 
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refuses to allow Ethiop to turn the space into his personal domicile.102  If the utopics of whiteness 
are predicated on “matters of taste” or beauty that close off and police citizenship, the Black 
Forest’s sublimity and each character’s response to it not only model the subjectivity of a critical 
citizen who resists arrest, but also suggest that such resistance carries with it a danger of 
reinforcing the closed structure it was supposed to open.103   
The Black Forest sequence, a narrative arc nested within the AAPG series (no. 3-4) that 
combines gothic science fiction, maroonage, and slave’s narrative, begins with the “gallery 
Boy,” “Thomas Onward,” presenting Ethiop with a portrait of himself (Tom) to hang in the 
Gallery.  A couple of days after viewing Tom’s portrait, Ethiop attempts to sketch “Picture No. 
XI,” “marked ‘The Black Forest’”:  a “landscape painting” of “grand and beautiful scenery, dark 
back ground shadows and the air of profound mystery…pervade[ing] it.”104  While Ethiop is 
“attracted” to the painting, the “beauty…[and the] superior excellence as a Work of Art” of the 
portrait of Tom and the identity of its unknown artist continue to demand his attention.105  Tom 
then presents Ethiop with an invitation:  “Come over to the Black Forest and examine some of 
the pictures and other curiosities there.  Two days journey by stage and by foot for a man, and 
none others are asked!”106 
Refusing to reveal the Black Forest’s exact location—”it is no part of my purpose to 
disclose the precise locality of the Black Forest, nor fully the manner of people dwelling 
there”—Ethiop codes the Forest in terms of maroonage:  the collectives that escaped slaves 
created that constantly threated the stability of slave societies.107  As Carla Peterson has argued, 
maroonage offered antebellum black writers a powerful metaphor for self-determining black 
spaces.108  Though we only meet one resident, we know the Forest’s residents are, if nothing 
else, actively opposing white power.109  Set in the midst of a post-Dred Scott landscape rather 
 233 
than safely framed in the AAPG, the Black Forest symbolically interrupts or intrudes upon the 
surrounding spatial and narrative order: 
a huge mountain forest, whose crest loomed up blacker and blacker as the clouds of 
coming evening rolled up from bellow the horizon.  Here in all its grandeur and wild 
sublimity was the native landscape spread out before me, the same that I saw in beautiful 
miniature but a day before hanging on the walls of our Afric-American Gallery.110  
  
Importantly, Wilson has Ethiop describe the actual Black Forest, but not its image, in terms of 
the sublime, signaling the Black Forest’s opposition to the national symbolic that the AAPG 
critiques.111  If citizenship is determined by its frontiers, that is those it admits and excludes, 
those that are sensible and those that are insensible, then the sublime here functions as a call to 
press against and see beyond those frontiers, those boundaries.112   
Inside the Forest, Wilson pairs Ethiop with Bernice, whom Ethiop describes as “a glory 
to look upon.”  The older man becomes Ethiop’s mentor, a “Gamaliel” to Ethiop’s Paul.113  
While in his “hut” (perhaps an intratextual reference to Blake, which was appearing 
concurrently), Bernice shows Ethiop his workroom, filled with “busts, statues, statuettes; 
landscapes, portraits, fancy pieces; paints, pallets, mallets, chisels; half finished sketches, studies 
in plaster,” and duplicates of Tom’s portrait and the Black Forest.114  The “profusion” of work 
leads Ethiop to realize that Bernice is “the executor” of the paintings he spent so much time 
admiring.  The recognition of Bernice’s artistic genius allays any qualms Ethiop feels about his 
situation, and further links the art in the AAPG to Atlantic world struggles for freedom.115 By 
bringing Ethiop from the contemplation of a beautiful image to an encounter with its sublime 
referent and the artist who produced it, Wilson takes Ethiop through a process of “agitation” that 
attunes him to possibilities made unthinkable, or insensible, in utopian discourses or even within 
the framed images presented in the Gallery.   
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Ethiop spends the day watching Bernice work, until he comes across a tablet, purportedly 
from A.D. 4,000, engraved in “words…curiously spelt by the aid of 41 singular, new and 
beautiful characters.”116  Unable to determine the tablet’s origins, aside from Bernice’s claims 
that it “was dug out of the mountain peak of the Black Forest,” Ethiop wonders if the tablet is 
“fiction…history…[or] prophecy.”117  This text from the future enters the present as an artifact 
of the past, placing Ethiop in a position not unlike the Last Colored Editor, reading a text that 
projects into his future even as it connects him to the past.118 Whether from past, present, future, 
or all three, the tablet jars linear temporalities in a way that opens up narrative space allowing 
Wilson to explore the consequences of Douglass’s link between modern whiteness and national 
degeneracy.119  Ethiop fills the rest of the day translating the text “by dint of hard study,” 
eventually producing a twenty-five-verse narrative detailing the history and demise of “The 
Amecans, or Milk White Race,” who, following the Angry-Saxon trope, destroy themselves “and 
their works” through their own “evil deeds.”120 If antebellum racial science proposed a historical 
and biological telos in which African-descended peoples were inherently inferior and suited for 
enslavement, this tablet, authored by a future people of African decent and found in a space of 
maroonage, read the historical arc of the nineteenth century as indicative of white degeneration.  
Moreover, translating the tablet prepares Ethiop for precisely the kind of question he himself 
asks his readers in February 1860:  “What shall we do with the white people?” 
Wilson takes Ethiop through a series of gothic inversions calibrated to jar him out of the 
sensible of U.S. citizenship, forcing him to think about not only the contradictions within U.S. 
legal code and practice, but also the fact that he is implicated within that system.  Ethiop’s 
peaceful reverie, however, devolves into horror as he confronts in real life the kind of narrative 
viewed only at a remove in the AAPG.  As Ethiop finishes his translation, Bernice invites him 
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deeper into his lair, where he shows Ethiop a scene that makes him fear for “[his] own safety.”121  
Bernice has his former master chained to the wall of a small cell.  Ethiop encodes the transition 
in gothic terms:  “From the artistic, the beautiful and the curious, we had just quitted, an object 
of the most appalling my eyes ever beheld stood before us.  Was it a man, was it even 
human?”122  Felix “lunge[s] for” Ethiop; “he raved, he shirked, he tor his hair,” yelling 
“imprecations,” but only the word “Bernice” was intelligible.  “A stout heart only saved” Ethiop 
“from petrification on the spot,” and he begins to lose confidence in his host.123   
Seeing Bernice’s captive produces a moment of horror that lasts only until we hear 
Bernice’s narrative.  Then Ethiop sees his logic.  As Bernice explains, the man had held 
Bernice’s wife and children “as property” until he sold them.  Sometime later, Bernice continues, 
“the wretch blew” his remaining son’s “brains out without provocation and without warning.”124 
Bernice eventually escaped, coming to the Black Forest where he “acquired” the man through 
secret means and where the man will remain as until his death.  Through the exchange between 
Ethiop, Bernice, and Bernice’s captive, Wilson takes readers through a sublime response:  initial 
horror triggers a reflective reason that bridges the fissure between the sensible and the 
supersensible, that is between the “sensible” limits of white citizenship, as illustrated in 
McLean’s appeal to taste, and the order of judgment invoked in Bernice’s actions.125    
The scene works initially through conventions of gothic doubling:  the slaveholder has 
become the captive and the slave has become the dispenser of justice, reversing the narrative of 
law and order and national wholeness presented in Burns’s rendition.  “Felix” and Bernice  
conversed much and freely.  [Felix] spoke of the wrong done him; I spoke of mine.  He 
spoke of his wife and children left behind.  I reminded him of the sale and separation of 
mine….  He plead [sic] earnestly for his rights.  I told him he had no rights that I was 
bound to respect….  I was now the master and he the slave.126   
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Bernice’s invocation of justice, in the language of Justice Taney’s majority opinion, silences 
Felix’s pleas and Ethiop’s qualms alike.  Much like the fugitive slave, whose testimony counted 
little in court, Bernice’s master can only beg “for liberty” or death’s release.  This engenders 
contempt, not pity—contempt for the former master, contempt for the system of laws that 
supported him, and, most of all, contempt for Northern complicity in maintaining these laws. 
Bernice offers no chance for redemption, sympathy, or repentance.  With such an image, the 
tablet’s account of the “Amecans” becomes all the more plausible.   
If the gothic of slavery “bound and violently silenced” black bodies, this moment of the 
unbound black subject conversing “much and freely” inflicts an equal amount of violence against 
Felix’s whiteness (and Ethiop’s moral judgment) in a way that transforms the master into a 
condemned criminal.  The “common sense” of Bernice, the black speaker challenges the 
constraints of what the putative wholeness of white citizenship codifies as visible, audible, and 
thinkable.127  Faced with the injustice of Bernice’s former master’s actions and the horror of 
what Bernice has done to him in retribution, Ethiop appeals to “law, redress, justice &c.”  
Bernice, however, forestalls Ethiop’s recourse to law for consolation.  “‘Laws!’” Bernice 
“exclaim[s] almost frantic” in response, “‘Law!!’ What laws, what justice is there for the 
oppressed of our class?  What laws except to oppress them harder?  What laws except to pursue 
and rob them from cradle to the grave, yea even beyond both.”128  The “law,” Bernice reminds 
Ethiop, is on Felix’s side: it allowed him to dispose of Bernice’s family and that same law would 
free Felix and authorize him to re-enslave Bernice and to enslave Ethiop if possible.   
Wilson’s gothic doubling and Ethiop’s response to it offer critical purchase on the “very 
real, pressing historical forces and the contradictions inherent in them,” allowing Wilson to 
expose the fissures within the surrounding political and moral order.129  As Teresa Goddu argues 
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about a similar scene of slavery and punishment in Letters from an American Farmer, “the 
gothic discourse of decay and degeneracy ruptures…[an] Enlightenment vision of balance and 
order” so that the “idealized fable” of law and order and beautiful union “cracks under the weight 
of history.”130  Rather than mend this crack in the narrative of law and order with a utopian 
narrative—effectively leaving the crack intact, but disguised—Wilson’s reversal (now a former 
slave binding his white former master as a black spectator looks on) constructs a narrative that 
keeps the crack open and in view, despite even Ethiop’s attempts to reconcile it.  The moment in 
the cave is a litmus test:  Ethiop could remain in the gothic mode, afraid of Bernice and the 
implications of his actions because Ethiop’s judgment, his sense of possibility, cannot expand 
beyond the closures of the state and its laws.  Or, realizing he has nothing to fear in Bernice, 
Ethiop could “discover within” himself “a capacity for resistance of quite another kind,” as Kant 
usefully frames it, and leave with an expanded consciousness.131  
Bernice’s entire hut—his paintings, sculpture, the technologically advanced door system, 
the tablet, even Felix as a captive—seems geared towards validating Bernice’s judgment and 
bearing witness to the supersensible of the slave sublime, a space in which the unthinkable and 
unrepresenatable of enslavement and its aftermath can be staged.132  The sublimity of the 
sequence, coded in gothic terms, stems not from the sight of Felix, but rather from Ethiop’s 
reaction to the deeper political, economic, and social implications of Bernice and the moral 
world that necessitates a space like the Black Forest.  That is, the moral force of the fugitive 
slave and the spaces of maroonage, not the white master, trigger the initial fascination and horror 
that initiates Ethiop’s judgment of the sublime.  At scene’s end, his confidence in his host 
restored, Ethiop reflects that he “too now regarded” Felix as a “wretched fiend.”133  The Black 
Forest, as maroon colony, disrupts chains of communication that would condemn Bernice (or 
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Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey) as a threat to national stability and calls on critics like Ethiop 
not only to point to such breaks, but also to recognize his embeddedness within those chains.134  
Despite Ethiop’s new understanding, the sequence and Ethiop’s gothic-coded response 
present several problems for developing critical citizenship.  First, caught between the horror of 
what Felix has done to Bernice and the horror of Bernice’s retribution (despite his 
understanding), Ethiop’s narration stops. “The pressure of other engagements” pull Ethiop away 
from the hut and “events of the passing hour require” him to halt his descriptions and to write 
“something else for [his] readers.”135  Ethiop, like Crevecoeur’s Farmer James or Douglass’s 
Listwell, leaves the Black Forest for more comfortable surroundings, offering an abrupt return to 
the relative safety of the Gallery.  The Fourth Paper, the last installment of the Black Forest arc, 
ends with “To be continued”; the Fifth Paper begins with Ethiop back in the gallery. While his 
last sketch was numbered 14, his next sketch is numbered 19, suggesting that either something 
should be there, but Ethiop has not or cannot write it down, or that the scenes in Bernice’s hut 
were supposed to be numbered, but they exceeded Ethiop’s ability to organize them.  Ethiop 
reaches an impasse that Wilson does not force him to navigate, leaving readers to fill in the space 
between installments, just as visitors to the AAPG fill in the interpretive space between 
paintings.  The gothic, even as it provides a discourse through which Ethiop can articulate the 
slave sublime, facilitates Ethiop’s retreat.  By telling the story through the gothic mode Ethiop 
contains it.136  He can see the justice in Bernice’s actions even as he is horrified by their results 
and implications.  He can present its radical take on law, while keeping it contained in Bernice’s 
“hut” with all the other wonders found in that “place of mysteries”137   
Second, it’s not that Bernice’s actions are too fantastic for Ethiop to grasp, but rather that 
Ethiop can too easily distance himself from their implications by framing them as pictures.  
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Hence, the Black Forest is a “Picture Outside of the Gallery,” and Ethiop jokes about an 
encounter with slave catchers in the stage on the way to the Black Forest, aestheticizes them 
“two portraits that ought to be hung up.”138  Ethiop glibly notes the prospect of capture:  “I 
prepared myself…and should have summary work with them, had a hand to hand encounter 
taken place, just such as fugitives should make in a like case.”139  While showing his approval 
for violent resistance to recapture, Ethiop also separates himself from the imminent danger an 
actual fugitive would have faced—he is a metaphorical stand-in for the fugitive, and his “case” is 
a simulation.  Ethiop’s adventure on the stage allows him to observe and describe in detail two 
specimens of “genuine American stock,” and his intellectual “route” of them disabuses the men 
of “the assumed or imagined mental superiority of white men.”140  Despite moments of danger 
when “fingers began to twitch and pistols move from their places,” the scene demonstrates the 
potential power of Ethiop’s critical perspective, the voice of “a common sense black [man]” 
causing the white men to shrink in chagrin, their superior arms notwithstanding.  The three part 
ways at the depot, the slaveholder and the slave catcher continuing their hunt without Ethiop’s 
taking actions to actually “hang” them or impede their progress.   
Yet, as Bernice notes in his discourse on the law, Ethiop was never that safe.  He may 
have routed the men intellectually, but Bernice’s story about his son’s murder and texts such as 
Solomon Northup’s 12 Years a Slave, narratives of free black men taken as slaves, tell of the 
physical threat Ethiop faced, the legal and political power that was against him.  Ethiop’s 
encounter with Bernice and Felix—his encounter with a man who actually took justice in his 
own hands and punished the criminal outside and against the confines of constitution or law—
places Ethiop’s previous conversation with the slaveholder and slave catcher and musings about 
who ought to be hung up in sharp relief.   
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Ethiop’s state of mind upon returning to the Gallery suggests that even as the space and 
images in the AAPG give him critical purchase for deconstructing narratives of white 
citizenship, it also allows Ethiop to become too comfortable in an aestheticized world of 
memory.  The space itself and its art can only foster a critical sense; it cannot, in itself, do the 
work of critical citizenship.  After the Black Forest, readers find Ethiop siting in his “big 
armchair” to “take in the beauties and excellences of Pictures No. XIX and XX, “Preaching and 
After Preaching,” and No. XXI, “A Head of Phillis Wheatley.”  The paintings lead Ethiop to 
think about other instances of the slave sublime, including praise for “the Margaret Garners who 
rather than their babes even shall clank a chain, prefer to send them up to their God who gave 
them.”141  As Ivy Wilson and John Ernest have differently argued, these images crystalize the 
connection between art and radical resistance outlined in Bernice’s narrative.142  When not 
sketching, however, Ethiop’s mind returns to Bernice and he experiences “such a storm of 
choloric [sic] feeling as will serve for all of life to come.”143  For consolation, Ethiop reminisces 
about “the days when Banneker lived and told of the stars and of the rising suns, and Wheatley 
sung their praise to listening worlds.”144 Ethiop’s reflections provide a useful instance of 
liberation historiography—informing his readers, readers of the AAM, about a history of 
resistance, artistic and violent, and reminding them of their own revolutionary potential—but it 
also stops his returning Bernice’s imprecations against present-day law, a critique also embedded 
in the allusion to Margaret Garner.145 
Third, the Fifth Paper reveals that perhaps Ethiop learned the wrong lessons from the 
Black Forest:  he attempts to turn the AAPG into his personal enclave, mirroring the Black 
Forest’s exclusivity.146 A central problem with the “Black Forest” sequence is that it risks, and in 
some ways does, reproduce the systems of power it could potentially upend.  Only those invited 
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can enter the Black Forest, and Bernice, or maybe the Forest itself, only grants men entry.  
Ethiop displays a similar attitude towards the AAPG, despite his advertising its contents through 
his sketches.  Even before the Black Forest sequence, Ethiop, despite his regular column 
describing its art, was thinking about the AAPG as his space, speaking in a conspiratorial “we” 
of “our secret.—Our pleasant hiding-place, where we have so often and so long shut ourselves 
from the blast and chill of the world,” and mourning the loss of “the luxury of solitude.”147 He 
continually refers to the Gallery’s visitors as “intruders”—after Gallery patrons interrupt his 
reflections, Ethiop asks Tom “to bar it against all further intruders”—perversely reproducing 
Douglass’s 1854 sense that law and custom had made him and black citizens seem intruders.148  
More ominously, as work on maroon societies and in geographical studies reveals, spaces 
like Bernice’s Black Forrest and Ethiop’s Afric-American Picture Gallery offer tactics that can 
fit within the spatial strategy of citizenship without disrupting its overall structure—sometimes 
strengthening that structure instead.  Spaces like the state conventions constantly risk serving the 
very strategies they mean to disrupt, as they become static locations of officiousness and the 
accepted location for black agency.  Black citizenship can thrive as long as it remains within this 
space without appreciably affecting the surrounding civil society; indeed, that society, as in the 
case of minstrelsy can actually turn acts of resistance into comedic performance. These narrative 
moments and spaces allow readers to elide their counter-hegemonic implications in their 
representation of figures not embraced in the national imaginary (American Indians, African 
Americans, women, Catholics, etc.), because the overall narrative gives them an “authorized 
placement.”149 
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6.  Young Tom:  The Critical Citizen as Doorkeeper and Trickster 
The preceding sections unpacked the internal logics of Wilson’s “Afric-American Picture 
Gallery” as an exploration of spaces and practices that cultivate critical citizenship.  Ethiop’s 
sketching within the Gallery allows him to propose an alternative framework for mapping a 
critical civic imaginary with a taste for understandings of citizenship outside of what whiteness 
makes sensible, while his trip to the Black Forest exposes the dangers of critical projects 
becoming disconnected from political reality and the operations of power.  Yet, in both 
instances, Ethiop neglects two principles of citizenship I’ve outlined in previous chapters, 
neighborly contact—the meetings between strangers that foster horizontal civic exchanges 
outlined in Jones and Allen’s Narrative—and circulation—the free movement of civic power 
among a diverse citizenry.  By neglecting these principles, Ethiop short circuits the power his 
critical sensibility could offer, reproducing the proprietary closures his work was meant to 
prevent. 
Young Tom, the third image in Wilson’s Ethiop-Bernice-Tom triptych, embodies the 
critical citizen-subject, the “Anglo-African” in circulation, who refuses to be pinned down and 
refuses Ethiop’s (and perhaps Bernice’s) debilitating isolation.  Ethiop introduces him in 
mythological terms as a “brown-faced boy,” a “shrewd little rogue,” not an “Old Tom…nor an 
Uncle Tom, nor a Saintly Tom,” but rather “a real live Young Tom, up to all conceivable mischief 
and equal to all emergencies.”150  Of Tom’s origins, Ethiop writes: 
though he has seen all of life…one would scarcely conclude that this boy has come down 
to us through nearly three hundred years of hard trial….  He was almost whipped into 
existence, whipped into childhood, whipped up to boyhood.  He has been whipped up to 
manhood, whipped down to old age, whipped out of existence.151 
 
In contrast to the stability of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom, Wilson’s Tom calls to mind 
trickster-like narrators such as Henry Bibb, “who was whipped up,” and Harriet Jacobs, who 
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creatively uses space and language to gain freedom.  Yet, Tom is not “able to remember a tithe 
of the hard things done to” him.  He instead represents constant renewal: a youth who has come 
“out of…mountains of dust and ashes without one bit of sackcloth upon [him]…fresh, smiling 
and free.”152  This is not to suggest that the “nearly three hundred years” have disappeared.  
Though his body does not show the marks of his past, the lifetimes of experience have made 
Tom “a shrewd little rogue.”153  In short, Tom’s life encompasses the history of the Afric-
American as palimpsest, generation overlaying generation as in the image of “The First and the 
Last Colored Editor” and the Black Forest tablet.  Tom’s youth signals that this history offers 
regenerative possibility.  He has avoided Ethiop’s preoccupation with that history and Bernice’s 
gothic revenge plot, distilling the lessons of the past without becoming trapped by their traumas.   
Tom completely disregards Ethiop’s requests to bar the door to the Gallery, refusing 
Ethiop’s distinction between himself and “intruders.”  In the process, Tom reintroduces 
neighborly contact into the narrative, keeping the Gallery accessible and its critic in public 
circulation.  After “three weeks’ barricading the doors of the” Gallery following his trip to the 
Black Forest, Ethiop finds solace in the “justness” of his sketches and memories of the past.  But, 
a loud rap at the door [brings him] to a sense of the present moment and to [his] feet. 
Wondering who the intruder might be that dared to thus disturb [him], [Ethiop] bade him 
enter.  It was Tom—yes, Tom, with a package of letters in his hand….  Somehow or 
other, there was a wicked twinkle playing about the corners of his usually wicked little 
eyes...154 
 
Tom’s intrusion, suggestive of Douglass’s stance in Chicago, agitates Ethiop, bringing him out 
of the kind of celebration of the past that Thoreau critiques in “Slavery” back into the present 
and to a standing position.  Indeed, often intrudes at crucial junctures throughout the series, 
brining Ethiop “to a sense of the present moment,” forcing him to move.  Earlier in the series, 
“our little brown-faced boy in attendance,” brought in two patrons, who leave Ethiop “bothered 
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and puzzled.”155  The encounters compel Ethiop to articulate the AAM’s and the Gallery’s overall 
mission, thus anchoring his historical sketches to present concerns and the continued building of 
political communities.  “These pictures, as a whole,” he tells a “colored lady,” who visits the 
Gallery on a faultfinding mission, “serve as simple reminders of what the people of color were, 
now are, and will yet be.  What they have gone through, are going through, and have yet to go 
through.”156  By bringing Ethiop in contact with contentious visitors “without paying heed to” 
Ethiop’s “embarrassment,” by agitating him into outlining the Gallery’s critical mission, Tom 
forces Ethiop to confront competing interpretations, to think about his work in the Gallery as a 
public process, and to engage with that public as a critic even when he would rather brood. 
As the Gallery attendant, the doorkeeper with the power to bar or allow entry to the 
Gallery, Tom represents the free play at the heart of the Gallery that makes Ethiop’s sketches 
possible and the principles of contact and debate that activates its critical project.  Tom’s eyes 
twinkle, we discover, because “the little rogue had been operating on his own hook” in Ethiop’s 
absence, “pointing out the Gallery to the various magnates around for his own special 
amusement,” including a “doctor… and the Professor…, and the Philosopher with him; and a 
little lady in black, and a tall lady, and a fat lady, and a strange nice lady from abroad,” the litany 
continuing with others “some queer ones…a crusty old gentleman, (white)…and two colored 
gentlemen.”157 Tom has mischievously orchestrated a site of contact where strangers moving 
about the Gallery engage in “free, characteristic, and remarkable” conversation, covering a range 
of issues from the condition debate and economic citizenship to “The First Colored Convention.”  
Members of the “strange” assemblage, a microcosm of activist and professional circles, 
challenge each other and Ethiop to think beyond disciplinary confines or social backgrounds. 
Picture No. 26, “Condition,” a painting of a “colored youth,” “face marked with ignorance and 
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the indifference of stolid content” and “surrounded by abject wretchedness,” sparks a debate 
among them about if or how “such a subject” could “be improved.”158  The Doctor describes the 
problem in terms of “nature,” an abstraction that “meant nothing,” Ethiop notes, but carried 
weight because it was delivered from “so high an authority, and so deliberately.”  The 
Philosopher, in turn, “entered upon a learned dissertation, upon the nature of the world in 
general, and our poor little ‘Condition’ in particular,” but ends even further away from concrete 
answers than the learned doctor.159  Ethiop interjects, hoping to bring the debate to a more 
material grounding:  “the youth’s condition, not his nature…demands change.”  Ethiop’s 
“impetuosity” in responding results in further debate, however, now about solutions for changing 
“condition.”  The “lady from abroad,” chimes in suggesting reform programs:  “let the light of 
culture beam upon him” to change his “moral and religious state” followed by “wealth” to 
change his material condition, and, she posits, “you place beneath him a power, and put in his 
hands a force, that will be felt throughout the entire ramifications of human society.”160  The lady 
“had such a neat way of putting her propositions, that it was not an easy task to disturb them 
without risk.”  That is, between protocols of politeness and the rhetorical force of her 
articulation, the lady would seem to have settled the debate, but again, without articulating 
exactly how such a change could occur. 
Despite the silence of the Doctor, the Philosopher, and even Ethiop, “an old lady, who 
had hitherto been a quiet spectator,” warns against the group’s falling victim to “metaphorical 
veils.”  “You are not understood,” she exclaims, pointing out that they have abstracted the image 
and its problematic to the point of incomprehensibility and immobility.161  Here, the arrangement 
of the Gallery works in tandem with the chaos of contact as the woman calls the group’s 
attention, somewhat inadvertently, from “Condition” to “Farm Life in Western America,” a 
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landscape painting covering the wall and showing an active community living out, not 
coincidentally, the project of economic citizenship Ethiop outlined in Douglass’s Paper earlier in 
the decade.  Through discussing the image, the old lady dismantles the doctor’s argument about 
biology and giving material purchase to the lady’s similarly abstract appeal to reform:  “Colored 
folks farming!!” the old woman exclaims,  
Now here are colored folks farming for themselves; and don’t their grain grow as well as 
if they were white; and don’t it sell as well….  Here is a colored man tending his own 
mill; and is not the flour as white as any other?  and are not all the town, white and 
colored, running to procure it?   
 
“Away with your metaphorical, metaphysical nonsense,” she admonishes the group, “and give 
them plenty of wherewith to do with, and they may wear their color without let or hindrance.”162  
While Wilson plays at least part of the old lady’s discourse for humor—she speaks in dialect, 
and her critique comes from her mistakenly thinking the group was talking about “Farm Life,” 
not “Condition”—her ostensibly plain language, perhaps a performative echo of Sojourner 
Truth’s “Aren’t I/Ain’t I a Woman Speech,” disturbs the group’s disciplinary siloes and 
ideological commitments in a way similar to Tom’s disturbance of Ethiop’s solitude.   
Regardless of intent, the woman, now sitting in Ethiop’s “good old Gallery arm-chair,” 
changes the nature of the conversation, and gets the group moving in a direction that eventually 
ends at Picture No. 27, “The First Convention,” an image of the 1830 Convention of People of 
Color held in Philadelphia.  Their movement through the Gallery tracks one path for black 
political agency from the “abject wretchedness” of “Condition” to the economic citizenship in 
“Farm Life,” to the politics of the state and national convention movements, suffused throughout 
with critique:  interruptions, intrusions, and agitation.  The way Wilson produces these intrusions 
and Ethiop’s inability to fully manage them suggests the importance of a degree of intrusiveness, 
of mischievous contact, to the project of critical citizenship and public discourse.  The woman’s 
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interjection in the conversation, and the conversation more broadly, the Doctor’s leveraging of 
his authority notwithstanding, demonstrates the kind of horizontal, democratic exchange, that is 
the critical sense, Ethiop finds lacking in U.S. civic discourse.   
By introducing elements of neighborly contact and circulation into the Gallery, Tom 
changes the way Ethiop and his readers encounter the images it contains, now as a public 
conversation rather than solitary writing or reading exercise, and how knowledge is produced 
from them. We might think of this Tom as the Picture Gallery’s version of Esu, the “god of the 
crossing” or “gateway god.”163  As Heather Russell explains, Esu is a tricky shape shifter not 
necessarily because his form changes, but rather, because “he shifts the shape of received 
knowledge” in a way that represents the epistemological challenge of the “African Atlantic 
subject.”164  Rather than utopian consolation, Tom suggests instability, restlessness, and a 
willfulness that keeps the spatial and temporal location of citizenship fluid, un-circumscribed.  
Tom doesn’t necessarily oppose boundaries as such; he is, after all, the doorkeeper.  Rather, the 
young trickster, like Communipaw’s Whitewasher, works to keep those boundaries permeable 
and dynamic, to insure passage between space and subject positions.  In contrast to Bernice’s 
narrative of maroonage, Tom offers a delinquent story, one that, following Rancière, lives “in the 
interstices” rather than the margins “of the codes that it undoes and displaces.”165 Instead of a 
counter site, Tom’s movements and critical sensibilities—his willful disobedience and insistence 
on creating contact and on his own free circulation—calls into question the management or 
attempted framing of all the sites he touches. Tom activates the methodology of critical 
citizenship, living in a constant state of revolutionary becoming and connecting histories, 
institutions, and peoples from a stance that takes such disruptive connections as a normative 
political practice necessary for democratic citizenship.  We can see Tom’s ethic at work in the 
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Free African Society’s negotiation between official and unofficial civic spaces, the black state 
conventions’ leveraging of print circulation to change the constitution of the sovereign people, 
and Smith and Wilson’s sketched debates in Douglass’s Paper.   
Tom provides the link between Ethiop, Bernice, and the world their work seeks to 
engage; however, like Wilson’s triptych of Jefferson, Washington, and L’Ouverture, or the AAM 
itself, no single character gives the whole image of critical citizenship.  The three—Bernice, 
Tom, and Ethiop—form a collective subject, a collective sense of who the critical citizen is and 
what the critical citizen does.  Like the articles in the AAM, they are at odds with each other—
Ethiop’s unease with Bernice’s revenge set against Tom’s intrusions in the Gallery, and 
Bernice’s challenge to Ethiop’s critical judgment—even as they work together, the one keeping 
the impulses of the other in check.  They, outside of Bernice’s holding his former master captive, 
do not do anything with the white people, as such.  Instead, they challenge the tendency to freeze 
structures of citizenship, to suture its cracks with consensus myths, such that critique becomes 
relegated to its content rather than its framing.  In so doing, the magazine and the AAPG model 
the tensions within both the single critical citizen and, as importantly, within a state that 
cultivates critical citizenship, not in order to resolve such tensions, but rather to maintain them as 
what the people can now see as a beautiful, if still arduous process of citizenship.   
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the stability of slave economies.  As Carla Peterson has insightfully observed in her reading of Frances Ellen 
Watkins’s Jane Rustic series, the core functions of maroonage—constituting places of refuge “by limiting contact 
with the dominant society, negotiating with it on favorable terms, establishing their own core values, and creating 
their own forms of government and cadre of leaders”—“applies as much to populations of escaped slaves in the 
seventeenth-century Brazilian wilderness as it does to northern free black sin the nineteenth-century United States; it 
is the foundation of black nationalist thought” (196-197).   Baker on the New Negro: “represents a unified 
community of national interests set in direct opposition to the general economic, political, and theological tenets of a 
racist land.  The work is, in itself, a communal project, drawing on resources, talents, sounds, images, rhythms of a 
marooned society or nation existing on the frontiers or margins of all American promise, profit, and modes of 
production” (77).  See Baker, Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 77.  Alvin O. Thompson, Flight to Freedom: African Runaways and Maroons in the Americas (Kingston: 
University of the West Indies Press, 2006), 13.  See also Peterson, “Literary Transnationalism and Diasporic 
History:  Frances Watkins harper‘s ‘Fancy Sketches,’ 1859-60” in Women’s Rights and Transatlantic Antislavery in 
the Era of Emancipation, ed. Kathryn Kish Sklar and James Brewer Stewart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 196-197; and Ernest 312. 
66 See Ernest, Liberation, 2-4 and 306-313; and Heather Russell, Legba‘s Crossing:  Narratology in the 
African Atlantic (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 2009), 3. 
67 Ernest, 301. 
68 As Toni Morrison posits of American literary traditions, “the fabrication of an Africanist persona is 
reflexive; an extraordinary meditation on the self; a powerful exploration of the fears and desires that reside in the 
writerly conscious” (17).  While Morrison was referring specifically to how white writers used Africanist presences, 
I think it also applies to Wilson and Watkins’s relation to their pseudonymous characters, Ethiop and Jane Rustic.  
The characters allow the two to work through the problems and possibilities of their own lived experiences.  See 
Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992). 
69 The AAPG numbers 27 of the pictures, but several distinct images are not numbered. 
70 Liberation Historiography, 325.  It is no coincidence that Ernest concludes the final chapter of Liberation 
Historiography with an extended analysis of Wilson’s “Afric-American Picture Gallery,” which, according to 
Ernest, makes the AAM a “masterful example of collective history” (321).  John Ernest has already identified within 
this series an “aesthetics of liberation” capable of “accounting for the dynamic relations among artistry, history, and 
community.” My discussion of the series builds on Ernest’s concerns with the relation between aesthetics and 
historiography.  See Liberation Historiography 321-328.  
71 “Of Other Spaces,” 25. 
72 “Afric-American Picture Gallery Number 1,” AAM, 1.2 (February 1859), 53. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Rushkin, Modern Painter, 383. 
75 See the essays in William H. Gerdts and Mark Thislewaite’s (eds.) Grand Illusions:  History Painting in 
America (Fort Worth:  Amon Carter Museum, 1988) and Patricia M. Burnham and Lucretia Hoover Giese’s 
Introduction to Redefining American History Painting (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
76 “Afric-American Picture Gallery.—Second Paper,” AAM 1.3 (March 1859), 87. 
77 Ibid., 87.  On the traditional status of history painting as educative, see Thistlethwaite, “The Most 
important Themes:  History Painting and Its Place in American Art” in Grand Illusions, 8-21.  
78 As Ernest observes, the gallery offers “not a singular story but a gallery of many stories, connected by a 
complex narrative of experience and by significant silences that push against and through that collective experience” 
(328). 
79 As Houston Baker has argued, “critical memory compels the black intellectual…to keep before his eyes 
(and the eyes of the United States) a history that is embarrassing, macabre, and always bizarre with respect to race.  
The clarity bestowed by black critical memory is painful.  It is terrible lucidity, casting dark light on a deeply 
troubling racial idea” (Critical Memory 10).   
80 “Afric-American Picture Gallery,” 53. 
81 Ibid., 53-54. 
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82 Ibid., 54.  As Ernest aptly puts it in Liberation Historiography, “if one wants a quick overview of the 
conventional features of African American history from the early slave trade to the brink of the Civil War, one could 
get more from these fictional sketches than from most of the textbooks used in K-12 schools” (322). 
83 See Ernest 324-325. 
84 “Afric-American Picture Gallery,” 53. 
85 Baker, Critical Memory 10.  See also Ernest, Chaotic Justice.  In The Reaper’s Garden:  Death and 
Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery (Cambridge:  Harvard UP, 2008) Vincent Brown argues against a literal 
reading of Orlando Patterson’s “social death” to suggest that the enslaved and racially oppressed continually resisted 
death, and that this resistance compelled them to “to cultivate important features of social life” (5).  Brown 
continues, “Just as the Grim Reaper arrived to gather the harvest at the end of the life cycle, he also sowed the seeds 
of social renewal.  Death was as generative as it was destructive” (5).  The juxtaposition of images in the picture 
gallery, particularly the first shift from the slave ship to the editorial chair offers a vivid example of this movement. 
86 “Afric-American Picture Gallery—Second Paper,” AAM, 1.3 (March 1859), 87. 
87 William Wells Brown, The Black Man, 229. 
88 He also observes on several occasions that the Gallery should be better organized, suggesting that 
pictures 5 and 6, “The Underground Railroad,” should be split.  The depiction of the South (before) in picture 5 
placed on the South side and number 6, a depiction of the North (after), placed on the North.  In his appeal to artists 
to contribute to the Gallery, Ethiop also promises, “we will be sure to assign it to its appropriate place,” asserting his 
own authority over the space.  See AAPG, 53 and 54-55.  Later in the series, Ethiop sketches pictures that are 
already numbered, suggesting the Gallery’s organization is more in keeping with other New York galleries and 
catalogues, but these numbers don’t seem to correspond with where the pictures are in the Gallery.  “The Slave 
Ship,” picture number 1, is on the South side of the Gallery, while “The First and the Last Colored Editor,” picture 
number 2, is on the North side.  For a slightly different account of the gallery’s numbering scheme, see Ivy Wilson, 
Specters of Democracy:  Blackness and the Aesthetics of Politics in the Antebellum U.S. (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 156-157. 
89 Wilson endows Ethiop with the authority and distance of a critic who offers, following Oscar Wilde, to 
“translate into another manner or a new material his impression of beautiful things” for his readers.  Oscar Wilde, 
“Preface,” Portrait of Dorian Gray.  As Kevin Lamb suggests of Oscar Wilde’s work, criticism “transforms the 
practice of translation…into an ongoing aspiration, which assumes its own activity as the basis for self-innovation.”  
Kevin Lamb, “Foucault’s Aestheticism,” Diacritics 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 52.  See also Ivy Wilson, Specters, 
158. 
90 See Squibbs, “Civic Humorism and the Eighteenth-Century Periodical Essay,” ELH 75, no. 2 (Summer 
2008),  389.  
91 AAPG, 88 
92 Maurie D. McInnis has argued that the “painting emphatically reminds viewers of the enforced 
agricultural labor of Washington’s slaves, but it does so in a way that suggests slavery was a benevolent and natural 
institution” (89). 
93 “Afric-American Picture Gallery—Second Paper,” AAM, 1.3 (March 1859), 88. 
94 “Afric-American Picture Gallery—Second Paper,” AAM, 1.3 (March 1859), 88.  For a discussion of the 
implication of Mount Vernon in larger debates over slavery see Maurice McInnis’s “The Most Famous Plantation of 
All:  The Politics of Painting Mount Vernon” in Landscape of Slavery:  The Plantation in American Art, eds. Angela 
D. Mack and Stephen G. Hoffius, (Columbia:  University South Carolina Press, 2008), 101. 
95 See Russ Castronovo, Necro-Citizenship:  Death, Eroticism, and the Public Sphere in the Nineteenth-
Century United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 3; Nelson, National Manhood, 204-205. 
96 “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” Frederick Douglass:  Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. 
Philip S. Foner (Chicago:  Lawrence Hill Books, 1999) 193. 
97 Linda Ayers, “‘Their unfailing friend” Edward Everett and the Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association,’ A 
Paper Presented at the Annual George Washington Symposium,” Mount Vernon, Virginia, November 8, 2003; 
McInnis, 105. 
98 Ayers, 4.   
99 Qtd. in McInnis, 101. McInnis’s reading of Johnson’s work, particularly his 1857 “The Old Mount 
Vernon” suggests that Johnson’s paintings are ambivalent towards the anti-slavery cause, but also presents a radical 
shift in how artists treated Mount Vernon:   “Mount Vernon had for decades served as the symbolic embodiment of 
Washington and the virtues he represented.  Now the dilapidated buildings referred instead to the unhealthiness of 
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the institution” (107-109).  Later in the decade, artists like Eastman Johnson offered realist paintings Mount Vernon 
from the perspective of its current slaves with the white proprietors conspicuously absent. 
100 See Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 16. In referencing 
Mbembe, I do not mean to suggest that Ethiop borrows directly from West African traditions, but rather, I join 
scholars like Russell, Mbembe, and Edward Glissant in thinking about how black Atlantic writers used formal 
aesthetics to break, in Russell’s words, “traditional or canonical social contracts” (2).  In many ways Ethiop’s 
imagery looks forward towards the postmodern instances of haunting, pastiche, and bricolage in the works of Toni 
Morrison, John Edgar Wideman, and Octavia Butler. 
101 Schiller, “Concerning the Sublime” in Essays By Friedrich Schiller, 79. 
102 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” April 1859, 103; Schiller, “Concerning the Sublime,” Essays By 
Friedrich Schiller, 79. 
103 My understanding of utopics as policing citizenship builds on Jacques Rancière’s notion of policing as 
dividing communities into groups with the rules that govern the presupposition of who is visible within such a 
community, that is who can form the political community that creates citizenship.  See The Politics of Aesthetics:  
The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. by Gabriel Rockhill (New York: Continuum, 2006). 
104 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” April 1859, 101. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” April 1859, 101.  These “last independent polities from European 
colonial rule,” served as a refuge for African descendants in slave societies and as a constant threat to the stability of 
slave economies.  Thompson 13.  See also Peterson, “Literary Transnationalism,” 196-197; and Baker, Modernism, 
77. 
108 See Peterson, 190, 196. As Peterson argues, maroonage in this sense also paradoxically highlights the 
“fundamental homelessness of blacks in the new world,” providing temporary respite from the ravages of the 
dominant society (196-197).  This sensibility also animates Singh’s analysis in Black is a Country.   
109 Like the “Anglo-African” Magazine, the Black Forest’s blackness comes not necessarily from the color 
of its looming landscape, but rather from the political project it represents.  Where the art in the gallery recalls a past 
purposefully forgotten as a project in, to borrow from Ernest, “liberation historiography,” the sublimity of the Black 
Forest not only invokes a critical stance vis. the present—against the national structures that, despite their critique, 
Ethiop’s images work within—, but also actively disrupts the wholeness of the putatively white land from that 
stance. 
110 Ibid., 103. 
111 The sublime, following Kevin Hetherington, “make[s] use of the limits of our imagination, our desires, 
our fears and our sense of power/powerlessness.”  It taps into that part of us that allows us to think about that which 
we cannot know/understand through established channels of understanding, ultimately opening new imaginative 
vistas. Hetherington, The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering. (London: Routledge, 1997), 40.   
112 On spaces and ways of seeing the world within the African Atlantic traditions that disrupt linear notions 
of time and memory in a way that, following Russell, offers “a radically empowering space in which to define,” see 
Russell 14-15, 68; Gilroy, Black Atlantic, 196-197; and Mbembe, 14-17. 
113 Ibid., 103. 
114 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” June 1859, 173-174. 
115 Wilson and Delany seem to be developing the same type:  the revolutionary artist/former slave. 
116 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” June 1859, 174.  This tablet might be a reworking of the Poe’s 
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, which comes from a long dead African civilization or possibly Joseph Smith’s 
golden tablet. 
117 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” June 1859, 174. 
118 The tablet’s generic indeterminacy would seem to discredit the tablet’s contents or, at the very least, any 
reader’s ability to properly frame and interpret its text.  However, this generic question, posed just after referring to 
it as a challenge to the professional discourses of History, Ethnology, and literary history (or the history of the book) 
highlights the interconnectedness of the three (fiction, history, prophesy) three discourses, suggesting their mutual 
indeterminacy as equal parts fiction, history, and prophesy. The text creates an “absolute break with traditional time” 
and a reader’s ability to judge a text’s value as history, contemporary report, or oracle.  See Foucault, “Of Other 
Spaces,” 26.   
119 On the “Angry-Saxon” trope, see Bay, White Image, 109.  As Bay observes, “Brutal, arrogant, and 
selfish,” the Angry-Saxon was the “violent, domineering, and overly materialistic” foil to the Anglo-Saxon myth. 
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120 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” June 1859, 174.  For a more detailed reading of this tablet see Ernest, 
Liberation Historiography, 322-323.  Again, Ethiop offers an alternative to the specter of race-war Jefferson raises 
in Notes on the State of Virginia. 
121 Ibid., 174. 
122 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” June 1859, 176. 
123 “Afric-American Picture Gallery,” June 1859, 176.   
124 “Afric-American Picture Gallery,” June 1859, 176. 
125 As Matthew Cordova Frankel argues using Jefferson’s Notes, the sublime in a Kantian sense can 
function a dialectical movement from awe and rapture to harmony that mirrors the interplay between national and 
local interests, between actual and virtual representation, in the republican citizen.  Frankel explains:  “It is only 
through the sublime…that each new American subject may experience nature’s moral and institutional prescriptions 
as a single interior command, which, once complete, translates the psychic demands of citizenship into an 
aestheticized moment of surrender” to the state (709-710).  Yet the moral imperative embedded in the sublime is not 
fully aligned with the ethical implications of virtual representation. Matthew Cordova Frankel.  “‘Nature‘s Nation‘ 
Revisited:  Citizenship and the Sublime in Thomas Jefferson‘s Notes on the State of Virginia,“ American Literature 
73, no. 4 (December 2001), 695-725.  In contrast to Jefferson’s sublime, I offer Ethiop’s sublime as a perspective or 
“attunement” in Kant’s words that maintains the disharmony.  I focus on the sublime here as producing a sense of 
agitation that leads to and is symptomatic of critique:  not an end, but a method and a means of not only judging 
other means, but (as reason) determining which ends are worth while.  
126 “Afric-American Picture Gallery,” 177. 
127 Morrison, Playing in the Dark, 39; Goddu, Gothic America, 132. This wholeness is predicated on its 
ability to bind individuals to police the uses of space and language through self-reinforcing narratives of law and 
order, as in the Anthony Burns case, or through recursive myths of continuity, as in the fugue S.S.N. outlines.  
Wilson’s gothic doubling offers critical purchase on what Toni Morrison has called the “very real, pressing 
historical forces and the contradictions inherent in them,” allowing Wilson to expose the fissures within the 
surrounding political and moral order.  See Reid-Phar who argues that heterotopias reveal “that myths are not 
hermetically sealed ‘truths’ or even self-consciously fashioned ideologies, but, on the contrary, nodes of 
communication, or formulae, that work to support ‘common’ sense notions of right and wrong, native and foreign, 
self and other” (347). 
128 “Afric-American Picture Gallery—Fifth Paper,” July 1859, 177. 
129 Morrison, Playing, 24. 
130 Goddu, Gothic, 13. 
131 For Kant, sublimity in nature is contingent on whether or not the subject can face the unimaginable, 
threatening scene (the waterfall, for instance) without feeling threatened, without fleeing, physically or emotionally, 
in fear.  In judging something sublime, the subject recognizes his or her physical powerlessness, but more 
importantly, the subject finds within his or her mind an expanded critical consciousness that “calls forth our 
power…to regard those things about which are we are concerned (goods, health and life) as trivial and hence to 
regard its power…as not the sort of dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it 
came down to our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment.”  Kant, Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
145-145. 
132 By “supersensible,” I follow Kant’s division between the sensible—those phenomena that experience 
can account for and that fit under the jurisdiction of understanding, the beautiful, objectivity, and consensus—and 
the supersensible—those phenomena, like the sublime, for which experience has not yet or may never provide a 
frame.  In literary studies, this binary generally appears in discussions of sensibility and legibility.  See Critique, 
524.  For Gilroy, music serves the purpose of communicating the unspeakable of the slave sublime.  Wilson, 
however, foregrounds the ability of the visual arts to represent what writing cannot.  I think Wilson and Gilroy come 
at the same problem from different directions, and both use the position of critique to “translate” if not the exact 
meaning, then the ethos and philosophy, of these utterances.   
133 “Afric-American Picture Gallery—Fifth Paper,” July 1859, 176. 
134 Versions of this type of narrative abound throughout the corpus of African American writing, from 
Richard Allen and Absalom Jones’s yellow fever account, to David Walker’s Appeal, to Harriet Jacobs’s use of 
sentimental conventions.  In each instance, the narrator normalizes the perspective of the oppressed in a way that 
highlights the “peculiar” nature of her surroundings. 
135 AAPG, Fifth Paper, July 1859, 216. 
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136 As Goddu’s reading of Wright’s selling newspapers suggests, the gothic becomes a part of the national 
imaginary in a way that supports rather than subverts its boundaries.  See Gothic, 1-2. 
137 AAPG, Fifth Paper, July 1859, 216. 
138 Ibid., 102. 
139 Ibid.,102. 
140 Ibid., 102.  The exchange fits within a tradition following texts like Daniel Coker’s “A Dialogue 
Between a Virginian and an African Minister” (1810), which features an intelligent black man catching a supporter 
of slaveholding or a slaveholder (typically Virginian) unawares. 
141 AAPG, Fifth Paper, July, 217. 
142 Ernest, Liberation, Chapter 5; Wilson Specters, 158-160.  
143 AAPG, Fifth Paper, July, 217. 
144 AAPG, Fifth Paper, July, 217. 
145 Note:  Ohio judge decided federal fugitive slave law had supervening authority over Ohio state law, 
which would have protected the Garners, as state citizens, from re-enslavement. 
146 Ironically, Thoreau summarized Ethiop’s choleric mood in his 1854 assessment of reactions to the 
Anthony Burns trial:  “Suppose you have a small library, with pictures to adorn the walls- a garden laid out around- 
and contemplate scientific and literary pursuits and discover all at once that your villa, with all its contents is located 
in hell, and that the justice of the peace has a cloven foot and a forked tail- do not these things suddenly lose their 
value in your eyes?”  See Thoreau, “Slavery in Massachusetts.” 
147 AAPG, Second Paper, 89-90. 
148 See, for instance, AAPG, Second Paper, 89-90; and AAPG, Fifth Paper, July, 217. 
149 Indeed, as Berlant notes, scenes like the Black Forest can become negative images upon which the 
National Symbolic could be made stronger.  See Berlant, Anatomy of a Nation, 54-56; Andrew F. Wood, “Managing 
the Lady Managers: The Shaping of Heterotopian Spaces in the 1893 Chicago Exposition‘s Woman‘s Building,” 
Southern Communication Journal 69, no. 4 (Summer 2004), 291. 
150 “Afric-American—Third Paper,” April 1859, 100.  
151 “Afric-American Picture Gallery—Third Paper,” 100.  Ethiop’s description of Tom echoes those of 
slave narrators like Henry Bibb and William Anderson, both of whom claim to have been “whipped up.” 
152 “Afric-American Picture Gallery.—Third Paper,” 100.   
153 Ibid., 100. 
154 AAPG, Fifth Paper, July, 217. 
155 AAPG, Second Paper, 89-90. 
156 AAPG, Second Paper, 90. 
157 Ibid., 215, 219. 
158 AAPG, Sixth Paper, August, 244. 
159 AAPG, Sixth Paper, August, 244. 
160 AAPG, Sixth Paper, August, 244. 
161 AAPG, Sixth Paper, August, 244. 
162 AAPG, Sixth Paper, August, 245.  She echoes “Sidney’s” remonstrances during the 1840 debate over 
the first NY state convention:  he accuses the collective of “metaphycising upon things, when they should be using 
the resistless energy of principle, to vindicate their wronged and deeply injured brethren.”  “William Whipper’s 
Letters,”  The Colored American, March 13, 1841. 
163 Legba’s Crossing, 9-10. 
164 Ibid, 9-11.  See also Gates, Signifying Monkey, xx-xxi and 19-22.  
165 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 139.  Subjects like Tom “form…uncertain communities that 
contribute to the formation of enunciative collectives that call into question the distribution of roles, territories, and 
languages.  In short, they contribute to the formation of political subjects that challenge the given distribution of the 
sensible.  A political collective is not, in actual fact, an organism or a communal body.  The channels for political 
subjectivation are not those of imaginary identification but those of ‘literary’ disincorporation” (40).   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION:  CONSTITUTIVE STORIES OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
 Throughout Black Theories, I have analyzed how black writers theorized citizenship as a 
matrix of practices—neighborliness, political participation, economic participation, and 
critique—with distinct ethical imperatives, critical sensibilities, and stylistic concerns.  These 
practices cultivate and are cultivated through permeable civic spaces, free contact amongst a 
diverse citizenry, and the even circulation of civic power.  I began with James McCune Smith’s 
account of how a young African named John’s resistance to white supremacy aboard a ship 
catalyzed a wider defense of equality.  The young man’s refusal to succumb to another man’s 
violent attempt to enforce racial hierarchy resulted in a change in the ship’s composition, the 
people themselves refusing the “cankerous” prejudice that, for Smith, had become the 
concomitant of U.S republicanism.  When the passengers “dub” John the “belt of the ship,” they 
were recognizing not only how their actions created a new space, but also a change in the very 
spirit of the ship, one that is less a fulfillment of U.S. republicanism and more a rebuke of its 
practices.  If Smith originally calls our attention to the ship (an object) as symbol of the genius of 
U.S. institutions, the end of his narrative foregrounds the generative power of the people 
themselves and John’s active fight as republican citizenship’s central dynamo.   
 By way of conclusion, I turn to Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s fiction in the Anglo-
African Magazine between 1859 and 1860, as an exploration of the constitutive stories that could 
ground all other citizenship practices and sustain a prolonged battle for emancipation, even if, or 
perhaps especially when, violent conflict seemed not only imminent, but also necessary.1  
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Watkins’s “Fancy Sketches” and “Triumph of Freedom—A Dream” in particular offer an 
overview of black political rhetoric and citizenship practices from the past decades, analyze their 
grounding ethos, and argue that they should be focused through the fight against enslavement 
and the greater dissemination of freedom.  This focus emphasizes the connection between black 
civic life and emancipation highlighted in Jones and Allen’s call for an emancipatory 
“experiments,” and it animates northern vigilance committees, Watkins’s own calls to cultivate 
an ethics of “common defense,” and Charles Henry Langston’s 1851 proclamation:  “I would 
vote under the United States Constitution on the same principle…that I would call on every 
slave, from Maryland to Texas, to arise and assert their liberties, and cut their masters’ throats if 
they attempt again to reduce them to slavery.”2  Where Narrative offers an ethics of 
neighborliness that creates fellow citizenship through real sensibility and contact, and the black 
state conventions and the Anglo-African Magazine model the kinds of critical-intrusive and 
circulatory practices that work to distribute power evenly and to keep civic spaces permeable, 
Watkins’s short fiction connects the citizenship practices I’ve outlined throughout Black 
Theories to John’s initial self-defense, suggesting a reciprocal relation between anti-racism, 
histories of slave revolutions, and the everydayness of parlor conversation.  
 
1. Fancy Sketches of Black Activism  
 Frances Ellen Watkins, born in Baltimore, MD, in 1825, had become a fixture on the 
anti-slavery and reform lecture circuit by the 1850s.  Over the decade she’d also published two 
editions of Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects (1854, 1857).  Perhaps best known for her poetry 
and post-Civil War work, including the novel, Iola Leroy or, Shadows Uplifted (1892), Watkins 
regularly contributed poetry (“Truth”), essays (“Our Greatest Want”) and fiction (“The Two 
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Offers,” “Fancy Sketches,” and “The Triumph of Freedom—A Dream”) to the Anglo-African 
Magazine during its run from January 1859 to March 1860.3  Before her marriage to Fenton 
Harper in 1860, Watkins also made regular contributions to the National Anti-Slavery Standard, 
Liberator, and Weekly Anglo-African.   
 The “Fancy Sketches” series began appearing in the November 1859 issue of the Anglo-
African Magazine, and the series appeared regularly until the Magazine’s final issue in March 
1860. There were five “Fancy Sketches” in all, the first two set just before a wedding reception 
in “the city,” the final three set in the country home of Jane’s aunt.  While the Anglo-African 
never attributes “Fancy Sketches” to Watkins directly—it appears under “Anonymous” in the 
table of contents and by “Jane Rustic” in each issue—Watkins is almost certainly the author.  As 
Carla Peterson notes, the series takes up themes and character types from “The Two Offers” 
(September and October 1859) and Watkins later published “Fancy Etchings,” another sketch 
series appearing in the Christian Recorder from 1871 to 1874, that uses similar thematic and 
structural elements, particularly the “device of parlor conversation among an aunt, her niece, and 
their visitors.”4  The characters also take up the theme of education from “Our Greatest Want,” 
one character describing it in precisely those words:  “I think our great want… is a proper 
education.”5  Moreover, because Watkins did publish work in the AAM under her own name, her 
use of a pseudonym for “Fancy Sketches” does not necessarily indicate a need to mask her 
gender or some other aspect of her identity; rather, on the level of character “Jane Rustic” 
communicates the “plain-speaking” critical sensibilities of a “country girl who,” not unlike 
Ethiop’s “old woman” and Thomas Onward, “relies on her wit and political acumen to spark 
debate among the supposedly more sophisticated city folk.”6  By writing pseudonymously 
Watkins was also connecting her work to a community of black pseudonymous writers dating 
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back several decades that included Sarah Forten, who wrote as “Magawisca” in the Liberator, 
Smith’s Communipaw, Wilson’s Ethiop, and others writing for Frederick Douglass’s Paper and 
the AAM.  Put somewhat differently, by explicitly writing in the sketch form and using a 
pseudonym in the AAM, Watkins was inviting readers to read “Fancy Sketches” as a part of the 
same thought-world and literary tradition as Ethiop’s “Afric-American Picture Gallery” and the 
sketches I analyzed in Chapter 4. 
 Despite these generic and thematic similarities, however, “Fancy Sketches” differs from 
Wilson’s “Afric-American Picture Gallery” in several important ways:  1) Watkins situates Jane 
Rustic among a black middle class rather than an interracial collection of strangers, and most of 
the action happens in parlor spaces rather than a public gallery or on urban streets.   
2) Jane is much more aligned with Tom than Ethiop in the sense that she is literally an orphan 
(her parents are dead), who seems slightly outside of whatever group she happens to become a 
part of, often interrupting conversations already in progress with questions, prodding as a kind of 
gadfly.7  3) If the “Afric-American Picture Gallery” critiques a utopian promise of white 
wholeness, “Fancy Sketches” deconstructs the “metaphorical veils” of those black citizens whose 
class, gender, and geographical privilege allow them to discuss anti-slavery and reform activism 
as idle “chit-chat,” those who have convinced themselves that the immediate threat of racial 
violence (both physical and structural) is too remote to require anything more than abstract 
speculation.  Instead, the series argues for the cultivation of a “home culture” that could help 
prepare black citizens for what Watkins sees as a siege on “Freedom” in the present and a greater 
conflict in the future.8   
 In the first installment, “Chit Chat, or Fancy Sketches,” Jane attends a wedding where 
attendees rehearse the kind of tactical debates I discuss in previous chapters.  All angles are 
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represented—black aristocracy, violent revolution, emigration, education and reform, etc.—but 
sapped of an impulse towards action or sense of urgency.  The first speaker echoes accords in 
black state conventions and periodicals:  ‘“Give us wealth,’ said he, ‘and that will give us 
position; white men will court our society, and gold, though yellow will be the most potent 
whitewash we can find.’”9  Other speakers include “emigration friend,” “a dark-browed and 
enthusiastic speaker” who argues that he “would have our race live out their own individuality, 
and build up their own character”; a man “whose fair complexion scarcely showed his identity 
with the negro race” arguing for “staying and fighting it out”; and “an impetuous youth who was 
a good soldier when there was no battle to fight.”  The whole exchange reads like a well-
rehearsed play or, in Jane’s words, “so much buncombe,” not because of the augments 
themselves, but because the group has manufactured a stance of helplessness and detachment.10  
The youth pledges to support the slave “if he will only throw down his sugar knife, cast away his 
cotton hook, and strike for liberty.”11   This last comment elicits a “mischievous” response from 
Jane; she “did not feel any fear of soon seeing” the man’s “wife widowed by his sleeping in a 
martial grave, a martyr to the cause of negro freedom.”  Jane’s intrusion in the conversation 
exposes both the patriarchal attitudes of a man who does “not think it worth while to combat” her 
critique and how such men use talk of rebellion as a scapegoat for their lack of activity, shifting 
attention from their own complacency to slaves who, they argue, have not yet made efforts on 
their own behalf.12  The argument, however, is undercut by the man’s incompetence and 
hypocrisy:  he calls for slaves to throw down the very objects—”knife” and “cotton hook”—that 
would help them in their “strike for liberty,” and, as Jane observes, “several fugitives had been 
taken from [their] State,” without his lifting a finger.  
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 While the characters are apparent caricatures, the whole scene nevertheless offers a 
potent warning that contemporary activists risk replicating this vacuity if their focus becomes too 
insular and disconnected to actual events.  Watkins’s point here is not which strategy—wealth, 
education, rebellion, emigration, etc.—is more viable; Jane never quite takes a side, though she 
seems least satisfied with the emigration option.  Rather, “Fancy Sketches” is concerned with 
exploring a tradition of black political thought and activism and those practices that could 
maintain the connection between rhetoric and practice even when a sheen of comfort had been 
achieved.  This conversation could have been lifted out of convention proceedings, newspapers, 
or country parlors; and these were precisely the arguments filling the pages of Thomas 
Hamilton’s Weekly Anglo-African, the Anglo-African Magazine’s weekly counterpart.  Many 
prominent black activists—Mary Ann Shadd Cary, Martin R. Delany, Frederick Douglass, Henry 
Highland Garnet, James McCune Smith, and Watkins herself among others—were taking part in 
feverish debates about the future of black citizenship and activism.  Was emigration (selective or 
en masse) the answer to full citizenship and emancipation, and if so, to where?  Did the crisis 
over the election of Abraham Lincoln signal an impending resolution, whether political or 
violent, and what role should black citizens have in bringing about this resolution?  How could 
black citizens best support the efforts of escaped and escaping slaves?   
 “Fancy Sketches” mirrors this debate, but frames it as the chatter used to fill the time and 
show off rather than the kind of discussion characteristic of critical citizenship.13  These were 
people who, Jane observes, preferred lamplight to sunlight “as if gas-light were an improvement 
on sunshine.”14  They take concern for “the race” as a fashionable badge of philanthropy, 
observing the forms of past civic practices, but stopping short of their disruptive possibilities.  
And yet, the ease with which they produce this debate and its very ubiquity offers a warning that 
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current activists, if they are not careful, risk becoming, in one observer’s words, a “disgrace,” too 
focused on their own “wrangling and bitterness” to attend to the needs of the communities they 
purport to represent.15  They risk observing the form of critical citizenship—just as a lamp gives 
the form of light—without realizing of its substance.  Jane’s critique of the company’s empty 
rhetoric recalls neighborly citizenship’s challenge to those trading in the rhetoric of respectability 
and reform to “do all the good” they can, in Narrative’s terms, for their “fellow suffering 
mortals.”16  The people making up Watkins’s weding party neither recognize slaves or “the 
colored people” more generally as moral equals nor do they think about their concerns as 
proximately related to their own.  Talking about the impediments to improving the “condition of 
our people” is sufficient to prove their credentials.17    
 
2.  Catalyzing Action:  Parlor Room Agitation 
 Despite the potential for stagnation, Watkins finds value in the parlor and “chit chat” as a 
space where theories and practices of citizenship could be discussed and disseminated as an 
active and evolving intellectual tradition.18  “Fancy Sketches” and “Triumph” feature sequences 
and valorize resistance (violent, if required) through references to the aesthetics of the sublime 
and its production of “agitation.”  Similar to Wilson’s “Black Forrest” sequence, “Zombi, or 
Fancy Sketches” (February 1860), points to the “thrillingly sublime” courage of those who 
fought against enslavement as models not only for “negro courage,” but also for civic practice.19  
These examples of “negro courage,” including “that Tennessee hero” who “received 750 lashes, 
and died” because he would not betray an escape plan and “stories of Margaret Garner, of Aunt 
Sally, of Toussaint L’Ouverture, of Denmark Veazy [sic], of Nathaniel Turner…and others,” 
provide the ethical center of Watkins’s narrative landscape, constitutive stories that could give 
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purpose to the “intellectual acquirements” and wealth Jane finds among her friends and family 
and the apathy Watkins senses among her readers, but without the debilitating isolation found in 
Wilson’s sketches.  Jane makes an argument for “Zombi” as a constitutive narrative for the 
whole of African America and those fighting for greater freedom—a community that is sieged by 
an ostensibly overwhelming force and from which, in Jane and Ballard’s view, sacrifices on 
multiple fronts will be required.   
 Watkins introduces “Zombi” as a part of a conversation about “negro courage” and 
education between Jane, her cousin, Miranda, and Mr. Ballard, a student who is presumably 
courting Miranda.  It is an account of an actual fifteenth-century South American maroon 
society, the Palmares, led by Zumbi.20  After helping the Portuguese defeat the Dutch, explains 
Ballard, the former slaves refused to “[lay] aside the implements of war for the badges of 
slavery” and “constituted a nation under the name of the Palmerese [sic].”21  The society 
prospered for over two decades, growing to over twenty thousand.  When Portuguese armies 
finally attacked them, Zombi and his compatriots hold them off until their ammunition and 
provisions run out and Portuguese reinforcements arrive.   While many of Palmares’s citizens 
were captured and enslaved, the nation’s leaders “resolved not to be taken alive” and instead 
leapt to their deaths.22   
Ballard links the development of maroon communities in the Atlantic world to free black 
communities in the U.S., juxtaposing Zombi’s rebellion to cultivating a “well-directed home 
education” and broader “home culture” to the masses of black people, a project that, Jane 
observes, “may need more true courage and fortitude than the battle-field calls for.”23  The 
connections are stronger than they appear on first reading.  This connection, as Peterson has 
argued, provided a “foundation of black nationalist thought” throughout the century, and it 
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intensified during the 1850s and early 1860s.24  Ballard’s description of how the Palmares 
“formed a government” and “placed stockades[,] not knowing how long they would be permitted 
to live unmolested it was necessary to provide for the common defense,” speaks to a sense of 
being under siege that Jane registers her contempt for black men who “can put on pretty little 
aprons with showy rosettes, and march amid the darkness of the Dred Scott Decision, over the 
very streets where the trembling fugitive is dragged back to bondage.”25  It’s not that Jane 
condemns the parades as such.  For nominally free black citizens to parade in the streets would 
be laudable as a spatial practice, a display of community solidarity and even an act of 
intrusiveness in certain contexts given the history of white violence against them.  But, like the 
conversation at the wedding party, they seem a misplaced use of resources for the political 
exigencies of the post-Dred Scott era, especially if an equal measure of support cannot be found 
for vigilance committees and uplift more generally.  Jane’s frustration leads to a call for black 
citizens to rethink the efficacy of traditions like parades and everyday politics more broadly in 
the context of a more dangerous political terrain.  “Peace has its tests of valor as well as war; 
and,” Jane concludes;   
if I hear a colored man boast of what he would do in the event of an insurrection, and yet 
not brave enough to identify himself with the colored people, but shrinking from social 
contact with them on account of their ignorance, poverty and social disadvantages….[if 
such a person,] is not brave enough to battle with them in freedom…then I am not sure 
that he will be courageous enough to risk his life for me in slavery.26  
  
Practices in freedom—the kind of civic infrastructure that neighborly, economic, and critical 
civic practices can foster and the kind of engaged citizenship the wedding party lacks—create the 
bonds and material support through which the collective could make larger scale changes.     
The choice of Palmares over Haiti is also significant in the context of emigration and the 
history of republican governance in the hemisphere.  Peterson observes that focusing on 
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Palmares signals not only Watkins’s opposition to emigration (a sentiment she shared with her 
cousin, William J. Watkins), but also an uneasiness with Haiti’s “tragic history of degeneration,” 
an uneasiness shared by her contemporaries in the U.S., including James T. Holly’s conclusion 
that the nation showed none of the necessary “elements of morality and industrial progress.”27  
Moreover, as one of the earliest models of republican governance in the hemisphere—older than 
Brazil, the United States, and Haiti—Palmares represents ground zero for the tradition I have 
been examining throughout Black Theories—one based in “equal laws” and “equal rights” with 
“no hideous slave-code” to compromise its institutions.28   
Yet this tradition is not one filled with triumphal victories; rather, it offers the sobering 
forecast of uncertainty and hard work registered in Watkins’s letters and fiction for the AAM 
over these months register as a preoccupation with the power of sacrifice and making meaning 
out of losses, especially in the wake of John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry on October 16, 
1859.  The resultant recapture of many of its citizens also serves as warning for free black 
citizens, a warning about the precariousness of their position, the ease with which allies can 
become enemies, and the destructive potential of white supremacy and imperial avarice more 
generally.  Zombi’s ending with suicide and enslavement makes Palmares both an inspiration 
worth celebrating, on the order of the Battle of Thermopylae or siege of Carthage, and a dire 
warning about the persistence and nearly overwhelming force of “the fell spirit of destruction.”29  
Indeed, Carthage provides an apt point of comparison for Jane as she wonders if her 
contemporaries “would be willing, like the women of Carthage, to sacrifice” their jewels “for the 
good of their race” against, again, a destructive European force.30 Watkins echoes these 
sentiments in “An Appeal for the Philadelphia Rescuers,” a call to support those who attempted 
to rescue Moses Horner in June 1860:  “Let the hands of toil release their hold upon their hard-
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won earnings, feeling that there is no poverty like the poverty of meanness, no bankruptcy like 
that of a heart bankrupt in just, kind, and generous feelings.”31  
Both Jane and Ballard suggest that the circulation of such narratives in conversations and 
in print could contribute, not towards and immediate uprising, but rather towards “the gradual 
uprising and improvement of the masses.”  The telling of “Zombi” initiates a sublime response 
for Miranda, but in contrast to Ethiop’s encounter with Bernice, her response affirms action and 
retelling, rather than isolation and (generic and physical) containment.  The narrative “stir[s]” 
Miranda’s “soul” so that she vows “to be an active worker, and not an idle spectator” to which 
Jane responds:   
Now, I tell you, Miranda, one thing we can do, we can do it ourselves and try and enlist 
others in the same work, and that is to try to sustain the “Anglo-African.”  It is on of the 
most welcome papers that reaches me, and I want it to live….  I want the Anglo-African 
to live at least as one of our monuments.  I have the first volume, it was presented to me 
nicely bound, and it forms one of the valued books of my small library.  I would like to 
see that book bound in the houses of our people, and kept in existence as something to 
stimulate our young people to an interest in their improvement and progress.32  
 
Aside from the explicit plug for the struggling magazine (several are sprinkled throughout 
“Fancy Sketches”), the passage configures the parlor as a space for cultivating a revolutionary 
consciousness:  receiving the AAM as a gift book (advertised in multiple weeklies and in the 
December issue of first volume) adds to her “small library,” which contains or perhaps binds the 
word to a project of people-building, as a monument to and living agent in the creation of an 
Anglo-African (America), starting with the education of children.33  We can read Jane’s “small 
library,” then, as a generative node of democratic discourse and action that maintains the force of 
the slave sublime through print and oral traditions.34 
 The process of monumentalizing the Anglo-African is less about the object itself and 
more about the set of practices required to create such a monument:  the active binding, keeping, 
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and transmission of the text as a part of larger project involving the demolition of slavery and its 
infrastructure.  Indeed, the second, unquoted, Anglo-African suggests a slippage between the 
preservation of the printed word (“Anglo-African”) and the perpetuation of the Anglo-African as 
critical method and as a productive conceptual framework for people-buiding.  Jane’s parlor, 
then, resonates with the conditions of maroonage that Wilson explores in the “Afric-American 
Picture Gallery” but is infused with practices of contact and circulation that not only connect 
maroon space to maroon space, but also focuses them outward, between generations and into the 
broader body politic.35  The entire scene works to foster the mode of reading and responding 
characteristic critical citizenship, rather than “idle spectatorship,” as a part of the fabric of 
everyday life in the parlor conversations among friends and potential lovers, stories passed on as 
a precious gift, and the foundation that would ground all other pursuits.36  
  
3.  Freedom Ascendant 
 “The Triumph of Freedom—A Dream,” Watkins’s other short story in the 1860 volume 
of the Anglo-African, illustrates in mythological terms the agitational process Jane and Ballard 
witness in Miranda, connecting their conversation to contemporary events—including attempted 
fugitive rescues and John Brown’s raid on the federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry—and, at the 
same time, providing context for the ethical deployment of violence.  “Triumph” appeared in the 
January issue of the AAM (the same issue as “Home Influences, and Negro Courage, or Fancy 
Sketches”) and is perhaps better known than “Fancy Sketches” because it appears in A Brighter 
Coming Day: A Frances Ellen Watkins Harper Reader.  The story draws heavily from Watkins’s 
correspondences during the months preceding Brown’s execution, and it reflects her ecounters 
with fugitive slave rescue attempts, both successful and unsuccessful.  Through the series of 
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events in “Triumph,” Watkins maps how the sublime encounter catalyzes the movement towards 
structural change.   
 In brief, the first-person narrator falls asleep and has a vision in which she is guided to 
the altar of a goddess in “ robe of flowing white” that upon further inspection “was not pure 
white,” but had “great spots of blood” all over it.  As the narrator and her guide watch priests 
attesting to the goddess’s righteousness and attempting to cover these spots with passages from 
sacred texts, a young man “his face pale with emotion and horror,” calls out: “‘It is false.’”  
Guided by this young man, we discover that the foundation of the altar is filled with and 
supported by “piles of hearts laid layer upon layer,” including “the hearts of a hundred thousand 
new-born babes,” “the hearts of desolate slave mothers, robbed of their little ones,” of crushed 
manhood, of “young girls, sold from the warm clasp of their mothers’ arms,” and of “hearts in 
which the manhood has never been developed.”37 Again, Watkins, like Wilson, turns to the 
sublime, describing the man’s initial word as “sublime in its brevity,” and the subsequent 
demonstration as so powerful that it unleashes “the spirit of Agitation,” the mental processes 
associated with critical citizenship.  Even as the goddess calls for her priests to hide her “beneath 
[their] constitutions and laws” and “beneath the shadow of [their] pulpits,” Agitation pierces 
“into the recesses of her guilty soul,” and she “tremble[s] before its searching glance.”38  The 
sublime figure and Agitation pursue their audiences, exercising the politics of disruption and 
circulation that, as with the telling of “Zombi,” provide a direct call to action, this time on the 
mass scale for which both Jane and Ballard advocate.39  A second, “aged” man then appears with 
“gray hair float[ing] in the air,” leading a group of men attempting to overthrow the goddess.  
“[A] blood-stained ruffian, named General Government,” however, arrives to defend her, and the 
man and his companions are imprisoned and hanged.  The goddess’s “minions” then “[drain] the 
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blood from his veins,” but the blood, “like the terrible teeth sown by Cadmus…woke up armed 
men to smite the terror-stricken power.”  The story ends with this army unseating the goddess 
and enthroning Freedom in her place.40  After the conflict, the bodies of the man and his 
followers become “stepping-stones of Freedom to power,” figured as both monument to their 
heroism and support for the next phase in the revolution. 
 In the context of “Fancy Sketches” and Jane and Ballard’s call for a mass movement with 
enduring monuments, this imagery contributes to the larger narrative of common defense and 
sacrifice Watkins outlines in “Zombi” and other installments.  Importantly, though the old man is 
perhaps the story’s central figure, “Triumph” develops in several stages—critique to agitation to 
action to critique, and so on—that recall Miranda’s response to “Zombi,” and the final 
enthronement of Freedom depends on the “freemen” who go into battle against “hoary forms of 
gigantic Error and colossal Theory” with “fresh vigor” even as enslaved men “burst their 
chains.”41  In contrast to Blake, which imagines a plan for fomenting slave rebellion in some 
detail, “Triumph” sketches the kind of collective ethos needed for radical change.  Though the 
actual overthrow happens almost spontaneously from both ends—free and enslaved people rising 
up simultaneously—it is the result of an accretive process of consciousness rasing and 
contingency.   If “Zombi” provides historical grounding for Watkins’s calls for greater vigilance, 
and “Fancy Sketches” more broadly offers frameworks for applying disseminating this model in 
everyday practice, “Triumph” looks forward to what might happen as a result of these 
cumulative efforts in the hopes that the penultimate resolution might be close at hand.42   
 Indeed, “Triumph” takes on a tone of prophesy that was not lost to readers who could not 
help but connect the old man to John Brown, as accounts of his failed raid and subsequent trial 
consumed periodicals, including the Anglo-African Magazine.43  Indeed, Watkins’s description 
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of the aged man reproduces language from her letters to Brown and others that appeared in the 
Weekly Anglo-African and the National Anti-Slavery Standard.44  Watkins praises Brown and his 
company for having “rocked the bloody Bastille,” and she suggests that their “bodies may be 
only her [Freedom’s] first stepping stones to dominion.”  Watkins uses similar language in a 
December 9, 1859, letter published in the National Anti-Slavery Standard:   
Virginia has sacrificed that dear old man who laid his hands upon the bloody citadel of 
American slavery and shook the guilty fabric to its base; shall not, my dear friend, his 
blood be a fresh baptism of freedom, his grave a new altar where men may record more 
earnest vows against slavery?45   
 
Brown becomes a Christ-figure whose execution creates a “new altar,” a new civic ethos upon 
which men and women like Miranda might construct more active or “earnest” citizenship 
practices.  Like Jones and Allen’s “real sensibility,” Watkins’s “more earnest vows” calls on 
citizens to dedicate themselves to Freedom not simply as an ideal or article of faith, but rather as 
a “common cause” that compels them to action.  For Watkins, the raid on Harper’s Ferry shook 
the nation’s constitutive documents—the “fabric” (paper) upon which citizens had written its 
civic narratives, in a way that might create the impetus for a greater moment of revision.  It 
reproduces on a national scale John’s resistance on the Caledonia.  Where citizens “so fresh, 
from the baptism of the Revolution” could frame a Constitution that would “permit the African 
slave trade,” “the dark intent of the fugitive clause,” and the spread of “cankerous prejudice,” to 
return to Smith’s journal, citizens receiving the “baptism of freedom” would author a new 
compact.46 
 The metaphor of baptism is apt, not because Brown, Watkins’s old man, or any single 
person delivers the people, but rather because he is a part of a chain of citizens and texts that 
inspire the people to deliver themselves, to practice citizenship as an expression of neighborhood 
without the limitations on human rights Douglass notes in 1854.  Even as Watkins invokes 
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physical violence, a clash between humans and Titans (Error and Theory), former slaves and a 
colonial power (Palmares and Portugal), John Brown and the government, however, she also 
uses a Christian typology (the narrator recalls John of Patmos and the old man recalls a Christ 
figure) that frames the penultimate war as “not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, 
against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in 
high places.”47  Put somewhat differently, by using narrative formulas from classical mythology, 
historical slave rebellions, and Christian tradition across a series of texts, Watkins produces a 
pragmatic, a common ethos of resistance and vigilance for and multi-modal response to the 
complicated, chaotic, and dour outlook at the start of the 1860s.  While “Zombi” and “Triumph” 
evoke a sense of grandeur, “Fancy Sketches” grounds their ideals in everyday practice.  “This is 
a common cause,” Watkins writes to William Still in 1859, “The humblest and feeblest of us can 
do something,” and, “Fancy Sketches” suggests, this work of everyday, active citizenship 
requires its own degree of courage.48 
 Through these stories, Watkins organizes the theories and practices of citizenship I’ve 
outlined in previous chapters—the urgency of critical citizenship, the black state conventions’ 
emphasis on structural change and participatory politics, and the street-level protocols of 
responsibility and responsiveness outlined in Narrative and the Communipaw-Ethiop debates—
around a collective project of wholesale structural change, from “home culture” to the 
Constitution.  Her insistence on maintaining the link between theory and practice, between form 
and substance, gets to the heart of the story Black Theories set out to tell, a story about how 
black writers in the early United States imagined citizenship as an expansive set of actions 
calibrated not only to distribute power evenly among a diverse citizenry in freedom but also to 
use this power to liberate those in slavery.   
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 And yet, the seeming intractability of white supremacy and avaricious self-interest 
combined with narratives of loss outlined throughout this project points to the difficulty of 
making citizenship work along these lines and of keeping faith in a political system that, as 
“Triumph” graphically details, enshrined a goddess founded on and materially supported by the 
heart and blood of others.  With no way of knowing that South Carolina would secede from the 
Union in December 1860, that the states would be at war the following year, or that birthright 
citizenship would eventually become the federal standard, Watkins and others nevertheless offer 
a vision of what citizenship might have been and what it has yet to become.  That their challenge 
was not consistently reflected in U.S. institutions and civic practices does not diminish its power; 
rather, black theories of citizenship persist in their urgent call for citizens to engage actively 
within others in a spirit of common humanity and mutual aid, and they reveal the degree to 
which citizenship on these terms can be a radically imaginative process. 
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autocrat of the West Broadway drug shop,” and Smith’s purportedly arguing that for Garnet and his supporters, 
“next to God is the white man.”  See for instance, James McCune Smith, “Emigration,” Weekly Anglo-African, 
January 5, 1861 2 no.25 (77); “A Note from Mr. Garnet, on the proper mode of treating jealous, and unscrupulous 
slanders and false witness,” Weekly Anglo-African, January 12, 1861 2 no. 26 (78); “Mr. Garnet’s Reply to Dr. 
James M’Cune Smith,” Weekly Anglo-African January 19, 1861, 2 no. 27 (79); “The Emigration Question:  Letters 
from the People” January 26, 1861, February 2, 1861, February 16, 1861, and February 23 1861; and “Dr. Delany’s 
Letter to Rev. J. T. Holly,” February 2, 1861.  2 no. 29 (81).  See also Pease and Pease, They Who Would Be Free, 
296. 
16 Peterson makes this connection in her own analysis of sympathy in “Fancy Sketches,” arguing, “The 
feeling subject identifies with the suffering object in order to understand his (or her) plight and come to his (or her) 
aid” in a spirit of  “‘congeniality’” that acknowledges “relationships of interdependence and mutuality.”  See 
Peterson, “Literary Transnationalism,” 198. 
17 “Chit Chat,” 340. 
18 “Zombi, or Fancy Sketches,” Anglo-African Magazine 2 no. 2 (February 1860) 35. 
19 “Home Influences, and Negro Courage, or Fancy Sketches. No. III,” 11.  As Pease and Pease observe, by 
1860 such lists and the call for free black citizens to find inspiration in them was “commonplace.”  See Pease and 
Pease, 237. 
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20 See Peterson, 202.  Peterson suggests that Robert Southey’s History of Brazil (1821) was most likely the 
source for Watkins’s account of the Palmares. 
21 “Zombi, or Fancy Sketches.  Number IV,” AAM. 2.2 February 1860, 36. 
22 Ibid.  
23 “Zombi,” 35.  See Peterson, “Literary Transnationalism,” 196-197. 
 24 Peterson, “Literary Transnationalism, 196-197. 
25 “Home Influences,” AAM (January 1860), 10. 
26 “Home Influences,” Anglo-African Magazine vol. 2 (January 1860):  11. 
27 See Peterson, 206; Holly, “Thoughts on Hayti,” Anglo-African Magazine (September 1859), 299.   
28 “Zombi,” 36. 
29 Watkins’s connections to classical mythology and history have become much clearer to me thanks to 
conversations with Nicole Spigner. 
30 “Home Influences, and Negro Courage, or Fancy Sketches,” Anglo-African Magazine 2 (February 1860):  
10.  
31 “An Appeal for the Philadelphia Rescuers” in A Brighter Coming Day:  A Frances Ellen Watkins Reader, 
ed. Frances Smith Foster (New York:  Feminist Press, 1990), 52. 
32 Ibid., 36-37. 
33 As Peterson has argued, Jane’s sketches “blur the lines between public an domestic spheres, and 
challenge traditional views of men and women’s proper spaces” in a way that also allows for a more capacious 
definition of revolutionary work (197). 
 34 As Houston Baker has observed in I Don’t Hate the South, “American identity formation and citizenship 
entitlements have always been projects situated as resolutely in the library as in the bivouacs of Valley Forge, and 
often, perhaps, more healthily and democratically situated in the Library of Congress than in the halls of Congress.”  
See Baker, I Don’t Hate the South (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 27; and C. Douglas Lummis, 
Radical Democracy (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1996). 
35 For Peterson, “these seemingly trivial sketches are in fact the exact opposite; they raise fundamental 
questions about social value, political strategy, and literary composition of vital interest to free blacks in the 
antebellum North.” See Peterson, “Literary Transnationalism,” 190 and196-197. 
36 On the role of the black press in cultivating its own particular mode of reading, see Ernest, Liberation 
Historiography 297.  As Ernest’s reading of the black press reveals, even as editors and writers filled the pages of 
their periodicals with the building blocks of revolution, they also needed to promote within their target communities 
“an African American mode of reading” receptive to their message and calibrated to read the “text” of history 
through the same lens.   
37 “The Triumph of Freedom—A Dream,” 115-116. 
38 Ibid. 116. 
39 Ibid., 116. 
40 Ibid., 117. 
41 Ibid., 117. 
42 As Jane and William Pease observe, “as the condition of freemen became even more precarious, more of 
them extended approval to past revolts and encouragement to future ones.”  See Jane H. Pease and William H. 
Pease, They Who Would Be Free: Blacks’ Search for Freedom, 1830–1861 (New York: Athenaeum, 1974), 240. 
43 In one of the few essays that treats “Triumph” at any length, Michael Stancliff has described the narrative 
as “a republican allegory of the abolitionist moment” that “serves as a brief history of abolitionist rhetoric, a 
figuration of its providential import and its place in the progress of the republic.”  See Stancliff, 34-35. 
44 See Melba Joyce Boyd, Discarded Legacy: Politics and Poetics in the Life of Frances E.W. Harper, 
1825-1911 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994), 86-87. 
45 “To John Brown” November 25, 1859 in Frances Smith Foster ed. A Brighter Coming Day, 49-50. 
46 “Miss Watkins and the Constitution” in Frances Smith Foster ed., A Brighter Coming Day, 47-48. 
47 Ephesians 6:12, KJV. 
48 “I Have a Right to Do My Share,” in Foster ed. Brighter Day, 47.  Frederick Douglass similarly posits in 
1850, “the humblest may stand forth and be excused for opposing even his weakness to the torrent of evil.”  
Douglass, “Lecture on Slavery, No. 1, delivered in Corinthian Hall, Rochester, N.Y., on Sunday evening, December 
1, 1850) in Frederick Douglass:  Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. Philip S. Foner (Chicago:  Lawrence Hill 
Books, 1999), 164.  See also Jacqueline Bacon’s discussion of how this passage initially positions Douglass as 
among the “humble” and weak only to invert the hierarchical assumptions of his audience and society more 
 277 
                                                                                                                                                       
generally.  Bacon usefully connects the passage to a “dual tendencies within Christ’s teachings[,] which refer to both 
submission and liberation,” and which authorize a more radical approach to politics generated from those who 
occupy the humblest positions.  Bacon, The Humblest May Stand Forth:  Rhetoric, Empowerment, and Abolition 
(Columbia:  University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 66-68. 
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